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THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA

General editors

DENIS TWITCHETT and JOHN K. FAIRBANK

Volume 10

Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part 1

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Volume 10
Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part I

edited by
JOHN K. FAIRBANK



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GENERAL EDITORS' PREFACE

In the English-speaking world, the Cambridge histories have since the beginning of the century set the pattern for multi-volume works of history, with chapters written by experts on a particular topic, and unified by the guiding hand of volume editors of senior standing. *The Cambridge Modern History*, planned by Lord Acton, appeared in sixteen volumes between 1902 and 1912. It was followed by *The Cambridge Ancient History*, *The Cambridge Medieval History*, *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, and Cambridge Histories of India, of Poland, and of the British Empire. The original *Modern History* has now been replaced by *The New Cambridge Modern History* in twelve volumes, and *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe* is now being completed. Other Cambridge Histories recently undertaken include a history of Islam, of Arabic literature, of the Bible treated as a central document of and influence on Western civilization, and of Iran and China.

In the case of China, Western historians face a special problem. The history of Chinese civilization is more extensive and complex than that of any single Western nation, and only slightly less ramified than the history of European civilization as a whole. The Chinese historical record is immensely detailed and extensive, and Chinese historical scholarship has been highly developed and sophisticated for many centuries. Yet until recent decades the study of China in the West, despite the important pioneer work of European sinologists, had hardly progressed beyond the translation of some few classical historical texts, and the outline history of the major dynasties and their institutions.

Recently Western scholars have drawn more fully upon the rich traditions of historical scholarship in China and also in Japan, and greatly advanced both our detailed knowledge of past events and institutions, and also our critical understanding of traditional historiography. In addition, the present generation of Western historians of China can also draw upon the new outlooks and techniques of modern Western historical scholarship, and upon recent developments in the social sciences, while continuing to build upon the solid foundations of rapidly pro-

gressing European, Japanese and Chinese sinological studies. Recent historical events, too, have given prominence to new problems, while throwing into question many older conceptions. Under these multiple impacts the Western revolution in Chinese studies is steadily gathering momentum.

When *The Cambridge History of China* was first planned in 1966, the aim was to provide a substantial account of the history of China as a benchmark for the Western history-reading public: an account of the current state of knowledge in six volumes. Since then the out-pouring of current research, the application of new methods, and the extension of scholarship into new fields, have further stimulated Chinese historical studies. This growth is indicated by the fact that the History has now become a planned fourteen volumes, which exclude the earliest pre-dynastic period, and must still leave aside such topics as the history of art and of literature, many aspects of economics and technology, and all the riches of local history.

The striking advances in our knowledge of China's past over the last decade will continue and accelerate. Western historians of this great and complex subject are justified in their efforts by the needs of their own peoples for greater and deeper understanding of China. Chinese history belongs to the world, not only as a right and necessity, but also as a subject of compelling interest.

JOHN K. FAIRBANK
DENIS TWITCHETT

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
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PREFACE TO VOLUME 10

Historians writing about the late Ch'ing period for an English-reading audience have no choice in selecting a system of romanization of Chinese into English. The Wade–Giles system with its unfortunate use of the apostrophe is no doubt less simple and efficient than the new *pinyin* system of the People's Republic of China, but it is still the system used in nearly every reference work on China now available to a reader of English. From the corpus of dictionaries, bibliographies, biographical dictionaries, place-name gazetteers, maps and other research aids, the Wade–Giles system has permeated the Western literature on China too deeply to be substituted. We use it here.

However, as we ponder differences such as that between *chiang* and *ch'iang* (wondering, for example, if *chiang* is actually *ch'iang* with the apostrophe omitted by error), we should not blame our discomfort entirely on Sir Thomas Wade. Other cooks than he also contributed to our mess of romanized pottage. Nineteenth-century China's dialectical differences were reflected in the Imperial Post Office romanization which is generally used for *major* place names. Thus we spell the province Kiangsi, as in the *Postal Atlas of China*, not Chiang-hsi as it would be in Wade–Giles – *except* that our Bibliography follows Wade–Giles, and the gazetteer of Kiangsi will be found under Chiang-hsi, naturally.

To this place-name ambivalence (is Wade–Giles' Chiu-chiang such a major place that we should romanize its name by the Post Office's Kiukiang?), there is added only the unpredictable capacity of great men for lexicographical deviation. In this volume only the master comprador Tong King-sing (whose name sounded like that) seems to have beaten the system, as Sun Yat-sen will do in the next volume.

Works cited in footnotes with minimal data will be found listed alphabetically with full data in the Bibliography, which is divided into two sections. All entries with transliterated titles and Chinese and Japanese characters are listed in one section, and the remaining works in the other. We have avoided the constant repetition of p. and pp. The notation 2.27 refers to page 27 of volume 2 (in Western or modern-bound books) or *chüan* (of traditional Chinese works).

Places mentioned in the text are as far as possible shown on one or more maps; page numbers of such maps are in italics in the Index.

Acknowledgements

A *Cambridge History* is meant to be indebted to every significant contributor to its field. Our footnotes indicate the range of our debts inadequately yet they can hardly be otherwise expressed. We deeply regret the death of one of our contributors to this volume, the late Ting-yee Kuo, who was the first Director of the Institute of Modern History at Taipei.

JKF

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE OLD ORDER

HISTORY AND CHINA'S REVOLUTION

The history of modern China – what is now thought to have happened there – is full of controversy. Major events are known but their significance is disputed. Meanwhile many minor events remain unknown or disregarded.

The first cause of controversy is widespread historical ignorance due to the lack of a generally accepted body of research and writing in this under-developed field. I say 'historical ignorance' because the task of history is to understand the circumstances, motives and actions of *all* parties concerned, and an unbalanced knowledge, of one side only, may leave us still quite ignorant of the other side in a conflict, and therefore less able to comprehend it.

For example, British documents on the Opium War of 1840–2 were published extensively at the time, but Chinese documents not until ninety years later, in 1932. Moreover, the documents of both sides give primarily official points of view; the wartime experience of ordinary Chinese people was less well recorded and has been less studied. Even this seemingly well known event is still imperfectly understood. For instance, how far were Chinese local people merely passive spectators of Anglo-Ch'ing hostilities? How far were they moved to patriotic resistance? Opinions and instances differ.

A second cause of controversy is the broad cultural gap that separated the major historical protagonists – not only the cultural differences in language, thought, and values between the foreign invaders of China and the resistant Chinese ruling class in the nineteenth century, but also the similar differences between that ruling class and the great mass of the Chinese people, once they became revolutionary in the twentieth century. In short, China's modern history records two great dramas – first, the cultural confrontation between the expanding Western civilization of international trade and warfare, and the persistent Chinese civilization of agriculture and bureaucracy; and second, arising out of the first,

the fundamental transformation of China in the greatest of all revolutions.

These vast movements of conflict and change – between China and the outside world, between China old and new – have produced distinct points of view in the historical record and among historians. Most obvious to Western historians is the Victorian view of the world with which the British, French and American expansionists set up the unequal treaty system in the mid-nineteenth century. They believed in the nation state, the rule of law, the benefits of individual rights, Christianity and scientific technology, and the use of warfare in the service of progress.

Similarly identifiable is the old Chinese ruling-class view of the world which believed in the classical Confucian teachings and the universal supremacy of the Son of Heaven, who maintained his rule by the edifying example of his virtuous conduct at the top of a harmonious social order of hierarchy and status. In this *ancien régime* the classical learning tolerated only change-within-tradition, the extended family system dominated the individual, a doctrine of duty eclipsed any doctrine of rights, civil administrators controlled the military and used the merchants, and the principles of moral conduct took precedence over human passions, material profit, and the letter of the law. Truly, two civilizations stood embattled.

As the more ancient and less rapidly changing civilization gradually gave way before the more modern and dynamic, a pioneer generation of Chinese scholars and administrators pursued goals of reform, gradually working out a new view of the world and of China's place in it. This new view, in an era of collapse, inevitably lacked the unity of its predecessor. Confusion of ideas grew as central authority declined, and only in the mid-twentieth century could a new historical orthodoxy become established through the application of Marxism-Leninism to China in the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

As the great Chinese revolution continues to unfold, the Maoist view of history will continue to evolve; so also will Western, Japanese and other outsiders' views, and a degree of convergence between them is to be expected. Nevertheless, present-day ideas of what has happened in modern China, how and why, will continue to be highly controversial. The contrast between Chinese and foreign, Confucian and Victorian, views of history in the nineteenth century has been succeeded by a conflict of various views today. The fact that these latter views share much more common ground as to the nature of modern history may only sharpen the controversies that arise between them. But the continuing struggle of ideas in the effort to understand the past origins of the present can only strengthen, in the end, the common bonds of understanding among peoples.

Although the foci of historical concern shift about from generation to generation, in the case of modern China certain unresolved problems of interpretation seem likely to pre-empt attention for some time to come. One major problem of interpretation is the degree and nature of foreign influence. Foreign activity in China increased markedly during the nineteenth century, becoming steadily more influential and pervasive and eventually contributing to a metamorphosis of Chinese life from top to bottom. Yet the process of foreign impact and Chinese response began gradually, almost imperceptibly. The perception of this process has developed through a succession of phases with increasing intensity and sophistication.

In the first phase it was recognized by observers both foreign and Chinese that the old agrarian-bureaucratic empire of China was no match for the expanding British and other empires of international trade and gunboats. The tempo of foreign aggression on China steadily accelerated. The Opium War of 1840–2 was followed within fifteen years by the Anglo-French invasion of 1857–60, within another decade or so by Russia's occupation of Ili in 1871 and Japan's take-over of Liu-ch'iu in 1874, and within still another decade by the Sino-French war of 1883–5. Nine years later came the smashing Japanese victory over China in 1894–5, followed by the Scramble for Concessions of 1898 and the Boxer War of 1900. These dramatic disasters were accompanied by a less tangible but more far-reaching collapse of China's traditional self-image, her Sino-centric view of the world.

In retrospect, China's nineteenth-century experience therefore became a stark tragedy, an unforeseen and certainly enormous decline and fall almost without equal in history. This tragedy was the more bitter because it was so gradual, inexorable, and complete. The old order fought a rear-guard action, giving ground slowly but always against greater odds, each disaster followed by a greater, until one by one China's asserted superiority over foreigners, the central power of the emperor at Peking, the reigning Confucian orthodoxy, and the ruling elite of scholar-officials were each in turn undermined and destroyed.

A second perception gained ground among Chinese revolutionaries of the early twentieth century, who found themselves in a different world, as nationalists in an expanded international world of nationalisms. Under imperialist pressure the *ancien régime* of the Ch'ing dynasty in China had taken on during the late nineteenth century an increasing burden of foreign special privilege. This had been indexed in the steady expansion of the unequal treaty system: the increase in the number of treaty ports from five in 1842 to about fifty in 1911; the extension of extraterritorial

consular jurisdiction over treaty-power nationals, their property, trade and industry; the expansion of foreign shipping in Chinese waters from gunboats on the coast to steamship lines on main rivers; the employment of foreign administrators not only in the maritime customs but also in some native customs, post office and salt revenue administrations; the spread of missionary work into every province and into the fields of education and medicine; and a multitude of other features like foreign garrisons in Peking after 1900 and pre-emption of customs revenues after 1911 to pay off foreign loans and indemnities. All this represented the special influence in Chinese life of people from outside the country. For modern nationalists, what could be more provocative of patriot indignation? More and more, from the period of World War I, this foreign invasion was called 'imperialism', and imperialism was seen as a humiliation that must be wiped out.

Another perception accompanied this view: that imperialism in China had been facilitated by Chinese weakness, not merely in military terms but in moral terms – in a lack of patriotic devotion, manifested in working for foreigners and profiting with them from the vicious traffic in opium or in coolies as well as from the evils of industrial exploitation of labour in port cities. Moral degeneracy was equally evident in warlord particularism, landlord selfishness, family-first nepotism. Most of all China's weakness had inhered in the old ruling-class strata – the alien Manchu court, the out-of-date officials trained in ancient classics, the literati whose prerogatives let them monopolize higher learning and culture, the landlords who exploited impoverished tenants. All this complex of institutions and practices could be summed up under 'feudalism'.

In this way China's nineteenth-century disaster was perceived in the twentieth century under twin headings of feudalism and imperialism. These terms and the explication of them by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao have been used in the People's Republic to describe China's modern history. In a vast land still overwhelmingly agrarian, still mindful of the Japanese aggression of the 1930s and 1940s, the native ruling class and foreign invasion stand out as the two major evils inherited from the past and still to be combated today.

The concept of imperialism has been expanded during its use in China. The role of imperialism as seen in retrospect has grown steadily since the 1920s in the thinking of both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. It is built into the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Imperialism was at work from the Opium War onward, long before the rise of the Leninist type of finance-capitalist imperialism in the 1890s. Maoist imperialism not only goes further back in time to include the wars and gunboat diplomacy

of the era of commercial expansion in the early Victorian age; it also expands the scope of imperialism to include nearly all forms of foreign contact in the nineteenth century, including Christian missions as cultural imperialism. Since the often-aggressive expansion of Western activities is plain in the record, historians generally feel justified in the broad conclusion that the Chinese people were invaded, exploited and victimized by imperialism. This can hardly be disputed as a generalization. The aggressive expansion of Europe and its latter-day offshoots is a major fact of modern world history.

The studies in this volume, however, are committed to being past-minded as well as present-minded, and therefore to reconstructing the views, motives and historical understanding of people at the time when events occurred. Since China's historical consciousness has changed in the process of revolution, it is imperative to understand the Chinese self-image under the old order as well as the conditions of life then. Such an investigation, once undertaken, begins to fill out the picture of imperialism. From a unilateral force which overwhelms China from the outside, it becomes a result of interaction, and as this interaction between China and the outside world is studied further, imperialism as a generality breaks down into a variety of factors and circumstances.

It appears first that Chinese society was enormous in mass and extremely various in its local conditions. Because of its size, it was less easily influenced from abroad, and the reactions to foreign contact were diverse and separated rather than uniform and concentrated. In general, China was remarkably self-sufficient: first of all in foreign trade, which remained a comparatively unimportant part of the economy. In the second place, the Ch'ing empire, by its conquest of Ili in the 1750s and its successful dealings with the Russians at Kiakhta and the British at Canton, had established a seemingly strong defensive position militarily. Finally, the ideology of imperial Confucianism under the Ch'ing was almost impervious to the acceptance of foreign political concepts. All these factors made for a remarkable self-sufficiency. But still another historical tradition also made China unresponsive to foreign aggression – this was the tradition of barbarian invasion and the absorption or neutralization of the barbarians in the vastness of China's society and culture. For this reason, imperial Confucianism had become a supranationalistic system which could not easily appreciate the sentiments of nationalists from outside countries.

In this way the picture emerges of a Chinese state and society which, in the early 1800s, was self-sufficiently absorbed in its own domestic life and not capable of quick reaction to a Western invasion. The subsequent

Chinese interaction with the invaders did not meet the foreign system on its own terms. The Ch'ing dynasty, for example, was not primarily concerned with foreign trade and investment as functions important to the state. The Ch'ing regime was mainly concerned with preserving the agrarian social order over which it presided, and from which it derived its main sustenance. Foreign relations were a marginal concern. It was at first assumed that Westerners could, in fact, be taken marginally into the Chinese polity and social order and be permitted to function on its periphery, as other foreigners had done in the past.

As a result of these conditions of size, self-sufficiency, unresponsiveness and lack of concern among the ruling class, the Ch'ing empire was ill-prepared for Western contact. Put in more positive terms, when this contact materialized in modern times, one clue to China's collapse lay in the very success which China's civilization had achieved in pre-modern times. To understand the collapse one must appreciate the earlier success, for it had been so great that China's leaders were unprepared for disaster. As the reformer Liang Ch'i-ch'ao put it as late as 1896, 'Here is a big mansion which has lasted a thousand years. . . . It is still a magnificently big thing, but when wind and rain suddenly come up, its fall is foredoomed. Yet the people in the house are still happily playing or soundly sleeping . . . quite indifferent.'¹

THE OLD SOCIETY

Another set of unresolved problems of interpretation concerns the traditional society – its social structure, the administrative institutions and ideology of its government and its economic growth. One widely held assumption is that this traditional society had created such an effective and balanced structure of ideas and practices that an innovative response to Western contact was difficult. In this view China's 'maturity' was evidenced in her stability, her capacity to maintain a steady state almost like the homeostasis of physiology. To put it another way, the accumulation of vested interests was so great as to inhibit change. The result was a tremendous inertia or persistence in established ways, a tendency to change only within tradition. This notion of China's inertial momentum and non-responsiveness is supported also by the concept of the autonomy of culture – that Chinese ways were different, mutually reinforcing, and therefore resistant to outside stimuli.

Broad conceptions of this sort may of course merely substitute for

¹ Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, *Yin-ping-shih bo-chi*, 1.2, trans. in Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's response to the West*, 155.



MAP 2. China proper in the nineteenth century

thought. No doubt they display the degree of our present ignorance. Yet if history is to give understanding to non-historians, it must use general ideas. The essential prerequisite for generalizing is a factual picture of the Chinese state and society, including its general conditions and institutional practices, about 1800. At this time China's population was over 300 million, almost double that of Europe including Russia, and it is safe to say that her home market and domestic trade were also far greater than those of Europe.

The inertial momentum of China's social order was evident in the early nineteenth century at every level – among the common people in the peasant villages and market towns, among the dominant big families of the local elite or 'gentry', in the layers of imperial administration rising from the local magistracies all the way up to the court at Peking, and in the monarchy at the top of the human scene. This Chinese world (*t'ien-hsia*, 'all under heaven') was considered to be, and to a large extent was, remarkably unified, homogeneous and long-lasting.

The unity of the empire had been the first great achievement of Chinese civilization and it remained a major concern, for unity meant peace. And yet the mere size and diversity of the empire often made for disunity. The eighteen provinces were divided by nature into a number of discrete and clearly marked regions, each comparatively self-sufficient. The central Taiyuan plain and Fen river valley of Shansi province, for example, were bounded on two sides by mountains and on two sides by the Yellow River. The great irrigated basin of Szechwan was ringed by mountains and communicated with the rest of China mainly through the Yangtze gorges. Yunnan province in the south-west was a plateau not in easy touch with the rest of the country. The great rice baskets of the Canton delta, the Yangtze delta, and Hunan and Hupei provinces each provided a base for local power. South Manchuria, as foreigners have called it in the twentieth century, or in Chinese terms of 1800 Liao-tung, was another power base where the Ch'ing dynasty of the Manchus had built up its strength before taking over south of the Wall in 1644.

Moreover, China stretched so far from north to south that the climatic difference created contrasting ways of life in the two regions. In the south and south-east, the heavy monsoon rainfall in summer facilitated double-cropping of rice. In contrast, the sparseness and unpredictability of rainfall on the north-western Great Wall frontier left people there constantly in danger of famine. The dry farmers in the north could live in houses of tamped earth walls or simple sun-baked brick with thatched roofs, while the wet farmers of the south had to use kiln-baked brick and tile roofs. They also wore straw sandals or clogs instead of cloth shoes, and broad plaited hats against rain and sun rather than the fur-covered caps of the

north with ear flaps against winter cold. Much transport in the south was on waterways or, alternatively, on stone-paved paths not adequate for wheeled vehicles. Carrying poles, barrows and donkeys were universal, but the typical north China transport was by two-wheeled cart along dusty roads, frequently sunk several feet down into the loess soil scoured out by the wind. Most striking was the scenic contrast between the broad north China plain, dotted by walled villages that could defend themselves against cavalry raiders, and the typical hill country of south China where cavalry were useless and farmsteads might be more widely scattered in smaller units amid a lush cover of trees and vegetation. Since irrigated rice culture was far more productive than dry cereal farming, south China had a higher per capita food supply and more landlordism and tenancy among farmers.²

The gradual spread of Chinese civilization, with its characteristic features of intensive agriculture, tightly-organized family life, and bureaucratic administration, had given an underlying homogeneity to the whole country north and south, east and west. Perhaps this homogeneity was greater in the minds of the ruling elite than a sociologist would have found it to be in fact. Nevertheless, it was generally assumed. Like political unity, cultural homogeneity was one of China's great social myths, demonstrating the universality of the Confucian way of life. Consequently, regional differences and the forms of localism have not yet been much studied, for it had always been and still is the fashion to discuss the vast land of China as a unit.

The sense of unity and homogeneity had been fostered by the extraordinary continuity of the Chinese way of life, which came down undisrupted from neolithic times before the dawn of history. Hoe agriculture by family groups in settled villages had emerged by the fifth millennium BC in the Wei valley near the great bend of the Yellow River (as at the site of Pan-p'o outside Sian). Despite occasional invasions of warrior-rulers, Chinese village life had evolved steadily from that time with a continuity seemingly unbroken by sudden changes, either social or technological. The maintenance of peace and order among the village communities had been the special concern of China's equally ancient ruling class. Under successive dynasties it had gradually created complex institutions of bureaucratic government. Until after 1800 the agrarian-bureaucratic empire of China thus preserved a social order more ancient than, and very different from, the commercial-military society of Europe.

² Of the notable series of Western geographers who described the terrain and ecology of China in the century before 1949, one of the most widely travelled was George B. Cressey, whose two general descriptions still have visual introductory value: *China's geographic foundations* (1934), *Land of the 500 million* (1955).

The individual's prowess and aggressiveness, including his use of violence, had not been fostered in China's agrarian communities as much as in the seafaring, warfare, exploration and overseas emigration of the Europeans.

By 1800 we may assume that the ordinary peasants, who formed at least four-fifths of the population, were cultured individuals in the sense that they were well-schooled in the bonds of kinship, the duties of status, and the forms of politeness and social deportment, but generally illiterate or only semi-literate. Consequently their lives were less devoted to Confucian rationalism than to the lore, superstitions and Taoist-Buddhist religious observances of the folk culture. As farmers, most of them lived close to nature. They were accustomed to nature's beauties but also suffered from epidemic diseases, for example, the prevalence of eye and skin ailments and intestinal parasites. As commoners, they were well aware of the ruling elite and its prerogatives, but they saw little of it directly and were chiefly absorbed in their own village-and-market-centre community.

The usual village, perhaps one hundred households, was below the market level and not self-sufficient. Its real community centred on the market town, which was, of course, within walking distance not more than two or three miles away, so that a family member might go there and return on a periodic market day. The schedule of markets in one town, say on the third, sixth and eighth days of the ten-day cycle, would be integrated with the schedules of the adjacent towns, which might have their markets on the second, fourth, seventh and ninth days, or the third, fifth, eighth and tenth days of the cycle. In this way itinerant pedlars and merchants who operated out of a still larger market centre, could make the rounds of the market towns in its region. The lowest level or standard market town was usually surrounded by a dozen or eighteen villages, totaling perhaps fifteen hundred households or seven thousand people. From one of these village households an able-bodied male through the years might visit the market town a thousand times, and thus in its tea houses, its local temple or its occasional fairs and holiday celebrations have an opportunity to meet a large proportion of his market community.

The basis of this community was not only economic – to exchange surplus farm or handicraft products so as to secure paper, iron implements, ceramic-ware or other imports – but also social. Since many villages were dominated by one kinship group, the rule of exogamous marriage led families to seek brides in other villages, usually through market town matchmakers. A secret society lodge, if present, would normally be centred in the market town, and there also the peasant would meet any local members of the ruling class or representatives of officialdom.³

³ G. W. Skinner, 'Marketing and social structure in rural China', *JAS*, 24.1 (1964).

In this peasant society, the individual depended upon his own kinship group for his livelihood and for the security provided in modern societies through insurance, as well as for education, recreation and major social contact. From infancy he was trained to observe the proper familial relationships, especially filial piety. The three bonds (*san-kang*) of the classical teaching were authoritarian, enjoining obedience to parents, subordination of wives to husbands, and loyalty of subject to ruler. But the hierarchy of status within the nuclear family was only part of the kinship network that extended out into the common descent group or lineage with which most families were connected.

The lineage (also called 'clan') was an autonomous organization that cut across class lines, often including the impoverished and incompetent at one extreme and those who had achieved elite status at the other. A lineage organization usually maintained its own temple and sacrifices to its ancestors as a religious ritual. It normally arranged marriages and might set up schools for the education of talented children. It strove to keep law and order among its members and prevent their conflicts developing into lawsuits entangled with officialdom. For the same reason its authority might undertake to ensure tax payments from its members. In time of disorder it might even organize local militia for defence. The lineage's position was recognized in Ch'ing law, which generally upheld the authority of elders and meted out punishments according to kinship status. Thus the state gave legal support to the family structure as an obvious way to maintain the social order.

The full import of this subordination of individual to family is not easy for us to comprehend today. So absolute were the paternal authority and the virtue of filial obedience that a son who disobeyed parental instructions could be punished and even killed by his father with legal impunity unless the killing were held 'inhuman'. Alternatively, parents could ask the authorities to punish or even banish an unfilial son. 'Scolding or beating a parent or visiting any kind of physical harm upon him carried the death sentence.'⁴

Deference to superiors within his kinship group prepared the peasant commoner to defer to his betters in the upper class. At the top of the market community were members of the local elite or *shen-shih*, a term generally translated as 'gentry', although its meaning is ambiguous. Max Weber's influential analysis of Chinese society, made during World War I when modern studies had hardly begun, stressed the role of the literati as key functionaries in the Chinese state and social order. More recent work has built up the picture of these examination graduates, at their various

⁴ T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, *Law and society in traditional China*, 28.

levels in the official hierarchy of degree holders. At the same time, other studies have stressed the key role of landlords in a land-hungry, agrarian society which by 1800 was feeling the strain of rapid population growth. There have thus been two approaches to understanding the role of the local elite which dominated the rural scene. One approach is socio-political and one economic. While these two approaches have sometimes created controversies of interpretation, perhaps it is not impossible to harmonize them if we look at each in turn.

The bulk of the degree holders in the early nineteenth century were licentiates (*sheng-yüan*) who had passed the prefectural level of examination or else licentiates-by-purchase (*chien-sheng*) who had secured the equivalent status by money payments. The total of both groups together has been estimated at about 1,100,000 persons. The proportion between them was generally two to one, that is, a third of these first-level degree holders secured that status by making contributions to the government funds at established rates. Another group secured their degree status by recommendation of higher officials but they constituted only a small proportion. Thus the triennial classical examinations offered the main opportunity for talent.

Degree status, of course, did not in itself confer office. The passing of further examinations, the securing of recommendations, and finally, specific appointment were all necessary for one's entrance into official life. A man who became a licentiate at age twenty-four might normally expect to pass the provincial examination and become a 'recommended man' (*chü-jen*) at age thirty-one and pass the metropolitan examination to become a 'presented scholar' (*chin-shih*) about age thirty-five, if he got that far. The degree holders thus formed a sharp pyramid. There were only about 2,000 primary administrative posts in the empire outside the capital, plus another 1,500 posts for educational officials; the whole civil bureaucracy totalled on the statute books only about 20,000 civil officials plus about 7,000 military. This sparseness of the official class in power was paralleled by the small numbers of qualified degree holders likely to be extant at any one time: provincial graduates would total about 18,000, metropolitan graduates about 2,500, and the prestigious members of the Hanlin Academy at Peking about 650. Truly the office holders were a picked group. This has led to the view that the first-level degree holders, more than a million strong, should be regarded as 'scholar-commoners', a transitional group who had achieved exemption from labour service, for example, but had not yet established themselves actually in the official class. These so-called 'lower gentry' were the local literati who might be available for tutoring, teaching, clerking and other forms of respectable

long-gown activity. It was the restricted number of the higher degree holders or 'higher gentry' who formed the immediate reservoir for officialdom and interpenetrated it as a functional group.

In the local community, the lower gentry and any higher gentry who might be present performed many functions of leadership. They commonly superintended public works to keep up bridges, ferries, walls and temples, supported schools and academies, sponsored and printed local gazetteers, and participated in local sacrifices and Confucian rituals. They might also confront local disaster by organizing relief for refugees, the homeless, aged and destitute; and in time of disorder, they might with imperial approval finance, recruit and even lead militia forces. In all such activities, the local elite provided both financial means and personal leadership, making use of their prestige among the populace and their access to official circles, as well as their knowledge of the Confucian code of conduct and local administration. They formed an underpinning to the magistrate and the official regime which it could not do without. In return the local elite, especially the upper gentry, commonly protected their economic position through their official contacts, since the state system provided no effective legal immunities to protect private property from official exactions or even seizure. Their prerogatives of influence with officialdom and freedom from manual labour or corporal punishment were jealously preserved. Gentry status was symbolized by the gentry style of life – the long gown and long fingernails, literacy and leisure for aesthetic enjoyment, civility and etiquette, a life apart from the common mass. In times of stability this local elite or ruling class had a strong self-consciousness and cohesion. Its ideal was that of the extended family residing in its big house with courtyards for several generations and many servants all within one compound.⁵

One way to reconcile the roles of the gentry as socio-political functionaries and as landlords is to recognize the distinction between the individual and the family. In brief, degrees by their nature could be held only by individuals whereas property was held and passed on in families. The important non-economic functions of the literati just described were performed by individuals who were also members of families, in a society in which landlordism, especially in south China, was tied in with familism. Since property was to be protected less by legal safeguards than by official contacts, scholar-gentry could use their political-social status to preserve the economic position of landlord-gentry. The two functional elements, scholar-gentry and landlord-gentry, were not incompatible but mutually reinforcing, often overlapping, and sometimes identical. The local elite

⁵ See Ping-ti Ho, *The ladder of success in imperial China* and works cited therein.

in the early nineteenth century may be seen as consisting, first of all, of families who held property, principally in land, and from whom, in the second place, came the great part of the successful examination candidates. Although some degree holders made their way as individuals living by their talents and sometimes moving far up in the social scale, those who got started without the family support of early leisure for study and a tradition of scholarship at home were undoubtedly rather few.

The landlord-gentry family seems to have had a special capacity for self-perpetuation. It might marry its sons at a younger age than the peasantry. They might bring in more concubines or secondary wives and enjoy a lower rate of infant mortality so that the gentry family, with more offspring, might have more chance of producing talent among them. An established family might also diversify its human and material resources, setting up bases both in the village and in the big market town. Destitution or disorder in the countryside might leave the town part of the family intact, whereas a dynastic change or official disaster in the town might leave the country seat intact. Civil war or invasion might find family members on both sides, working opposite sides of the street. The established families of old China set great store by having many sons and maintaining the family-lineage structure. This required ostentatious display in connection with births, weddings and funerals, the cultivation of official contacts, and investment in scholarship so that sons might rise through the examinations.

The socio-political functions of individual degree holders thus went hand-in-hand with the economic functions of landlord-gentry families; no either/or choice need be made today between these two analytic bases of the local elite. Nevertheless, rival interpretations have been fostered by historical circumstances: first, the flow of degree-holders ceased with the abolition of the old examination system in 1905; subsequently landlordism or at least absenteeism apparently increased, so that the agrarian revolution of recent times has found a prime target in the 'local strongmen and oppressive gentry' (*t'u-hao lieb-shen*) who remained landlords but became more exploitative and ceased to be local community leaders. The actual working of this large-scale absentee landlord system in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been illuminated by documents showing the activities of 'landlord bursaries' (*tsu-chan*) or land management offices in the lower Yangtze region, in the era from the 1890s to the 1930s. These bursaries represented the lineages or clans that established them and might also represent other big families on a commission basis. They collected rents, paid taxes, charged fees, and employed rent collectors who lived in the countryside as well as clerks and workmen at the main

offices. They also secured the assistance of yamen underlings in their contact with tenants. A bursary's books might cover several thousand *mon* of land, on which tenants would be cultivating a great number of small and scattered plots under rent contracts which bore no date of expiration and might be inherited from father to son. Tenancies under these contracts could be bought and sold. They could be inherited and subdivided among sons or, on the contrary, concentrated by tenants who accumulated holdings themselves. While inheritable, the contracts did not create a 'legal serfdom' but permitted a degree of mobility. In general, the average rent paid by a tenant in the lower Yangtze area would be over 50 per cent of the crop, whereas the average land tax paid by his landlord would be only about 13 per cent of the amount of rent. Rent notices issued by a bursary would be delivered by rent collectors, who might be local village headmen or priests or even widows. To enforce collections, warrants might be issued from the local yamen and its runners might be used to arrest defaulters, their expenses being paid by the landlord bursary. Thus at least in this most productive region of China at the end of the nineteenth century, there was plainly a close relationship between the local authorities and the landlord lineages represented by bursary offices. Bursary clerks would list bad tenants, and magistrates through their runners would make arrests because of a common interest between state and landlord in collecting the rents from which the land tax could then be paid.⁶

The documentation of similar activities in earlier periods and other regions is less detailed. By 1800 the big households (*ta-hu*) of the Chinese countryside may have maintained some sort of balance between conscientious leadership of the community and selfish family-centred exploitation of tenants; but the proportions of this balance are still another unresolved question. Tenancy is known to have been less in the generally less productive farming areas of north and north-west China where less surplus crop could be grown, harvested, transported or marketed to urban consumers. But this may be viewed as a picture of poverty so great that landlordism could not be made to pay. Meanwhile, the incidence of peasant poverty, unrest and rebellion in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is becoming increasingly well documented. The unresolved problem how far the local elite were community leaders or exploiters in this way merges into the problem of peasant poverty and the Chinese living standard in general.

⁶ Eight articles in Japanese by the late Prof. Yuji Muramatsu are summarized by him in 'A documentary study of Chinese landlordism in late Ch'ing and early republican Kiangnan', *BSOAS*, 29.3 (1966) 566-99.

Here we confront one basic and overwhelming fact, the full implications of which have still not been worked out by historians: the Chinese population had at least doubled in the eighteenth century and this general increase continued down to 1850 although at a slower rate. The social repercussions of this increase were evidenced in many ways: the landless poor grew in number and many migrated out of crowded areas. In the places where such migrants settled, communications might remain inadequate and government administration ineffective. In newly settled areas of marginal subsistence, there naturally ensued destitution, lawlessness and rebellious movements such as that of the White Lotus. Government was in turn demoralized and Ch'ing prestige damaged (see chapter 3). Increase of rice prices, exhaustion of granary stores, government exhortations to be frugal and economize, and many other symptoms of strain are recorded in the mid-Ch'ing era.⁷

Yet population growth was by no means an unmixed disaster. It represented a great increase in the consuming public and so fostered a great growth of the domestic market economy, increasing the demand for specialized regional products. The resulting growth of trade stimulated the further organization of banking and credit and the use of new institutions – guilds and merchant associations – as well as new devices such as bills of exchange and transfer taels. In short the early modern growth of population and trade, in China as in parts of contemporary Europe, moved toward commercialization and enlarged the role of the merchant.

The vast historical record produced by scholar-officials had devoted little attention to the merchant class. As early as the Han period, trade was an important part of Chinese life, but merchants seldom succeeded in gaining independent status for themselves as a group. Quite the contrary, they remained subordinate to officialdom, obliged to secure official licences and pay official taxes while at the same time dependent on personal relations with bureaucrats to avoid being unofficially squeezed out of business. As a result of this official domination of the merchant, the Chinese written record stresses the institutions of government and the thought and literature of the scholar class, whereas personal observation of Chinese urban life from the time of the monk Ennin or Marco Polo down to the present day has usually emphasized its bustling commercial character – a real paradox!

Economic enterprise in the old China, like a political career or social life generally, was based on the family unit and depended on the cultivation of personal relationships. Thus, trade depended on the family firm,

⁷ Dwight H. Perkins, *Agricultural development in China, 1368–1968*, *passim*. Suzuki Chūsei, *Shinbō chūkiishi kenkyū*, ch. 1.

in which kinship created the essential bonds of loyalty. Individuals in a family firm bore an unlimited liability but by the same token could expect family backing in a crisis. In the absence of impersonal legal safeguards and institutions of insurance and commercial law, the principal assets of a merchant were his good name and his guarantors, but equally important was his personal relationship with official authorities from whom his firm might have to obtain a formal or informal sanction to do business. The chief defence of the commercial class against official manipulation and exploitation was merchant group solidarity. From very early times shops of one kind were situated together on a city street. Merchants in the same line flocked together by order, and by the late T'ang or Sung in their interaction with officialdom, they developed guilds.

In the lateral growth of their personal relations, merchants followed the same general practices as scholars, who developed personal bonds first vertically with their teachers, examiners and patrons to whom they were beholden. Horizontally they developed close personal relations with other scholars of the same year in the examinations, or of the same teacher, or of the same academy or school of thought. These relations created the patronage networks of scholar-official life. In the case of merchants, their vertical relations with officialdom were probably outweighed by their common bonds horizontally with others in the same line of trade or handicraft production, in other words, with their closest competitors. In particular, merchants at a distance from home developed strong ties with other traders from the same place. This became the basis for the *Landsmannschaften*, or regional associations according to native place (*t'ung-hsiang hui*). These merchant associations like the Ningpo Guild in Shanghai, or the Canton Guild in Peking, sometimes found it expedient to cater to the scholar-gentry as well. The result was a tremendous proliferation of *Landsmannschaften*, organized sometimes purely by native place and sometimes by line of trade. But until the nineteenth century these voluntary associations had seldom reached the point of consolidating merchant interests and power. Instead the guilds in their various lines of trade and representing various trading places remained fragmented each in their own bailiwick.⁸

Government had kept the merchant class under control by a variety of measures. One was government licensing in certain lines such as salt production and distribution, or mining of copper for making cash. Another was direct control, like the domination of the rice trade through the grain tribute system of shipments from the lower Yangtze to Peking, or the control of silks and ceramics from imperial manufacturies at

⁸ Ho Ping-ti, *Chung-kuo hui-kuan shih-lun* (An historical survey of *Landsmannschaften* in China).

Soochow, Hangchow or Ching-te-chen. On the whole, however, the government maintained a dominant position rather than a strict monopoly. This was accomplished basically by the principle of licensing, which brought in revenue to the government, unofficial perquisites to officials operating the system, and an official sanction and opportunity for the merchants. The principal examples that have been studied are the Cohong of Canton, and the salt merchants of Yangchow.

By about 1800 after the doubling of population in the preceding century, the growth in domestic trade can be inferred from its spillover into international channels. Beginning thus on the periphery, we may note the rapid expansion of the tea trade between the Cohong and the British East India Company at Canton, and the contemporary growth of the rice trade with Bangkok under the cover of tributary trade from Siam to China. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the tributary trade with Liu-ch'iu and thus indirectly with Japan (Satsuma) showed a similar increase, as well as Chinese trade directly to Nagasaki. The rise of the Chinese junk trade to Japan, Liu-ch'iu, Manila and south-east Asia (Nanyang) must be seen as an index to the much greater development of China's domestic coastal and riverine trade using very similar shipping. The junk trade that went from Amoy to the Nanyang was matched by the flow of Chinese shipping from Ningpo and the lower Yangtze ports to southern Manchuria. As another index of this domestic commercial growth, we know that the Grand Canal transport system by this time was a channel for a dominant and growing private trade carried on transport vessels by private merchants, in addition to the tribute rice cargoes carried

In short, it may be assumed that economic growth was under way in China on a massive scale decades before the opening up of treaty ports. The eighteenth-century population growth had been made possible only through a growth of domestic commerce, exchanging surplus produce between specialized producing-areas in the north and south. Foreign participation in the trade of China through Canton was well established after 1760, but it did not represent a foreign invasion of China so much as a point of contact between Europe's maritime trade and China's domestic continental trade. The latter indeed was often superior in volume and quality of product to the European commercial goods. China was receiving from abroad raw cotton, silver and often unsaleable woollen goods, while exporting valuable teas, silks, porcelains, lacquerware and other handicraft products. The size of this commercial growth within China before 1840 remains unmeasured. It bears directly on the similarly unresolved questions of the beginnings of a Chinese capitalism and the

disequilibrating effect of commercial growth upon society and government.

Still another unresolved question arises regarding agriculture. As population increased, we know more land was cultivated, the new marginal-soil crops (potatoes, maize, peanuts, tobacco, opium poppy, etc.) were more widely used as well as faster-ripening strains of rice, and yet agriculture also had to become more labour-intensive – that is, productivity per cultivator declined. The farming populace, working as hard as ever but confronting the law of diminishing returns, produced less surplus per capita and became more impoverished.

We cannot yet draw a balance between the technological and distributionist explanations of modern China's rural poverty. Without the modern technology of scientific farming, including chemical fertilizers, pesticides, improved crop strains, consolidated fields, storage and marketing facilities, better tools, new management and the greater capitalization all such things imply, it seems obvious that China's rural living standard could never have kept up with recent population growth. In the early nineteenth century, at any rate, the potential surplus that might have been mobilized from agriculture to modernize it was not being so mobilized.

Pre-modern agrarian technology and maldistribution of the available surplus seem to have been cognate factors that reinforced each other. China's weakness in rural productivity unfortunately coincided with the many social evils, uneconomic practices and failures of government listed in the distributionist explanation of China's economic retardation: the agricultural surplus, such as it was, got misused in many ways. Among the populace, much labour was underemployed, particularly in the north China winter. Potential savings were squandered in ostentatious displays for birthdays, marriages and funerals, which in turn produced the waste of grave mounds and the fragmentation of holdings. More important, landlord rents, usury and official taxes supported upper class parasitism, leisure and luxury consumption including much personal service. Most important, government lacked the strength, the ideas and the impulse to shatter tradition and lead toward economic development.⁹ In this volume, of course, we see more of these accumulating problems than of their solutions.

⁹ Dwight H. Perkins, ed. *China's modern economy in historical perspective*, esp. 49–84; Carl Riskin, 'Surplus and stagnation in modern China'; W. E. Willmott, ed. *Economic organization in Chinese society*.

GOVERNMENT

One mystery of the Chinese empire was its capacity to govern so large a populace with so small an official establishment. The explanation must begin with a look at how the local magistrate functioned.

A hsien (county or district) magistrate appointed from Peking came into a scene that was far from lacking in local authorities and a local power structure; his first task was to work out his relationship with the local elite. After he had had audience of the emperor in Peking, he journeyed by the official post to his county seat to take up his appointment. He might travel for a month or more by daily stages from one town to the next along the post routes. At each stop he would be received by local magistrates and housed in the post stations. When he was eventually welcomed to the yamen (or big compound of government offices, residence, jail, treasury and warehouse) in his hsien city, a magistrate would have brought with him two types of personal assistants – first, his personal servants, and second, his private secretaries, who were advisers or specialists in administration. These were known as *mu-yu* (literally, ‘tent friends’) and would be men of scholar status, usually degree holders well versed particularly in managing legal or fiscal affairs. Both his servants and his secretaries would be paid by the magistrate personally. They came with him to a strange area, for the famous ‘law of avoidance’, forbidding an official to serve in his own province, made him and his staff outsiders, probably unacquainted with the local dialect and unconnected with local interests.

In their yamen, these newcomers would find two groups – first, the body of clerks who handled the inside paperwork of the yamen and knew its files and special concerns; second, the outside ‘runners’ or police personnel who dealt with the populace on behalf of the yamen to maintain order, collect taxes, catch criminals or the like. These local members of the magistrate’s staff of course had their roots widespread in the local scene, and the magistrate’s first task was to superintend their work in his own interest. He accordingly placed his personal servants in charge of the yamen gate, to control ingress and exit, and in charge of the clerk’s procedures, to control the handling of documents. A balance might thus be struck between the imperial official coming in from outside and the indigenous apparatus through which he handled the problems of his jurisdiction.

One feature of the usual magistracy was its superficial position in a region of perhaps 200,000 or 250,000 inhabitants where the magistrate was the sole commissioned representative of the central government. The

result of this superficiality was that the magistrate could do his job only in close cooperation with the local gentry leadership. In theory his prime virtue was to be 'close' (*ch'in*) to the common people. In fact, he had to keep in close touch with the elite. Peking depended upon his cooperation with them to maintain stability. The dynasty needed to prevent the hsien administration becoming a purely pro-gentry regime and for this it was essential to keep the gentry imbued with a spirit of concern for the populace. No dynasty could provide a better government than the gentry desired. In short, the Ch'ing central government was highly centralized but extremely superficial. It prevented local autonomy but put a great responsibility on its magistrates to cooperate with the local elite. The regulations were rigid but in universal terms. They had to be applied to the local scene. Conformity to them was enjoined by fear of punishment but often had to be worked out by negotiation.

Another feature of local government was that it did not have a separate budget but was expected to operate mainly on customary fees secured from the locality and thus pay its own way. Corruption was thus built into it (at least in the modern Western sense of the term) by the custom of tax-farming. Tax revenues were expected by the government in the amount of pre-set quotas. The yamen clerks and runners both lived off their customary fees and the magistrate off his take of the local revenues, from which he both maintained his administration and made his quota payments. The Ch'ing problem was therefore not to avoid irregular exactions but rather to avoid excessive ones.

This created a government by interest groups. It was heavily weighted in favour of the local gentry, who were able to work out the best arrangements in tax payments and thus, in effect, secure regressive taxation, the rich paying proportionally less and the poor paying more. If one became sufficiently rich and well connected one might have to pay the government very little. Gentry participation in local administration, utilizing their degree status and special contacts and privileges, was hardly a form of representative government but rather a form of elitism, even when the gentry conscientiously undertook the responsibilities of paternal or benevolent rule. As a result, the equity and efficacy of Ch'ing administration depended heavily on the morale of the local populace and the self-discipline and restraint of the gentry leadership in each region.¹⁰

Still another feature of the dynastic government was thus its personal quality. The emperor was a father figure writ large. The loyalty of officials and gentry was due to him and his line in concrete personal terms, just

¹⁰ T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, *Local government in China under the Ch'ing*; John R. Watt, *The district magistrate in late imperial China*; Yeh-chien Wang, *Land taxation in imperial China, 1750-1911*.

as his magistracy over the empire was conducted through his personal acts of rule from day to day. His dynasty's ultimate claim to power stemmed from its capacity to maintain unified control over the Chinese state and society. Today the unity of China has a modern value in the language of nationalism, to maintain China as a nation among nations. But in pre-modern times, the essential value of unity was to give the Chinese people security by suppressing civil strife, local anarchy and bandit disorder. Disunity spelt disaster in the old days primarily because it meant civil war and insecurity for elite and commoners alike. Unity meant peace and therefore plenty. It was an ideal thoroughly established in the Chinese value system since the era of Warring States (403–221 BC) if not before. Peace and order sanctioned dynastic rule. They were to be achieved by the central power of a dynasty which sat on top of its territorial bureaucratic administration and beneath this level maintained local control through the loyalty of the lineage structure and gentry leadership. Such loyalty was the product of Confucianism; China's traditional polity can be understood only in Confucian terms.

The activities of government may be divided between the formal bureaucratic structure that descended territorially only to the hsien magistrate's level and the informal network of leadership and influence of gentry families in each locality. This division was evident in the resolution of conflicts. In general, the magistrate's court provided legal recourse only after informal mediation had proved ineffective. The resolution of conflicts was encouraged through the family and lineage as well as through guilds and other non-governmental agencies. The formal 'clan rules' enjoined the members of a lineage by all means to avoid law suits and settle all conflicts within the clan under the auspices of the elders, beyond the clutches of the yamen underlings. Disputes in civil law and commercial matters were thus left as far as possible under the jurisdiction of lineages, commercial guilds and other informal bodies.

The Ch'ing code listed some four thousand offences in specific terms and provided penalties for them, also in specific terms. The five gradations of punishment began with the light bamboo and then the heavy bamboo, which were prescribed for some one thousand offences. It was customary for a prescribed one hundred blows with the bamboo to be actually reduced to forty, but this would still be a serious danger to life through infection following the punishment. The third grade was penal servitude. This carried with it the heavy costs of paying fees and bribes to jailors to keep a prisoner adequately fed and cared for through their corrupt ministrations. The fourth grade was exile or banishment, either for life or for a certain distance or for military service on the frontier.

Finally, the death penalty at the top grade was prescribed for some eight hundred offences and in increasing degrees of severity, including strangling, decapitation, exposure of the corpse, and dismemberment by slicing or 'one thousand cuts'.

The Ch'ing judicial system rose upward through a territorial hierarchy of some six different levels. It began with the 1,500 hsien or counties (also called districts) and similar regions and then proceeded to the higher levels of the 180 prefectures and the 18 provinces. Thence cases went to the Board of Punishments at the capital and then to a fifth level, the three high courts. The emperor was the top level. He might confirm or reject recommendations concerning capital cases sent up from below. The system was elaborately organized and punishments were carried out with great exactitude, at least according to the record. Precedents were cited, but cases were quoted not as legally binding but only as analogies.

In practice mere matters of bambooning were usually settled at the hsien level and only reported further. While the magistrate might deal summarily with minor cases, he would have to send serious ones involving penal servitude or heavier sentences on up to his superiors with a recommended penalty. A magistrate would be guided by his legal secretary (*mu-yu*) who, however, could not be present in the court. He would be under pressure to apprehend a criminal within a certain time limit and close cases by certain deadlines. A robber, for example, must be detected within four months, and so a magistrate would set deadlines for his runners, who would be rewarded or penalized according to their performance. In his court, a magistrate could inflict judicial torture both on plaintiff and on defendant, using standard instruments for flogging, slapping the face, squeezing the fingers or ankles, and the like. Sentence could be given only according to some definite legal provision, and parties were expected to sign their confessions and sign and accept decisions. But a magistrate, in turn, was subject to severe penalties for wrong judgments and, if error was proved against him, he could be subjected to the same punishment as the wronged person.

In applying the law the magistrate was guided by both the 436 fundamental laws (*li*) of the late Ch'ing code and by the 1,900 or so supplementary cases (*li*), but the provisions of these two types of laws might be contradictory. The law was not primary nor entirely pervasive and it remained both ambiguous and uncertain. The magistrate thus had to tread warily and was not in a secure position as a judge. He also had to steer by the private interests involved in a case and reach judgments that would not result in gentry complaint through other channels to his superiors. Law was a headache for any magistrate sitting as a judge. Among the

public it was generally ruinous for all concerned. The fees paid to yamen runners might bankrupt plaintiff as well as defendant. Consequently, litigation played a rather small role in the Chinese society of the Ch'ing. Imperial edicts even urged the populace to avoid the courts rather than crowd into them. The prejudice against going to court extended to those who wrote briefs. They were condemned for fomenting litigation. The legal profession was not recognized in this land without lawyers. Most of all, the law was seen as a buttress of the personal relationships that should obtain in the family and lineage. The law expressed Confucian social norms. When they were being properly observed, recourse to law should be unnecessary.¹¹

On balance one can only conclude that traditional China at the local level was dominated by the extended family or lineage, not least because it was the main support of the hierarchic structure of roles enjoined by the classical teachings about kinship. It taught obedience to superiors, whether father or husband, gentry or official. The bureaucracy with its various devices for political control represented the ruler and sought obedience to him. But the bureaucracy played a minor role in the life of the common people, while the lineage system played the major role. In the revolution of modern times, the balance has shifted so that the bureaucracy now dominates and the family-clan has been largely broken up. But the Ch'ing state of the early 1800s can be understood only on the old basis.

The Ch'ing imperial government retained the basic three-part structure that had been established under the Ming in 1368 and later: a civil government headed by the court, where the Son of Heaven ruled as well as reigned; a military echelon that maintained order both within the Wall and on the frontiers; and a supervisory system that scrutinized the functioning of administration at all levels. Each part of this dynastic tripod had been inherited from the Ming; only certain improvements had been added by the Manchus.

In the civil administration the metropolitan government was organized in the Six Ministries (Liu-pu), which in Western parlance have been called 'boards' under the Ch'ing because Manchu and Chinese presidents and vice-presidents acted collegially at their head. This six-fold structure had come down from the T'ang and divided all kinds of administration under the categories of personnel, revenue, ceremonies, war, punishments and public works. This six-fold structure was reflected in every yamen from the provincial governments down to those of prefectures and counties. The governors of the eighteen provinces with few exceptions administered their regions jointly with governors-general who, in most

¹¹ Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, *Law in imperial China* and works cited therein.

cases, were responsible for two provinces and thus worked with two governors. As a general rule, governors under the Ch'ing were Chinese and governors-general Manchus. Each of them had his own battalion of troops for his personal security. In reporting the affairs of a province the governor-general and governor normally memorialized the emperor together. At the territorial levels of administration below them – in the circuits or *tao* consisting of two or more prefectures (*fu*), which in turn consisted of two or more counties (*hsien*), and in the fifteen hundred or so counties or similar bodies at the lowest level – the official posts were held almost entirely by Chinese.

In the military branch, remnants of the Ming garrisons (*wei* and *so*) had been made the original nuclei under the Ch'ing of the 'green battalions' or Army of the Green Standard (*lü-ying*), stationed in small posts all over the country. As the ultimate force in reserve the Manchus had added to this structure their own garrisons of banner troops. Long before their seizure of north China the Manchu nation-in-arms had been organized in combined civil and military units known as banners. Under the banner system the Manchu fighting men belonged by birth to one of eight banners and were allotted their own lands in various areas for their livelihood. To this original administrative structure had been added eight Mongol banners and eight Chinese banners. All together, the twenty-four banners could produce on demand striking forces directly loyal to the Ch'ing dynasty. Their officers were appointed by the throne and their livelihood granted by the dynasty in the form of lands or stipends. The banners had no territorial base in any single area, and the Ch'ing promotion of officers in the forces saw to it that no personally-led groupings and so no disloyalty ever appeared.

The supervisory organs were primarily represented by the Censorate, again an institution inherited from the T'ang and earlier. Censorate personnel were drawn from the regular civil service for a term of years and returned later to the main stream. They served in offices attached to the Six Boards at the capital and in fifteen circuits in the provinces, performing duties of investigation, scrutiny and impeachment of fellow officials. The censors' ancient duty of also remonstrating with the sovereign was not abandoned entirely but under the Ch'ing it took a secondary place. Certain other agencies also supervised the administration on behalf of the monarch – first of all, the dynastic family. Its princes were carefully kept out of power at court or in the provinces but might be called upon in time of need to deal with critical problems. The dynastic family was a reservoir of personnel available to assist the throne and schooled to support the succession to it. By the Ch'ing tradition, a dying monarch left his suc-

ceeding son's name in a sealed box, and his wishes had the force of ancestral law. To be sure, this had not prevented fratricide among the sons of K'ang-hsi and the suspicion that his successor, Yung-cheng, had usurped the throne (in the end, he encompassed the death of five of his brothers). Another element of surveillance was provided by eunuchs of the palace, a necessary feature of the harem, which in turn was needed to provide a large corps of sons among whom a talented successor might be found. The Ming experience of eunuch tyranny had led to strict rules among the Ch'ing against their rise to power, and they were generally kept out of government work. Instead, the Ch'ing at first found their most trusted servitors in Chinese bondservants (originally household slaves) and Chinese bannermen, who staffed many high offices in the first century of Ch'ing rule. Eunuchs, however, remained indispensable in the palace and finally had their brief day under the Empress Dowager as a woman ruler in the late nineteenth century.

Sitting on top of these three echelons – civil, military and supervisory – the emperor in his day-to-day administration dealt with a number of organs that helped preserve his power or helped him exercise it. Special offices handled the affairs of the imperial nobility and of the imperial clan and the bannermen as well as the imperial household in the palace with its eunuchs. The Imperial Household Department (Nei-wu Fu) collected very extensive revenues from a variety of sources – imperial lands, special taxes and tribute payments, including those on the Canton trade, monopolies of ginseng and furs, fines and confiscations, and the imperial kilns and silk manufactories. But these immense resources were kept secret, a special support of the Manchu dynasty, and quite separate from the revenues of the civil government.

At Peking thousands of clerks in hundreds of offices copied and filed hundreds of thousands of documents. In the course of all this scribbling and communicating, a traditional distinction had been made between the inner court and the outer court. The outer court was the formal top of the administration in the Six Boards and other high offices, including the Grand Secretariat (Nei-ko) inherited from the Ming. In the inner court were the less formal advisers and tools of the emperor – princes, empresses, concubines, eunuchs and others who assisted his administration on a personal basis, including at first certain 'inner Grand Secretaries' selected for this work and eventually the Grand Councillors (Chün-chi ta-ch'en), who were set up about 1729 as a still less formal and more efficient body, originally to handle military campaigns. Through these various means and by complex procedures the imperial will was formed and expressed, providing the top decisions of the governmental pyramid.

In the administrative process, the official post brought memorials to the emperor in person from his high officials in the provinces. The Ch'ing rulers used this system to secure intelligence from trusted officials all over the empire, who might submit special 'palace memorials' that were to be opened only by the Son of Heaven in person. Returned directly to the sender, these documents might bear instructions and moral exhortation in the imperial hand. Petitions might also come from higher-level officials or even from the populace. In return, imperial edicts were issued to settle questions or decide on proposals thus raised. These decisions in turn were sent out through the official post and, in many cases, posted outside the palace for copying and distribution to provincial centres by commercial firms in the form of the so-called *Peking Gazette*.¹²

The rule of the Son of Heaven combined the most wide-sweeping prerogatives in theory with a notable degree of superficiality in practice. The monarch dominated the top level of the society, not only the military command and the administration of civil affairs but also the national economy through monopolies like that on salt and the licensing or regulation of all large-scale economic activity. In addition, the emperor was a sage whose daily conduct set an edifying moral example. He issued ethical pronouncements and, at the same time, was a connoisseur of fine arts and exemplar of literary style. His rule was extremely personal as well as ritualistic, and in theory was all-powerful. Yet this concentration of imperial prerogatives was compensated by the superficiality of his official machinery.

Though he might dominate the top of the state and society, the emperor remained only a symbol in the daily life of the populace, who carried on their mundane affairs below the level of government attention. The emperor's officials were never present in the villages where most of the Chinese people lived. They were represented only by underlings in the market towns that were the focus of rural life. Our picture of China in the early 1800s is thus foreshortened: we know relatively more about the imperial system at the upper level and much less about life among the mass of the people. Popular Taoism and Buddhism were able to flourish in the village community because they had been compelled to remain decentralized and offered no rival network or alternative to the structure of government. The great variety of temple fairs, religious observances, holidays and festivals, was maintained by custom, with lineage support and gentry leadership but remote from official channels. This left a rough equilibrium between the powerful but thin state apparatus and the ongoing self-sufficient life of the populace.

¹² Silas H. L. Wu, *Communication and imperial control in China*.

The grand design of imperial Confucianism under the Ch'ing combined ethics with politics and fused the social order with the cosmic order. It was actually an amalgam of several Confucian and non-Confucian elements. Originally, the teachings of classical Confucianism had stressed the power of virtuous example and right conduct to influence all beholders and so keep the social hierarchy of status intact. But as early as the Former Han period, the imperial state had added to this certain elements of 'Legalism'. These included both a stress on penal law and rewards and punishments to keep the common people in order and a stress on administrative methods to guide the power-holder. Both law and method were represented by the ambiguous term '*fa*' and thus the so-called school of 'Legalists' (*fa-chia*) may also be called the school of administrators. In their view the power-holder had the prime task of using men's talents in the official system, securing the proper performance of their duties, and acting as the supreme arbiter to keep the administration functioning. A very ancient tradition thus lay behind the administrative sophistication of Ch'ing officials and the methods of 'statecraft' which they used to meet the problems of government.

In addition to this imperial amalgam of Confucianism and Legalism, another cognate set of principles in the Ch'ing state lay in its combination of bureaucratic and personal-feudal methods of organization. From very early times the Chinese empire had developed features of bureaucracy. Han emperors gave an official a fixed area of jurisdiction, a certain stipend, regular official duties, instructions by correspondence, and definite limitations on his authority, all to assure the regular and continuous performance of his tasks. This early Chinese ideal of impersonal, objective and categorized administration had rather 'modern' features. Beginning with the Ch'in unification of 221 BC, the expansion of the central power had spread this system of bureaucratic government by setting up commanderies and counties under appointed officials. Yet at the same time, a personal or personal-feudal type of administration had continued to grow along with the bureaucratic type. This was evident not only in the fact that the emperor appointed officials with an eye to their personal loyalty to himself. He also continued to grant fiefs and titles to his relatives and supporters. Each Son of Heaven maintained an aristocracy of vassals loyal to himself in person. He also continued to expect tribute and homage from them as well as from rulers outside China if they desired contact. The English terms *fief*, *vassal* and *tribute*, inherited from medieval European feudalism, are used here advisedly because the Chinese terms (*feng* for *fief*, *fan* for *vassal* and *kung* for *tribute*) seem to represent quite comparable transactions. Even bureaucratic practice was couched in per-

sonalistic terms concerning the imperial favour or grace (*en*) and the bureaucrat's sense of obligation and loyalty (*chung*). These feudalistic terms were mixed with kinship relations within the dynastic family.

In practice, Confucian and Legalist, bureaucratic and feudalistic, principles were both evident in Ch'ing administration. For example, the *pao-chia* system of mutual responsibility inherited from the Sung period was a Legalist device to entangle all households in the affairs of their neighbours and induce mutual spying and informing in the interests of law and order. The *pao-chia* system was organized so as to keep it out of the hands of gentry leaders and to cut across natural village lines, so that local influence would remain fragmented and the magistrate who appointed the heads of the *pao-chia* organization could maintain his own separate structure of control.

Other devices for ideological control over the populace had a distinctly Confucian tinge – for example, the ceremonies at the Confucian temple and the early Ch'ing system of lecturers who expounded the 'local covenant' (*hsiang-yüeh*) and read the emperor's Sacred Edict that enjoined proper conduct upon the populace. The examination system was, of course, primarily a Confucian device that called for voluntary self-indoctrination among talented persons who sought access to government careers. In addition, there were established local rewards for the aged and the virtuous to demonstrate respect for elders and for proper conduct.¹³

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In its foreign relations the Chinese state and society in the early 1800s still felt itself central to the civilization of east Asia. Its contact with the non-Chinese peoples round about was posited on a Chinese myth of central superiority. But this solution to the problem of China's foreign relations had evolved only by slow degrees. The early Chinese on the north China plain had tried out many ways to deal with the barbarian horsemen who might invade this area from the grasslands beyond the Wall. When strong enough the Chinese could conquer them or push them out of Chinese territory. When less strong they could refuse contact or buy peace by payments of grain, silk or even princesses given in marriage. When weak, the more numerous Chinese could still assimilate the rather small numbers of barbarian invaders. But it was seldom feasible to establish equal relations with them for very long. The basic problem was that the Chinese scheme of things was a hierarchic pyramid. The emperor's position within China could not be sustained without the acquiescence of

¹³ Kung-chuan Hsiao, *Rural China, imperial control in the nineteenth century*.

all Chinese in his supremacy, and this required in turn that the barbarians similarly accept lord-and-vassal relations.

The Chinese state had gradually developed its own image of world order radiating outward from the Son of Heaven at the top of the Chinese scene. The early histories set forth a theory of a concentric hierarchy in which, as geographical distance increased, the outer barbarians had a more and more tenuous relationship with the emperor but, in all cases, remained tributary to him. The idea that the only possible relationship with the emperor of China must be that of a tributary was hard hit at times but always survived. After the decline of Han power, the terminology of tribute was already so well established that it was applied to the trade relations with the barbarians as well as the diplomatic contact. The revival of Chinese power under the Sui and T'ang gave the theory of superiority a new lease on life. It could be demonstrated that the imperial virtue in the T'ang era was manifested abroad. This provided a firm basis for China's superiority and the non-Chinese submission of tribute.

The barbarian incursions that culminated in the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century were nothing new in Chinese experience except in the ultimate degree of the Mongols' takeover. But this was traumatically complete. The union of imperial supremacy with the superiority of the Chinese, which the T'ang had demonstrated, now was shattered. The Mongol Yüan dynasty substituted for this the single concept of the superiority of its Son of Heaven over all mankind, but this powerful political myth was no longer purely Chinese. The revival of Chinese power under the Ming in 1368 therefore provided a much-desired opportunity for the reassertion of the Chinese tradition of superiority. The first Ming emperor and his vigorous successor reasserted the old Confucian idea of rule-by-virtue. In seeking the submission of tribute from the states of the known world, they sought to demonstrate the Son of Heaven's impartiality as a proof of his superiority. They also showed their paternalistic generosity. The Ming founder, the Hung-wu Emperor, at the very beginning of his reign brought the mountains and rivers of the adjoining states of Korea, Annam and Champa into the list of natural phenomena that should be put on Chinese maps, marked by stone inscriptions, and offered sacrificial rites. Towards foreign rulers, he conferred titles, sent official seals, permitted the use of the Chinese calendar, and provided passport tallies for tribute missions. By confirming the succession of foreign rulers, he exercised a power of legitimization. All this was on a normative plane, including a correspondence in Chinese, not in the tributary states' writing. It showed that China was the superior centre and its ruler had duties toward all other rulers as his inferiors.

The expeditions sent out by Hung-wu's vigorous successor, Yung-lo, were headed mainly by eunuchs who thus were personal representatives of the emperor, rather than of his government. These totalled forty-eight missions in the course of twenty-two years. They carried costly gifts to the tributary rulers but, at the same time, brought an imposing naval force and offered protection. The emperor enfeoffed the local mountains as a symbol that the subordinate states were taken into the Chinese scheme of things like the tribute-paying provinces of China itself.¹⁴

The grand design by which the Son of Heaven in China generously admitted non-Chinese to the cultured order of civilization had been further developed by the Ch'ing dynasty. Even before 1644 it had set up in Manchuria a special ministry, the Li-fan Yüan, to maintain the Manchu ruler's superiority over his Inner Asian allies, primarily the Mongols. The Ch'ing emperor in this way from the first ruled over both Chinese and non-Chinese. Over the Chinese he used the two systems noted above: bureaucratic administration through the official territorial hierarchy and personal-feudal suzerainty through personal relations. The vassals or feudatories who depended personally upon the emperor began with the dynastic lineage related by kinship. It then expanded to include the internal vassals (*nei-fan*) or inner feudatories within the Chinese scene. All these vassals had hereditary status, though it might decline in rank generation by generation. They all received investiture which extended even to princes and imperial concubines. They also presented tributes (*kung*) which were essentially ceremonial presents but also included provincial taxes like the 'tribute rice' (*ts'ao-kung*) from the Yangtze delta provinces. The structure of personal-feudal relations was then further extended to the outer vassals (*wai-fan*) who dwelt outside China proper and yet were within the emperor's sphere of concern. They also received investiture and paid tribute. Here were to be found the Mongol princes, the rulers of Tibet, and other figures in Inner Asia, and the rulers of peripheral states like Korea and Annam (Vietnam). Finally, the distant countries, providing they sought contact with China, were enrolled as outer-outer tributaries, all of them still being regarded as vassals (*fan*). This completed the concentric and graded order of the world scene.

In dealing with these different types of non-Chinese rulers, the Son of Heaven at Peking had a sophisticated repertoire of methods and means. The first was military force, which held down the provinces of China and might be used on the frontiers or in expeditions beyond them. The second was the system of bureaucratic regulations (*fa*) through which adminis-

¹⁴ Wang Gungwu, 'Early Ming relations with southeast Asia', in John K. Fairbank, ed. *The Chinese world order*, 34-62.

trative control might be exercised over the non-Chinese aboriginal peoples (mainly in the south-west) through their headmen (*t'u-ssu*), much as over the Chinese people themselves. The third was rule-by-virtue, the normative or ideological influence-of-virtuous-example (*te*) derived from a demonstration of proper conduct and the awe-inspiring sagehood of the Son of Heaven. A variant on this was, particularly in the case of relations with Lhasa, the use of religious influence; the early Ch'ing rulers had acted as chakrivartin kings (patrons) supporting the Buddhist priesthood there.

Finally, towards those non-Chinese who were beyond the reach of force or administration or virtuous example, not only because of geographic distance but also because of cultural differences, the Chinese ruler was skilled in the art of manipulation by means of material interests (*li*). This took the form primarily of permitting trade but also of giving gifts. The cupidity of foreigners was well attested and could be used to induce them to perform appropriate rituals that would place them properly in the Chinese scheme of things. This had been demonstrated as recently as 1795 by the Dutch mission that kowtowed frequently at the Ch'ing court while seeking trade concessions. Finally, there was the art of manipulation by diplomacy in which basic principles could be newly applied – that of impartiality and, as a cognate method, that of using one barbarian against another.¹⁵

China's myth of superiority over non-Chinese in this way had preserved an ancient doctrine of universal kingship, which in turn sanctioned the rule of non-Chinese dynasties. The Manchu conquest of the seventeenth century had been facilitated by the precedent of the Mongol conquest of the thirteenth. Together, they had continued to stress the universal role of the Son of Heaven, and they probably made the imperial government more despotic and less nationalistic than it might have become under Chinese rulers only. This generalization is by no means the whole story – perhaps despotism would have grown simply with the evolution of administrative methods and controls. But the dynasties of conquest, as unified minorities of tribal groupings, chose their leaders not by the Chinese custom of seniority but by tribal custom according to prowess and personal capacity. The conquerors therefore had ultra-vigorous leaders. T'ang and Sung emperors had often reigned while their high officials ruled over the daily administration of the empire. The head of a ministry might issue his own orders to provincial administrations and appoint low level officials. But this was changed by the Mongol conquest. When the first Ming emperor undertook after 1368 to rule directly, he was following the Mongol example.

¹⁵ John K. Fairbank, ed. *The Chinese world order. Traditional China's foreign relations.*

The Ch'ing monarchy, as the culmination of this long development, combined many inherited Chinese devices with the special vigour of self-conscious conquerors, who were a small minority of hardly a million, and who recognized that they must stick together to survive. They were specialized for warfare and for powerholding.

The early Ch'ing rulers had set a remarkable record. Nurhachi, by the time of his death in 1626, had founded a sinicized state in southern Manchuria and created the banner system as its striking force. His successor Hung Taiji, who died in 1643, had conquered or enrolled Mongol and Chinese allies, extending the banner organization to them and in addition had brought Korea into tributary status. Dorgon, who ruled as regent until 1650, had effected the seizure of north China. Under the first emperor within the Wall, Shun-chih, who died in 1660, the invaders had organized a Sino-barbarian administration. The Ch'ing power was then consolidated by the great K'ang-hsi, who reigned from 1661 to 1722. He not only suppressed a great rebellion but also began the cultural assimilation of the dynasty to the Chinese tradition of scholar government. K'ang-hsi defeated the three Chinese feudatories in the south, who had collaborated with the conquest and then sought to dominate it, in a civil war that lasted from 1673 to 1681. He got control of Taiwan at last in 1682-3 and expelled the Russians from the Amur watershed by the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. Then by his victory of 1696 over the western Mongols or Zunghars led by Galdan, he preserved Ch'ing control over eastern Outer Mongolia. This striking success seems to have been due in part to K'ang-hsi's flexibility. He was not yet thoroughly sinicized in outlook and method and was able to make use of Jesuit advisers at his court and to deal with the Russians on equal terms when this was diplomatically expedient.

The Yung-cheng Emperor continued to strengthen the monarchic power. He created the Grand Council in 1729 as a new and more flexible administrative organ and at the same time developed the system of secret palace memorials which gave him direct contact with chosen officials throughout the government. His successor, the Ch'ien-lung Emperor, kept the peace at home but fought repeatedly on the frontiers of the empire. His ten great campaigns included two against rebels in Szechwan (1747-9, 1771-6), an expedition which finally withdrew from Burma (1766-70), another which soon withdrew from North Vietnam (1788-90), and still another which suppressed a rebellion in Taiwan (1787-8). However, the main achievements of the armies of Ch'ien-lung were in Inner Asia, where the western Mongols were wiped out in the 1750s and the Tarim basin taken over by 1760. Meanwhile, as a means to the indirect

control of Mongolia through the Lamaist church, the Ch'ing had sent expeditions into Lhasa in 1720, 1727-8 and 1750. These were completed by the two expeditions of 1790-2 against the Gurkhas of Nepal. In all these cases, the Manchu bannermen had shown their mettle while their commanders had received high honours and extensive perquisites.

Judged superficially, the Ch'ing regime by the late eighteenth century was at an unsurpassed height of power. Yet by the mid-nineteenth century, it would prove to be a hollow colossus. To appreciate the suddenness of this reversal, we must begin by looking at the Ch'ing empire as a whole from the neglected perspective of Peking. Only this unusual approach can indicate the pre-eminence of Inner Asia in Ch'ing strategic thinking by 1800.

CHAPTER 2

CH'ING INNER ASIA c. 1800

THE CH'ING EMPIRE IN INNER ASIA

Three changes occurred in the eighteenth century that set the course of China's subsequent history. The change that has received the most scholarly attention is the solid establishment of Europe's presence. But two other changes may prove to have been of greater significance in the long run. One of these was a doubling of the territorial size of the Chinese empire. The other was a doubling of the Han Chinese population. The interplay of these three factors has set the direction of China's history in modern times.

By the opening decades of the nineteenth century the dimensions of the Middle Kingdom's effective sovereignty were greater than at any time in her history, and China was on the threshold of a political, economic and cultural metamorphosis. This metamorphosis, often seen as 'modernization', came not only as the result of the influence exerted, directly and indirectly, by European civilization but also as a result of China's internal social evolution. The indigenous social and economic processes of a demographically and territorially expanded China, no less than pressures from outside, have underlain the modern transformation of Chinese society that is still under way.

Before 1800 the focus of Ch'ing history was on Inner Asia – its conquest, its politics, the swallowing and digesting of immense, culturally diverse areas by a single, increasingly Han Chinese empire. After 1800 that emphasis began to shift to the interior of China proper and to the coast. In the nineteenth century Ch'ing Inner Asia commenced being slowly absorbed into an expanding China and began to come under the influence of Han Chinese culture. But the modern transformation of Inner Asia did not begin to take place until the period of Sino-Russian interaction there during the Muslim rebellions of the 1860s and 1870s.

Despite the great size, resources, and cultural variety of Ch'ing Inner Asia – fully half of China's territorial extent today – historians have accorded it surprisingly little attention. For foreign relations, at the time

of writing there is no book on Ch'ing Inner Asian history in its nineteenth-century context of Ch'ing policy and Anglo-Russian rivalries.¹ For domestic Chinese history, there is no study that examines the effects of territorial expansion on the social, economic or political history of China proper. And such a task still remains to be undertaken, for the Inner Asian chapters of the present volume try only to present an over-view of Ch'ing frontier history from 1800 down to the eve of the great Muslim rebellions of north-western China proper and Sinkiang. After those rebellions great changes began to take place in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet, and the history of Ch'ing Inner Asia took on an unmistakeably modern look. Equal weight has not been given here to each of the regions discussed. Sinkiang has received the fullest treatment because of its cultural complexity, its rebelliousness, and the fact that no satisfactory account of its history is available to readers of English. Tibet, although equally complex, has received shorter treatment because of the existence of good and readable books describing its history and culture.²

In its long-range historical effect, the expansion of the Ch'ing armies into Inner Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries meant the spread of Han Chinese influence, culture and population. This had not been the Manchus' intention. The dynasty's need to make full use of Han Chinese talent, especially in the empire's non-Han territories, and to encourage Han Chinese settlers to people the Inner Asian frontiers, became evident to the Ch'ing government only dimly and belatedly in the nineteenth century, after it was too late in Manchuria and Sinkiang to preserve the full territorial extent of the Ch'ing realm. The Han Chinese expansion occurred in spite of the Ch'ing government's efforts throughout the eighteenth century to prevent this expansion. Nevertheless, it was the Manchus who laid the groundwork for the sinicization of China's Inner Asian frontier. This process of sinicization is a difficult one to study in any depth, and is likely to remain so because of the lack of adequate records. Manchurian tribesmen, Mongols, Tibetans, Turkic-speaking Muslims and all bannermen were omitted from the tax registers of the Ch'ing empire.

¹ Approaches are to be found in Irie Keishirō, *Shina henkyō to Ei-Ro no kakubhiku* (The Chinese frontier and Anglo-Russian rivalry); John K. Fairbank, ed. *The Chinese world order*; O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: the 'Great game'*; Ram Rahul, *Politics of central Asia*; and Morris Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia from 1368 to the present day*.

² Most recently, Pedro Carrasco, *Land and polity in Tibet* (which I have found particularly useful in writing the present chapter); Alastair Lamb, *Britain and Chinese central Asia: the road to Lhasa 1767 to 1905*; H. E. Richardson, *A short history of Tibet*; Giuseppe Tucci, *Tibet land of snows*, tr J. E. Stapleton Driver; W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: a political history*; David Snellgrove and H. Richardson, *A cultural history of Tibet*; and R. A. Stein, *Tibetan civilization*, tr J. E. Stapleton Driver.

Despite considerable Han Chinese immigration into Manchuria, part of Inner Mongolia, Tsinghai and northern Sinkiang, the government's basic policy was that the Han population should remain in China proper. The Ch'ing did not appoint ordinary non-banner Han Chinese to Inner Asian posts. Inner Asia was a bannerman's preserve. In 1800 it consisted of four main areas – Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet. All were garrisoned by Ch'ing forces, but were governed through several different types of administrative structure. Manchuria consisted of three provinces. Mongolia, although much subdivided and under rigid control, still had many semblances of its original administration. Sinkiang was under the jurisdiction of the Ch'ing army commander in Ili, but on the local level native rulers and officials had varying degrees of authority. Tibet stood divided. Tibet proper retained its overall indigenous government, but north-eastern Tibet (Tsinghai) paid taxes directly to the Ch'ing government and was under the jurisdiction of an amban (Manchu for 'high official') at Sining, while easternmost Tibet (eastern Kham) was similarly taxed and came under the administration of the provincial authorities of Szechwan.

In theory, at least, the imperial government expected its Inner Asian dependencies (Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet) and provinces (Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungkiang) to be self-supporting. The authorities of each of these were supposed to levy enough revenue locally to cover the costs of their own administrations. This they were unable to do, by and large, except in Mongolia and Fengtien. In Sinkiang especially, the military expenses that would be required to maintain imperial control were destined to rise far beyond its tax resources.

Superintendence of Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet, all Ch'ing Inner Asian tributaries coming to the Ch'ing capital, and of relations with the other Inner Asian polities that lay outside the imperial boundaries, was the responsibility of the Li-fan Yüan (or Court of Colonial Affairs) in Peking. In the far west, outside the empire, Nepal (under Hindu rule) and Kanjut (Hunza and Nagir, whose population were Ismailis, Muslims of the Sevener Shi'a) were directly tributary to the Ch'ing court, whereas Ladakh, Sikkim and Bhutan were client states of Tibet and therefore not directly related to the Ch'ing empire. Balti merchants traded in the markets of Sinkiang and Tibet, but the Ch'ing knew Baltistan only as part of a non-existent country named Bolor (an ancient name for the Gilgit valley but in Ch'ing terms consisting principally of Baltistan),³ and had no

³ Hsü Sung, *Hsi-yü shui-tao chi*, 1.18a–b, seems to put Bolor in the Gilgit valley. Cf. Alexander Cunningham, *Ladakh: physical, statistical, and historical; with notices of the surrounding countries*, 45; Muḥammad Ḥaydar Dughlat, *A history of the Moghuls of central Asia being the Tarikh-i-Rashidi*

established relationship with the Balti rulers. Beyond the Himalayas lay the Indian countries and the British East India Company, which had made several attempts in the eighteenth century to gain access to Tibet and which was growing steadily more active. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the Li-fan Yüan had only the vaguest idea about Tibet's western neighbours and was not even certain that the East India Company in India came from the same country as the British trading at Canton.⁴

West of Sinkiang were the Muslim Turkic-speaking Kazakh nomads, who were tributaries of both the Russians and the Ch'ing, and various Kirghiz tribes in the mountains, who were also Muslims. The ruler of the preponderantly agricultural and urban Islamic polity of Kokand, centred in the Ferghana valley, was a Ch'ing tributary, but tribute went in the reverse direction too, for the Ch'ing government paid him a regular stipend of money and tea to keep peace on Sinkiang's western frontier. Tashkent, Bukhara, 'Bolor', Badakhshan and the crumbling Afghan realm of the Durrānīs were each, in the Ch'ing view, tributary polities of the empire.

Tributary status in the eyes of the Ch'ing government conferred on foreigners the right to trade under specified conditions, and it legitimized the emperor's authority over foreign visitors in China. But it was not vassalage and carried no implications of Ch'ing protection. The only true 'protectorates' were dependencies within the imperial borders, some of whose rulers were regarded as tributaries, but not as foreign ones.

In 1689, by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Moscow government had reluctantly recognized the entire Amur basin as Ch'ing territory and had withdrawn into undisputed Muscovite lands to the north and west. Although the Ch'ing government had realized that the Russians were the major Siberian power, they failed to appreciate how technologically advanced and militarily strong the Russians were. As a result, the Manchus left the north Manchurian tribesmen to their own devices under a 'loose rein' (*chi-mi*). When the Ch'ing government sent officials to erect boundary markers on the frontier between Manchuria and Muscovite territory, they were for some reason set up far to the south of the agreed limits, ignoring some 23,000 square miles of territory belonging, by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, to the Ch'ing empire.⁵ Russia, taking advantage of Ch'ing in-

of Mirza Mubammad Haidar, *Dughlat*, tr E. D. Ross, ed. N. Elias, 135, 384-5; Paul Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, 1.91-2. Saguchi Tōru, *Roshia to Ajiasōgen*, 181, evidently follows Hsü Sung.

⁴ See Suzuki Chūsei, *Chibetto o meguru Chū-In kankei shi: Jūbachiseiki nakagoro kara jūkyūseiki nakagoro made*, 179, and Schuyler Cammann, *Trade through the Himalayas: the early British attempts to open Tibet*, 140, esp. n. 73.

⁵ Ernst G. Ravenstein, *The Russians on the Amur; its discovery, conquest, and colonization, with a description of the country, its inhabitants, productions, and commercial capabilities; and personal accounts of Russian travellers*, 66.

attention in the territories north of the Amur, continued to settle, to prospect and to strengthen her eastern Siberian position throughout the eighteenth century.

MANCHURIA

At the turn of the nineteenth century Manchuria was already undergoing the Han Chinese immigration that would convert this formerly isolated territory of Tunguz-speaking bannermen and tribal enclaves into the developing Chinese agricultural and industrial region it was to become in the twentieth century. The earlier pattern of Manchu dominion through banner garrisons and tribal connections was breaking down, and Han Chinese immigrants were moving in, bringing with them their language and culture and linking Manchuria both socially and economically with China proper. By the end of the eighteenth century Manchuria's population probably exceeded a million and by mid-nineteenth century it was about three times that number.⁶

The Manchurian frontier (Kirin and Heilungkiang) was officially closed to Han immigration, but throughout the eighteenth century the Ch'ing government acted with increasing ambivalence, sometimes blocking immigration, sometimes looking the other way while Han Chinese settlers filtered through the Willow Palisades. By 1800 it was obviously too late to think of keeping Fengtien province as a specifically Manchu preserve or of protecting it from the assimilative power of Chinese civilization. In Kirin and Heilungkiang, however, the irreversibility of the demographic and cultural trend was less obvious, and the Ch'ing government, at least at the top levels, was still making a serious effort to block immigration and to minimize China's cultural contacts with the Manchurian frontier. In 1811, for example, Peking issued a new order designed, like those in the past, to prevent Han Chinese immigration.

Four principal motives have been adduced to explain the Ch'ing effort to preserve the banner and tribal character of Kirin and Heilungkiang. One was to hold open a place of retreat for the dynasty, should the need arise for the Manchus to abandon China; another was to maintain a military reservoir of banner troops untouched by Han Chinese cultural influence so as to bolster Manchu dominance among the immense population of China; a third was to guard the government's monopoly on the production of ginseng (a highly valued aphrodisiac and medicinal root), furs, pearls and gold; and a fourth was to preserve Manchu culture and the Manchu dynasty's ancestral traditions.

In retrospect, none of these reasons would seem to have been very com-

⁶ Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the population of China, 1368-1913*, 158-63, 283.

elling by the beginning of the nineteenth century, although the first and the second still had some of their original psychological and strategic validity. Even so, by 1800 the Manchus had no need of a place to hide. Later on, during the mid-century rebellions in China proper, the Ch'ing made use of a large proportion of the Manchurian banner troops, but in 1800 those troops, with perhaps the exception of the Solons, lacked training, equipment and morale. They did not appear to be an army that the Ch'ing were holding in readiness to protect the dynasty's hold on China. Moreover, in view of the Russian encroachment that was to come, the Ch'ing, by then essentially a Chinese empire, would have done better to encourage Han immigration into the Amur basin to keep that region within imperial control. Only the Han Chinese had the capacity to develop Manchuria's resources to their full potential, and the government might well have derived greater benefits from its ginseng, fur, pearls and gold if it had encouraged immigration and had carefully farmed out these monopolies to Han Chinese concessionnaires. Sinicized Fengtien more than Kirin – let alone Heilungkiang – had been the Manchus' homeland and the cradle of their empire; so protecting the Manchurian frontier from Chinese influence could do little to preserve the cults, culture and traditions of the Manchus themselves. In any case, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the impossibility of keeping Han Chinese settlers, poachers and runaways out of the Manchurian frontier must have been apparent to all.

With the great population expansion in China in the eighteenth century, the northward movement of Han migrants had accelerated. Since southern Manchuria was already largely saturated with Han Chinese farmers, more and more migrants kept moving northward. The Manchurian frontier authorities, unable to prevent this influx, had begun to enrol the Han settlers and to tax them, even though the authorities had not yet fully formalized the settlers' position by imposing the land tax upon their farms. It is not unlikely, in fact, that the local authorities had abetted Han Chinese immigration into the frontier, precisely because the settlers developed Manchuria's economic resources and thus provided additional revenue.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century some 80 to 90 per cent of the town population of Kirin and perhaps also of Heilungkiang were Han Chinese. The Ch'ing government, in spite of its official ban, had begun to send Han Chinese officials into the Manchurian frontier to govern the immigrant communities there. By 1800 almost everyone in Manchuria south of the Amur spoke some Chinese, and many Manchus, already showing the effects of sinicization, had lost their mother tongue.

Only the Mongols who were interspersed in some of the frontier areas, but who represented a radically different mode of life from that of the settled Han Chinese and Manchu population, had remained largely unaffected by this acculturation.⁷ Although Han merchants in Heilungkiang could do business with Manchus in the Chinese language, they often had to learn Mongolian to trade with the Mongols. North of the Amur, where the population was primitive and extremely sparse, people who could speak Chinese must have been few indeed. The Ch'ing government had undertaken only one investigation of this area carried out in 1765 by Fusengge, who had reported, hyperbolically, that there were no signs of human life on the northern bank of the river and that the region was bitterly cold, with no pasture and no animals.⁸

Geographically, Manchuria had much to recommend itself to China's rapidly expanding population. The soil was rich, and although the growing season was shorter in the north-east than in the Ch'ing empire's other agricultural zones, Manchurian farmers could count on adequate rainfall. Moreover, the Manchu conquest of China had drained Manchuria of much of its population, so that potential farmland lay untouched, and even cultivated lands, tilled and sown by agricultural techniques that were less sophisticated than those used in China, produced only a fraction of the yield that a Han Chinese farmer could have expected.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Manchuria's agricultural possibilities were less known than the furs and ginseng that the forests of the north-eastern frontier produced for the markets of China. The supply of both these items had declined during the eighteenth century, and in the case of furs this may have been due in part to the early Russian movement into eastern Siberia. But in 1800 both the fur and ginseng businesses, legal and contraband, were still thriving. In addition to these, Manchuria's mountains, waters and forests offered gold, pearls and lumber, and also, less attractively, an abundance of mosquitoes and biting insects. To judge by twentieth-century conditions, malaria must have been prevalent too, especially in eastern Manchuria and the Amur basin, but the demographic effects of the disease are unknown. Tuberculosis, smallpox and syphilis must also have been common.⁹

⁷ Robert H. G. Lee, *The Manchurian frontier in Ch'ing history*, 23, 113. Cf. Denis Sinor, 'Notes on the historiography of Inner Asia I', *Journal of Asian History* 7.2 (1973) 186, but Lee is correct. By the twentieth century, Hauer's 1927 Manchu passport notwithstanding, Manchu speakers were a rarity.

⁸ *Ta-Ch'ing Kao-tung shih-lu*, 743.4b (4 Oct. 1765). I am indebted for this reference to Meng Ssu-ming, unpublished paper, entitled, 'The signing of the Treaty of Aigun in 1858' (MS 1949) 10.

⁹ A. L. Narochenskii, *Kolonial'naiia politika kapitalisticheskikh derzhav na Dal'nem Vostoke 1869-1895*, 150 (smallpox and syphilis in Sakhalin in the 1870s).

'Manchuria' is a European rather than a Chinese or a Manchu term, and is used here to designate the birthplace of the Manchu state in the Liao River region and the frontier tribal areas to the north, including the Amur basin as defined by the Sino-Muscovite Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. It was part of China's provincial structure and was known in Chinese as the Three Eastern Provinces. Technically, therefore, Manchuria was not a dependency. Fengtien, the southernmost of the three provinces, had its capital at Mukden (present-day Shen-yang), which served simultaneously as an auxiliary, if purely nominal, capital of the Ch'ing empire. Mukden thus had an administrative structure consisting of Five Boards – Revenue, Rites, War, Punishments and Works – parallel to the Six Boards in Peking, but lacked a Board of Civil Appointments. These boards had jurisdiction over many aspects of Manchurian banner affairs and also over a growing civil administration that governed the rising Han Chinese civilian population. Simultaneously, Fengtien had a military governor (*chiang-chün*) whose authority covered the banner population and in many areas overlapped with the authority of Mukden's Five Board structure. The overlap, which led to administrative conflict and confusion, was responsible for much misgovernment and opened the door to official corruption and a host of bureaucratic evils.

The two north Manchurian frontier provinces were Kirin, whose capital city bore the same name, and Heilungkiang, with its capital at Tsitsihar. Here, military governors exercised both military and civil jurisdiction over the provincial administrations, and the military governors, as elsewhere in Ch'ing Inner Asia, had to be bannermen – either Manchus or, less commonly, Mongols. They had authority over the banners and Han Chinese civilian farmers and townsmen, and also over the tribal areas, which the Ch'ing had not attempted to incorporate into the banner system and which therefore still retained their original tribal organization.

After the Manchus' invasion of China, the Ch'ing government had incorporated many of the northern and eastern Manchurian tribesmen into new banners patterned after the original pre-conquest (Old Manchu) banners, which had been made up of Manchus (Jushens), Mongols and Chinese. From tribesmen of the Kúyalas, northern Húrhas, Hejes, Solons, Sibo and from the Mongolian-speaking Daghurs, the Ch'ing government had created the so-called New Manchu banners, thus incorporating them into the imperial military administration under the command of the Kirin and Heilungkiang military governors. The incorporated tribesmen, who now formed part of the Ch'ing military, received tax-exempt banner lands (*ch'i-t'ien*) for their upkeep. They joined in the annual winter hunts of Kirin and Heilungkiang, and were under the direct command of the mili-

tary governors. With the exception of the hunting banners in Heilungkiang, they did not present tribute. The hunting bannermen were a special category in that they served as auxiliary forces to the regular Manchurian garrisons and at the same time were required to present tribute, which the Ch'ing government evidently levied on the basis of the number of their households.

In the distant Amur basin and maritime territories on the seacoast it had been unrealistic to incorporate all the tribesmen into the Ch'ing banner system, and the government had been content simply to enrol these outlying tribesmen as tributaries within the empire and leave them, in effect, to themselves. Tribute in furs, especially the highly-prized sable and black fox pelts, was presented at stipulated times in token of submission to the Ch'ing throne. Occasionally they were permitted to do so in Peking, in which case the tribute missions fell under the jurisdiction of the Li-fan Yüan, but by and large the tribesmen brought their tribute to certain designated collection points, mainly San-hsing, Deren or the Muren, where Ch'ing revenue officials sorted the acceptable pelts from the unacceptable ones and released the sub-standard furs for sale. As a result, these tribute collection points had developed into periodic fairs to which both Chinese and Mongols regularly came for trade. The imperial return gifts that the tribesmen received in acknowledgment of their tribute were luxuries on the Manchurian frontier, and their value on the market was high; so the tribal chiefs commonly sold them. The headmen of the maritime territories, for example, regularly traded their imperial return gifts to Japanese officials in exchange for furs and then sold these to Han Chinese merchants.¹⁰ In binding the north Manchurian tribesmen to the empire, the Ch'ing court also conferred titles and honours. Formerly it had made marriage alliances by marrying Manchu girls to tribal chiefs, but after the beginning of the nineteenth century this practice disappeared.

Manchurian society in 1800 consisted essentially of three main groups – bannermen, civilian Han Chinese and the tribal peoples – all three of which were stratified into various social classes. This population was also ethnically diverse. The banners consisted of Manchus, who were shamanists, Mongols, who with few exceptions were adherents of the Tibetan Yellow (or dGe-lugs-pa) church, and Han Chinese, who followed that mixture of Buddhism, Confucianism and folk beliefs characteristic of Chinese religion. The tribal peoples, whose several religions are generally categorized under the heading of shamanism, had various origins, but most of them spoke Tunguzic languages, although the Giliaks, who inhabited Sakhalin and the lower Amur, spoke an unrelated language.

¹⁰ Lee, *Manchurian frontier*, 47–8. I have relied heavily on Lee in the writing of this section.

Ostensibly, the bannermen, being members of the Ch'ing establishment, stood at the head of society, but in practice this was true only of their high-ranking officers, a military elite who, in social influence as in administrative authority, held first place throughout Manchuria. Most of the banner officers, at least in Kirin and Heilungkiang, were probably bannermen from Manchuria, but as a rule the highest-ranking officers were Peking Manchus, who were far more sinicized and sophisticated than their Manchurian counterparts. Whereas Manchus of China proper received a Chinese education, on which their social and political advancement had already come to depend throughout most of the empire, in Manchuria the school curriculum, except in a few private instances, included only the Manchu language and military arts. Despite a certain amount of Manchu literary production in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including enormous translation projects and some *belles-lettres*, efforts to create a Manchu literary culture of stature had ended in failure. Manchu continued to be used in government documents in an increasingly formalistic and lifeless way until the twentieth century, but a Manchu education was of limited use. For those Manchurian bannermen who had received a Chinese education and were successful in the prefectural examinations, the Ch'ing government had a degree quota, and as the population grew, this quota gradually increased. But few bannermen were adequately prepared, and those who were had to travel to Mukden to be examined, with the result that prefectural candidates were few. Even fewer were candidates for the provincial examinations, which were held in Peking.

The Han Chinese civilian population consisted mainly of farmers, merchants, craftsmen and exiled officials. Of these by far the most numerous were the farmers, and, as might have been expected, the heaviest Han population concentrations were in Fengtien province, followed by Kirin province, while the smallest number of Han Chinese was in Heilungkiang. Throughout the eighteenth century, as the Han Chinese population of Manchuria increased, urban concentrations also grew, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century the first signs of Manchuria's urbanization were already to be seen. Of greatest importance, of course, were the cities in the south – especially Mukden – but Kirin, Ninguta and Tsi-tsihar were growing, and the sub-prefecture of Ch'ang-ch'un was established in 1799 as an administrative centre to take charge of the Han Chinese who had settled in the surrounding region. These cities served not only as the seats of military and civil administrations but as market centres, bases of various crafts and nascent industries, and places of entertainment where gambling was a favourite form of recreation and sexual mores were more relaxed than in China proper.

In Manchuria in 1800 the rich Han Chinese merchants stood at the top of the social ladder, just below the high-ranking banner officers, with whom they had many social, cultural and business relationships – merchants and officers often meeting one another on terms of equality. Han Chinese society in Manchuria was an uprooted society of immigrants, most of whom, except in Fengtien, had lived where they were for only a number of decades. Although the settlers had come mainly from Chihli, Shantung and Shansi and had brought with them many of the social patterns of those provinces, the immigrants derived from the poorer and less educated elements of society, with the result that at the beginning of the nineteenth century a ‘gentry’ class of the type known in China proper – families of education, wealth and prestige who had exercised social leadership in a given locality for generations – had only recently come into being in Fengtien province and cannot be said to have existed in the Manchurian frontier at all. Chinese scholars may have disdained merchants, but in frontier Manchuria it was often precisely the best scholars who became the leading merchants, since, with a few exceptions in the military and civil administrations, the only true literati in Kirin and Heilungkiang were disgraced officials whom the Ch’ing government had exiled there. Theoretically, these former officials, stripped of their ranks and privileges, were no more than ordinary subjects. But in fact they soon improved their fortunes either by going into business, or by tutoring the children of Manchu officers in preparation for careers that required a Chinese education. Tutoring led to other opportunities, for some of the prestige of these former officials’ pre-exile status still clung to them, and the elites of Manchurian society found them congenial and were happy to be associated with them.

The other main element among Manchuria’s leading and middle merchants was associates of the Chinese trading houses of China proper, mainly the famous Shansi banking firms, who had done increasing amounts of business in Manchuria throughout the eighteenth century. Their business dealings were certainly interrelated with the enterprises of the ex-official exiles and of native Manchurian Han traders, some of whom also had important businesses. These categories of top merchants held a place in society that was very different and more elevated than that of ordinary shopkeepers, pedlars, craftsmen and farmers, who were essentially on a par with rank-and-file bannermen, notwithstanding the ostensible primacy of the military establishment.

In theory, the chiefs of the various tribal components of Kirin and Heilungkiang, who held special distinctions from the Ch’ing government, should have stood very near the top-ranking banner officers in

social status, but in practice the tribesmen were somewhat isolated from the more civilized elements of the Manchurian population, and many tribal chiefs inhabiting the northern frontier regions and the maritime zone, were also geographically isolated. When they came to town on official business or to trade they seemed rustic and primitive. This *déclassement* of the tribal chiefs increased as the Han Chinese population in Manchuria increased, as the bannermen became more sinicized, and as the region became more developed. The ordinary tribesmen were, of course, even less sinicized than their chiefs, and as time went on they either adopted Han Chinese ways themselves or became increasingly isolated from the changing Manchurian scene.

At the bottom of society were the unskilled workmen, domestic servants, prostitutes and exiled convicts, including slaves. One of the capacities in which Manchuria, especially Kirin and Heilungkiang, had served the Ch'ing empire was as a place of exile, not only for disgraced officials but also for convicted criminals. The worse the crimes and the more hardened the offenders, the farther north the Ch'ing judicial system generally sent them. Many of these criminals took up crafts or small businesses, eventually becoming dependable members of society, but their presence in increasing numbers added to the lawless, rough-and-ready character of Manchurian frontier society.

Beginning in 1796, the Ch'ing government had substantially reduced the dispatches of convicts to Manchuria, but the problems caused by enslaving certain serious criminals and transporting them to work for the Manchurian bannermen had already risen to such proportions that further official measures were required. At the heart of the matter lay the fact that the bannermen were too poor to support the slaves whom the Ch'ing government was loading upon them, and it was therefore in the interests both of the slaveholders and of the slaves that the latter should quickly regain their freedom. As a result, slaves found it possible to buy their freedom. Sometimes their owners simply manumitted them outright. Although some of these criminals returned to China proper, many remained in Manchuria, adding to the freely moving outlaw and semi-outlaw population. Neither of these eventualities pleased the imperial authorities; so in 1810 the Ch'ing government officially prohibited slaveholders from selling slaves their freedom, and in 1813 it suspended, for a time, the exiling of convicts to Manchuria. To relieve the bannermen of their burden of slave support, the government also took steps, where appropriate, to transfer the slaves of the impecunious bannermen to their more well-to-do officers and to Manchurian administrative officials, who had more use for menials and could afford to keep them.

In Kirin and Heilungkiang, most of whose territories were not easily accessible, there lived a considerable Han Chinese outlaw population. These were poachers in the imperial preserves – hunters, trappers, ginseng gatherers, goldminers and robber bands. The numbers of these outlaws had grown rapidly in the eighteenth century, and continued to grow in the nineteenth. Some of them, especially the goldminers and bandits, formed organized communities with rudimentary local governments. Groups of outlaw ginseng-diggers, known as ‘blackmen’, in the forests and mountains beyond the reach of the Manchurian authorities, so disturbed the tribal frontier areas that in 1811 the military governor of Kirin had to send troops into the mountains to drive them out. But the authorities found that protecting the frontier from Han Chinese outlaws was no easy matter because communications were so difficult. Although ginseng-digging was officially a government monopoly reserved for bannermen and Han Chinese diggers licensed by the Board of Revenue, there was little that the provincial authorities could do to enforce the government’s prohibitions in the remote Manchurian forests and mountains.

By the opening decade of the nineteenth century the sinicization of Manchuria was already irreversibly advanced. Fengtien province had for some time been essentially Han Chinese and part of China, and the military governors of Kirin and Heilungkiang, though charged with the duty of upholding the supremacy of the banner element in society, had failed to preserve the *status quo*. The bannermen, who lacked the industry and technical skills of the Han Chinese settlers, were concerned only with holding on to what they had. Unlike the immigrants from China, they had no sense of building a new home or developing a new land. Nothing of their Manchu and tribal cultural background equipped them to compete with the incoming Han Chinese, who were outnumbering them, outworking them, and buying their lands from them. In spite of repeated government measures, the bannermen were rapidly becoming pauperized, and they grew increasingly dependent upon subsidies from the Ch’ing government. The culturally dynamic example, which more and more of them began to emulate, was that of the Han Chinese. As time went on, not only the bannermen but also many of the tribal peoples began to adopt Chinese culture and fall into the orbit of Han tastes, Han markets and Han ways of doing things. Only the cold and sparsely populated Amur basin, which had not attracted settlers from China, remained essentially outside the Chinese sphere.

MONGOLIA

The Mongolian frontier had always been China's frontier *par excellence*, for the nomads of Mongolia had in earlier times posed an almost constant military threat to China's agricultural civilization. But by the end of the eighteenth century Mongolian nomadism had thoroughly decayed. The old days of nomad power and independence were gone. War, once the basis of nomad glory and solidarity, was a thing of the past, and the Ch'ing had tightly bound the Mongols of both Inner and Outer Mongolia – despite the mobility of their way of life – to the Middle Kingdom. Population records are lacking, and only the grossest speculation is possible, but it is not out of the question that the total Mongolian-speaking population of the Ch'ing empire in 1800 (not counting bannermen) could have been as high as 3,500,000 persons – perhaps as many as 700,000 in Outer Mongolia with the bulk living in the north central region, and 2,600,000 in Inner Mongolia concentrated in the east. Sinkiang and Tsinghai could have had another 200,000. If these estimates are correct, the Mongolian population was undergoing a decline that may have dated from the first half of the eighteenth century, or even before.¹¹

In the raising of livestock, the nomads' traditional occupation, the Mongols had fallen on hard times, for they were regularly importing horses and cattle from Siberia. Occasional livestock imports would not, of course, have been proof of prolonged nomadic decline, because the *jud*, or grazing disasters, could strike at any time. Sometimes there was 'too much snow for the stock to get down to pasturage, or not enough snow to serve as a substitute for water in a dry winter pasture'. Sometimes too many animals concentrated in too small a pasture trampled the herbage so that they could not graze, or, most commonly and most catastrophically, a sudden freeze would follow an unseasonable thaw, and a film of ice would sheathe the herbage. Then animals, already weakened by the winter, could not graze, and in a few days they might 'die off by the thousand or even the hundred thousand'.¹² But there is evidence that the Mongols' horse and cattle imports from Siberia represented more than an occasional restocking after unavoidable natural calamities.¹³

Neither Inner nor Outer Mongolia had any overall indigenous govern-

¹¹ The subject needs serious historical study. For twentieth-century estimates, see, among others, Ivan Mikhailovich Maiskii, *Mongoliia nakanune revoliutsii*, 2nd edn, 28–30; Robert James Miller, *Monasteries and culture change in Inner Mongolia*, 25–7; *Handbook on People's China*, 14–15.

¹² Owen Lattimore, *Nomads and commissars: Mongolia revisited*, 33.

¹³ Clifford M. Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin: Russia's trade with China and its setting, 1727–1805*, 85.

ment. In Inner Mongolia, the empire maintained its presence through the Ch'ing military forces based along Mongolia's southern and eastern frontier. These held such control over Inner Mongolian affairs that by the nineteenth century the region retained little effective autonomy. In Outer Mongolia, where Ch'ing garrisons maintained the imperial presence, the Mongols enjoyed more autonomy because they were farther from China proper, but here too the Ch'ing stood in firm control. Technically, the entire territory of Outer Mongolia came under the jurisdiction of the military governor (*chiang-chün*) of Uliasutai, a post held only by Ch'ing bannermen. In practice, however, by 1800 the amban at Urga had general supervision over the eastern part of the country, the tribal domains (aimaks) of the Tüshiyetü Khan and Sechen Khan, while the military governor of Uliasutai had supervision over the Sayin Noyan Khan and Jasaghtu Khan aimaks. The region around Khobdo in westernmost Outer Mongolia, which had originally been under Uliasutai, was now an independent administrative post. The Ch'ing authorities administered both Mongolias in accordance with the *Collected statutes of the Ch'ing dynasty* (*Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien*) and their precedents (*tse-li* or, after 1818, *shih-li*). Only in internal disputes were the Outer Mongols (the Khalkhas) permitted to settle their differences in accordance with the traditional *Khalkha Code* (*Khalkha jirum*).

Mongolian society consisted essentially of two classes, nobles and commoners. From the nobles came the jasaks, or banner princes, who were the hereditary rulers of the khoshuns, or banners, the basic nomadic political unit under the Ch'ing dynasty. The banner was further subdivided into units known as sumuns, or 'arrows', and six sumuns comprised one regiment (*jalan*). The subjects of these banners in Mongolia must be sharply distinguished from the Manchu, Mongolian and Chinese bannermen (*ch'i-jen*) who constituted the basic personnel support for the Ch'ing dynasty. The term 'bannermen' is reserved here for this latter group in the Ch'ing military structure, and 'banner subjects' for the former.

Every member of the Mongolian nobility held a rank in the Ch'ing aristocracy, ranging through ten ranks from *khoshoi chin wang* to *tayiji* of the fourth degree. But only the jasaks, or banner princes, ruled with temporal power. In acknowledgment of their subordination to the Ch'ing dynasty, the jasaks annually presented the emperor with tribute consisting of specified items – mainly livestock and animal products – in specified amounts. The most famous of these tributes were the Outer Mongolian khans' so-called 'nine whites', theoretically composed of eight white horses and one white camel, although by 1800 the 'nine whites' actually

consisted of a changing variety of items, including such things as furs, wild beasts' hides and choice domestic livestock. In return, the Mongolian tributaries received imperial gifts of silks, cottons, porcelains, gold and silver, and there is reason to suppose that because of these return gifts, which were intended to be at least equal in value to the tribute, the Ch'ing government did not consider the presentation of tribute to be an economic burden to the tributaries.¹⁴

The Mongolian commoners, or 'people' (*arad*), were for the most part banner subjects (*albatu*) who owed tax and service obligations (*alban*) to their banner princes and to the Ch'ing government. Taxes were usually in kind, mainly livestock, although as time went on silver played an increasing role. Banner subjects were additionally liable to special levies, like the annual imperial demands for animals, furs, felt, tents, native jewellery and other Mongolian products, and for such extraordinary exactions as the Khalkhas' gift of 40,000 head of young livestock to the Chia-ch'ing Emperor on the occasion of his visit to Dolonnor in 1819. Services included support of frontier guard posts, postal relay stations and a whole roster of other official and unofficial tasks. The banner subjects each belonged to a given banner, which they could not legally leave without the *jasak's* permission. The *jasak* assigned pasturage rights to his subjects as he saw fit, in proportion to the number of adult males rather than in proportion to the amount of livestock that they had to graze.¹⁵ Such allotments varied in size in accordance with the productivity of the local terrain. Sometimes, against the interests of his own pasture-hungry banner subjects, a *jasak* would, illegally, allow the subjects of other banners to pasture in his domain in return for payment. This could force his own people to infiltrate the territory of neighbouring banners in order to survive.

The banner subjects consisted of *sumun* subjects (*sumun albatu*) and of bondsmen (*khamjilgha*), belonging to the *jasaks* and other noblemen within the banners. In theory the *sumun* subjects were supposed only to provide tribute for the Ch'ing court, and services and taxes for the support of the administration, whereas the *jasak's* personal support was supposed to come only from his bondsmen, whom the Ch'ing government assigned to him along with an annual stipend (*pöngliü*) of silver and cloth. But by the nineteenth century the line between *sumun* subjects and bondsmen had become indistinct. *Jasaks* frequently changed the records or exchanged their poorer bondsmen for richer *sumun* subjects or made exactions from

¹⁴ See, for example, the tribute obligations of the hunting banners, mentioned in Lee, *Manchurian frontier*, 51. Cf., however, Lee, 56-7.

¹⁵ Sh. Natsagdorj, 'The economic basis of feudalism in Mongolia', tr Owen Lattimore, *MAS*, 1.3 (1967) 268.

the sumun subjects for the jasaks' own use, although this was forbidden by Ch'ing law. Another social category was the ecclesiastical retainers, known as shabis (plural, *shabinar*), which means 'disciples', although these 'disciples' were simply retainers and not monastic students or apprentices. The shabis were tax-exempt bondsmen belonging to monasteries or to certain reincarnating lamas (*khubilghan*), and the jasaks had the authority to create shabis by assigning commoner families in their possession to monasteries and incarnations. On becoming shabis, these families ceased to belong to their original banners, and their labour and its product went to the support of the monasteries or incarnations. At the bottom of the social scale were slaves, whom, for the most part, the government had reduced to that condition as punishment for criminal offences. Slavery as such was not an indelible, inherited social category.

Apart from China's industrial and technological advantage over the steppe, three main factors combined to reinforce the decline of the Mongols' once-glorious military power and the decay of the nomadic economy. The first was the banner system, which the Manchus employed to divide the Mongols and sever their traditional lines of tribal authority. For each banner, the pasture lands were fixed and carefully delimited, unlike the relatively open (and economically more productive) grazing conditions of pre-Ch'ing Mongolia, so that no prince could expand and acquire preponderant power. Even more important was the fact that powerful tribes which had once obeyed a single tribal leader now consisted of several separate banners, each of which had a *jasak* with autonomy in his own banner and direct responsibility to the Ch'ing administration.

Only shadows of the former aimaks, or tribal domains, remained, and to take their place the Manchus had created leagues (*chighulghan*), which the Ch'ing closely supervised, and which, when they met every three years, lacked authority to do much more than regulate inter-banner disputes. Among the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia, the heirs of Sechen Khans, Tüshiyetü Khans, Sayin Noyan Khans and Jasaghtu Khans still bore the title of khan, which stood even higher on the scale of the Ch'ing aristocracy than *khoshoi chin wang* (in Manchu, khan was the word for 'emperor'), but in terms of political power these khans were little more than distinguished banner princes. Their aimaks had only a nominal existence, for the Manchus had converted them into leagues, each of which bore the name of the place in which the league held its triennial meeting. In addition to four leagues in Outer Mongolia and six leagues in Inner Mongolia, there were large areas – Dariganga, Chahar, the Tümed banners of Kuei-hua-ch'eng, the Alashan territories, the Khobdo frontier and the guard post zone (*keharaghul-un nutugh*) along the Russian

border – where the Ch'ing administration wielded an even tighter and more direct control. In Tsinghai the Mongols, mostly Öölöd belonging to the Khoshuud tribe but including one sumun of Khalkhas, constituted a league of twenty-nine banners under the presidency of the imperial controller-general who resided at Sining.

If a banner prince or a league captain-general (*chighbulghan-u darugha*) made trouble, the imperial government had the power to dismiss him outright and strip him of his titles, no matter how august his lineage. In 1800, for example, the Ch'ing dismissed the Sechen Khan Sangjayidorji, a descendant of Chinggis Khan, from his position as league captain-general and deprived him and his descendants of their khanship. Members of the royal house of Chinggis Khan were also bound to the Ch'ing dynasty by marriage ties, and the Manchus had always been careful to make these princes feel they occupied a special position in the empire: the court elevated them to the Ch'ing aristocracy and impressed on them that, as military allies from the beginning, they stood above the bureaucratic officialdom of conquered China. But by 1800 the Manchu dynasty had gone a long way toward Chinese cultural values and standards, and the Mongols were clearly subjects, not allies.

The second important factor in the taming of the once terrible Mongols was the Tibetan Buddhist 'Yellow church', known as the dGe-lugs-pa. For Inner Mongolia the lCang-skya Khutughtu, a reincarnating lama resident in Peking, was head of a centralized monastery system under imperial patronage and was the Inner Mongols' most important ecclesiastical figure. The monasteries and lamas under his authority were exempt from taxes and services and enjoyed many privileges. Other monasteries in Inner Mongolia lay outside the Peking system headed by the lCang-skya Khutughtu. These did not have the same legal footing as the imperial monasteries, but the Ch'ing officialdom, the jasaks and the people customarily accorded them many of the same privileges. By and large, each reincarnation had his own monastery. The great monastic centre at Dolonnor was a notable exception in that it contained living quarters for the lCang-skya Khutughtu and twelve other incarnate lamas.¹⁶

In Outer Mongolia, the head of the religious establishment was the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu in Urga, an incarnate lama of enormous prestige who, in the Mongols' eyes, ranked third in the dGe-lugs-pa, after the Dalai and Panchen Lamas of Tibet. The Ch'ing government, anxious to prevent the development of a single Mongolian church that might serve as a rallying point for Mongolian unity, had been careful to build up the standing of the lCang-skya Khutughtu as a counterweight to the Jebtsun-

¹⁶ Hashimoto Kōhō, *Mōko no ramakyō*, 199–200.

damba's influence, and they also tried subtly to maintain an equilibrium of power in Mongolia between the Dalai Lama and the two Mongolian primates. To prevent an alliance between the lay aristocracy and the lamaist church, which might have united Mongolian society with dangerous consequences, the Ch'ing government discouraged the finding of reincarnations in noble families.

On the other hand, the government wanted to tie the Mongols to the empire and it was Ch'ing policy to fuse lamaism with Chinese religious ideas insofar as Mongolian religious sentiment would allow. The second lCang-skya Khutughtu (1717–86), for example, had been encouraged to write a prayer in Tibetan, Manchu and Mongolian versions to join Kuan-ti, the Chinese god of war, with the three leading divinities of the Yellow church. At the end of the eighteenth century, in Manchuria and in all the Chinese provinces bordering on Inner Asia, the Ch'ing began to subsidize the building of temples to Kuan-ti as the tutelary deity of the bannermen-officials. Kuan-ti was now equated with Vaiśravaṇa, who had long been identified with the Tibetan and Mongolian folk hero Geser Khan, and Chinese omens relating to Kuan-ti began to be translated into Mongolian, thus furthering the Ch'ing policy of religious fusion. In the second half of the nineteenth century Ch'ing-supported Mongolian theologians would explicitly enthrone Kuan-ti/Geser Khan as a tutelary deity of the Buddhist religion.¹⁷

The monasteries, and also individual reincarnating lamas, drew an increasing proportion of their support from the growing numbers of shabi families whom the jasaks donated as bondsmen. The jasaks also supplied large areas of pastureland for the monasteries' livestock, and the monks constantly dunned the banner subjects for contributions. Ordinary herds-men dared not refuse, and the church lavished great sums on lamaist rituals, like making Buddha images out of butter, while the poor went hungry. In Outer Mongolia the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu had acquired so many shabis and pastures by the beginning of the nineteenth century that his possessions, administered by an Office of Shabis, virtually constituted a separate aimak. In 1822 the Ch'ing government, in effect, gave recognition to this fact by making the post of treasurer (*shang judba*) of the Office of Shabis equal in rank to the league captains-general. Since the government exempted monasteries and their shabis from taxation, the tax burden fell the more heavily upon the banner subjects. Meanwhile the monasteries used their property for all kinds of business transactions, the most lucrative of which was moneylending.

¹⁷ Walther Heissig, 'Die Religionen der Mongolei', in Giuseppe Tucci and Walther Heissig, *Die Religionen Tibets und der Mongolei*, 408–10.


In Mongolian eyes the Buddhist church and its doctrines counter-balanced the Mongols' ancient lay culture and their traditional leadership, descended from Chinggis Khan. Some of the Mongols of Old Barga remained shamanists, and shamanism had remained strong among the Buriat Mongols, in Russian territory, until the end of the eighteenth century. It was not until the first decades after 1800 that the Buriats' shamanic utensils and garments were sought out and burned. Moreover, the syncretic tendency of Buddhism in Mongolia allowed many shamanist traditions to take on Buddhist clothing and survive in this form, but as a force to be reckoned with in Mongolian society, shamanism was a thing of the past. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, increasing numbers of the Mongols' most talented young men took vows and became monks. Not all of these abandoned their pastoral labours and went to live in the monasteries. About two-thirds of the monk population remained in the banners, and there was nothing inconsistent in a lama being the bondsman of a member of the lay nobility.¹⁸ But more and more young men did enter the monasteries, and increasing amounts of Mongolia's pasture and produce went to the payment of monastic ceremonial expenses rather than to feed the people.

While the population was shrinking, the number of monasteries was growing. By the early twentieth century the monasteries in Inner Mongolia may have exceeded 1,000, and in Outer Mongolia there seem to have been about 750 monasteries, with many additional small temples in both regions. For Inner Mongolia it has been estimated, astonishingly, that between 30 and 65 per cent of the male population took vows (at least one son from each family), and the proportion given for Outer Mongolia in 1918 is about 45 per cent. By comparison, a late nineteenth-century estimate for Tibet reckoned that only one third of the Tibetan male population became monks.¹⁹ What relation these estimates bear to the situation in Mongolia in 1800 is unknown, but it is not unlikely that the proportion of monks, like the number of monasteries, increased over the course of the nineteenth century.

By 1800 the monasteries and the mercantile activity that they sheltered had also given birth to another social development – urban centres, growing first in Inner Mongolia and then gradually spreading into Outer Mongolia. Around the major monasteries, and especially at Urga – the residence of the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu – market communities had developed into towns populated by lamas, Han Chinese merchants

¹⁸ See, for example, Charles R. Bawden, 'A juridical document from nineteenth-century Mongolia', *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 3 (1969) 231, 247, n. 36.

¹⁹ Miller, *Monasteries*, 27–31; Maiskii, *Mongoliia*, 42–3, 246–7; Charles R. Bawden, *The modern history of Mongolia*, 160; and Carrasco, *Land and polity*, 121.



MAP 3. Mongolia in the 1860s

and artisans, and the vagrant poor. In the most important of these Outer Mongolian centres, such as Urga, Uliasutai and Khobdo, Ch'ing military garrisons added another element to the process of urbanization.

The third factor in Mongolia's social and economic decline was an outgrowth of the second. The building of monasteries had opened Mongolia to the penetration of Chinese trade. In earlier times, Mongols had exchanged livestock and animal products at the borders of the steppe for the items that they needed from China and elsewhere. Otherwise they had done business in China on tribute missions to the Chinese capital or else had bartered with limited numbers of Muslim merchants from central Asia who had brought their caravans into the steppe itself. Except for the import-export business of these central Asian merchants, Mongolia had little internal trade other than non-market exchanges on a relatively limited scale, and there was no Mongolian merchant class. The Mongols also did some trading with the Russians, legally at Kiakhta, and illegally at other points along the Russo-Mongolian frontier, but a principal effect of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Kiakhta (1728) had been to put trade with Russia into the hands of Han Chinese merchants.

The monasteries greatly aided these merchants in establishing their commercial control throughout Mongolia. Where once nothing but nomad encampments had dotted the open grazing lands, fixed monasteries with surrounding walls served as marketplaces and storage depots, providing the Chinese trader with direct access to the steppe. This did not mean that border trade along the Sino-Mongolian frontier ceased to exist, for the number of Han Chinese shops at the border markets, and especially at Kalgan, increased steadily throughout the Ch'ing period.²⁰ But Han merchants, mainly from Peking and Shansi, were bringing their wares into the very heart of Mongolia in complete safety and were building up tastes and creating demands for Chinese products. Things that the nomads of an earlier day would have regarded as luxuries, such as tea, tobacco and Chinese manufactures, the Mongols had come to consider necessities. Chinese luxuries had always symbolized wealth for the nomad aristocracy, but as the monastic communities had grown in power, monks too had begun to demand luxuries of all kinds and consistently extracted contributions from the people to pay for them. This led to much popular resentment. At the end of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth, there were many local disturbances directed against Han merchants, especially in the Tüshiyetü Khan and Sechen Khan aimaks. From time to time mobs would beat up Han traders, plunder their warehouses, and

²⁰ Tayama Shigeru, *Shin jidai ni okeru Mōko no shakai seido*, 280-1.

destroy their account books.²¹ The Han merchants frequently provoked the anger of the monasteries as well as that of the laity, but the net effect of the monasteries' role was support for Chinese trade.

In the eighteenth century it had been Ch'ing policy to keep the Mongols as a military reservoir. Since Han Chinese trade penetration undermined this objective, the empire had made various attempts to restrict the activities of Han merchants, especially in Outer Mongolia, but without success. The Ch'ing government required that Han traders in Mongolia be licensed on an annual basis. It forbade them to marry Mongolian women, spend the night in Mongolian tents, or construct permanent buildings except under specified conditions. Since the Han merchants had not heeded these restrictions, the government tried to expel unlicensed merchants from Mongolia, as in 1805, but such attempts had little effect. Merchants to whom the Mongols owed money had to be allowed to stay long enough to collect it. The Mongols not only could not pay but could not avoid increasing their indebtedness; so the Han traders remained in Mongolia and carried on their business as before. The Ch'ing government, for its part, began to depend more and more on the Han merchants' licence fees to support the imperial administration in Mongolia. In short, the Ch'ing government gradually shifted to a policy of supporting Han merchants in the steppe.

The Mongols produced seasonal animal products and needed to sell them as soon as they could, but their needs were continuous. Consequently Han traders could buy low, sell high, and extend credit. Widespread indebtedness had resulted, and such wealth as there was in Mongolia had begun to flow more and more into Han Chinese hands. Han Chinese business firms also acted as banking institutions, charging the unsophisticated Mongols high rates of interest. Whole banners had become mortgaged to these firms, and by the nineteenth century Han usurers did a thriving business. As the Mongols' indebtedness increased, interest rates soared. Jasaks, lamas and merchants together encouraged the sale of goods on credit, and when the jasaks themselves contracted debts beyond their ability to pay, they began illegally to transfer the collection of taxes and levies directly to the Han Chinese firms, so that in time Han trading firms and private merchants began to 'own' the Mongolian *arad*, or common people. The trend towards commuting services and taxes in kind into money taxes aggravated this situation still further. In the eighteenth century Mongolia had already begun to shift in the direction of a money economy, and by the nineteenth century silver had widely become the required means of payment. Monasteries were insisting that their shabis

²¹ *Istoriia Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki*, 2nd edn, 211–12, and Bawden, *Modern history*, 173.

render their payments in silver. At the same time the price of silver was steadily rising, so that all fixed silver payments that shabis had to make to their monasteries and that banner subjects had to make to their princes grew steadily more onerous. This hard economic fact, coupled with the increasing levies and taxes that banner princes imposed on their subjects to cover their accounts with Han merchants, led gradually to the impoverishment of the Mongolian commonalty.

Although trade and banking remained for the most part in Han Chinese hands, there was cooperation between merchants and banner princes, and princes and lamas became shareholders in Chinese trading and money-lending firms. Wittingly and unwittingly, banner princes, monasteries and Han merchants were working hand-in-hand to destroy what remained of Mongolia's traditional nomadic society. And meanwhile on the rim of the steppe another process of even greater long-range significance was under way: Han colonists were farming the edges of what had once been pastureland.

SINKIANG

Two distinct zones diverged from the crests of the T'ien Shan mountain range. Eastern Turkestan, south of the T'ien Shan, belonged to the world of the sown. Zungharia, north of the T'ien Shan, belonged to the world of the steppe. In the 1750s the Ch'ien-lung Emperor's armies conquered both sides of the T'ien Shan, putting themselves in possession of what then became the most ethnologically diverse territory in Inner Asia. They called Zungharia the T'ien Shan Northern Circuit (T'ien Shan Pei-lu), and they spoke of Eastern Turkestan as the T'ien Shan Southern Circuit (T'ien Shan Nan-lu). The Ch'ing army administered these two zones together as an imperial dependency under the name of Sinkiang, Kansu's 'New Dominion'. The dependency was rich in jade, gold, copper, cotton, farming land and pasture. It was also rich in political trouble.

Like the Zunghars before them, the Manchus established their administrative centre in Ili. They renamed the former Zunghar capital which the Kazakhs and other Muslims referred to as Kulja (Ghulja), calling it Ning-yüan, and built a new city, Hui-yüan, farther west. The Kazakhs came to refer to this new city, where the Ch'ing installed their military governor (*chiang-chün*) in 1762, as New or Little Kulja. Ning-yüan, which continued to thrive as an economic and cultural centre for Ili's expanding immigrant Muslim population, was spoken of as Old Kulja. The Ch'ing also built seven other cities in Ili in the eighteenth century, but as might have been expected, New Kulja, which housed the offices of the military governor, experienced the most rapid growth.

Sinkiang's overall administration was in essence nothing more than a huge garrison under the command of the military governor, who in theory also held a 'loose rein' on the outer regions of Kokand, Tashkent, Bukhara, Bolor, Badakhshan, Afghanistan and Kanjut. He had civil jurisdiction over the Öölöd (Kalmuk) banners within Zungharia, the Kirghiz and Kazakh tribes, the civilian colonies, the principalities of Hami and Turfan, and all the cities of Altishahr, but it was Ch'ing policy to interfere as little as possible in the native peoples' internal affairs. Sinkiang officials 'neither respected nor learned much about the languages and customs of the peoples whom they ruled'.²²

To aid the military governor, the Ch'ing established a military lieutenant-governor at Urumchi (Tihwa) with jurisdiction over the imperial bureaucracy north of the T'ien Shan and in Uighuristan (Hami and Turfan). The Sinkiang garrison also had councillors at New Kulja in Ili and at Tarbagatai (Chuguchak) in north-western Sinkiang, and a third councillor at Kashgar – known to the East Turkestanis as the 'khan amban' – who had jurisdiction over the imperial bureaucracy in Altishahr (literally, the 'Six Cities' – Eastern Turkestan exclusive of Hami and Turfan). The post of military governor and all the top official posts in the dependency were reserved for bannermen. The garrison forces themselves, which ranged between totals of 10,000 and 23,000 men, consisted mainly of bannermen from Jehol and China proper, but also included nomads (Chahars from Inner Mongolia, Öölöd survivors of the Ch'ing conquest and some from Jehol, and the Shabinar who had returned from the Volga), Manchurian tribal peoples (Sibo from Fengtien province and Solons and Daghurs from Heilungkiang) and Green Standard Han Chinese forces from Kansu and Shensi. Being stationed as occupation troops without limit of time, they were, in effect, an immigrant population permanently established in Sinkiang with their families and all their belongings.

For duty assignments, these military forces were divided among three military districts: northern, eastern and southern. The northern district, directly under the military governor, numbered over 13,000 men and was by far the largest. By the beginning of the nineteenth century it consisted of something over 98,000 persons, including all dependents. The backbone of the northern district, and indeed of the whole Sinkiang army, was the main garrison force of bannermen at New Kulja, and there was another large garrison of bannermen under a commandant of the forces at Hui-ning, with four additional contingents of Sibos, Solons, Chahars and Öölöds camping in the vicinity, each under a separate commandant, as well as Shabinar, Daghur and attached Han Chinese military colonists from the

²² Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia*, 171.

Army of the Green Standard. The Chahars and Öölöd served mainly as livestock raisers, supplying the army with horses and other livestock for combat, transport and meat.

The eastern district, under the command of the military lieutenant-governor at Urumchi, numbered between 5,000 and 6,000 soldiers, mostly bannermen, and included 1,000 troops stationed at Khitai (Ku-ch'eng), another 1,000 at Barkol (Chen-hsi), and a growing number of Green Standard forces.

The southern military district, unlike the northern and eastern areas, had no permanent forces of its own. Instead, it drew most of its troops from the other two districts on five-year (originally three-year) tours of duty, and the families of the garrison forces were not allowed to move in. Bannermen and Green Standard forces garrisoned Kashgar, Yarkand, Yangi Hisar and Ush Turfan. Green Standard soldiers from north of the T'ien Shan were stationed at Karashahr, Kucha, Sairam, Aksu, Khotan and elsewhere. Other Green Standard troops, detailed for duty in Sinkiang by the governor-general of Shensi and Kansu, were stationed at Hami and Barkol. In all, the total number of Ch'ing forces on duty in the southern military district at any one time must have been around 6,000 men, and in addition to these there was a small corps of 500 East Turkestanian soldiers at Kashgar under a native commandant (*tsung-kuan*) and six subordinate native officers. Indigenous households also did semi-military duty by manning guard posts.

At the turn of the nineteenth century – on the eve of Kokand's rise to regional power, and before Russia and Britain began to make themselves felt in Ch'ing central Asia – Eastern Turkestan, protected as it was by the T'ien Shan and the Pamirs, seemed to the Ch'ing government to be a political and military *cul-de-sac*. The imperial authorities focused their attention instead on the defence and development of the T'ien Shan Northern Circuit and regarded Altishahr mainly as a huge tax-farm to support the army.

The Sinkiang garrison was an expensive operation, for the soldiers' annual pay alone was the equivalent of roughly 3,000,000 taels in silver, and the tax revenues of the dependency did not begin to cover this. Money taxes and raw copper levied annually from the population of Altishahr amounted to only about 13,500,000 *pūl* (or Altishahr copper cash), not counting foreign trade duties and other miscellaneous taxes. This was valued locally at less than 62,000 silver taels by the current copper-silver exchange rate in 1801 (220 *pūl* = one silver tael).²³ The government

collected annual grain revenues totalling just under 649,000 piculs, mainly from the Zungharian colonies. Even with all the additional taxes and duties levied in money and kind, including the produce of the governments' copperfields and livestock-breeding farms, Sinkiang was not self-supporting. By 1800 the garrison's official granaries were full (there were reserves of well over 500,000 piculs of wheat – the only grain that the government stored²⁴ – in the Ili grain stores alone), but something like 1,200,000 silver taels had to come each year from China proper for Sinkiang to meet its expenses.

In Sinkiang money circulated separately in two discrete regions. In the first, consisting of Zungharia and Uighuristan as far west as Karashahr, the monetary system was based on silver by weight, as in China proper whence this silver came. But as early as 1814 the Peking government began making efforts to reduce its exports of silver to Sinkiang. Cash (coins, *wen*) of standard Chinese alloyed copper money (*chih-ch'ien* or simply *ch'ien*) was also minted in Ili. In Altishahr, the second region, the monetary system was based on copper, but not on the Ili cash, since copper coinage was not standardized for Sinkiang as a whole. The basic unit of Altishahr's currency was the *pūl*, which was of pure red copper and therefore called *hung-ch'ien*, 'red cash', in Chinese. Its face resembled the cash of China proper, but the place of the mint was given in both Arabic script and Manchu. Fifty *pūl* made one *tängä*. In 1800 Altishahr had only one functioning mint – in Aksu – and the *pūl* did not circulate outside Altishahr. Within Altishahr there were no gold or silver coins, but halves and quarters of silver ingots called *yambu* (*Yüan-pao*), as well as smaller portions and even ordinary lumps of silver, circulated at their value by weight.

The output of the Aksu mint averaged over 26,000 strings (1,000 *pūl* each) annually, and the Ili mint coined a yearly average of 1,722 strings (1,000 cash each). Both mints coined money twice a year, in spring and autumn. The Aksu *pūl* and the Ili cash each had the same weight, 0.12 Chinese ounces (1 *ch'ien* 2 *fen*), but the *pūl*, being of pure copper, was worth five Ili cash. Most of the raw copper, and in particular the copper for the mint in Aksu, came from the government fields at On Bash, where a Ch'ing military work force produced over 21,000 lbs (16,200 catties) annu-

Hisar, Yarkand and Khotan (7,669,000 *pūl* – Tseng, 286–7), plus raw copper from On Bash (worth over 1,600,000 *pūl* – Tseng, 290), plus raw copper levied from the people (11,053 *chin* = over 1,092,000 *pūl* – Tseng, 290). For the silver exchange rate see Tseng, 289. The subject awaits careful study. See also Narochinskii, *Kolonial'naia*, 110–11.

²⁴ See Ahmad Shāh Naqshbandi, 'Route from Kashmir, viā Ladakh, to Yarkand, by Ahmed Shah Nakshahbandi', tr J. Dowson, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 12 (1850) 383.

ally. Since copper was mined indigenously, while silver had to be imported, the value of copper relative to silver was declining.

Zungharia

The pastoral territories of the T'ien Shan Northern Circuit were culturally and historically an extension of Mongolia. Hereditary *jasaks* ruled the nomad population under the watchful eyes of garrison officials in Ili, Kur Kara Usu (Wu-su), Tarbagatai and Karashahr. Two leagues of Kalmuk immigrants from the Volga pastured in Zungharia. The Ünen Sūjügtü League, consisting of ten Old Torghuud banners, camped in four groups: three northern banners at Tarbagatai, one western banner near Ching-ho (south of Lake Ebi Nor), two eastern banners at Kur Kara Usu, and four southern banners on the southern slopes of the T'ien Shan in the Yulduz River area north-west of Karashahr. The Batu Sedkiltü League, consisting of four banners of Khoshuud, pastured beside the southern Old Torghuud in the Yulduz region. In all respects, except for the fact that the Torghuud and Khoshuud did not pay taxes on livestock, their administrative rules, tributary and taxation requirements and social organization resembled those obtaining in the various leagues of Inner and Outer Mongolia. Like other Mongols, the Volga Kalmuks belonged to the dGe-lugs-pa or Yellow church of Tibetan Buddhism, which played an important part in the cultural life of northern Sinkiang. The Ch'ing throne, as patron of the religion, made gifts to the monasteries and temples of Zungharia, just as it supported the Yellow church elsewhere among the Mongols.

In the tribal areas west of the guard posts and in the steppe region beyond the imperial frontier, the Kazakhs, a nomadic Turkic-speaking Muslim people, pastured their animals with virtually no interference from the authorities. They were regarded as foreign tributaries, sent tribute every three years to Peking, and had a two-way trade monopoly with the Ch'ing government: officially the authorities monopolized the right to trade with the Kazakhs, and the Zungharian officials, in theory, allowed no other foreigners to do business in northern Sinkiang. This official Ch'ing-Kazakh barter trade was confined to Ili and Tarbagatai. The Kazakhs exchanged livestock (mainly horses) – the Chahars and Öölöd being unable to raise enough to satisfy the army's needs – for cloth (mainly silk) at fixed trade values. But the Kazakhs exercised their tributary rights by doing private business on the side. Although the authorities supplied the army in Eastern Turkestan with Kazakh horses, the Kazakhs themselves were not supposed to sell their animals in Eastern Turkestan,

and East Turkestanis were forbidden to go to the Kazakh pastures to buy livestock there. When some Kazakhs came to Kashgar to sell livestock in 1808, the local officials fixed impossibly low prices so that the Kazakhs were forced to give up their attempt and return home, taking their animals with them. In Zungharia and Mongolia the authorities were less strict, and on various pretexts Kazakh caravans occasionally visited Urumchi, Khobdo, Uliasutai, the Uriyangkhai territories and Kashgar, managing to bypass the government's restrictions. But the Ch'ing government carefully enforced its prohibition against the sale of metalware to Kazakhs, Kirghiz or any central Asian merchants.

As tributaries, the Kazakhs were permitted to pasture within the imperial frontier. In the event of heavy snow, the government even let them winter in the area of the guard post line, in return for which the Ch'ing taxed them 1 per cent of their horses. Every year the Sinkiang authorities sent a detachment out into the steppe to collect taxes from them. Because the Kazakhs were foreigners, the Ch'ing named no *jasaks* among them and made no attempt to divide them into banners. Those Kazakhs who pastured within the imperial frontier came and went at will, and while their chiefs enjoyed the benefits of being Ch'ing tributaries, most of them simultaneously acknowledged themselves clients of Russia.

The Ch'ing government was confused about the Kazakhs' internal organization because in the eighteenth century Ablai, a sultan of the Middle Horde, had both ruled the Senior Horde and become khan of the Middle Horde as well. In the 1750s, following, perhaps, a Zunghar or Kazakh usage of the time, the Ch'ing authorities had categorized the Kazakhs into two groups – the easternmost Middle and Senior Horde units under Ablai, which they called the tribes of the left (*tso-pu*) and the remaining, more westerly Kazakhs of the Middle Horde under Abu'l-Muhammad, whom they referred to as the tribes of the right (*yu-pu*).²⁵ Discovery of the Junior Horde's existence still farther west had led to the creation of a third category, the tribes of the west (*hsi-pu*). These categories reflected *de facto* political realities in the late eighteenth-century Kazakh steppe, but the Ch'ing government's knowledge that there were three Kazakh hordes led to some faulty identifications. When the first official Sinkiang gazetteer appeared in 1782, it correctly associated the tribes of the left with Ablai and the Middle Horde, but the editors made the mistake of identifying the tribes of the right with the Junior and Senior Hordes and characterized the Middle Horde sultan Abu'l-Fayḍ (Abu'l-Muhammad's son and Ablai's rival) as khan of the Senior Horde.²⁶ In

²⁵ Cf. Saguchi Tōru, *Jūbarshi-jūkyūseiki Higashi Torukisutan sbakaisbi kenkyū*, 272–9, to the contrary.

²⁶ See Fu-heng *et al.* ed. *Ch'in-ting huang-yü Hsi-yü i'u-shih*, 2.17b, 44.23ff.

the official publication *Hsin-chiang chih-lüeh* (1821) these errors were partially rectified,²⁷ but as late as 1842 the historian and publicist Wei Yüan was still identifying the tribes of the right with the Junior and Senior Hordes.²⁸ It is clear that by the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ch'ing government's 'loose rein' policy over the Kazakhs was loose in the extreme.

Another nomadic Turkic-speaking Muslim people inhabiting Sinkiang's western marches was the Kirghiz. They were known in Ch'ing sources as Burut (a name not used by the Kirghiz), and called by the Russians Dikokamennye, Zakamennye or Kamennye (because of their inaccessible mountainous habitat) or Kara – Black – Kirghiz (because, unlike the Kazakhs, their rulers were not royalty, that is, not descended from Chinggis Khan). These epithets were necessary in nineteenth-century Russia in order to distinguish the Kirghiz from the Kazakhs, whom the Russians referred to as Kirghiz-Kazakhs, Kirghiz-Kaisaks, Kaisaks or even Kirghiz, so as to distinguish them in turn from the Cossacks (in Russian, Kazak) of Russia proper.

The Ch'ing authorities classified the Kirghiz into two tribal confederations, an eastern group in the western T'ien Shan and a western group in the Pamirs, but this classification bore little if any relation to the thinking of the Kirghiz themselves.²⁹ In fact, they pastured in individual tribal groups, and without any general political unity, acknowledging themselves as subjects, when occasion required, of Kokand, Badakhshan, Karategin, the East Bukharan province of Hisar, or the Ch'ing empire – wherever they happened to be. In Ch'ing theory they were tributaries, and in some cases subjects, of the empire: they were expected to present an annual tribute of horses, were permitted to pasture in Sinkiang as far east as Aksu, and were allowed to trade at Kashgar, where they bought cotton cloth and other products and sold mainly livestock. They paid a commercial duty on this livestock at the rate of one head out of every thirty and, on other goods, the standard import duty of 3½ per cent *ad valorem*. In practice, however, they lived almost wholly outside the rule of law, and the Ch'ing government made no attempt to restrict their comings and goings across the border.

In addition to its pasturelands, Zungharia contained huge tracts of territory suitable for farming; so the Ch'ing had moved considerable numbers of East Turkestani families, known as Taranchis, into the region around Old Kulja to grow food in what were called Muslim colonies

²⁷ See Mien-hsin *et al.* ed. *Ch'in-ting Hsin-chiang chih-lüeh*, 12.3b–4a.

²⁸ Wei Yüan, *Sbeng-wu chi*, 4.32a–b, 33b.

²⁹ Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 1.301–2.

(*Hui-t'un*) for the support of the military and civil administrations. By 1800 the Taranchis numbered over 34,000 persons. The Ch'ing had also transferred soldiers from the Han Chinese Green Standard forces, Sibos, Solons and Chahars, along with their families, to the lands north of the T'ien Shan, forming permanent military colonies (*ping-t'un*) of non-bannermen which handed over a stipulated portion of their annual harvests to the Sinkiang garrison. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, it had become clear that these military colonies were not sufficiently productive; so in 1802 the authorities dug a large irrigation canal east of New Kulja on the northern bank of the Ili River and created farming colonies for bannermen (*ch'i-t'un*). Despite some ambivalence on the government's part about the role of these bannermen-farmers, the Ch'ing preferred to keep them in training as soldiers and accordingly allowed them to lease their lands to tenant farmers, usually Taranchis. The authorities continued to improve the irrigation system, and the Ili farmland area steadily increased.

Even more important in its long-range significance had been the government's decision to move Han Chinese and Chinese Muslim families into northern Sinkiang from China proper – the very policy that the Ch'ing were resisting in northern Manchuria and in which, in Mongolia, the authorities were only lately and grudgingly acquiescing. The Ch'ing government soon after the conquest started to encourage immigration from China proper and settlement north of the T'ien Shan by converting large areas of unused pasture into civilian colonies (*hu-t'un*). By the turn of the nineteenth century, hundreds of thousands of Chinese Muslims and non-Muslim Han Chinese had settled in northern Sinkiang, primarily in the districts of Barkol, Turfan and Urumchi. As in Manchuria, the government had also exiled convicts to Zungharia to till in exiles' colonies (*fan-t'un* or *ch'ien-t'un*). By 1777, north of the T'ien Shan, there had been some 10,750 Green Standard households and almost 500 civil and military exile families cultivating a total farm area of nearly 35,000 acres (some 227,300 *mou*). South of the T'ien Shan, mainly in the territories of Hami and Turfan, there were also some colony lands but with a total area less than one third that amount.

The number of Green Standard colonists did not substantially increase in the last years of the eighteenth century, and the number of criminal exiles never rose above 2,000, because in 1804 the government began to liquidate the exile colonies. But the number of civilian colonists grew enormously, attracted by the government's offer of 4½ acres (30 *mou*) of land per family. In 1775, there had been just under 17,200 civilian households – some 72,000 persons, mainly around Urumchi, cultivating a total

area of just under 42,500 acres (280,253 *mou*). By 1800 the Chinese-speaking population must have doubled several times over, for in 1808 in the districts under Urumchi's jurisdiction, the amount of civilian farmland had expanded to ten times its area of 1775.³⁰ There had been a similar increase of cultivated land and of immigrant farmers in Ili, and by the nineteenth century new civilian settlements were in existence at Kur Kara Usu and Ching-ho. Civilian colonists owned their lands and were liable for taxes and services on the same basis as in China proper. The government also permitted craftsmen and merchants to migrate with their families from China proper into northern Sinkiang, and to do business there and in the region of Hami.

Among Zungharia's most valuable resources were the region's sub-surface minerals. Fear of attracting a gold rush of politically troublesome drifters from China proper prompted the Ch'ing emperor to issue an edict in 1801 that discouraged the mining in Zungharia of precious metals, but gold was nevertheless mined privately, as was coal, under government regulation. There were fourteen gold mines in operation, employing 1,223 miners, each of whom paid the government 0.03 taels (3 *fen*) of gold per month, so that monthly gold revenues totalled 36.69 taels. Deposits of iron ore and lead (used to cast bullets) were worked, and Zungharian copper deposits began to be exploited in the first decade of the nineteenth century, mainly for the Ili mint.

Administratively, the farming population of Ili was subject to the authority of the Sinkiang military governor, but the Chinese-speaking farmers, craftsmen, merchants and miners of the eastern district, under the supervision of the military lieutenant-governor at Urumchi, came under the jurisdiction of Kansu province. They were governed by a taotai of Chen-hsi (Barkol) and Tihwa (Urumchi), who was stationed at Urumchi and had both civil and military responsibilities over three subordinate administrative areas: Chen-hsi prefecture, the independent department of Tihwa, and the independent sub-prefecture of Turfan.

Chinese Muslims from Shensi, Kansu and Szechwan, whom the East Turkestanis referred to as Tungans, made up by far the largest part of this immigrant Chinese-speaking population – 1,500 Tungan families living in New Kulja alone. The Tungans were Sunnis (Orthodox Muslims), some of their jurists belonging to the Hanafite school of law and others to the Shafi'ite. Sufi tarikats (mystical brotherhoods) played an important part in their religious lives. The most important of these were the Old Teaching (Lao-chiao or Chiu-chiao) of the Naqshbandiyya (Khafiyya,

³⁰ Tseng, *Chung-kuo*, 275–8, 282; p. 280 says approximately fourteen times, but this does not correspond to the figures in his tables on pp. 278–80.



MAP 4. Sinkiang c. 1800–c. 1860

pronounced Khufiyya, the 'Silent' brotherhood), associated with the early eighteenth-century preacher Ma Lai-ch'ih, and the New Teaching (Hsin-chiao), of Ma Ming-hsin (d. 1781), another Naqshbandi branch known as the Jahriyya, the 'Vocal' brotherhood. The Tungans read their prayers in Arabic, using the Chinese language for sermons and commentaries, and lived strict lives: they shaved their moustaches, abstained from tobacco and wine, and ate no pork. Filtering out of the colony districts of Chen-hsi, Tihwa and Turfan, they soon came to comprise an important segment of the populations of Ili and Tarbagatai, and despite Ch'ing restrictions on immigration into Eastern Turkestan, many of them made their way into the oases south of the T'ien Shan, where they ran restaurants or earned a living in the tea trade.

The Tungans, however, dressed like Han Chinese and could not mingle easily with the East Turkestanis and other central Asian Muslims, who found them alien and aggressive and tended not to distinguish them from Chinese in general. Nevertheless, wherever the Tungans went, their commercial talents and their culturally intermediate position between China and the Muslim world enabled them to play a powerful role in trade. Virtually all of the non-Muslim Han Chinese were Shensi or Kansu people, and most belonged to the Army of the Green Standard. Those who did not were mainly government clerks, merchants, artisans and, of course, farmers. Since the Tungans spoke Chinese, they could deal with these people, which gave them access to the lower echelons of government and strengthened their contacts with skilled Chinese handicraft manufacturers and with the trading firms of China proper. Tungan men also commonly married Han Chinese women, thus further extending their business connections through family ties and expanding the Muslim community by rearing the children of such unions in the Islamic religion. Since many of them could speak a little Tatar, they also had an advantage in the Kazakhs' trade in Ili and Tarbagatai. The Ch'ing garrison administration, which valued the Tungans' reputation for incorruptibility, preferred them to Sinkiang's other ethnic groups for service in police capacities. As time passed, the Tungans steadily increased their numbers, their economic power, and their political and cultural influence.³¹

³¹ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.340-1, esp. n. 3; P. I. Nebol'sin, 'Ocherki trgovli Rossii s Srednei Aziei', *Zapiski Imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva*, 10 (1855) 341-2, 347; and Henry Walter Bellew, 'History of Káshghar', in T. D. Forsyth, ed. *Report of a mission to Yarkund in 1873*, 201 ('Sháfi sect' = Shafi'ite madhhab).

Eastern Turkestan

South of the T'ien Shan lay Eastern Turkestan, or Little Bukharia. This was composed of a north-eastern zone, which had formerly been known as Uighuristan, and a much larger south-western zone, the Tarim basin, called Altishahr or Kashgaria, although both terms – Altishahr and Kashgaria – have sometimes been used to designate the whole of Eastern Turkestan. In these two areas, Uighuristan and Altishahr, the inhabitants were almost exclusively Turki-speaking. Tajik – the central Asian form of New Persian – continued to be understood by a few people, but by the nineteenth century such people were rare.³² By religion the East Turkestanis were Sunni Muslims and followers of the Hanafite school of law. Although not without cultural peculiarities of their own, the East Turkestanis were an integral part of the Turco-Iranian civilization of central Asia. The entire indigenous population was probably under 300,000, not counting foreigners or the children of foreigners by native wives, and of this figure over 70 per cent lived at the western or Kashgar end of the Tarim basin, while Uighuristan in the east accounted for only about 10 per cent of the native population.³³ Between the Ch'ing conquest in 1759 and the 1820s, both the East Turkestan population and the farmland under cultivation appear to have doubled.

As a whole, the people of Eastern Turkestan had no common ethnic designation for themselves other than *yerlik*, which merely means 'local'. They went separately under the several names of the oases that they inhabited. Thus, the natives of Kashgar called themselves Kashgaris; the people of Turfan spoke of themselves as Turfanis; and the populations of the other oases followed the same pattern. Even foreign Muslims did not see the East Turkestanis together as a distinct ethnic group. The Siberian Tatar merchant Murtaḍā Fayḍ ad-Dīn Marzian, for example, who traded in Sinkiang in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, simply lumped East Turkestanis with West Turkestanis, referring to them all as 'Uzbeks'.³⁴

A few ethnic groups, however, did stand out from the Turki-speaking

³² W. H. Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary and Khoten', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 4.48 (Dec. 1835), esp. p. 662.

³³ Saguchi, *Jūbachi*, 197–8; cf., however, Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.342.

³⁴ Nebol'sin, 'Ocherki', 345, 347; Gregor von Helmersen, ed. 'Nachrichten über Chiwa, Buchara, Chokand und den nordwestlichen Theil des chinesischen Staates, gesammelt von dem Präsidenten der asiatischen Grenz-Commission in Orenburg, General-Major Gens', *Beiträge zur Kenntniss des Russischen Reiches und der angränzenden Länder Asiens*, series 1, 2 (1839) 95–7; also Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', esp. p. 662. Helmersen and Humboldt change Fayḍ ad-Dīn to Sayf ad-Dīn and 'Seyfullin' – see Helmersen, 'Nachrichten', 89.

oasis population at large. In the Karashahr, Kucha, Aksu, Ush Turfan and Yarkand districts, for example, were the Dolans, who spoke Turki with an accent of their own and whose women, like Kirghiz, wrapped their heads in white kerchiefs. In the Aksu and Ush Turfan regions they raised sheep of a breed common among the Öölöd, and they manned postal relay stations for the Sinkiang garrison. In the district of Ush Turfan, the Niugeits, apparently of Kirghiz origin, dwelt in felt tents in the summer and had fixed settlements in the winter. They lived by livestock raising and served the Ch'ing government by clearing out the ice from the Muzart pass. A similar type of tent-dwelling in summer and village-living in winter was to be found among the inhabitants of the region between Yarkand and Yangi Hisar.³⁵ The settled inhabitants of the Lopnor district seem to have been somewhat different from other East Turkestanis and may not all have been Muslims.³⁶ In 1800 the native population of Ush Turfan, with few exceptions, appears to have had no traditional roots in that place but to have been the children and grandchildren of people whom the Ch'ing had resettled there from other districts of the Tarim basin a generation earlier. Turki was spoken as far east as Su-chou in Kansu, and it was only beyond that point that central Asian merchants began to need interpreters who could speak Chinese.³⁷

At the western end of the Tarim basin, mainly in Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan, there was a substantial foreign population of merchants, which included some craftsmen connected with foreign commercial interests and a growing number of natives of mixed parentage. In 1795 the Ch'ing government had prohibited foreigners from taking native wives, but the prohibition was not easily enforceable, and with time, marriages between foreign Muslims – mainly Kokand subjects – and Kashgarian women increased. The children of these marriages, who were known as Chalgurts, were considered, despite their language, residence and culture, to be subjects of the same rulers as their fathers. Children of Chalgurt fathers were similarly considered Chalgurts and so not Ch'ing subjects. Bannermen kept local women, but marriages between Ch'ing personnel and East Turkestanian women were forbidden by law. Children of such unions were regarded as natives.

At Tashmalik, in the district of Kashgar, were the Turaygir Kipchak tribe of the Kirghiz numbering some 500 families in the 1850s – the

³⁵ Mir 'Izzat Allāh, *Travels in central Asia by Meer Izzut-Oollah in the years 1812–13*, tr P. D. Henderson, 30.

³⁶ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.339. Buddhism survived into the twentieth century among some of the Turks of north-west China.

³⁷ 'Izzat Allāh, *Travels*, 38.

only Kirghiz whom the Ch'ing permitted to live in Eastern Turkestan on the same basis as the settled oasis population. In some of the villages of the Yarkand district there were settlements of freed slaves from Chitral and Wakhan, who were known as Shi'ites (Rāfiḍī). In the more mountainous areas were Tajiks, Ghalchas (or Mountain Tajiks) and Wakhanis, all three of which peoples were Iranian-speaking and, in Ch'ing territory, semi-nomadic. Although they were now Muslims, vestiges of pre-Islamic Iranian fire cults still survived among them.³⁸ Even among the East Turkestanis of the Tarim basin oases, remnants of a pre-Islamic cultural substratum persisted, especially at the bottom layers of the social scale. The rainmaker (*yadachi*), for example, who produced rain or snow by rubbing the *yada* stone with the blood of an animal or by placing it in 'sweet water', still plied his trade, and shamans still practised their ancient arts.³⁹

The economies of both Altishahr and Uighuristan rested on oasis agriculture, handicraft manufacture and trade, and all but a few East Turkestanis either farmed or made a living in some urban commercial enterprise. The two main facts of oasis life were the T'ien Shan, Pamir and Kunlun mountains on the one hand and the Taklamakan and Lop deserts on the other. The mountains supplied the rivers and, ultimately, provided the ground water, while the deserts soaked up these waters and formed the limits of the zone beyond which settlements could not exist. This zone blended into nomad pastures on its mountainous side. On its desert side it was only as broad as the distance to which human labour could carry irrigation into the sands. Rainfall was so meagre that it could 'hardly meet even the water requirement for grazing', and when rain did fall it was not necessarily a blessing, for rains in the spring obscured the sun, yet even so were not able 'to compensate the loss of the water created by the melting of snow in the heights'.⁴⁰ Yarkand, according to one traveller, was such a dusty place that the new moon could not be seen, and when it rained, it rained mud.⁴¹

Apart from limitations of water and occasional earthquakes, Eastern Turkestan was a healthy environment. Its dry heat and minimal rainfall in summer and its intense cold in winter prevented epidemics, in contrast to neighbouring Kansu. Venereal disease was not uncommon in the cities

³⁸ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.295, 297, 338-9, 341-2, 389, 419, 643, 657; also Ludwig Golomb, *Die Bodenkultur in Ost-Turkestan: Oasenwirtschaft und Nomadentum*, 25-6.

³⁹ Gunnar Jarring, 'A note on Shamanism in Eastern Turkestan', *Ethnos*, 1961, nos. 1-2, pp. 1-4; 'Izzat Allāh, *Travels*', 28; and Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 657.

⁴⁰ Chih-yi Chang, 'Land utilization and settlement possibilities in Sinkiang', *The Geographical Review*, 39 (1949) 58, 66.

⁴¹ Aḥmad Shāh Naqshbandi, 'Narrative of the travels of Khwajah Ahmud Shah Nuksh-bundee Syud', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 25.4 (1856) 348.

and among the nomads, but widespread typhus was rare and cholera epidemics rarer.⁴² Tuberculosis was infrequent and malaria non-existent.⁴³

Irrigation, originally introduced into Eastern Turkestan from more westerly regions, made extensive use of ditches, conduits and underground canals called *kāriz*, which were required where surface water would simply drain away in the porous loess soil and gravel. For certain crops, farming was highly rewarding. Particularly renowned were the grapes and melons of Uighuristan, the best grapes being from Turfan and the best melons from Hami. Turfan raisins were famous all over central Asia, and the oasis exported them to India and China proper. Agricultural and marketing techniques were serviceable but relatively primitive, and on the whole, the yield of food crops was probably much lower than in China proper. Farmers grew lucerne to enrich the soil but did not practise crop rotation. Granary structures were the normal way of storing grain, but the dry climate and cold winters also made it possible to store harvests underground, so that subterranean caches were common among poor farmers and, in times of unrest, among the population at large.

Shawl wool from the shawl goat, 'of which almost every landed proprietor possesses a large number',⁴⁴ was produced in the Yarkand and Khotan districts. Western Altishahr had many mulberry plantations, and silk was produced there, mainly by women. But the major cash crop was short-staple cotton, which farmers paid out as taxes and sold raw to the government or to the thriving cottage textile industry. Hemp too was a valuable crop, for there was a sizable cordage industry in Khotan, where carpet-making was well established, and hemp also produced hashish (bhang) and the resinous excretion known as *charas*.⁴⁵ Juice from cut poppy bolls, called *kōknār* enjoyed a certain popularity. Tobacco growing was probably also established by the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the influx of Han Chinese into northern Sinkiang which followed the Ch'ing conquest had introduced spirits and may have increased the use of opium. The extent to which these industries were developed south of the T'ien Shan in 1800 is, however, unknown. Eastern Turkestan had produced wine in the early eighteenth century, but nothing is known about wine in the early nineteenth.

The government ran an important copper works at On Bash in the Aksu district and had a saltpetre company in Ush Turfan. The south-

⁴² Jack A. Dabbs, *History of the discovery and exploration of Chinese Turkestan*, 75, mentions a cholera epidemic at Kashgar in 1886, whereas Golomb, *Bodenkultur*, 9, says that they do not occur. For cholera and earthquakes, see also Wathen, 'Mémorial on Chinese Tartary', 659.

⁴³ Golomb, *Bodenkultur*, 9-10 (information from the twentieth century).

⁴⁴ Wathen, 'Mémorial on Chinese Tartary', 655.

⁴⁵ Description in Bill Drake, *The cultivator's handbook of marijuana*, 6.

western end of the Tarim basin produced jade (or jasper) under government monopoly. The rivers of the Khotan district produced white jasper, and clear pieces were worth their weight in silver. Green jasper was produced in the Yarkand district, where gold – another government monopoly – was also mined. Keriya had a very productive gold mine and between 200 and 300 labourers were always employed in the Khotan mines. In the winter months, ‘the whole of the population’ of Khotan was required to go to a place forty days’ march away and dig for gold, which was turned over to the Ch’ing government. Gold was also found in the sand of the river that flowed near the Keriya mine.⁴⁶ Nitre deposits were worked in the Karashahr, Kucha and Ush Turfan districts. Sulphur deposits were worked in Aksu and Kucha. Nearby copper deposits were worked by the inhabitants of Aksu, Kucha and Sairam.

There was a certain amount of trade between oases. Khotan, for example, sent caravans of *masbrū* (cloth of silk and cotton mixed), satin, paper, gold dust (supposedly a government monopoly), silk, grapes, raisins and other commodities to Yarkand, and Yarkand exported such things as copper pots, leather and boots to Khotan. Khotan’s revenues exceeded those of Yarkand.

Under Ch’ing rule, East Turkestan society consisted of only three officially recognized classes: the indigenous officialdom (the begs), the religious establishment (the akhunds) and common subjects (*alban kash*). Begs and akhunds were exempt from taxes, and the law was rather liberally interpreted in the case of religious persons in general, for sayyids, mullas, pirzadas and fakirs were all excused from paying the head tax (*alban*). The *alban kash* owed the head tax and service obligations to the government. City-dwelling *alban kash* paid taxes in money, and farmers paid taxes in grain.⁴⁷ Foreigners resident in Altishahr, even those who had settled down with wives and families, continued to be regarded as transients and were therefore excused from paying the *alban*.⁴⁸

Most numerous among the *alban kash* were (1) the free peasantry (*ra’āyā*), consisting of landowning peasants; (2) tenants on *khāniyya* (government land – in Chinese, *kuan-ti* or *kuan-t’ien*); and (3) the tenants of private landowners. A few landowning peasants, mainly in Hami and Turfan, possessed tax-free property. The remainder owned tithable land inherited from pre-Ch’ing times, from which they paid one-tenth of their harvests as taxes to the Ch’ing government. In addition, the free peasantry were subject to government service for public works. Government

⁴⁶ Ahmad Shāh, ‘Narrative’, 350; and Wathen, ‘Memoir on Chinese Tartary’, 657.

⁴⁷ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.343, but cf. Ahmad Shāh, ‘Route’, 384, who indicates that only the peasantry (‘ryots’) paid the *alban*.

⁴⁸ ‘Izzat Allāh, *Travels*, 27.

tenants received seed, work animals and tools but paid one-half of their harvests to the Ch'ing. Tenant farmers on privately-owned lands worked under periodically renegotiated contracts, the terms of which undoubtedly varied, but one-tenth of their harvests went to the government. Probably never less than two-tenths went to the landlord. Although the Ch'ing administration certainly introduced some special features, the patterns of land tenure, taxation and service obligations in Eastern Turkestan in 1800 were essentially a continuation of pre-existing customs and were very similar to patterns obtaining in other parts of Muslim central Asia.⁴⁹ A fourth category of peasant was the bondsman (*yānchi*), who paid no taxes in his own name and was therefore not included among the *alban kash*. Bondsmen, originally prisoners, laboured for the begs, and as time went on, their numbers increased, both because begs forced peasants into *yānchi* status and because some peasants voluntarily converted themselves into bondsmen in order to escape taxation and debt.

The religious establishment consisted of three groups. First, from the Ch'ing point of view, came the akhunds, who exercised religious functions by virtue of their competence and training and were the only religious category to have official status. Among these were the judges and muftis, mosque functionaries and madrasa (seminary) teachers, and out of its *alban* revenues the government gave small allowances to students, mullas, fakirs and travellers. Second, but most esteemed in the eyes of the East Turkestan population, were the saintly families (sayyids and khojas), the most important of these being the Makhdūmzādas, descended from a famous sixteenth-century Naqshbandi shaykh known as the Makhdūm-i A'zam. Another such saintly family was that of the Naqshbandi Khojas of Kucha, descended from the fifteenth-century shaykh Arshad ad-Dīn, who had converted the Moghuls to Islam. Third came the more humbly-born shaykhs and companions of the Sufi tarikats, or brotherhoods, several branches of the Naqshbandiyya in particular, but including also the Uwasiyya, Kubrawiyya, Qādiriyya and a few others. In Eastern Turkestan, as among the Tungans in Zungharia, the tarikats were deeply influential.

After the Ch'ing conquest, except perhaps in Hami and Turfan, where the local rulers had the right to use mullas in government as they saw fit, East Turkestani akhunds had ceased to have the political powers that other central Asian mullas enjoyed. There was, consequently, no group to bridge the gulf between the indigenous officialdom and the governed.

⁴⁹ Cf. L. I. Duman, 'Zavoevanie Tsinskoi imperiei Dzhungarii i Vostochnogo Turkestana', in S. L. Tikhvinskii, ed. *Man'chzhurskoe vladychestvo v Kitae*, 285–7, who gives the misleading impression that the land system was a Ch'ing innovation.

Only akhunds attended the seminaries or madrasas, where Arabic, Persian, the Koran and commentaries were taught; so religious education had less impact in Eastern Turkestan than it did elsewhere in the Turco-Iranian world, although in Yarkand alone there were over ten endowed religious schools.

The government appears to have confirmed the tax-free status of most of the *waqf* (religious endowment) lands and buildings that supported tomb sanctuaries and other holy places, including even the Āfāqī tombs in Yaghdu some ten *li* north-east of the old city of Kashgar. At Yaghdu the Ch'ing went so far as to appoint guardians to protect the khojas' tombs – although here the authorities may have had other motives, since Yaghdu was the Āfāqī Makhdūmzādas' holiest centre in Sinkiang and a gathering place for those sympathetic to their cause. When private individuals made new religious endowments, government endorsement was evidently not required.⁵⁰ When the hakim begs or native governors made religious endowments of government lands, these remained tax-exempt.⁵¹ *Waqf* properties continued to provide an economic underpinning and even a source of considerable riches for shaykhs in charge of tombs and shrines. Many of these shaykhs were Sufis and came of saintly lineages.

Of the two main regions of Eastern Turkestan, Uighuristan – essentially Hami and Turfan – had the longer history of interaction with China, and Ch'ing control was deeply rooted there. Like the banner princes of the Mongols, the princes of Hami and Turfan belonged to the Ch'ing imperial nobility and were autonomous hereditary rulers (*jasaks*), not merely governors or representatives of the Ch'ing throne. Hami and Turfan stood, therefore, on the same footing as the Mongolian banners, and the military lieutenant-governor at Urumchi oversaw their affairs in a purely supervisory capacity. Some 2,400 Green Standard soldiers and about 200 Han Chinese criminal exiles (all the exiles being in Hami territory), cultivating a total area of roughly 7,000 acres (45,200 *mu*),⁵² came under the direct control of the Ch'ing government. So also did the Chinese-speaking civilian colonists and the immigrant merchants from China proper. But over the indigenous settled populations of Uighuristan, the Hami and Turfan *jasaks* had complete autonomy. They themselves

⁵⁰ The Ch'ing government is not mentioned in the *waqf* of 1812 published in A. K. Borovkov, 'Vakufnaia gramota 1812 g. iz Kashgara', in M. N. Tikhomirov, ed. *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1959 god*, 344–9. Other examples of nineteenth-century Sinkiang *waqf* deeds are preserved (presently uncatalogued) in the Houghton Library at Harvard University, two dated 1804, one 1867 and another 1879. The 1867 deed is on parchment. The other three are copies.

⁵¹ Aḥmad Shāh, 'Route', 384.

⁵² Tseng, *Chung-kuo*, 276 (45,186 *mu*, 2,380 Green Standard soldiers and 180 criminal exiles in 1777).

paid tribute to the Ch'ing throne, but the authority to tax their subjects rested in their hands alone. The only partial exception to this rule was that the natives who cultivated Ch'ing government land, notably at Pijan, paid the required annual land-use tax (totalling almost 3,500 piculs of grain) to the imperial administration.

Altishahr, the other main region of Eastern Turkestan, differed substantially from Uighuristan in its political organization, for the entire bureaucratic apparatus of the Tarim basin came directly under the jurisdiction of a Ch'ing councillor at Kashgar, who was responsible to the military governor in Ili. The main garrison command, consisting of bannermen from Ili and Green Standard forces from Shensi, Kansu and Urumchi, was stationed at Ush Turfan, at the approach to the Muzart pass, which connected Altishahr with Ili. There were smaller garrisons of bannermen and Green Standard soldiers at Kashgar, Yangi Hisar and Yarkand, with Green Standard camps at Karashahr, Kucha, Sairam, Aksu and elsewhere. The only military agricultural colonies of note were at Karashahr and Ush Turfan. There was also a Green Standard camp at Khotan, but for the most part the Ch'ing army refrained from stationing Chinese troops west of Ush Turfan to avoid exciting the ill will of the Altishahr population, whose densest concentrations were at the western end of the Tarim basin.

The Ch'ing government maintained a strict policy of segregating Altishahr from contact with the Han Chinese for fear that Han businessmen would take over Altishahr economically (as Chinese trading and moneylending firms had already begun to do in Manchuria and Mongolia) and thus provoke East Turkestani anger and rebelliousness. The Ch'ing sent military forces to Altishahr only on rotating tours of duty, thereby preventing them from establishing themselves on anything other than a temporary basis, and the imperial authorities kept the number of Green Standard troops to a minimum while leasing government farmlands in Altishahr to native farmers who produced food to support the civil and military administrations. The government did not set up criminal exile colonies in Altishahr, nor did it allow civilian colonists or merchants to migrate into any of the districts west of Hami. The authorities would not admit Han civilians into any part of Eastern Turkestan without good reasons and properly validated passports.

The Ch'ing government also strove to segregate Ch'ing official personnel from the natives of Altishahr. At each of the main Tarim basin cities, apart from the quarters inhabited by the East Turkestanis themselves, the Ch'ing built a separate walled administrative citadel, known as the Manchu or Chinese cantonment, or alternatively the *yangi shahr*

(new city), *qal'a-yi shahr* (city fortress) or at Kashgar and Yarkand, *gulbāgh* (lit. 'rose garden'), to house the Ch'ing garrisons, administrative offices and non-indigenous personnel. These Manchu cantonments were situated outside the native city walls, but in smaller settlements they were little more than enclosures of shoulder height standing beside the native towns. In Kucha, by mid-century, Muslims and non-Muslims were living together. Restrictions on communication between the Manchu cantonments and the dwelling places of the local inhabitants were strict. Ch'ing personnel mixed with the locals only during the day. At night the authorities bolted the citadel gates. East Turkestani men and women were not allowed to enter the Manchu cantonments without proper invitation and authorization. Ch'ing personnel were similarly barred from entering the natives' cities or villages at will, the only exceptions being a few Ch'ing functionaries whom the authorities allowed, with doubtful legality, to run wine shops, public houses and distilleries. The government imposed restrictions on moneylending, the hiring of native labour, and other business contracts.

Towards Islam and local customs the Ch'ing maintained a policy of non-interference, allowing the East Turkestanis to live by the Islamic calendar, dress in their traditional fashion, and, except in the case of the begs, go without the queue. More important than these symbolic gestures, however, was the fact that the Ch'ing had preserved the forms of local administration much as they had been under the Moghuls, Zunghars and Makhdūmzāda khojas. Although the Manchu dynasty had ennobled several East Turkestani collaborators from Kucha, Bai, Aksu, Ush Turfan and Khotan, just as it had earlier ennobled the rulers of Hami and Turfan, it had created no ruling *jasaks* in Altishahr but had established instead a bureaucracy of East Turkestanis. This bureaucracy of begs and *akhunds* lived in the native cities, towns and villages, governed the indigenous population directly, and tried local court cases by the prevailing Hanafite legal precedents. Foreigners were impressed by the fact that disputes arising between Muslims and 'Chinese' (namely Manchus, Green Standard soldiers, and other non-native Ch'ing subjects in Altishahr) were settled according to Muslim law. One traveller noted that 'the law is very rigidly administered, even to the nobles; so much so, that if a prince were to kill a poor man, the murderer would on no account be exempted from the punishment of death'. On the other hand, for the administration of justice the Ch'ing did import at least one new feature from China proper, because foreign Muslims were struck by the sight of criminals wearing the *cangue*.⁵³

⁵³ Aḥmad Shāh, 'Route', 383.

Under Ch'ing rule native bureaucrats all carried the title of beg, which followed the designation of their offices, even though the offices were non-hereditary and the officials themselves were not necessarily drawn from aristocratic families of begs who had hereditary pre-Ch'ing claim to such a title. 'Beg', in other words, which had once been a title of nobility, had become a synonym for 'official'. Although some begs whose families had held the title for generations continued to be addressed as beg out of courtesy, the essential effect of the Ch'ing use of the title had been to erode the leadership of the traditional local aristocracies of the Tarim basin and to establish the Manchu dynasty as the source of all secular authority.

The highest-ranking begs (in the third and fourth degrees of rank of the imperial officialdom) dressed in Han Chinese fashion and wore the queue. In appointing them, the government followed the 'law of avoidance', which, as applied to Eastern Turkestan, meant that the principal begs were supposed not to be natives of the districts in which they served. Theoretically, the law of avoidance was intended to prevent corruption, but the main reason for its use in Altishahr was that the Ch'ing government had more confidence in the political dependability of the Hami and Turfan ruling families and the new nobility of Kucha and Bai, who owed their positions solely to the Ch'ing, than in the leading notables elsewhere in Eastern Turkestan. The begs, as such, had no hereditary claim to their offices, but unlike the Ch'ing garrison personnel, who were transferred regularly, the begs tended to remain in office unless removed for malfeasance. In other words, the highest begs of Altishahr were governors, officials and, not uncommonly, noblemen, but they differed from their counterparts in Hami and Turfan in that they were not hereditary rulers. They came under the ultimate jurisdiction of the Li-fan Yüan, and, until 1859, when the practice was abolished, top-ranking begs had the privilege of presenting annual tribute to the emperor in Peking, which brought handsome imperial gifts and many benefits in return.

At the head of the indigenous officialdom stood the hakim begs, or native governors, the most important of whom were in charge of the administrative districts of the eight major cities of Altishahr – the so-called 'four eastern cities' of Karashahr, Kucha, Aksu and Ush Turfan and the 'four western cities' of Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, Yarkand and Ilchi (the ancient Khotan – Khotan now being the name of the whole district). Each of these cities supervised a district composed of many smaller cities and villages. The hakim begs of Kashgar and Yangi Hisar had the right to memorialize the Peking throne directly, but the other native governors dealt with the central government by way of the Sinkiang garrison, and

when it was necessary for them to communicate with Peking, they did so through the Ch'ing councillor at Kashgar. Under the hakim begs was a long roster of lesser begs with special functions.

In lieu of direct salary, the begs received official land grants – varying in size in accordance with their ranks – from which they derived the net yield, and bondsmen to cultivate these lands and perform other services. In keeping with general Ch'ing practice, the state further supplied them with small stipends of money (*yang-lien*) to 'nourish their incorruptibility', and in case of transfer, the government covered their travel expenses. The begs insisted on the kotow from their inferiors and wore the queue proudly as a symbol of power. Unlike the often illiterate officials in Kokand and Bukhara, the Altishahr begs had both a knowledge of Chinese and Manchu and a smattering of religious instruction and history. One possibly troublesome state ritual which the begs appear to have reconciled with their religion was their appearance at the Confucian temple early in the morning at the beginning of every month. Here they prostrated themselves before an image of the emperor. In imitation of the Ch'ing bannermen, the begs also drank wine and smoked opium.⁵⁴

The officially recognized portion of the religious establishment stood apart from the district bureaucracies but was routinely subject to the supervision of their judicial officers and commissioners for public morality and religious education. By analogy with the title of beg for the indigenous civil officialdom, its members all bore the title of akhund. The akhunds – the official functionaries of the East Turkestani ulema – discharged the functions of a native judiciary and provided the organization and leadership of the population's religious and cultural life. The principal figure of the religious establishment in each district was the chief justice (*a'lam ākhūnd*), under whose jurisdiction were the offices of judge (*qāḍī ākhūnd*) and mufti (*muftī ākhūnd*). The heads of the cathedral mosques, the collectors of offerings, the heads of parish mosques, and the akhunds who gave instruction in the madrasas were all answerable to the district chief justice. The sources from which the akhunds drew their livelihood are not clear, but they would appear to have been supported by contributions and fees. Many of them, especially the richest, received revenues from religious endowments.

Although the domestic affairs of the Altishahr natives were in the hands of the local begs and akhunds, the East Turkestanis were liable directly to the Ch'ing government for taxes and services. Of the above-mentioned annual Altishahr copper yield, valued at 13,500,000 *pūl*, all but 1,600,000 *pūl* (of raw copper from On Bash) consisted of taxes levied from the native

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 384; Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.349.

population – mostly from Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, Yarkand and Khotan. The inhabitants of Altishahr annually paid taxes of over 66,000 piculs of grain and more than 143,000 bolts of cotton cloth, most of which also came from the western end of the Tarim basin, as did most of the raw cotton.

The main source for these revenues was the *alban*, or head tax, which was mainly collected in copper or grain (the equivalent of 'one rupee from each man, per month, and a tenth of the produce of the land').⁵⁵ The government allowed substitutions in lead, raw cotton or cloth, or sulphur and saltpetre – the raw materials for gunpowder. There were also taxes on individual trade transactions, shops and places of business, vegetable gardens and orchards, coal pits and building construction. On the other hand, the government considered gold and jade to be tribute items and, as such, had them sent directly to Peking without permitting the Sinkiang garrison to tax them. East Turkestani households who manned guard stations, and the 500 native soldiers at Kashgar were excused the *alban*. There was a special levy to cover the expenses of maintaining the route through the Muzart pass – a service for which the Niugeits were mainly responsible. To cover the expenses of the local officials, the hakim begs levied a semi-official tax known as the *qirqlıq* ('fortieth') on Altishahr households, and if this proved insufficient, the hakim begs levied a surtax. When the Ch'ing garrison officials went on inspection tours of the Altishahr guard stations, the hakim begs made still further collections to cover the tour expenses. The begs sometimes levied food, clothing and other supplies from the common subjects without recompense, and when Ch'ing bannermen requisitioned property, the begs raised special levies to compensate the property-owner. In addition to these taxes was the traditional central Asian post-horse (*ulagh*) levy drawn from horse-owning households. The city officials were accountable to the Board of Revenue for regular reports, and tax quotas were fixed, but it is clear that corruption abounded.

The native begs and the Ch'ing officials over them abused their authority also in other ways. Bribes between the various levels of government were routine, and the hakim begs used their power in the domestic market to buy at fixed prices and sell first at harvest time. Begs illegally bought up official lands and sold them for profit. They manipulated peasants out of their fair share of irrigation water. They reclaimed dead farmlands and failed to register them. They lent money, catching small farmers in a web of debts that could force them into bondsman (*yānchi*) status so that the begs could appropriate their property and their labour. The growing use

⁵⁵ Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 661.

of money – both as a prescribed medium for paying taxes and in the market – strengthened the hands of the begs. Farmers had, in effect, to ‘buy’ money by selling their crops so that they could use it to pay for what they needed at home and to pay off the demands – especially the unofficial demands – of the government.

Altishahr's external trade

The use of money both facilitated and was increased by external trade. Information dating from the first quarter of the nineteenth century indicates free trading conditions in which, insofar as sales to East Turkestani natives were concerned, there were no contraband goods.⁵⁶ Imports consisted mainly of livestock, fruits, shawl wool, furs, opium, Indian hemp for smoking, European (mostly Russian) manufactures and slaves – boys and girls (whose price ranged from 200 to 500 rupees) and adults bought in Kanjut, Gilgit and Chitral and sold in Yarkand by merchants from Badakhshan, Wakhan and Shighnan.⁵⁷ Legally exportable items consisted principally of jewellery and precious stones, raw silk (which was also imported), silk and satin cloth, camlet, cotton cloth and yarn, porcelain, chinaware, kiriana (spices and medicinal drugs, especially rhubarb – a major export item used in western central Asia as a medicine and as a dyestuff), *charas* and – most important – tea, which came through Khotan from south China by horse-caravan. Tea came both in boxes and in bricks (one horseload consisting of from thirty to forty bricks), but the brick tea was of inferior quality and was used only by the poorer classes. The principal illegal export was bullion (gold, silver coins and silver *yambu*). Many of these export items, especially tea, bullion, precious stones, silks and kiriana, came from China proper, being carried principally by merchants from Shansi, Shensi, Kiangsu and Chekiang, who bought local silk, cattle and other articles of trade for export to China.

The conduct of commerce between China proper and Sinkiang remains to be studied, but it is clear that Ch'ing taxation discriminated in favour of Han Chinese merchants. Of goods entering China proper at Chia-yü-kuan, only jade was taxed. In Ush Turfan, where the China–Altishahr trade was legal, East Turkestani sellers to traders from China proper had to pay a tax of 10 per cent *ad valorem* on sales of their silk, coarse calico, leather and other merchandise, whereas their sales in Kashgar and Yarkand were taxed at half that rate. Andijanians and other foreigners paid sales

⁵⁶ Helmersen, ‘Nachrichten’, 81.

⁵⁷ William Moorcroft and George Trebeck, *Travels in the Himalayan provinces of Hindustan and the Panjab; in Ladakh and Kashmir; in Peshawar, Kabul, Kunduz, and Bokhara; by Mr. William Moorcroft and Mr. George Trebeck, from 1819 to 1824*, 2.479; and R. H. Davies, comp. *Report on the trade and resources of the countries on the north-western boundary of British India*, ccclvii.

taxes of only 5 per cent in Ush Turfan, and Han Chinese merchants selling anything other than tea to the traders of Altishahr paid even less – $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

State concessionaires and the government itself exported brick tea from Kansu to Sinkiang for domestic consumption. By a decree of 1760, the government also allowed unlicensed private merchants from Shansi to carry on a small-scale export of cloth and assorted leaf teas across Mongolia to Zungharia, mainly for export to central Asia. Merchants from Szechwan sold rice and flour in Ku-ch'eng. Although Kiangsu and Chekiang traders evidently found ways of visiting Yarkand with some regularity, Han Chinese traders were, as a matter of policy, excluded from Altishahr. A partial exception was made in the case of the Kansu brick tea concessionaires, but as time went on, the tea and other wares of the unlicensed Shansi merchants began to play an increasingly important role in the Altishahr markets. For the Han Chinese merchants of the China–Sinkiang tea trade, the unlicensed Shansi trade in assorted teas – being less easily monitored by the authorities – was more profitable than the official Kansu concession in brick tea. From the point of view of the government, revenues from the Kansu concession were greater than the tax revenues from the Shansi trade.⁵⁸

Apart from Ush Turfan, the main point in which the trade economies of Altishahr, Zungharia and China proper met was Karashahr, the only city in Altishahr where the *pūl* and the Ili cash circulated freely side by side. Karashahr's population appears to have consisted largely of Öölöd (Kalmuks), but the surrounding district was the single area in Altishahr in which Han Chinese colonists had been allowed to settle and own private land. For this reason – in line with the Ch'ing policy of segregation – residents of Khotan, Yarkand and Kashgar and foreign merchants were not permitted to enter the city itself. The inhabitants of some other districts evidently were admitted within Karashahr's walls, but they were not allowed to take up residence.⁵⁹

Despite Altishahr's substantial flow of trade, the East Turkestani merchant class failed to prosper because of the power of bureaucracy to interfere with and make demands on private businesses. Here, the avarice of the officials and the traditional Confucian prejudice against merchants

⁵⁸ V. S. Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane v pervoi polovine XIX veka*, 16–19, 92–6, 115; also V. S. Kuznetsov, 'Ekonomicheskaiia politika Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane v pervoi polovine XIX veka', *Izvestiia AN KazSSR*, Serii istorii, arkhologii i etnografii, Vypusk 3 (17) (1961) 84.

⁵⁹ Davies, *Report*, 25–6, cccxiii, cccxxv. Cf. Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 656, who says that the Kucha population consisted chiefly of Kalmuks. 'The principal people of substance reside in the city, and the poorer classes in tents on the plains'. Wathen, whose information dates from the 1830s, evidently confuses Kucha with Karashahr.

reinforced each other. Merchants as such, no matter how rich they were, had no official standing, and the trade guilds, which had once carried considerable weight, had lost their influence after the Ch'ing conquest and no longer served to bridge the gulf between the government and the native merchants. Even from the point of view of education, the native merchantry suffered by comparison with their counterparts from western central Asia, where merchants commonly had madrasa educations and in schooling stood second only to the mullas.

Travel abroad by Kashgarian traders began to be restricted in 1794. They could obtain passports and travel in groups beyond the border control points for trade with the nearest Kirghiz, but that was all. They were confined by discriminatory official taxes, heavy import duties and bureaucratic 'squeeze'. They had even to buy the right to trade.

In general, the effect of Ch'ing policy was to favour the interests of foreign merchants over those of the Altishahr natives, so that the native traders, to some extent, had to tie themselves to the coat-tails of the foreigners. Successful Altishahr businessmen who remained in the Tarim basin hid their profits and their property and pretended to be poor. Otherwise, if their businesses were big enough, they could go to live in Ili or Urumchi, where pressure from the officialdom was less severe. The government imposed a customs duty of 5 per cent *ad valorem* on livestock imported by the Kazakhs and Kirghiz, these being tributaries of the Ch'ing, and only $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on livestock imported by foreigners. On imports of silk fabrics and furs, Kashgarian traders had to pay a duty of 10 per cent, while foreigners paid only 5 per cent. On most other goods, native importers paid 5 per cent, while foreigners paid $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, except for 'Kashmiris' (including Baltis and merchants from the Pamir countries), who paid only $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Precious stones from Badakhshan were taxed at the rate of 500 *pül* for each catty.⁶⁰ One result of this policy was an outflow of silver, which the Ch'ing tried unsuccessfully to stem.

Most of the foreign merchants came from Kokand, Bukhara, Baltistan, Badakhshan, Kanjut, Kashmir or the Kazakh steppe, but there were also Iranians, Shirvanis, Russian (or Nogai) Tatars, Hindus, central Asian Jews (of whom there was a large colony in Kokand) and Armenians. Kirghiz from the Pamirs probably passed themselves off as native subjects. The Ch'ing authorities made few distinctions between these various kinds of foreigners and, by and large, regarded them all either as 'Andjanis' (Andijan being the name of a city and of a region in the Ferghana

⁶⁰ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.680 (reading *shelkovymi* for *melkovymi*); 'Izzat Allāh, *Travels*, 24; Aḥmad Shāh, 'Route', 382 (where '40 per cent' must be an error for $\frac{1}{40}$); Nebol'sin, 'Ocherki', 347-8; Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaja*, 19.

valley under Kokand's control) or as 'Kashmiris',⁶¹ thus permitting even the merchants of non-tributary countries to enter Sinkiang for private trade. In effect, the 'Andijanis' were those who traded at Kashgar, and the 'Kashmiris' were those who traded at Yarkand. Tribute missions appear to have been profitable nonetheless, and foreign envoys commonly presented horses as gifts to the military governor and other high Ch'ing officials of the Sinkiang garrison, always receiving presents in return that were more valuable than the original gifts themselves.⁶²

The subjects of Kokand and the traders from Bukhara and elsewhere in western central Asia carried on the bulk of their external business in Kashgar, which, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, was a bigger city than Bukhara.⁶³ Since the empire's official attitude towards trade categorized it as a concession to foreigners (who supposedly needed the products of a self-sufficient China) granted in return for peace and a properly submissive posture toward the Ch'ing throne, the foreign traders enjoyed both a bargaining position and a degree of autonomy that native merchants lacked. The subjects of Kokand – the real Andijanis – stood in the best position of all, for they were 'very similar' to the Kashgaris 'in their manners and customs'⁶⁴ and formed the largest group among Kashgar's foreign merchants, therefore dominating the resident community of foreign traders. To speak for these merchants and to oversee the day-to-day activities of the market, the Kashgar hakim beg and the foreign trading community jointly appointed a senior foreign merchant called, in Manchu, 'superintendent of trade' (*būda-i da*),⁶⁵ who, like the taipans on the China coast, was not recognized as a member of the Ch'ing officialdom. Unlike the taipans, there appears – at least at first – to have been a single superintendent for all foreign merchants rather than a separate one for the subjects of each of the countries that carried on trade with Sinkiang. Under this superintendent of trade, the merchant community enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, free from the interference of Ch'ing rule.

The superintendent of trade was usually a Kokandi, and, as time went on, the post gradually became an instrument for the Kokand government's efforts to control Kashgar's foreign commerce. The fact that most of the city's external trade passed through Kokand territory further

⁶¹ Moorcroft, *Travels*, 1.452.

⁶² *Ta-Ch'ing Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 262.24b (16 Feb. 1835), 26b (19 Feb.).

⁶³ Helmersen, 'Nachrichten', 96.

⁶⁴ Ahmad Shāh, 'Narrative', 351.

⁶⁵ I am indebted to Okada Hidehiro, who in 1971 brought this Manchu term to my attention as the proper reconstruction of the Chinese *bu-tai-ta*. Cf. Saguchi, *Jūhachi*, 380–3, and Saguchi Tōru, 'The eastern trade of the Khoqand khanate', *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 24 (1965) 86–9.

strengthened the Kokand government's hand in Kashgar, and the Kashgar trade in turn nourished the Kokand economy, accounting for much of the kingdom's rapid growth in the closing decades of the eighteenth century. At first, the Ch'ing government responded by adopting a conciliatory attitude. In 1809 the Ch'ing informed 'Ālim Khan, the Kokand ruler, that his country's goods in Sinkiang were being exempted from customs duties that year because of his obedient behaviour. In future, the Ch'ing said, customs duties on Kokand's exports would be reduced by half.

Trade with India, Tibet, Ladakh, Baltistan, Afghanistan and the Pamir countries centred on Yarkand (an even more populous city than Kashgar) and the Sarikol district, which also served as junction points for goods flowing between India and Russia. Here, and in Khotan, the proportion of Andijanians in the foreign merchant community was considerably smaller and there were more Badakhshanians, Kashmiris, Afghans, Baltis, Tibetans and Hindus, but no Jews or Russian Tatars.⁶⁶ These made up a less homogeneous foreign population than the one at Kashgar, and it is uncertain whether there was a single foreign superintendent of trade with the same duties as those of the Kashgar *hūda-i da*.

Trade between Zungharia and Altishahr centred on Aksu because of the city's proximity to the route across the T'ien Shan by way of the Muzart pass. Eastern Turkestan's commerce with the Kazakhs and the T'ien Shan Kirghiz held an important place in the Aksu market, and from at least as early as the 1770s, on market days, there had been 'such crowding and rain-like sweating that the merchandise seemed enveloped in fog'.⁶⁷ By the late 1780s, partly as a result of stoppages in the Sino-Russian trade at Kiakhta, increasing amounts of Russian goods had begun to make their way to Aksu despite Ch'ing efforts to keep them out, and from Aksu, Ch'ing merchants carried them on to other parts of the empire. More and more foreign merchants took up residence in the city, and by the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Aksu's population, native and foreign combined, appears to have exceeded 10,000 households, of which about 8,400 were registered Ch'ing subjects.⁶⁸

On reaching the first customs barrier inside the Ch'ing frontier, an incoming foreign trader had to show his papers and obtain permission to proceed, which depended upon procuring written security from a merchant guarantor in Sinkiang – comparable to the security or 'hong' merchant (see chapter 4) on the China coast – saying, 'The bearer is a traveller without any outstanding liabilities; I hold myself answerable for

⁶⁶ Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 654.

⁶⁷ Ch'un-yüan Ch'i-shih-i, *Hsi-yü wen-chien lu*, 26b–27a. Cf. Saguchi, 'Eastern Trade', 68.

⁶⁸ Ts'ao Chen-yung *et al.* comp. *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Hui-chiang chiao-ch'in ni-i fang-lüeh*, 9, 5b (14 Feb. 1826), and *Ch'in-ting Ta-Ch'ing bui-tien shih-li* (1818), 742.11b.

any claim against him after his departure.' The trader then submitted this document to the local beg, who submitted it in turn to the Ch'ing garrison authorities. The latter kept the original and furnished the trader with a translation of it in Chinese.⁶⁹ Provided in this way with properly validated passports, foreigners coming from central Asia could do business in western Altishahr and Zungharia but were excluded from Kucha, Karashahr, Turfan, Hami and China proper. Some foreigners, mostly Kokandis, but also Bukharans, Badakhshanis and Kashmiris, even found ways of investing their commercial profits in Altishahr lands, frequently with the help of the begs. It was illegal for foreign merchants to purchase lands in Ch'ing territory, but Andijanis evidently bought and paid for such property in silver. Even government property found its way into foreign hands. The main concentrations of foreign-owned lands were in the Kashgar, Yangi Hisar and Aksu districts under lease to native farmers.

No group of official merchants fully equivalent to the Cohong at Canton seems to have developed in Altishahr, and the main relationship appears to have been the one between the foreign merchants and the Altishahr begs. This was by and large cordial, although there were occasional incidents, such as the one in 1808 when Pin-ching, the Ch'ing councillor at Kashgar, dishonoured the *būda-i da's* daughter. The enraged father, a Kokand merchant, killed the girl and stormed into Pin-ching's yamen brandishing her head, but the merchant's open act of protest probably reveals a certain lack of fear on his part for the Ch'ing officialdom.⁷⁰ In return for bribes, the Tarim basin officials gave special consideration to foreign merchants by collecting less than the full customs duties. Border officers sometimes inspected only part of the foreign traders' baggage. Militarily useful items, such as nitrate ore, were not supposed to be sold to foreigners but were exported nonetheless. (The extent to which this prohibition would have been meaningful, even had it been effective, is doubtful, for a mid-nineteenth-century traveller saw sulphur exposed for sale in Kokand and found that saltpetre was 'manufactured on the spot'.)⁷¹ Whether the 'Chinese short swords', carried by Kokandis on pilgrimage to Mecca,⁷² were on the prohibited list is not clear, but smuggling was widespread and commonly ignored by the authorities.

⁶⁹ 'Izzat Allāh, *Travels*, 45–6.

⁷⁰ See, in support of this, the story of Kokand's kidnapping of a Ch'ing border officer, in Davies, *Report*, cccxl.

⁷¹ Ahmad Shāh, 'Narrative', 352.

⁷² W. H. Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek State of Kokan, properly called Khokend (the ancient Ferghana) in central Asia', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 3.32 (Aug. 1834) 378.

The Makhdūmzādas

The Andijanīs' privileged position in western Altishahr was to have far-reaching consequences for the Ch'ing, because foreign merchants kept open the lines of communication between the people of Altishahr and their previous rulers, the Āfāqī khojas of the Naqshbandī brotherhood, then living in western central Asia. The Naqshbandiyya, who had originated in Bukhara several centuries before, were the most influential of all the Sufi tarikats in central Asia, and a sizable proportion of the foreign traders in Altishahr must have been Naqshbandī initiates.

The Makhdūmzādas, descendants of the Makhdūm-i A'zam (mentioned above), had acquired a position of dominance among the East Turkestan Naqshbandiyya in pre-Ch'ing times, and two rival lines of Makhdūmzāda khojas – the Ishāqiyya (or Qarataghliq) and the Āfāqiyya (or Aqtaghliq) – had struggled for leadership of the tarikat. The Āfāqiyya had brought in the Zunghars and, after virtually annihilating their Ishāqī rivals in 1755, had precipitated the Manchu conquest of Altishahr. Some branches of the Naqshbandiyya did not resist the Ch'ing, and the Ch'ing ennobled several Makhdūmzāda khojas who were not of the Āfāqī line, requiring them to live thereafter in Peking. The Naqshbandī Khojas of Kucha descended from Arshad ad-Dīn (fl. c. 1450), and the Indian Naqshbandī line of the Mujaddidiyya evidently had no difficulties with the Ch'ing. But the two principal Āfāqī khojas were forced to flee into Badakhshan in 1759 and there met their deaths. Several thousand Altishahr households fled with them, and most of these eventually settled in Kokand territory.

These emigrant Kashgarian communities and the expatriate Ishāqī and Āfāqī religious leaders remained in touch with their kinsmen in Altishahr through merchants in the Sinkiang trade. The Ishāqiyya were particularly strong in Yarkand, where earlier Ishāqī khojas lay buried in the old Golden Cemetery of the Moghul khans. The Ishāqiyya also predominated in the settlements south-west of Kashgar and in Yangi Hisar and Khotan. For religious leadership they looked to the khojas of Margelan in the territory of Kokand, annually sending them offerings. The Āfāqiyya had their main strength in the city of Kashgar, in the settlements to the north-east of it, and in Aksu and Kucha. For religious leadership, by 1800 the Āfāqiyya looked to the descendants of Khoja Burhān ad-Dīn, whom the Ch'ing had driven into Badakhshan. Burhān ad-Dīn's son Muḥammad Amin, better known as Samsaq,⁷³ had wandered through

⁷³ Egor Timkovskii, *Puteshestvie v Kitai chrez Mongoliu v 1820 i 1821 godakh*, 2.77, n. 1 (seven khojas: 4 killed, 2 captured by the Ch'ing, and 1 – Sarīmsaq [= Samsaq] – escaped); and

various parts of western central Asia, settling within the borders of Kokand towards the end of his life, and died in 1798 or sometime not long after. The Ch'ing government, to enlist Kokand's help in keeping peace along the frontier, sent the Kokand ruler an annual stipend of from 10,000 to 50,000 silver taels⁷⁴ and substantial quantities of tea as payment for holding Samsaq under control, but travelling merchants and also the Kirghiz, many of whom were followers of the Āfāqiyya, had kept Samsaq in touch with his people in Altishahr.

Samsaq left three sons: Muḥammad Yūsuf, Jahāngīr and Bahā' ad-Dīn. The eldest of these, Muḥammad Yūsuf, seems to have attacked the Sinkiang border at the head of a Kirghiz army in 1797, but the Ch'ing forces drove him off. Sometime about the beginning of the nineteenth century, after Samsaq's death, a certain Yūsuf Khoja (who may have been this same Muḥammad Yūsuf) visited Egypt, Shahrizor and Baghdad, where the wazīr arrested him and, for unexplained reasons, handed him over to the British consul (*bālyōz-i Angrēz*) who sent Yūsuf Khoja as a prisoner to India. In the port of Bombay, the khoja got free and escaped to Basra, then Shiraz, then Teheran, where he worked his way into the good graces of the Qājār government. 'And he had it in mind that if he could, he would become king.'

Yūsuf Khoja formed an alliance with the Yomut and Göklän Turkmens and attacked the Qājārs in 1813. After an initial defeat, he regrouped 20,000 Yomuts and Göklāns and routed the Qājārs, but according to Muḥammad Taqī Sipīhr, 'one of the men of the Girāyli [Turkmens] who was well acquainted with the Kashgari khoja recognized him and without delay moved from his place, firing his gun at him in the same motion. And Yūsuf Khoja, [being struck] by that bullet, fell from his horse and died. Because the king of Badakhshan had, [in vengeance] for the blood of his father Sulṭān Shāh [who had supposedly been killed in revenge for the murder of the Āfāqī khojas], pledged that if anyone brought him Yūsuf Khoja's head, he would reward him generously with gold and silver, at this time a great fight broke out among the Turkmens for the head of Yūsuf Khoja's corpse, and a large multitude were killed. In the

Iu. V. Gankovskii, *Imperiia Durrani: Ocherk administrativnoi i voennoi sistemy*, 31–2. Cf. Martin Hartmann, 'Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam: Das Ende der Caghataiden und die Herrschaft der Choḡas in Kašgarien', in his *Der islamische Orient: Berichte und Forschungen*, pts 6–10, p. 314.

⁷⁴ From 200 to 1,000 *yambu*. See Kuznetsov, 'O reaktsionnoi', 77; Saguchi, *Jūbachi*, 410; Saguchi Tōru, 'The revival of the White Mountain Khwājas, 1760–1820 (from Sarimsāq to Jihāngīr)', *Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture*, 14 (1968) 15; 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, *Histoire de l'Asie Centrale (Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand) depuis les dernières années du règne de Nadir Chāh (1753), jusqu'en 1233 de l'Hégire (1740–1818)*, tr Charles Schefer, 217–18; Valikhkanov, *Sobranie*, 2.172, 317; and V. P. Nalivkine, *Histoire du kbanat de Khokand*, tr A. Dozon, 132.

end, they picked up his head and took it with them. The Iranis trampled his body with their horses, and picking up his signet-ring and the dagger that he had worn at his waist, they brought them to the [Qājār] prince.⁷⁵ But it is possible that Yūsuf Khoja may not have been killed in 1813 after all, for a mysterious 'Sultan Khan' from 'the borders of China or India' who had been leading Turkmen raids against the borders of Iran was found to be living in Khiva in 1819–20,⁷⁶ and Muḥammad Yūsuf unquestionably reappeared in 1830 to lead an invasion of Altishahr.

Jahāngir, Samsaq's second son, on whom the religious succession appears to have devolved, may have been in Bukhara at the turn of the century, while Bahā' ad-Dīn, Samsaq's third son, was evidently in Kokand. Communications between these two Āfāqī khojas and their followers in Altishahr remained essentially unbroken, and some of the Altishahr begs also remained in touch with the Kokand government, trying to evaluate the political future. In particular, Yūnus, the hakim beg of Kashgar, was in correspondence with Muḥammad 'Umar Khan of Kokand, and the 'ambassador' from China that the Russian interpreter Nazarov saw in Kokand in 1813 seems likely to have been the head of Yūnus's caravan.⁷⁷

The Altishahr begs and the Kokand government shared an interest in preventing the Āfāqī khojas from invading Altishahr, since this would be bad for the Kokand–Kashgar trade. Yūnus evidently even encouraged Muḥammad 'Umar Khan to request permission from the Ch'ing authorities to station an official political agent of the Kokand government in Kashgar to replace the semi-official *hūda-i da*. The Kokand government made this request at about the end of 1813, proposing that the khan's appointee be given the title of *cadi* (*qāḍī*, judge) beg and that he take over the Kashgar hakim beg's duties of supervising trade and taxing Kokand merchants. In other words, Kokand was asking for juridical extraterritoriality, and the right to levy taxes on Ch'ing soil. Sung-yūn, the Sinkiang military governor, refused and disciplined Yūnus, banning all communications between the Altishahr begs and Kokand.

Muḥammad 'Umar Khan responded in 1814 with a threat. He had been restraining the sons of Samsaq from invading Altishahr, he said, and in return for this service, he demanded rewards and a reduction of customs duties for Kokand merchants. Again Sung-yūn refused, expressing doubt –

⁷⁵ Muḥammad Taqī Lisān al-Mulk Sipīhr, *Nāsikh at-tawārikh: Salāfin-i Qājāriyya*, ed. Muḥammad Bāqir Bihbūdi, pt 1, 229, 231.

⁷⁶ Cf. V. V. Grigor'ev, 'Vostochnyi ili Kitaiskii Turkestan', in his *Zemlevedenie K. Rittera: Geografiia stran Azii nakhodiasbikhsia v neposredstvennykh snosheniiax s Rossiei*, Vypusk 2, Otdel 1, 441–2, construing the evidence differently.

⁷⁷ See Filipp Nazarov, *Zapiski o nekotorykh narodakh i zemliakh srednei chasti Azii*, 42; and Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.317.

in accord with an investigation that had been conducted the previous year – that Samsaq had any sons. The Manchus continued to pay the khan his stipend of silver and tea, but the emperor authorized Sung-yün to threaten an interruption of trade should Muḥammad 'Umar repeat his demand.

By 1814 the Ch'ing authority in Eastern Turkestan was solidly ensconced, but every overtaxed peasant and artisan, every disadvantaged merchant, every beg who regretted the revenues that he passed along to the Manchus believed in the ultimate illegitimacy and impermanence of the idolaters' dominion. Although the most likely leaders for a jihad (holy war) against the Manchus would have been the sons of Samsaq, the Kokandis, profiting from the China trade, prevented them from crossing the mountains into Sinkiang. The time seemed ripe for the Ishāqiyya to seize the advantage.

Early in 1814 an Ishāqī Sufi of Tashmalik named Ḍiyā' ad-Dīn began to conspire with his religious following and with some Kirghiz for the overthrow of Ch'ing rule. Tashmalik had a Kirghiz as its hakim beg and was inhabited by several hundred families of the Turaygir Kipchak tribe. Turdī Muḥammad Biy, a Kirghiz chief, took an oath on the Koran in the autumn of 1814 that he would support Ḍiyā' ad-Dīn's revolt,⁷⁸ and many other Kirghiz joined forces with the conspirators. In the summer of the following year the rebels struck, setting fire to Ch'ing stables, attacking garrison troops, and calling on the populace to rise. The populace, however, failed to respond. When the garrison forces counter-attacked and summoned the Kirghiz as auxiliaries, the Kirghiz, deciding that the revolt would not succeed, helped capture Ḍiyā' ad-Dīn and restore order. A few of them escaped across the border to Kokand territory.

The government executed the rebels and conducted an investigation to find all those who had participated in the revolt. Particularly difficult was the task of sorting out the roles of the various groups of Kirghiz, for many, like Turdī Muḥammad Biy, whom the Manchus condemned to death, had cooperated with both sides. The uprising had been a local one and of short duration, but it was symptomatic of bigger troubles to come. Sinkiang in the nineteenth century was to become the most rebellious territory in the Ch'ing empire.

TIBET

Tibet, unlike Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, enjoyed a considerable degree of independence, largely because of her remoteness and inaccessibility. By 1800 the Tibetan government was irrevocably committed to a

⁷⁸ See *Ta-Ch'ing Jen-tsung shih-lu*, 312.30a-b (27 Dec. 1815).

policy of seclusion, but self-isolation had not been characteristic of Tibet's earlier history. Indeed it has been argued that 'the nineteenth century is the only period when Tibet might justly be described as a "forbidden land"'.⁷⁹

In 1800 the entire Bhotia population – namely Tibetans from Tibet proper and all other ethnologically Tibetan peoples – was probably no more than about six million, and those directly subject to the Lhasa government must have numbered well under four million.⁸⁰ The economy that supported this population was based on patterns of cereal agriculture and animal husbandry that derived originally from the early civilizations of the Middle East but had been accommodated to Tibet's high-altitude environment. The pastoral regions were more extensive, but something like five-sixths of the Tibetan population were agriculturists. The country's cultural and political centres had always been in the agricultural areas.

Barley, which can grow at altitudes up to 14,000 feet, was Tibet's staple crop and the mainstay of the people's diet. Buckwheat, peas, radishes and mustard were also grown, and at lower altitudes there were crops of wheat, fruits (apricots, peaches, pears) and walnuts. Rice grew only on the lower ground of certain regions of Sikkim, Bhutan and southern Kham (Khams). Irrigation was necessary because the high mountains kept rain out of the major agricultural valleys and rainfall was insufficient. Landowners who held estates from the Lhasa government cooperated in maintaining the systems of canals and conduits, while peasants supplied the labour in proportion to the size of their holdings. Good irrigated land was kept in almost continuous production.

All Bhotias spoke dialects of a common Tibetan language and believed in at least one of three religions – lamaist Buddhism, the indigenous Bon and Islam – although Bon and lamaism were not completely separable and both were further intertwined with Tibetan religious traditions independent of either. Perhaps no peculiarities of native Tibetan culture are better known than the marriage customs, for various forms of polyandry and polygyny obtained among both nobles and commoners, including the sharing of a single wife by a father and a son and the sharing of a single husband by a mother and a daughter. It could also happen that sexual relations other than marriage extended to several sisters or several women of the same generation. These practices counterbalanced the effects of polyandry 'by taking up the considerable surplus of women'.⁸¹ Among Muslims, of course, Islamic marriage laws applied.

⁷⁹ Snellgrove and Richardson, *Cultural History*, 227.

⁸⁰ Doubling a nineteenth-century estimate for the male population in Sarat Chandra Das, 'The monasteries of Tibet', *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1.4 (1905) 106, and following the early twentieth-century estimate in David Macdonald, *The land of the Lama*, 115.

⁸¹ Stein, *Tibetan civilization*, 96.

Politically, the Bhotias were divided into several different countries. In the extreme west lay Baltistan, or Little Tibet (a term sometimes used to include Ladakh), which had been Muslim (Twelver Shi'a) since the fourteenth century and was heavily influenced by the Sufi *tarikāt* of the Nūrbakhshiyya. Since the disappearance of Buddhism from Baltistan, the country had been completely independent of even the nominal protection of any other Bhotia country, and the rulers of Skardu (sKar-rdo), Shigar (Shi-dkar) and Khapulu (Kha-pu-lu) had abandoned their earlier regional ties with Ladakh. People continued to speak the Balti Tibetan dialect, but written Tibetan had disappeared along with the old religion, and literate Baltis wrote in Persian.

The other Bhotia land that stood outside the interconnected web of Tibetan politico-religious relationships was Lahul, under the rule of the Hindu rajas of Kulu. Even here, some vestiges remained of Lahul's earlier status as a protectorate of Ladakh, for the Lahul chiefs continued to pay tribute and, in some places, land rents to the Ladakhi king.

All the rest of the Bhotia countries – Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan and the various districts of eastern Kham and Amdo (A-mdo) – were tributaries (but not protectorates) of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, either directly, as with Ladakh, Sikkim and Bhutan, or indirectly through religious affiliations that had underlying political significance, as with the local chiefs of Amdo and eastern Kham.

The westernmost of these outlying Tibetan states was the kingdom of Ladakh, separated from Baltistan in the north-west by differences of spoken dialect. Leh, its capital, was the centre of a broad network of trade, carried on largely by Kashmiris, with trade routes radiating to Lhasa, Changthang (Byang-thang), Yarkand, Kashmir, the Punjab, Kulu and British India. The king had authority over a number of petty local kings, hereditary ministers and chiefs, some of whom, like the chiefs of Kargil (dKar-skyil), Chu-shod, Cig-tan, Pas-kyum and Sod, were Muslims and their subjects were Twelver Shi'ites, like the Baltis. The capital district of Leh itself had a large foreign Muslim trading population, and a Muslim trader was always paired with a Buddhist ecclesiastic in heading Ladakh's triennial tribute mission to Lhasa. These foreign Muslims were mostly Sunnis and evidently did not object when the Buddhist Ladakh government allowed private Ladakhi individuals to go on raiding expeditions against the Shi'ites of Baltistan in times of peace. The raiders received rewards of land in proportion to the number of Baltis killed.⁸² The Baltis responded by sending agents into Pas-kyum, Sod and environs for the

⁸² A. H. Francke, *A history of western Tibet: one of the unknown empires*, 127. Citation from Moorcroft, *Travels*, 2.28.

purpose of 'detaching the affections of the peasantry' – their Shi'ite co-religionists – from the Leh government.

As elsewhere in Tibet, Ladakh's overwhelmingly dominant religion was lamaist Buddhism, the main monastic orders being the bKa'-rgyud-pa ('Brug-pa sub-order), with which the king's family had a special relationship, and the dGe-lugs-pa, the order of the Dalai Lama. The bKa'-rgyud-pa had their principal monastery at Hemis (He-mis), and Ladakh's main dGe-lugs-pa lamasery was situated at Spituk (dPe-thub).

Sikkim, also under a lay ruler, stretched south to include the Terai jungle region known as the Morung, and in the north the king's lands did not end with the border but included estates in Tibet proper. In the rainy season the king lived on his estate in the Chumbi valley, and herds-men migrated seasonally between Sikkim and the realm of the Dalai Lama, paying taxes and services to both governments. Fourteen clans of Bhotias, of which the king's clan was one, had immigrated into Sikkim from Kham in the sixteenth century and now dominated an aboriginal population composed mainly of Lepchas. In theory, but only in theory, the king was absolute and could reassign the Bhotia clan chiefs' territories at will. The Bhotias and Lepchas were Buddhists, and their main monastic order was the rNying-ma-pa, whose chief monastery Pemiongchi admitted only monks of pure Tibetan ancestry. The Karma-pa sub-order of the bKa'-rgyud-pa was also represented in Sikkim with three monasteries.

Bhutan, being a church state, bore certain resemblances to the Dalai Lama's realm, but Bhutan's monastic order was the 'Brug-pa sub-order of the bKa'-rgyud-pa, and the entire state was in effect a 'Brug-pa endowment. No other monastic order was represented in the country. The government's nominal chief was the Zhabs-drung Rin-po-che, a religious figurehead generally known in English as the Dharma Raja – incarnation of the eleventh-century Indian tantric adept Nāro-pa, guru of the founder of the bKa'-rgyud-pa. The monastic establishment dominated Bhutanese society, and even lay officials remained celibate, lived separately from their families, and on attaining high office renounced their families altogether. Bhutan's temporal affairs were administered by a lay governor, known in English as the Deb Raja, who was appointed by a council consisting of the six provincial governors and the other top-ranking officials. By and large officials held their posts on tax-farming terms. The Bhotia population, who lived in the mountains, monopolized all positions of authority, and the higher officialdom was open only to certain privileged families. The Hindu population of the low-lying Bhutanese Duars (Gates) carried on agriculture and served the Bhotias in the highlands as menials and slaves.

The eastern districts of Kham, annexed by the Ch'ing in the eighteenth

century, were administered locally by hereditary native chiefs under the ultimate jurisdiction of the governor-general of Szechwan, although an annual 5,000 taels from the Ta-chien-lu (Dar-rtse-mdo) customs continued to be paid to the Dalai Lama. On a less obviously political level the Dalai Lama continued to receive religious recognition from the indigenous lay and religious leaders of eastern Kham, and it should be remembered that religion in Tibetan eyes was not clearly distinguishable from political allegiances. Even in easternmost Kham, adjacent to China proper, Ch'ing control was not easily maintained, especially in Chin-ch'uan (rGyal-rong), where the native Bon religion was stronger than in most parts of Tibet, and where the people spoke a Tibetan language that differed substantially from the dialects of Tibet proper.

Amdo, which had also been annexed by the Ch'ing, was known as Tsinghai (Ch'ing-hai, Blue Lake), or, in its Mongolian form, Kokonor (Köke Naghur) after the huge lake of that name at the northern end of the region. This was a superintendency of China's Kansu province and was inhabited by Tibetans (known as Tanguts or, in Chinese, Hsi-fan), Öölöd Mongols, several smaller indigenous ethnic groups, and an increasing number of Han Chinese colonists. The indigenous peoples were ruled by their own local chiefs under the supervision of an imperial controller-general at Sining, who also had supervision over the district of Nang-chen, to the south-west, even though from a Tibetan point of view Nang-chen was part of Kham. Notwithstanding the Ch'ing empire's direct jurisdiction, the Dalai Lama had a commissioner in Amdo who supervised trade and controlled the local monasteries, and there is evidence that at least some people were paying taxes to Lhasa.⁸³ The pastoral component outweighed the agricultural – the typical rural scene included Tibetan nomads with tents like the black tents of the Middle East, and Öölöd Mongols, whose tents were of the round Turco-Mongolian felt type. Among the Tibetan nomads the rule of Ch'ing law was slackly administered. In 1807 the Ch'ing had to send in 8,000 troops, and the Dalai Lama's government sent an army at the same time against two chiefs of the pastoral Golog (mGo-log) tribesmen in an adjacent district of Kham. The Tibetan army spent two years in this region pacifying the tribesmen, even though Kham was under Ch'ing jurisdiction.

In Huang-chung, the north-easternmost area of Tsinghai, there was a people known as the Monguors, speaking Mongolian, Tibetan, Turkic and Chinese dialects. The Monguors were both lamaist and shamanist, and their shamanism contained an admixture of Chinese Taoism. The

⁸³ Luciano Petech, *Aristocracy and government in Tibet 1728–1959*, 13; and Shakabpa, *Tibet*, 173.

Salars, a Turkic-speaking Muslim people, also played a prominent role. Among them, the influence of the Naqshbandiyya and Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching (Hsin-chiao) would seem to have been considerable. The same was probably true of the local Chinese Muslims, who played an important part in Tsinghai's trade. The Ch'ing had outlawed the New Teaching, and in 1789 the Sining officials had broken up a small group of New Teaching adherents who had been creating disturbances,⁸⁴ but government efforts were unsuccessful in eradicating the movement. Islam was making headway, and the number of Muslims was increasing. But Tibetan Buddhism, especially the dGe-lugs-pa order, was the overwhelmingly dominant religion. The two great dGe-lugs-pa monasteries of Kumbum (sKu-'bum) and Labrang (Bla-brang) enjoyed enormous wealth and ruled over sizable agricultural and nomadic communities.

Tibet proper, the Dalai Lama's realm, consisted of four main regions: the western districts of Kham; the central provinces, which included Ü (Dbus) and Tsang (gTsang); the province of Ngari (mNga'-ris); and the largely uninhabited Northern Pastures called Changthang. The Dalai Lama also had a claim to the Duars of Assam, a long east-west zone of lowlands, lying about thirty miles north of the Brahmaputra River. The western Kham districts were ruled locally by monastic hierarchs, lay princes, or officials named by the Dalai Lama's government, and all of these were directly subject to Lhasa's authority. Ngari, which had earlier been under the protection of Ladakh, was predominantly pastoral, and Changthang almost entirely so. Ü, where Lhasa was situated, and Tsang, which contained the important cities of Shigatse (gZhis-ka-rtse) and Gyantse (rGyal-rtse), were heavily agricultural, as were the lesser provinces of Kongpo (Kong-po) and Dakpo (Dwags-po), which were politically dependent on Ü and Tsang. The main river system of these agricultural provinces was that of the east-flowing Tsangpo (gTsang-po) River, which loops south into Assam and then flows west under the name Brahmaputra.

The temporal and spiritual ruler of Tibet proper was the Dalai Lama, head of the dGe-lugs-pa monastic order. His seat was the Potala palace in Lhasa, and he was believed to reincarnate. During a Dalai Lama's infancy, a regent exercised the powers of Tibetan chief of state, and in the nineteenth century the reins of government left the hands of the regents and their administrations only rarely and for very short periods of time.

⁸⁴ Louis M. J. Schram, 'The Monguors of the Kansu-Tibetan frontier: pt III. Records of the Monguor clans: history of the Monguors in Huang-chung and the chronicles of the Lu family', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, NS, 51.3 (1961) 65; for Taoist admixture, see his, 'The Monguors of the Kansu-Tibetan Border: pt II. Their religious life', *Transactions*, NS, 47.1 (1957) 84-90 and 126.

The eighth Dalai Lama (d. 1804) lived to the age of forty-six, but he showed little interest in politics and mainly left affairs to his regent. The ninth Dalai Lama died in 1815, the tenth in 1837, the eleventh in 1855 and the twelfth in 1875.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Dalai Lama's government, with Ch'ing backing, had transformed Tibet's hereditary territorial chiefs into a predominantly bureaucratized aristocracy. The Ch'ing had tried and failed to force the Tibetan government to admit commoners to the officialdom and to separate civil and military careers, but by and large Lhasa had broken the independence of the nobility of Tibet proper and now held direct control over the country from the province of Ngari to the western regions of Kham. To this rule there were only two noteworthy exceptions: the autonomous king of lHa-rgya-ri south of the Tsangpo River and the hereditary ruler of Po-yul near the river's bend. The families of both of these, however, paid tribute to Lhasa and intermarried with the aristocracy of Ü and Tsang. The lHa-rgya-ri king even supplied an official for the Dalai Lama's government.⁸⁵

Below the Dalai Lama, the Lhasa government was composed of two balanced branches, clerical and lay, consisting of 175 officials each. The lay branch was headed by a Council of Ministers known as the Kashag (bKa'-blon shag lhan-rgyas), which had direct access to the Dalai Lama. It consisted of four ministers, called kalons (*bka'-blon*). In 1800, one of these was supposed to be an ecclesiastic, but from 1804 to 1878 the government ceased reserving a seat for the clergy, and all four kalons were laymen. If dismissed or retired, a kalon was never reinstated, and there was an unwritten rule that during a Dalai Lama's lifetime none of his relatives would be appointed kalons. To administer the provincial districts, most of which were in Ü and Tsang, the Lhasa government appointed one (a layman) or two (usually one lay and one monk) governors for each. Governors were responsible for the collection of revenues, the preservation of law and order, and the hearing of civil and criminal cases, which could be appealed, if need be, to the Kashag. Not uncommonly, younger governors belonging to the high nobility were absentees, living in Lhasa while stewards performed their duties. Stewards also administered many of the government's revenue-producing estates. The Tibetan military forces consisted of local militia, which could be mobilized in times of emergency, usually under the command of one of the kalons. There were three provincial generals (*mda'-dpon*) in Tsang and two in Ü.

The clerical branch was headed by a chief abbot (*spyi-khyab mkhan-po*), who had direct access to the Dalai Lama. Under the chief abbot was the

⁸⁵ Carrasco, *Land and polity*, 137-8.

Church Council (Yig-tshang), which was a secretariat composed of four lama officials serving as a kind of ecclesiastical counterpart of the Kashag. The Church Council controlled the monasteries – except for the three main dGe-lugs-pa monasteries of the Lhasa district, namely Ganden (dGa'-ldan), Drepung ('Bras-spungs) and Sera (Se-ra) which were directly subordinate to the Dalai Lama – and it kept a register of the incarnate lamas. Under the Church Council came the entire ecclesiastical bureaucracy consisting of monk officials drawn from Ganden, Drepung and Sera. Most of them were commoners. The monk officials manned the ecclesiastical administration, the Dalai Lama's household and various other posts, such as governorships, in which they were paired with laymen. Although this government structure, both clerical and lay, had been created in the 1720s, 'there was no substantial modification during the whole of the following two hundred years'.⁸⁶

Lay officials were drawn from the Tibetan nobility, which was an aristocracy of birth based on the possession of agricultural lands and government posts. From the point of view of the Dalai Lama's government nobility did not exist among the nomads or other pastoralists. Noble status was in theory connected exclusively with government service, and sons who did not succeed to their fathers' positions were supposed to revert to the status of commoners unless they became monks. In practice, however, the younger sons of noble families rarely lived their lives as commoners. Noble families drew their incomes from hereditary landed estates that the Dalai Lama's government assigned to them in return for their providing one or, in a few cases, two sons for service in government posts. These estates were their principal landholdings. The families took names derived from the names of their estates but noblemen were not barred from owning other lands, and nobles bore the names of their family mansions in Lhasa side by side with their estate names. When a family had no son to enter government service, an exemption fee had to be paid for the estates until the vacancy was filled.

There was no direct correlation between a nobleman's official post and his income. Officials from the high nobility, who came from richer families, received large incomes while serving in low-ranking posts, while officials from poorer families had lower incomes even while serving in upper-echelon positions. Officials were allowed to borrow funds from the government on favourable terms and invest them at higher rates of interest. As tax-farmers, they paid stipulated amounts of revenue to the Lhasa government but kept all collections in excess of these stipulated amounts. When being transferred, officials received special government

⁸⁶ Petech, *Aristocracy*, 7–19 (12 for citation).

allowances and were entitled to services from the peasantry. They also found it easy to abuse their authority, requisitioning transportation service from the peasantry to carry items of their own private trade.

The Ü and Tsang nobility came of various origins, the most ancient being descent from early Tibetan kings and ministers who had been territorial rulers before the consolidation of central power in Lhasa. But in the eighteenth century, as part of the consolidation of dGe-lugs-pa power, the families of the Dalai Lamas began to be added to the nobility, and these new noblemen soon acquired even greater importance than the noble families of older lineages. In general, noblemen married only noblewomen and, when sons were lacking, adopted sons from other noble families. These took on the adoptive family's name and carried on the line. Noblemen whose families had held the highest positions in government enjoyed special privileges, but the government tried to keep specific administrative positions from remaining in the hands of any one family. The nobleman's landed estate and the right to serve in the government were inherited, but his post was not. In effect, political influence in the Lhasa government was restricted to the Ü and Tsang nobility, with the addition of the leading families of Kongpo and Dakpo. Tsang had been more important in the eighteenth century, but after about 1792 Ü had become more prominent. A small number of noble families monopolized the top positions, and this number expanded only slightly during the course of the nineteenth century.

Besides the noble families of Ü and Tsang which supplied officials for the central government and thus constituted the aristocracy, there were many local landowners, notables and dignitaries, such as the *bon-po* (priests of the Bon religion) and *sngags-pa* (hail chasers, who received a hail tax in return for warding off the hailstorms that did terrible damage in many parts of Tibet), exercising a kind of semi-official local authority. Also important in outlying areas of Tibet proper were local families descended from earlier regional lords. In some places, these acted as a kind of territorial sub-nobility. In others, they were little more than hereditary village headmen holding tax-free lands and enjoying the right to make use of the villagers' labour.⁸⁷

The dGe-lugs-pa monastic establishment, with which the nobles were to a large extent intermeshed, was as powerful as the lay aristocracy. The most important figure after the Dalai Lama was the Panchen (or Tashi) Lama, also an incarnation, who ranked second in the Yellow church and had as his seat the Tashilhunpo (bKra-shis-lhun-po) monastery near Shigatse. The Panchen Lama's domain was an autonomous state,

⁸⁷ Carrasco, *Land and polity*, 127–36, 213.

patterned in miniature on Lhasa, with an indigenous lay nobility who received landed estates in return for service. Various dGe-lugs-pa incarnations in western Kham administered their lands more or less autonomously, and dGe-lugs-pa lamas and monasteries were to be found everywhere throughout Tibetan territory. Noblemen commonly held positions of special privilege within the monastic establishment. Reincarnations were often found among the nobility, and noble monks had opportunities that were in general denied to monks of common origin. Monk officials from noble families enjoyed greater prestige than their fellows, and noble monks received more financial support from home.

Monk officials of the Lhasa government, all of whom were recruited from among the most talented boys of the Ganden, Drepung and Sera monasteries, were trained in a special school in the Potala where their celibacy was strictly enforced. Unlike lay officials, monk officials apparently held no personal landed estates in return for their service, except when the offices to which they were assigned had lands attached specifically for the support of the office-holder himself. Otherwise they were supported mainly by their home monasteries. A sharp contrast may be seen here between the limited means of the monk officials and the wealth of the various dGe-lugs-pa incarnations, who not only possessed rich landed estates but also supplemented their incomes by moneylending and trade.

Monasteries of the older, 'unreformed' monastic orders held their lands by recognizing the political authority of the Dalai Lama, to whom in theory all land belonged. These older orders, Sa-skyapa, rNying-ma-pa and bKa'-rgyud-pa, have been referred to collectively as the Red Sect, but, like the dGe-lugs-pa, they were monastic orders rather than sects, and the epithet Red is more properly reserved for the so-called Red Hat lamas of the Karma-pa sub-order of the bKa'-rgyud-pa to distinguish them from the Black Hat line. A special position in Tibet proper was enjoyed by the Sa-skyapa, whose abbot ruled an autonomous church state in western Tsang.

Tibet's male monastic population in 1800 for all the lamaist orders probably totalled something under 760,000 monks affiliated to about 2,500 different monasteries.⁸⁸ Men of all classes could become monks, except for outcasts (corpse-cutters, butchers, fishermen, ferrymen, smiths and, in western Tibet, musicians) and persons with physical defects, but men from rich families stood a better chance of advancement through the various grades (candidates – novices – ordained monks – literary degree-holders – adepts of esoteric doctrines) because monks had to provide partial self-support and had to pay fees and to feast their congregations

⁸⁸ Das, 'Monasteries', 106; Carrasco, *Land and polity*, 121.

before obtaining each advancement in grade. Many candidates from poor families therefore failed to advance beyond the novitiate and lived by acting as pastors to the lay people, managing monastic properties or by various crafts. The top positions of the several monastic orders were in general not open to men rising from the lower grades. The Dalai and Panchen Lamas were incarnations, as were many other top positions in the dGe-lugs-pa hierarchy. The heads of the 'Brug-pa in Bhutan, of the rNying-ma-pa in Sikkim and of the Hemis monastery in Ladakh were all reincarnations, while the leading hierarchs and abbots of the Sa-skya-pa and the main rNying-ma-pa monastery were hereditary and thus also closed to talent from among the community of monks. The most important exception was the position of the abbot of Ganden monastery, the seat of the dGe-lugs-pa founder, which was open to talent.

People of all levels and classes engaged in trade. The most profitable commodities, especially tea, wool and rice, were usually government monopolies assigned to monasteries or to individuals. Among the greatest traders were the monasteries and the incarnate lamas, who were also the main moneylenders. Commoners engaged in trade at a disadvantage. Even when rich they ranked below the lowest officials and were not allowed to wear silk. Craftsmen too worked at a disadvantage. The government ran certain textile and other specialized industries, making use of peasant labour, and in other crafts had the right to buy at very low prices. In Ngari the government owned gold mines as state monopolies and farmed them out on three-year leases to a contractor who was empowered to levy free peasant labour to mine the gold. Smiths, as mentioned above, were outcasts. As in Leh, so also in Lhasa, foreign merchants predominated – Kashmiris, Nepalese or Han Chinese. Of the Tibetan traders, many were from Kham.

Ch'ing influence in Tibet had reached its highest point with the Ch'ien-lung Emperor's military intervention in the Tibetan-Nepalese war in 1792. Thereafter it began a slow decline. Ch'ing supervision of the Kashag was represented by an amban, an assistant amban and a small Ch'ing garrison in Lhasa. As in Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, the ambans were always bannermen. In theory the Ch'ing emperor himself named replacements for all vacancies in the Kashag or among the provincial generals. In practice this was mainly a formality, but the Dalai Lama or his regent regularly went through the steps of submitting recommendations for these positions to the amban, who forwarded them to Peking. Moreover, the Ch'ing recognized members of the lay bureaucracy as members of the imperial officialdom: kalons and the recipients of

specially conferred Ch'ing titles of nobility held the third degree of rank, like the hakim begs of Altishahr; other top-ranking officials, including the provincial generals, held the fourth degree. Occasionally, as a mark of special favour, the emperor might elevate a Tibetan to the second degree. The Dalai and Panchen Lamas stood above and outside the Ch'ing rank structure, but the fact that these degrees had standing in Tibetan eyes may be seen in the term 'Fourth Degree' (*Rim-bzhi*), which was a general style for most of the Tibetan upper bureaucracy.

The Ch'ing and the Tibetans saw the relationship between the emperor and the Dalai Lama from two very different perspectives. From the Ch'ing point of view, the Dalai Lama was a mighty ecclesiastic and a holy being, but nonetheless the emperor's protégé. From the Tibetan point of view, the emperor was merely the Lama's secular patron. This meant that in Tibetan eyes the Dalai Lama's position was superior to that of the Ch'ing emperor, because in Tibet, whereas it was the duty of the laity to provide material support for the monastic community, the monastic community (*dGe-lugs-pa*, in this case) was the ruling body, and lay persons, no matter how rich or powerful, were thus in a subordinate position. The Tibetan government was well aware of the Ch'ing view of the matter, but it was impolitic for the Tibetans to question the Ch'ing interpretation. The chronic problem that the Tibetan government faced was how to reconcile the interests of the Tibetan populace, who were hostile to Ch'ing influence, with the separate interests of the monasteries, the aristocratic families and the Peking government.

A perennial issue of this kind was the method of selection of reincarnations. In 1793 the Ch'ien-lung Emperor had sent a golden urn to Lhasa, ordering that thenceforth the names of the leading candidates for recognition as reincarnations of the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama and other high incarnate lamas should be written on slips of paper and placed in the urn, then drawn by lot. The traditional method of selection had been based on a series of tests, such as the ability of the infant candidate to distinguish objects that had belonged to his previous incarnation. The winning candidate had customarily been a nobleman on whom the chief Tibetan officials had agreed. The Ch'ing court, however, had decreed that the Dalai Lamas should be chosen from among the commoners, and had sent the urn to Lhasa to prevent Tibetan officials from choosing the Dalai Lamas in accordance with the interests of the dominant political group among the nobility. From the Ch'ing point of view, it was also unthinkable that an important dignitary like the Dalai Lama should be chosen by any system that excluded the emperor's authority. Not only did the Tibetans regard the golden urn as unwelcome interference; they also re-

garded it, as indeed the Ch'ing government itself regarded it, as a symbol of Ch'ing authority in Tibet. Upon the death of a Dalai Lama, therefore, the Lhasa government was obliged both to lead the Tibetan public to suppose that the traditional method of selection had been used and at the same time to reassure the Ch'ing authorities that the Dalai Lama had in fact been selected by lot from the urn.

The extent to which the lottery-urn was actually used during the nineteenth century remains a mysterious question, but the two occasions when it is generally agreed that it was employed came in 1841 and 1858 – precisely the time when Ch'ing influence in Tibet was at its lowest ebb. This suggests that the Tibetans were willing to use the urn to keep up a semblance of Ch'ing protection when the imperial power was too weak to exercise any real authority. When the Ch'ing were strong, however, the Tibetans left some doubt about the urn's use so as to emphasize Tibetan autonomy.

In 1804, following the death of the eighth Dalai Lama, the question of the urn contributed to growing popular resentment against the Ch'ing presence. Agitators distributed pamphlets and put up placards, and the Tibetan government, hoping to calm the situation, urged Peking to reduce the size of the garrison. The Ch'ing complied, and in return the Lhasa government imprisoned the ring-leaders of the anti-Ch'ing demonstrations. Nevertheless, the protest movement continued because people believed that members of the Kashag were in league with the Ch'ing ambans and had their hands in the government till. In response to growing popular agitation, the regent put two of the kalons under house arrest but also sent a force of Tibetan troops to protect the ambans from any incident that might provoke the imperial government.

Popular suspicions seem to have had some basis, because in 1805 a Ch'ing investigation led to the recall of one of the ambans in chains and the exile of the other to Urumchi. The regent responded to the Ch'ing government's gesture by demoting the two kalons accused of corruption and by exiling from Lhasa the leaders of the anti-Ch'ing demonstrations. In 1808 the Ch'ing allowed the Tibetans to choose the Dalai Lama's ninth incarnation in the traditional way instead of using the urn. But the prestige of the Ch'ing garrison continued to decline. The ambans had been forced to borrow 20,000 taels from the Dalai and Panchen Lamas in 1801 to pay the garrison soldiers, since the Peking government had failed to send money. When the ambans tried to obtain a second loan, the Tibetans refused. Moreover, the Manchus failed to replace the garrison soldiers every three years as the regulations required. So the soldiers intermarried with Tibetan women, produced families who ate up their scanty pay, and


became impoverished. Seen from Peking, their marriages also called their loyalty into question. By 1815 the garrison's finances were in such a critical condition that the use of gunpowder had to be curtailed, and reductions were made in the frequency of drills. The ambans had become 'little more than political observers'.⁸⁹

Another chronic problem that the Tibetan government would face was how to deal with Nepal and the British East India Company. The Tibetans had a trade agreement with Nepal that permitted Nepalese merchants to do business inside the Tibetan borders. The East India Company was another matter. The Tibetans did not want so strong and alien a power to build up its influence in Tibet. The British presented a double danger: not only might they encroach on Tibet, but their encroachment might provoke a reaction from the Ch'ing. The Nepalese invasion had led to Manchu intervention in 1792 and the establishment of Ch'ing authority at Lhasa. British activity in Tibet might stimulate the Ch'ing government to consolidate its hold over the country even more. This the Tibetans were anxious to avoid; so they tried to keep the British at arm's length.

The Ch'ing intervention of 1792 had cut off the Tibet-Bengal trade and had closed Bhutan to the British. But the commercial possibilities still strongly attracted the directors of the East India Company, who hoped that Tibet might serve as a route for direct trade with the Chinese interior and that they might obtain silver and gold in Tibet and Bhutan to help buy tea at Canton. The Company also wanted to plant tea in its own territory. An attempt in the eighteenth century to obtain the tea plant by way of Tibet had failed, but efforts continued. In pursuit of these goals, the Company directed its attention towards Nepal, which had become a Ch'ing tributary in the aftermath of 1792. Although Tibet and Bhutan were closed to British commerce, the East India Company reckoned that British goods brought to Nepal could be traded in Tibet by Nepalese traders. Accordingly, the British were quick to take advantage of dissension in Nepal, and in 1801 they extracted the right to station a resident at Kathmandu. But conditions did not yet favour the extension of British influence among the Gorkha rulers. Anglo-Nepalese relations rapidly deteriorated, and in 1803 the Company had to withdraw its resident. When the Company continued to pressure Nepal, the Nepalese pretended that their tributary relationship with the Ch'ing was one in which Nepal was under Chinese protection. Meanwhile in Peking the Nepalese tribute mission of 1812 was vainly urging the Ch'ing to promise assistance in the event of a British war. The Ch'ing in effect refused.

The ensuing Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814-16 clarified the Ch'ing govern-

⁸⁹ Shakabpa, *Tibet*, 170.



MAP 5. Tibet in the early nineteenth century

ment's position on the tributary status of Nepal. The Nepalese government sent repeated petitions to the Ch'ing ambans at Lhasa stating that the British intended to annex Nepal and cancel Nepal's tribute to Peking. The king of Sikkim, concerned about Nepalese expansion, allied himself with the East India Company, while the Bhutanese, being more worried about British expansionism, sympathized with Nepal. In Tibet proper, the Panchen Lama and some of the Lhasa officials urged the Ch'ing to aid the Nepalese. The regent, however, advised Nepal to make peace. In the end, the emperor instructed the amban that, for all the Ch'ing government cared, the Nepalese could even submit to the British outright so long as Kathmandu continued to send its quinquennial tribute. As the amban put it in a letter to the Nepalese government, 'The Emperor is not concerned with whether or not you honor the British. . . . *When you fight with the British, this happens outside our borders. The soldiers of the Emperor cannot go there.*'⁹⁰ Nepal was clearly not under Ch'ing protection.

The Anglo-Nepalese war also sheds light on the Ch'ing doctrine of 'impartial benevolence' (*i-shih t'ung-jen*), according to which the emperor was to treat all states equally, whether within or without the imperial frontiers. Nepal was a tributary, the East India Company was not. But the government invoked the principle of impartial benevolence to justify refusing its protection to a Ch'ing tributary state.⁹¹ Not without some setbacks, the British defeated the Nepalese and forced them to relinquish all their territory between the Kali and the Sutlej rivers. This did not trouble the Ch'ing government at all. In disclaiming responsibility to protect a tributary, Peking was following a practice that would later ease the bitterness of unhappy realities in Korea, the Ryūkyūs, the Kazakh steppe, the Pamirs and other fringes of empire.

In Inner Asia, as in China proper, Ch'ing authority was an overlay, far above the emperor's subjects in periods of peace, pressing down upon them only in times of rebellion. The Ch'ing superstructure rarely interfered in the affairs of ordinary men, but, by its presence, held indigenous hierarchies in their positions of power and preserved, even rigidified, local institutions.

Despite the dynasty's policy of segregating Inner Asia from China, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the expansion of Han Chinese population into Inner Asia had begun. With government consent, Han farmers tilled fields in Fengtien, Tsinghai, the fringes of eastern Kham

⁹⁰ From a Nepali source, *Itibas Prakas* – see Leo E. Rose, *Nepal: strategy for survival*, 73–87 (86 for citation).

⁹¹ Suzuki, *Chibetto*, 174.

and Zungharia. The Chinese prefectural administrative system had followed them. Illegally, Han farmers had started to penetrate the Manchurian frontier and the Inner Mongolian grasslands. Han Chinese traders had also expanded. Han merchants and craftsmen inhabited the cities and towns of Kirin and Heilungkiang, and Han outlaws mined and dug ginseng in the forests. Han merchants dominated the trade of Mongolia from Kiakhta to Kalgan and did business throughout the steppe. Han and Tungan traders played important roles in Zungharian commerce, bought and sold in the Tibetan borderlands, and increasingly tried to extend their activities into Eastern Turkestan. Only central Tibet remained completely closed to them.

Even so, in the early years of the nineteenth century this expansion was limited. For the common folk in Inner Asia, China and the Han Chinese were far away. Bannermen and Ch'ing officials were rarely seen.

No great revenues flowed to Peking from Inner Asian dependencies. Indeed there was nothing that the Ch'ing wanted from them but peace. Strategy rather than profit – a desire to forestall the rise of rival powers – had inspired the Manchus' Inner Asian conquests. By land, China proper was well protected at last. Border problems still existed. The expansion of British India carried potential threats for Ch'ing authority in Tibet. Kokand's commercial ambitions and Makhdūmzāda religious politics threatened Ch'ing control in Altishahr. Russian power loomed at the borders of Sinkiang, Mongolia and Manchuria. But seen from China proper, these were distant troubles. In 1815, in Peking, they were hardly perceptible at all.

CHAPTER 3

DYNASTIC DECLINE AND THE ROOTS OF REBELLION

Broad interpretations of late Ch'ing history inevitably revert to the imagery of dynastic decline. Yet a look at some of the political and social detail of the late Ch'ing period will suggest certain limitations of dynastic decline as an integrative concept; and will, perhaps, illuminate some of the elements of long-term social and political change that link the late Ch'ing to the broad trends of China's modern history. Dynastic decline has traditionally implied a loss of moral and administrative vigour among the bureaucracy. However, these phenomena can be understood more easily in the context of the social and political worlds in which bureaucrats had to live, than in the moral categories which adhere to the familiar decline model. Certainly there was rampant corruption throughout the bureaucracy; yet the early nineteenth century also witnessed a surge of concern for institutional reform and national defence among some of China's leading scholars and administrators.¹

Dynastic decline has been understood as an ebbing of centralized power and its accretion in the hands of regional satraps, a disruption of the balanced tension between state and society. Such a devolution did in some respects occur during the nineteenth century. Nevertheless the Ch'ing institutional format was able, to a surprising degree, to hold China together even in the wake of the century's most destructive civil war, a fact which no doubt ensured that the revolutionary transformations of the twentieth century would take place in a national context, and with the nation's preservation as their primary aim. Thus the degree to which China had achieved national political integration – even in the corrupting patronage systems that pervaded the public life of the scholar elite – must be taken into account as we examine the decline of Ch'ing power since late Ch'ien-lung times.

An image of dynastic decline also emerges in this period from the exploitation, careerism and inefficiency of local government, all spurs to

¹ The authors wish to acknowledge a special debt to Prof. James Polachek of Columbia University for his many contributions to the development of this chapter, particularly for permitting us to draw upon his important new research in late Ch'ing political history.

popular rebellion. An understanding of these phenomena must begin with the aftermath of the early Chia-ch'ing political crisis and its very limited success in precipitating basic reforms.

The most urgent task confronting the Chia-ch'ing Emperor at his father's death in 1799 was to rid his administration of the influence of the minister Ho-shen. The emperor proceeded with dispatch. Within a month after his father's death, Ho-shen was dead and his closest associate humiliated. There remained the problem of what to do with the vast network of patronage built and nurtured by Ho-shen's faction, whose influence permeated the bureaucracy in the provinces, particularly the military administration. The emperor decided that the vast numbers and responsibilities of these people precluded a purge. He preferred to assume that many were honest officials who had been led astray and who, with the proper leadership, could be rehabilitated. He further feared that an exhaustive purge would so intimidate the bureaucracy as to nullify his efforts to re-establish communication between officials and the throne. Many, he argued, had had no choice but to peculate if they wanted to keep their jobs.²

In part, then, the emperor himself was reluctant to take the steps necessary to wipe out the legacy of a quarter-century of Ho-shen's influence. For this reticence he was criticized at the time.³ But another part of the dilemma of the Chia-ch'ing administration was an underlying complex of social problems that overwhelmed the organizational capacities of the Ch'ing bureaucracy. Central among these was the ratio of resources to population.

DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURE AND ITS EFFECTS

Certainly the most striking feature of Chinese social history in late imperial and modern times has been the phenomenal rise in population. To it can probably be traced many of the unique conditions of the age, though the concrete mechanisms whereby its influence was felt remain inadequately studied. The long period of internal peace that began in the late seventeenth century and lasted until the White Lotus uprising in the late eighteenth century saw China's population more than double, from

² *Ta Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu Jen-tsung Jui-huang-ti shih-lu* (Veritable records of the Ch'ing dynasty: the Veritable records of the Chia-ch'ing Emperor), 38.7b-8b, 16b-17; 40.10b-12.

³ See a lengthy letter in Hung Liang-chi, *Chüan-shih-ko wen, chia chi* (the first prose collection from the Chüan-shih Studio), ch. 10 supplement, in *Hung Pei-chiang hsien-sheng i-chi* (the collected works of Hung Liang-chi), vol. 1. See also a memorial by the censor Chang P'eng-chan, reprinted in Ho Ch'ang-ling, ed. *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien* (Collected writings on statecraft of the reigning dynasty; Taipei reprint, 1963), 20.10b-11.

around 150 million to over 300 million. The period from 1779 to 1850 alone brought a 56 per cent increase, so that on the eve of the great rebellions of the mid-nineteenth century, the population was in the neighbourhood of 430 million.⁴

During this period of relative stability and population growth, commercial facilities expanded to meet rising demand in local and inter-regional trade. The eighteenth century was a benchmark in the growth of the rural networks of periodic markets inland, and in the flourishing of north-south shipping along the coast. The proliferation of merchant guilds in cities and the emergence of credit institutions – the first native banks (*ch'ien-chuang*) and the Shansi banks (*p'iao-hao*) – provide the best evidence of change in the nature and volume of trade. Such a growth of trade in the private sector also indicates that merchants were accumulating and investing capital outside the government-controlled salt gabelle, the focal point of merchant investment at that time. The demand for Chinese tea, silk and porcelain in European markets was a further spur to the commercialization of the domestic economy. While commercialization brought prosperity and affluence to the cities and towns of the populous plains and coastal regions, areas unconnected to the major arteries of trade and communication remained poor and depressed. Into these remote regions instead moved waves of landless migrants, themselves products of demographic change.

Since Ming times, a number of factors had kept China's food production rising in proportion to her population. An expansion of cultivated acreage by means of inter-regional migration and the planting of marginal lands with the new foods from the Americas – sweet potatoes, maize and peanuts – had put the expanding population to productive use. More people also meant more manpower for the labour-intensive process of double-cropped paddy rice culture as well as more fertilizer in the form of nightsoil. Evidently the diminishing returns of this process were beginning to be felt by the end of the eighteenth century, by which time the benefits of increased manpower in irrigation projects had perhaps been fully realized.

More important, the pressure of population upon land was noticeable as even marginal border regions were becoming saturated. Szechwan, for example, whose fertile basin had absorbed tremendous influxes of migrants during the eighteenth century, was already crowded; and even its eastern border mountains were filling up with refugees from poor harvests in other provinces. The river valleys of Kwangsi, site of migration by 'guest people' (Hakka) from eastern Kwangtung during the eighteenth

⁴ Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the population of China, 1368-1913*, 64, 278, 282.

century, saw intense competition for land. In mountainous western Hunan, influxes of migrants set off violent conflicts with the aboriginal Miao people by 1795. Probably the most desperate crowding existed in the lower Yangtze provinces, soon to become the battleground of the most destructive civil war of the age.⁵ Many of the landless who remained in the settled agricultural regions obtained employment as government labourers, hired militia (*yung*), or paid underlings for local officials. So the growing surplus of the agrarian sector and the extended peace of the Ch'ien-lung reign had produced and nurtured an expanding population, without developing the new kinds of economic and political growth whereby that population might be absorbed. In this period of prosperity within the traditional framework lay the roots of the crises of the early decades of the nineteenth century.⁶

The manifold ways in which the population growth made itself felt in the history of late imperial China were conditioned by the particular characteristics of Ch'ing society and institutions. If the effect upon the livelihood of the peasants was ultimately ruinous, the effect upon the polity was equally grave. Political life in this era was characterized by fierce competition for advancement and security on all levels of public administration. That this competition should frequently have taken extra-legal form was probably ensured by the fact that formal mechanisms for mobility lagged behind the growth of population.

Though research on this question has been scanty, it seems likely that China was already experiencing the classic symptoms sometimes associated with underdeveloped societies in the present age: an overproduction of literate men in relation to the capacity of the economic and political systems to absorb and reward them. Contributing factors were an educational system geared to training for public office, a value system that tended to inhibit the diversion of literate talent into alternative career channels, and an administrative structure that was resistant to expanding or reshaping itself to conform to the changing society around it.

Neither the statutory number of government posts nor the quotas for academic degrees were expanded in relation to the burgeoning population. Although in some areas *chin-shih* (metropolitan degree) quotas were expanded, over-all quotas for *chin-shih* and lower degrees actually fell significantly in relation to the size of the population over the course of the eighteenth century. *Chin-shih* quotas were reduced in absolute terms

⁵ Dwight H. Perkins has treated the relationship of population increase to food production in *Agricultural development in China, 1368-1968*, see especially chs. 2-4. Ping-ti Ho, *Population*, 137-68.

⁶ This theme is developed in Suzuki Chūsei, *Shinbō chūkishi kenkyū* (A study of mid-Ch'ing history).

during the Ch'ien-lung reign, and licentiate (*sheng-yüan*) quotas were stabilized. Even the previously unrestricted numbers of the lowly student candidates (*t'ung-sheng*) were subject to limitation by the late eighteenth century. The demand for such status was so insistent that magistrates were able to turn a handsome profit by accepting bribes from *t'ung-sheng* seeking to avoid being struck from the rolls. The sale of Imperial Academy studentships (*chien-sheng*, or licentiates-by-purchase), of brevet titles and of substantive offices, a revenue-raising device repeatedly employed during Ch'ing times, was evidently an inadequate outlet for the rising demand for access to elite status. Sale of degrees and ranks may actually have intensified the pressure on the limited number of official posts by increasing the numbers who were technically eligible for them, thereby in a sense sharpening the apparent inadequacy of mobility routes.⁷

Demand inevitably spilled into other channels. On the local level, the most striking effect was the proliferation of supernumerary personnel at every level of the administration. These were not members of the formal administrative hierarchy. They were rather attachés and hangers-on, members of official families and private staffs, personal aides and servants, hired labourers and the ubiquitous clerks. The stratum of clerks and runners who carried on the menial tasks of record-keeping, errand-running, tax-urging and local enforcement became swollen with profit seekers, many of whom were literate, but to whom legitimate channels of mobility were closed. A provincial judge complained in 1800 that, in recent years, clerical personnel had multiplied far beyond the established quotas. For every clerk there were now several secretaries, and for every runner there were now ten-odd deputies. If these estimates are even roughly correct, the clerk-runner stratum must have expanded enormously during the course of the eighteenth century.⁸

This expansion can certainly be attributed in part to the increased administrative load borne by hsien authorities since the 'single whip' tax reforms that began in the late Ming.⁹ Yet deeply-rooted social pressures also played their part. Government at all levels was becoming the host organism of an expanding occupational group, which used the empire's administrative machinery as a weapon in its own economic struggle. That this struggle was successful is suggested by a censor's lament of 1803, that

⁷ On the movement of degree quotas see Ping-ti Ho, *The ladder of success in imperial China*, 179–81, 190. On *t'ung-sheng* see Lo Chen-yü, ed. *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, supplement, 3.4. Hsü Ta-ling, *Ch'ing-tai chüan-na chih-tu*, 46.

⁸ Lo Chen-yü, *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, supplement, 2.14b–15. For an example of the proliferation in the sub-bureaucracy, see Li Ju-chao, *Ching-shan yeh-shih*, in Hsiang Ta et al. ed. *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo* (hereafter, *TPTK*), 3.15.

⁹ John R. Watt, *The district magistrate in late imperial China*, 174.

the clothing of the clerks and hangers-on was now so luxurious that there was no longer any way to distinguish persons of high and low status.¹⁰ Supernumeraries like these were all supported with money, obtained through patronage networks, which was exacted from bureaucratic personnel and ultimately from the taxpayer by extortionate methods referred to as 'the squeeze'.¹¹

The early nineteenth century, riding the crest of the hundred years of *pax sinica*¹² that preceded it, thus brought a new wave of men with education, seeking positions in a civil service system which had not grown with the population. The result was an increase in the number of so-called expectant officials – those who were qualified but for whom no office was available; and a growing number of students who had been successful in the lower levels of the examination system but who were prevented by restrictive quotas from advancing to higher levels.¹³ Many sought to purchase higher degrees, a practice which grew more prevalent as the government sought new sources of income. Many remained frustrated in their search for official employment, and many turned to occupations outside the government bureaucracy.

In an environment of intense competition, some of the more resourceful among these literate men sought survival through various illegal and semi-legal managerial business enterprises. One was that of tax-farmer; though strictly proscribed, the transmission of commoners' taxes for commission (known as engrossment, *pao-lan*) was a widespread racket in local society. Another lucrative managerial occupation was that of pettifogger (*sung-kun* or *sung-shih*), which involved the handling of litigation at the hsien offices on behalf of others. Though in our terms they may be seen as an embryonic class of advocates, such persons were unwelcome fixers and meddlers in the eyes of officialdom. The Ch'ing legal system afforded them no legitimate place. It is clear, however, that both the tax-farming and the pettifogging roles of the 'evil *sheng-yüan* and rotten *chien-sheng*' served certain functions in local government. Well-connected tax-farmers could offer their clients some protection against arbitrary mistreatment by yamen underlings, and the legal fixers could lubricate

¹⁰ Lo Chen-yü, *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, supplement, 4.9b–10.

¹¹ Miyazaki Ichisada, 'Shindai no shori to bakuyū' (The clerks and runners and the advisory staffs of the Ch'ing dynasty), *Tōyōshi kenkyū*, 16.4 (March 1958) 1–28.

¹² Ping-ti Ho, 'The significance of the Ch'ing period in Chinese history', *JAS*, 26.2 (Feb. 1967) 194.

¹³ Lower level degrees (*chien-sheng* and some *kung-sheng*) were available by purchase and the quotas for these degrees, as well as for the lower *sheng-yüan* degree, fluctuated. However neither provincial (*chü-jen*) nor metropolitan (*chin-shih*) degrees could be purchased, and quotas for these degrees were frozen after 1702. See Ping-ti Ho, *The ladder of success in imperial China* (paper edn, 1964), 187–8, 190.

judicial machinery through their documentary skills and their systematically cultivated connections at the hsien offices. Both roles involved a commercialization of local administrative functions by a group whose political vocation was not matched by legitimate opportunities.¹⁴

From the standpoint of officialdom, the clerks were the most insidious and uncontrollable of these local managerial groups. The avoidance system of Ch'ing China, as well as the deeply-ingrained official style, meant that no magistrate was ever able to master the administrative details of his office, so that although all recognized the damage done by the clerks, none could do without them.¹⁵

EDUCATION, PATRONAGE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

The primary path to upward mobility in Ming and Ch'ing times was through education and the civil service examination system. Whereas most educational institutions in the Ming period had been private, in the Ch'ing they came increasingly under the control of state officials. In the Yung-cheng reign, a series of provincial academies had been built at the order of government, with subsidies from the state.¹⁶ The subsequent Ch'ien-lung period was especially notable for the aggressive interest taken by the court in scholarly activity, an interest which took the form of both extravagant patronage and literary inquisition. While the state did not directly control the curriculum at provincial academies, one professed aim of the government in creating these academies had been (in the words of the Yung-cheng Emperor) 'to eliminate fickle argumentation' and to do away with 'abuses' in the educational system.¹⁷ The literary inquisition of the Ch'ien-lung period particularly inveighed against scholarly works pertaining to the north and north-west frontiers and to military and naval defence.¹⁸ Although the restrictions imposed in the inquisition fell rapidly into neglect after 1800, by the nineteenth century a significant number of academies, under the combined pressure of control and censorship, had degenerated into technical schools for examination essay composition. Among the reasons cited for this by critics of the time were a decline in the quality of instruction due to the inimportance of personal

¹⁴ On 'fixers' see Ho Ch'ang-ling, *Ching-shih wen-pien* (1898 edn), 46.9b, 94.5b-6. Lo Ping-chang, governor of Hunan during the 1850s, used the term 'evil gentry and rotten *ch'ien-sheng*' (*tiao-chin lueh-chien*) and estimated that a hsien might have as many as 'several tens' of such persons. Lo Ping-chang, *Lo Wen-chung kung tsou-i*, 1451.

¹⁵ Wang Yün-wu, ed. *Tao-Hsien-T'ung-Kuang ssu-ch'ao tsou-i*, 1.62-4 (a censor's memorial of 1822).

¹⁶ Sheng Lang-hsi, *Chung-kuo shu-yüan chih-tu* (The system of local academies in China), 155-6.

¹⁷ The edict, issued in 1733, is reprinted in Sheng, *Shu-yüan*, 132.

¹⁸ L. C. Goodrich, *The literary inquisition of Ch'ien-lung*, New York reprint, 1966), 47-9, 61.

recommendation and bribery in obtaining teaching positions, and an excessive concern with success in the examinations.¹⁹

Changes in the nature of education may also have been a reflection of the increasing competition for employment. On the one hand, educational opportunities were becoming more widely available and more standardized. Further, after the establishment of the network of provincial academies, scholars began to move outside their local districts for education, and this doubtless fostered ambitions for upward mobility among a broader spectrum of the population. Mobility in newly developing parts of China was even increasing. But the general trend, especially in the rich and populous south-east, was a decline in mobility rates.²⁰

These obstacles on the legitimate path to success in nineteenth-century society – problems in education and in the civil service system – enhanced the appeal and the importance of illegitimate routes, particularly among men of wealth and influence. They also encouraged those in power to create positions in order to accommodate a friend or to repay a favour, giving rise to the swollen ranks of expectant officials who gathered at river conservancy and courier posts awaiting appointments that never materialized; and the magnified importance of recommendations and guarantees in the review of qualified applicants for official positions.²¹

Pressure upon existing channels of social mobility undoubtedly contributed to the characteristic pattern of political behaviour in Ch'ing China, the patronage network, in which patron–client relationships were made to bear more than their usual burden in the workings of the government. Patronage networks had their roots in traditional social relationships, which were defined primarily in terms of kinship and territoriality. Common family bonds or common native place were the first principles invoked in interaction with strangers. They were used to establish social distance and hierarchical order as well as to ramify business commitments and mutual obligations. Where these bonds were absent, pseudo-kinship ties were frequently established in their stead. Such ties served as the basis for informal social interaction and also as the framework for permanent social organizations ranging from poetry clubs to secret societies

¹⁹ Sheng, *Shu-yüan*, 217–19, 221–2. For contemporary views see, for example, Juan K'uei-sheng, *Ch'a yü k'o-hua* (Conversation with guests after tea), 2.61; Ch'ien Ta-hsin, *Shih-chia-chai yang-hsin lu* (A record of new knowledge cultivated in the Shih-chia study), ch. 18.

²⁰ Ping-ti Ho, *Ladder of success*, 242. On the significance of the provincial academies in education, see Meng Sen, *Ch'ing-shih ch'iang-i* (Lectures on Ch'ing history), 390–1.

²¹ On the appointment system, see Watt, *District magistrate*, 51–5. On recommendations and guarantees, Adam Yuen-chung Lui (sic), 'The Han-lin Academy: a biographical approach to career patterns in the early Ch'ing, 1644–1795' (University of London PhD dissertation, 1968), 206–7, 212–13. Guarantees were sometimes secured with payments; Thomas A. Metzger, *The internal organization of Ch'ing bureaucracy: legal, normative, and communication aspects*, 323–4.

to trade guilds. In the scholarly and official communities, the educational and examination systems supported similar patron–client relationships, in which the superior was the teacher (*lao-shih*) and the inferior the student (*men-sheng*). ‘Teachers’ included not only instructors in the schools, but also government officials such as the examiners at provincial and metropolitan examinations, and commissioners of education in the provinces.

The tendency to infuse impersonal systems with personalistic ties was manifested in all spheres of social interaction. This tendency was recognized in government and in business as at least a potential hindrance to efficiency and, at worst, a source of corruption. The private interests thus consolidated could undermine the public interest of the bureaucratic administration, or the corporate interest of a commercial enterprise. Bribery, favouritism, nepotism and all kinds of gift-giving and tipping were endemic in Chinese bureaucracy, and this fact was accepted and even condoned in some situations. The problem was not to eliminate these practices but to limit them to a manageable scale.

Such a compromise required a more careful balance than the government was able to achieve. One general strategy was officially to forbid all bribery, gift-giving and favouritism on the assumption that whatever continued covertly would then remain within tolerable limits. The new reign of an emperor was thus begun with an announcement that all such practices and the cliques to which they gave rise were forbidden. Behaviour that might be construed as nurturing private associations between public officials was subject to censure and punishment. In periods when such policies were rigorously enforced, it was not possible to pay respects to a superior in any context – whether social or official – without risking criticism. A note, a word, a visit, might draw suspicion to both the initiator and the object of the overture.

Since social intercourse was of course never interrupted, even severe proscriptions did not prevent the formation of private political and social alliances of the sort the government opposed. Therefore one good measure of official corruption was taken to be the degree to which private factional ties were publicly expressed or even flaunted at any given time. This is reflected in the scandal created by the spectacle of hordes of petitioners outside the chambers of the minister Ho-shen; and in the remark of an official who said, in praising the character of another prominent minister: ‘His doors were without private petitioners.’ The importance of patron–client relationships in official and educational circles, and their distortion in periods of maladministration, became a burden for patron and client alike. Many officials refused the post of commissioner of education because of the plethora of political obligations it imposed. Many

successful examinees failed to obtain office because they neglected or, worse, refused to offer customary 'greetings' to powerful officials.

China's golden age was said to have been a time when teachers were officials and officials were teachers. The nineteenth century was a time when teaching was corrupted precisely because of its close ties with officialdom. With the teacher as patron, and his student as client, clear political obligations were implied. Indeed, a political relationship could be established by presenting a gift to the patron whose favours were desired, and declaring oneself his pupil (*men-sheng*). In this manner it was possible, though scandalous, to become the 'student' of a powerful man who was both younger and less educated than oneself.²²

THE CHIA-CH'ING REFORMS

The Chia-ch'ing Emperor assumed that, having cut the flower of the Ho-shen patronage network, its stem and roots would wither and die of their own accord. He gradually replaced or degraded a number of Ho-shen's powerful followers in the provincial administration. He reaffirmed his confidence in trusted Ch'ien-lung advisers who had retained their integrity in the Ho-shen years: his former tutor Chu Kuei, the Grand Councillor Tung Kao, the former president of the censorate Liu Yung. He called for open criticism of administrative problems and commanded officials to memorialize him directly and secretly, without recourse to the Grand Council, which had been the centre of Ho-shen's influence.²³ Meanwhile he underscored his determination to rid the Council of private intrigues by posting a censor to patrol the Council chambers.²⁴ Nonetheless, reform in the upper levels of the administration would not heal the deep-seated malaise in the nineteenth-century bureaucracy. So corrupted had been provincial administration that order was not restored in the countryside for six years after the Chia-ch'ing Emperor came to power, in spite of his avowed determination to put an end to maladministration.

The emperor concentrated his reform efforts in two areas: changes in personnel and economies in expenditure. The majority of high provincial officials from the Ho-shen era were replaced. Of eleven key officials holding office at the beginning of 1799, six were removed immediately: the Nanking governor-general, governors-general of Shensi-Kansu, Fukien-Chekiang, the Hu-Kuang region and Yunnan-Kweichow, as well

²² Ho Ch'ang-ling, *Ching-shih wen-pien*, 6.6; Hsü K'o, comp. *Ch'ing-pai lei-ch'ao* (Unofficial sources on the Ch'ing arranged by categories), vol. 7, 'Shih-yu lei' (On teachers and friends), no. 65, pp. 8-10.

²³ *Jen-tsung shih-lu*, 37.27a-b.

²⁴ Liang Chang-chü, comp. *Shu-yüan chi-lüeh* (Brief notes on the Grand Council), 14.9-10b.

as the director-general of grain transport. Two others, the directors-general of the Yellow River Conservancy, were replaced the following year.²⁵

These reforms supplanted cronies of Ho-shen with officials who had previously opposed him and, in many cases, had suffered demotion or transfer on his account. Wu Hsiung-kuang, for example, who replaced Ching-an as governor-general of the Hu-Kuang provinces, had been prevented by Ho-shen's manoeuvrings from retaining a seat on the Grand Council in 1797. Kao Shu-lin, the elder brother of one of the first censors to impeach Ho-shen in 1799, had earlier been demoted to an office in the western border regions due to a conflict with Ho-shen. With Ho-shen's death, Kao became governor-general of Yunnan and Kweichow. Other officials were awarded provincial posts through recommendations by Chu Kuei: Wang Ping-t'ao, director-general of the Yellow River Conservancy in Honan, Ching Tao-ch'ien, the new governor of Anhwei, and Juan Yüan, who was made governor of Chekiang.²⁶

The provincial officials who were removed in this reform were indicted in a series of impeachments submitted by censors in response to the emperor's announcement that the *yen-lu* (avenues of communication), the traditional channels for criticism of the government, were re-opened.²⁷ A Manchu prince close to the throne was convinced, however, that the Chia-ch'ing Emperor had been well advised before this time and had independently decided on a course of action to eliminate the Ho-shen faction.²⁸

It has recently been observed that the Chia-ch'ing era marks the beginning of a period in which Han Chinese officials dominated Ch'ing provincial administration, a change in ethnic ratios previously thought to have begun only in the period of the Taiping Rebellion.²⁹ It should therefore be noted that a number of Manchu censors were among those responsible for the reform proposals and impeachments of 1799.³⁰ Whether or not ethnic distinctions were being taken into account in appointments during this period remains an open question. There is so far no evidence that the early Chia-ch'ing reforms followed ethnic lines.

It is also unclear that the rapid succession of new appointments in 1799

²⁵ *Ch'ing shih* (History of the Ch'ing dynasty), comp. by Ch'ing-shih pien-tsuai wei-yüan-hui 193.2934-5.

²⁶ These changes are discussed, with relish, in Chao-lien, *Hsiao-i'ing tsa-lu* (Miscellaneous notes from the Hsiao pavilion), 10.33-6b.

²⁷ *Jen-tsung shih-lu*, 37.22a-b.

²⁸ Chao-lien, *Tsa-lu*, 1.23a.

²⁹ Lawrence D. Kessler, 'Ethnic composition of provincial leadership during the Ch'ing dynasty', *JAS*, 28.3 (May 1969), 499.

³⁰ Chao-lien, *Tsa-lu*, 10.36b-39.

in fact heralded a true reform of provincial administration. All of the new appointees had been part of the bureaucracy of the Ho-shen era, whether or not they had belonged to the Ho-shen faction. In addition, many of the ousted members of the Ho-shen camp later reappeared in other official positions, or were permitted to retire in comfort with titles intact. Research now in progress suggests that the years 1814 and 1820 mark the critical junctures in the rise of increased numbers of Han Chinese to provincial posts.³¹ At these junctures, marked by the Lin Ch'ing Rebellion (1813) and by the accession of the Tao-kuang Emperor (1820), occurred a similar rapid turnover in the upper levels of the provincial administration. These years brought an infusion of new men into provincial government – appointees who had won degrees and held office after the Ho-shen era – drawn increasingly from the ranks of the predominantly Han Chinese censorate and the Hanlin Academy. As in the past, the emperor was guided in his choices by the recommendations of a few trusted advisers. A number of these new appointees, who included the Hunanese reformer T'ao Chu, were associates or friends of a censor and later prominent provincial official named Chiang Yu-hsien, himself a Han Chinese bannerman. They also were linked through membership in an informal poetry club at Peking known as the Hsüan-nan circle, whose numbers later included the leading 'statecraft' reformers Lin Tse-hsü and Wei Yüan.

Such a renewal of Chinese literati influence in Ch'ing bureaucratic administration in this period can be viewed as the beginning of a trend that culminated in the rise of Tseng Kuo-fan and his protégés during the Taiping Rebellion and the Restoration that followed. It may also signify an increasing interest in provincial government service among Han Chinese in the Hanlin Academy and the censorate.

A secondary feature of the reforms of the Chia-ch'ing and later Tao-kuang reigns was a highly publicized effort to reduce spending by curbing waste and conspicuous consumption at court. The Chia-ch'ing Emperor ended the tradition of extravagant southern tours that had been a hallmark of his father's rule. He sought through official policy and personal example to slow the drain of revenues from the central treasury and to reform the indolent life-style that was widespread among members of the nobility and the official bureaucracy. To this end were halted the annual tribute gifts presented by provincial officials in border provinces, and the imperial robes were reputedly patched. However, these changes appear to

³¹ This research is the subject of a doctoral dissertation by James Polachek of Columbia University. Mr Polachek's work promises to fundamentally alter current views of early nineteenth-century politics.

have had no lasting effect on either the Manchu nobility in the metropolitan area or the officials in the provinces, and they were stoutly and successfully resisted after the mourning period following the Ch'ien-lung Emperor's death.³² The support of the growing population of indigent bannermen in Peking, and of the Imperial Household Department, for example, remained a fiscal problem of major proportions.³³


AUGURIES OF CRISIS: THE GRAIN TRIBUTE ADMINISTRATION

The new provincial officials of the Chia-ch'ing government went to their posts with a mandate to reform the bureaucratic administration under their jurisdiction. However, it was at the provincial level that the central government reforms confronted the legacy of the Ho-shen era. From this confrontation emerged conflicts over the pacification of the White Lotus Rebellion and over the problems of corruption in local government. A third area of conflict was the administration of the grain tribute system.

Grain tribute was one of the three great superintendencies administered by the central government in the provinces, the others being the salt monopoly and the Yellow River Conservancy. The grain tribute administration entailed the collection of a rice tax from eight provinces in south and central China, and its transportation to Peking, where the grain was used to feed members of the court and nobility and stored in granaries for distribution in north China. This collection and transport system had its own bureaucratic administration which paralleled that of the regular provincial bureaucracy and overlapped with the Yellow River Conservancy. At its head was the director-general of grain transport (*ts'ao-yün tsung-tu*), with headquarters at Huai-an, Kiangsu. Under him were the provincial grain intendants, one for each tribute province, and each directly responsible to the director-general, not to the regular governor-general in whose province he served. The grain intendant in turn oversaw a collection system staffed largely by non-bureaucratic personnel. Most of this staff was composed of the class of hereditary boatmen (*ch'i-t'ing*) who lived in the military colonies (*t'un-t'ien*) along the Grand Canal. The grain junks employing these boatmen were organized into fleets of up to one hundred. The grain transport administration also had its own militias for guarding the grain shipments, its own inspectors and checkpoints at

³² The edict banning provincial tribute appears in *Jen-tsung shih-lu*, 37.45–6b. Concerns of a censor about the lasting effects of austerity measures are expressed in Lo Chen-yü, *Huang-Ch'ing tso-i*, supplement, 3.16b–17b.

³³ See Ts'ao Tsung-ju, 'Tsung-kuan Nei-wu Fu k'ao-lüeh' (A study of the Nei-wu Fu), *Wen-hsien lun-ts'ung*, 112–14; Ch'iu K'uang-lu, comp. *Ch'ing-tai i-wen* (Anecdotes about the Ch'ing dynasty), 7.70.



MAP 6. The grain transport system

locks along the canal, and its own hired porters who carried the grain from collection posts in local districts to depots along the canal.³⁴

By Chia-ch'ing times this vast grain administration had been corrupted by the accumulation of superfluous personnel at all levels, and by the customary fees payable every time grain changed hands or passed an inspection point. The hereditary boatmen or *ch'i-t'ing* class formed one of the many groups in Ch'ing society who were expected to live on a fixed income in a period of economic growth, steady inflation, and population increase. As their numbers grew, many of the *ch'i-t'ing* class lost access to the hereditary fields (*t'un-t'ien*) that were to have been their legitimate source of support.³⁵ Further, the grain transport system had grown increasingly dependent upon a class of hired vagrant labourers called boat hands (*shui-shou*). This group, gradually supplanting the hereditary *ch'i-t'ing* who had been the mainstay of the Ming grain tribute system, required its own payment and exacted its own share of fees from the grain tax. By Chia-ch'ing times the number of *shui-shou* had more than tripled, increasing to an estimated forty or fifty thousand.³⁶ In addition the grain transport stations served as one of the focal points for patronage in official circles. Hundreds of expectant officials clustered at these posts, salaried as deputies (*ch'ai-wei* or *ts'ao-wei*) of the central government.³⁷

As the numbers of personnel in the grain tribute administration grew and as costs rose through the eighteenth century, the fees payable for each grain junk increased accordingly. Where in 1732 fees had ranged from 130 to 200 taels per boat, by 1800 they had grown to 300 taels, in 1810 to 500, and by the early Tao-kuang period (1821), to 700 or 800 taels. The rising costs of the grain tax in turn led members of the local gentry to negotiate for tax exemptions, thereby increasing the burden on taxpaying households and ultimately producing a decline in the actual amounts collected as poor taxpayers were dispossessed. One result of this was a gradual commercialization of the grain tribute, as local officials were forced to purchase rice from private traders in order to meet their quotas.³⁸

³⁴ The organization of the grain tribute system is described in Hoshi Ayao, *Tai unga: Chūgoku no sōun* (The Grand Canal – grain transport in China), 165–79. See also Harold C. Hinton, 'The grain tribute system of the Ch'ing dynasty', *FEQ*, 11.3 (May 1952), 339–54 and Yamaguchi Michiko, 'Shindai no sōun to senshō' (Tribute grain transport and merchant shipowners under the Ch'ing dynasty) *Tōyōshi kenkyū*, 17.2 (Sept. 1958) 56–9.

³⁵ On fees, see Hoshi, *Tai unga*, 185–8, 223–4. On the problem of landless hereditary boatmen, see a memorial of 1817 by Sun Yü-t'ing quoted in Ho Ch'ang-ling, *Ching-shih wen-pien*, 46.11a.

³⁶ Hoshi, *Tai unga*, 178.

³⁷ Meng Sen, *Ch'ing-tai shih* (A history of the Ch'ing dynasty), 334; Yamaguchi, 'Shindai no sōun', 59.

³⁸ Hoshi, *Tai unga*, 223–4; *Huang-ch'ao cheng-tien lei-tsu'an* (Classified compendium on the government and statutes of the Ch'ing dynasty), comp. by Hsi Yü-fu, 49.3a–b.

Meeting the grain quota was the single most important task of the provincial grain intendant. To this end he collaborated closely with the superintendents of the Peking granaries. These metropolitan posts were an important source of official speculation and probably served as the crucial link between the provincial grain tribute administration and officials in Peking.³⁹ Grain quotas were assessed on local districts or *hsien*, where the collection itself fell not to the grain administration but to the regular local government. Taxpayers paid a local broker, who took the grain to a *hsien* collection point; there it was checked by the magistrate, who was responsible for presenting it to the agents of the grain administration. Thus the burden of extortion exacted by the grain transport system fell ultimately on the shoulders of the beleaguered *hsien* magistrate, who took his complaints to his own superiors in the regular provincial administration.⁴⁰

These complaints led ultimately to a conflict between certain provincial officials and the officials with a vested interest in grain transport. When the grain tribute system began to show signs of breakdown in the period after 1803, this conflict of interest began to focus on proposals to the throne that advocated the use of a sea route. Officials aligned with the grain superintendency sought to preserve the existing inland transport system along the Grand Canal; many regular provincial officials wished to abandon it in favour of sea transport up the coast. The conflict culminated in the sea route debates of 1824–5, when the inland grain transport network temporarily collapsed.

Portents of this grain transport crisis began as early as 1803, when flooding on the Yellow River silted and blocked the Grand Canal, slowing grain shipments to the capital. At that time a number of detailed plans and memorials were submitted on the means and advantages of developing alternative sea routes, such as those employed in Yüan times and in the early Ming. Nothing came of these proposals once the flooding subsided, but they were revived for consideration in 1810 when new delays in grain shipments prompted the emperor to solicit proposals for combining the canal route with sea transport. The response from provincial officials at the time was overwhelmingly negative. Le-pao, then governor-general at Nanking, with the support of high officials in Chekiang and Kiangsu, submitted a memorial detailing twelve reasons why sea transportation was neither feasible nor desirable. Again in 1815 the issue was posed, and again defeated. One of the most important objections raised was a reluctance to alter established precedent. Advocates of this position were

³⁹ Hoshi, *Tai unga*, 164; Hsi, *Huang-ch'ao cheng-tien lei-tsu'an*, 48.4b–5.

⁴⁰ On the burdens imposed on local government by the grain tribute administration, see Hinton, 'Grain tribute', 349, 351; and Hoshi, *Tai unga*, 165, 190–1.

later able to invoke the words of the emperor himself who, in a strongly-worded edict in 1816, rejected sea route proposals.⁴¹

That most of the arguments against the feasibility of sea transport were fatuous was demonstrated by the flourishing condition of private coastal trade at the time. Neither piracy, nor hazards of weather, nor the costs of shipbuilding (all cited as obstacles to a viable sea route) hampered the merchants of the lower Yangtze who, by the Chia-ch'ing period, were operating some 3,500 Kiangsu traders (*sha-ch'uan*) in maritime trade. Single entrepreneurs were known to own fleets of up to thirty or forty vessels, deriving profits mainly from shipments of beans from north China to the south. Proponents of the sea route argued that this private trade could be tapped by the government with the cooperation of private traders and ultimately to their benefit. It was known that the bulk of the coastal trade ran north to south; light loads northbound often had to be ballasted with mud. A proposal by Ying-ho, president of the Board of Revenue, suggested that private merchants taking official grain shipments north be allotted 20 per cent of the lading in private goods; returning ships would carry exclusively commercial cargo.⁴²

From the point of view of its proponents, the sea route offered above all economy, because it was a means of circumventing the myriad inspection points and middlemen on the canal route. The sea route proposals were opposed for precisely these reasons, by the vested interests which profited from the canal system.⁴³ By the 1820s one of the most powerful of these interest groups was the class of expectant officials posted at points along the canal route as grain deputies (*ts'ao-wei*). The appointment of these officials was overseen by the superintendent of grain transport himself, and the *ts'ao-wei* post was regarded as an exclusive realm of private patronage. In 1819, for example, the emperor accused the director-general of grain transport of increasing the number of deputies under him by 140 in a single year.⁴⁴

Merchants both on the canal system and in the coastal trade tended to align themselves with opposition to the sea route. One reason for this was the fact that by the Chia-ch'ing era grain shipments along the canal had become heavily commercialized. A significant portion of the lading

⁴¹ See Hoshi Ayao, 'Shinmatsu ka'un yori kaiun e no tenkai' (The shift from canal to sea transport at the end of the Ch'ing dynasty), in *Tōyōshi ronsō: Wada Hakushi koki kinen kaiben* (Studies in Far Eastern history: a collection in honour of the seventieth birthday of Prof. Wada Sei), 809–10. See also Meng, *Ch'ing-tai shih*, 338.

⁴² A number of sea route proposals, including those of Ying-ho, may be found in Ho Ch'ang-ling, *Ching-shih wen-pien*, ch. 48. See also Meng, *Ch'ing-tai shih*, 338–9; Hoshi, 'Ka'un yori kaiun e no tenkai', in *Tōyōshi ronsō: Wada Hakushi koki kinen kaiben*, 809–10.

⁴³ Chang Che-lang, *Ch'ing-tai ti ts'ao-yün* (Grain transport in the Ch'ing dynasty), 56–7.

⁴⁴ Yamaguchi, 'Shindai no sōun', 59, 70 (note 14).

on the grain junks was in private hands northbound, and southbound vessels carried lucrative shipments of smuggled salt.⁴⁵ Further, merchants in the coastal trade were not eager for government involvement in the private shipping that had been their domain since 1684, when the K'ang-hsi Emperor lifted the ban on maritime commerce. One early tactic of officials opposed to sea shipments was to take their surveys on maritime conditions from the seamen themselves, whose reports were unanimously discouraging.⁴⁶

The conflict between proponents and opponents of sea transport came to a head late in 1824 when the grain fleets en route to Peking became mired in silt and were halted permanently in a flooded area south of Kao-yu. The crisis forced the Tao-kuang Emperor to revive the debate initiated under his father's administration. This time, however, the crisis was severe enough to force a compromise. Barely one-fourth of the grain junks bound for Peking had crossed the Yellow River successfully; the rest were hopelessly stuck. The major sea route proposal accepted by the throne was written by Ying-ho and carried out under the supervision of another Manchu statesman, Ch'i-shan, sent from the court to act as Nan-king governor-general during the crisis. There Ch'i-shan collaborated with a newly appointed governor in Kiangsu, T'ao Chu, and the financial commissioner Ho Ch'ang-ling, in planning the shipment of the grain by sea out of Shanghai. The office of director-general of grain transport appears to have been temporarily thrown into limbo, being filled for two years by a succession of appointees who included, for a brief period, the rising young imperial favourite Mu-chang-a.⁴⁷

From the start the emperor took great pains to impress on all officials the temporary nature of the sea route innovation. In fact, use of the sea route was approved only on condition that it be accompanied by repairs and reconstruction to restore the canal by the following year. The repairs themselves, it was argued, would provide the necessary employment for the hereditary canal workers who would be idled by the use of the sea route. Ch'i-shan's successor in 1827 strongly urged the continuation of the sea route, which proved efficient and successful, but his recommendations were rejected.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Thomas A. Metzger, 'The organizational capabilities of the Ch'ing state in the field of commerce: the Liang-Huai Salt Monopoly, 1740-1840', in W. E. Willmott, ed. *Economic organization in Chinese society*, 32-3. ⁴⁶ Ho Ch'ang-ling, *Ching-shih wen-pien*, 48.22.

⁴⁷ For an account of this crisis, see an unpublished paper by George W. Gross, 'Ho Ch'ang-ling and the 1825 debate over shipment of the imperial grain tax', University of Chicago, Department of History, 1970. Further details may be found in biographies of the officials involved. See Ch'ing-shih kuan, comp. *Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan* (Collected biographies of the Ch'ing period), 34.9b-13b; 35.51b-54. See also Hoshi, *Tai unga*, 179; Chang Che-lang, *Ts'ao-yün*, 55-60.

⁴⁸ Ming, *Ch'ing-tai shih*, 339.

Not until the late 1840s was the government forced to abandon the canal route for the sea route on a permanent basis. By the time this decision was taken, certain factors had begun to alter the context of the power struggle. The boat hands (*shui-shou*) had organized themselves into secret societies based on belief systems much like those that had held together the adherents of the White Lotus sect. In the 1840s these groups were beginning to show signs of political aspirations, and were starting to extend their influence and organization among the boat trackers and even the hereditary grain transport workers (*ch'i-ting*).⁴⁹ When, after the Opium War, these same organizations adopted anti-Manchu ideologies, the interest of the central government in their continued support declined markedly. After 1845, with the appearance of new and serious food shortages in the capital, the sea route was adopted with little controversy. The outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion and the disastrous change in course of the Yellow River in 1853, precluded further consideration of a restored canal system.⁵⁰

Whatever the emperor's reasons for restoring the canal route after 1824, he was not politically opposed to those who had advocated alternatives. T'ao Chu retained his post as governor of Kiangsu until 1830, when he was promoted to the governor-generalship at Nanking, a position he then held for nine years. Ch'i-shan, although briefly degraded, continued in important provincial posts until his disgrace in encounters with the British in 1841. Reformers likewise appeared in the grain superintendency itself, in 1830–2 (Wu Pang-ch'ing), and again in 1834 (Chu Wei-pi) and 1837 (Chou T'ien-chüeh).⁵¹ It was in fact under T'ao Chu in 1831 that the first and only significant reforms of the salt administration were carried out in Liang-huai.⁵²

The Tao-kuang Emperor, who oversaw these reforms, was compelled to view administrative problems from the vantagepoint of the court, which remained the pinnacle of the patronage networks along the waterways and through the bureaucratic administration. He appears to have been a cautious, even a timid ruler, preferring the close counsel of a few advisers, and reluctant to take realistic stock of criticism or warnings. As long as opponents of the sea route proposal presented him with the

⁴⁹ Hoshi, 'Ka'un yori kaiun e no tenkai', in *Tōyōshi ronsō: Wada Hakushi koki kinen kaiben*, 181–2.

⁵⁰ Harold C. Hinton, 'Grain transport via the Grand Canal, 1845–1901', *Papers on China*, 4 (April 1950), 33–7.

⁵¹ Ch'ing-shih pien-tsuai wei-yüan-hui, *Ch'ing shih*, 193.2946–8.

⁵² Thomas A. Metzger, 'T'ao Chu's reform of the Huaipai salt monopoly', *Papers on China*, 16 (Dec. 1962) 1–39. T'ao's role as a reformer in the grain and salt administrations is lavishly praised in an epitaph by Wei Yüan, in that portion of Wei's collected works entitled *Ku-wei-i'ang wai-chi* (The exoteric collection from the Ku-wei Hall; 1878 edn), 4.13b–15b.

prospect of defying the precedents of the ancestors and simultaneously throwing hundreds of thousands of canal employees out of work, he was not a ruler who could have been expected to act to reform the grain tribute system.

The salt administration, on the other hand, was different. While salt smuggling and the sale of illegal salt itself represented a decisive vested interest, there were important distinctions between the salt smugglers and the canal workers. First, the canal workers were employed by a legitimate bureaucratic agency; whereas salt smugglers worked outside the salt gabelle and at counter-purposes to it. Second, the canal system was an integral part of a hierarchical administration centred in Peking and paralleling the regular bureaucracy. By contrast, salt smugglers operated in local or at best regional networks, often (as in the case of pirates) along the coast and southern inland waterways. While the squeeze that came through the grain tribute system filtered upward into the ranks of the bureaucracy, the salt smugglers tended to be private merchants and profiteers who usurped the income of bureaucrats and merchants in the regular salt administration.

Moreover, a powerful interest group at court stood to benefit from the elimination of salt smuggling, and at the same time was able to limit the extent of the salt reforms. This was the Imperial Household Department (Nei-wu Fu).⁵³ This organization obtained a considerable portion of its income from the salt administration, which had traditionally been dominated by its appointees. The role of the Nei-wu Fu in this, as in other controversies, remains poorly documented, but it is known that the financial interests of the Department in the general revenues of the Chinese government had been increasing since the early eighteenth century.⁵⁴

To be sure, proposals for salt reform posed a threat to stability in the countryside insofar as they would make idle the salt smugglers who were counted among the most numerous and unruly of the vagrant and landless troublemakers.⁵⁵ But the critical issue was not the risk of alienating constituencies in the countryside; it was rather one of placating official interests at court. Our understanding of the composition, nature, and importance of such interest groups remains limited, however, and must await further research.

⁵³ Metzger, 'Organizational capabilities', 42.

⁵⁴ The most detailed study in English on the Nei-wu Fu is Preston M. Torbert, 'The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department: a study of its organization and principal functions, 1662-1796' (University of Chicago PhD dissertation, 1973). See in particular 148-9, 195-200. On the role of the Nei-wu Fu in the salt administration, see 115-18.

⁵⁵ On salt smuggling, see Saeki Tomi, *Shindai ensei no kenkyū* (A study of the salt administration of the Ch'ing dynasty), 157-78.

Crises in the grain transport system were part of a general breakdown of public functions in the early decades of the century, stemming in part from bureaucratic malfeasance. In the case of grain transport, malfeasance merely compounded physical difficulties in a complex canal system that was joined at its mid-point to the Yellow River Conservancy. The physical difficulties of the system stemmed from silting caused by heavy soil erosion and from periodic flooding in the north China plain. By the late eighteenth century, the bed of the Yellow River had risen to dangerous heights, threatening the dikes and causing observers to predict the change in its course which finally came in 1853. Nonetheless, in order to reach Peking, grain shipments had to cross the Yellow River at a point near Huai-an. To the west of this critical juncture was a system of feeder lakes which were used to store run-offs from the river and to raise the water level of the canal when it became impassable, a policy known as 'borrowing from the Yellow River to help the Grand Canal' (*chieh-Huang chi-Yün*). Years of silting had altered the logistics of this system to the point where the sand bars at the Yellow River crossing and the rising bed of the entire canal system itself made it impossible to regulate the water level without inducing disastrous flooding. Floods at Huai-an threatened not only the grain supply at Peking, but the functioning of the salt gabelle as well, since the affected area included a number of Liang-huai salt factories and evaporating facilities.

Carelessness, ill-advised economies and intentional negligence in the Yellow River Conservancy had become a marked concern in official memorials after 1780, and corruption continued to plague the administration in the early nineteenth century. By many accounts, the aim of the water conservancy administration appears not to have been flood prevention, but rather the keeping of a careful balance whereby floods could occur at intervals regular enough to justify a continuing flow of funds into the water conservancy administration. Stories of three-day banqueting circuits and continuous theatrical performances along the south river conservancy suggested that only 10 per cent of the six million taels that annually supported the water conservancy were spent legitimately. Between 1808 and 1810, for example, the government supposedly spent eight million taels dredging estuaries at the mouth of the river; yet the flooding in the ensuing two years was many times worse than ever before.⁵⁶

Unofficial accounts of this corruption hold that its roots lay in the late

⁵⁶ Ch'ang-tu Hu, 'The Yellow River administration in the Ch'ing dynasty', *FEQ*, 14.4 (Aug. 1955) 505-13. See also Meng, *Ch'ing-tai shih*, 330; Hsiao I-shan, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih*, 2.890-2; Chao-lien, *Tsa-lu*, 7.29-30; Hsi, *Huang-ch'ao cheng-tien lei-tsuai*, 45.7b-9.

eighteenth century, when the conservancy took shape as a patronage network in the service of Ho-shen. At this time, however, the men placed in the Yellow River administration were required to remit funds to Ho-shen's private purse in exchange for continued favour and protection. After the death of Ho-shen, this money never found its way back to Peking. By the Tao-kuang era the water conservancy, like the Grand Canal, had become a haven for unemployed bureaucrats. It was said that a new Hanlin sent out to a river post with a letter from an official at the court could expect an annual salary of 10,000 taels and other benefits; with a *chü-jen* degree he might still make one-tenth of that amount.⁵⁷

DISORDERS IN THE MONETARY AND TAXATION SYSTEMS

By the early nineteenth century, the impact of the growth of the patronage system was thus not far to seek: the essential lubricant of the system was money, and the result was widespread shortages in official treasuries at all levels. With the fall of Ho-shen, the government began a concerted effort to force local officials to make up these shortages (*k'uei-ch'ien* or *k'uei-k'ung*), even to the extent of forcing incumbents to fill in shortages bequeathed to them by their predecessors. By the 1820s, the shortages problem had become, in the opinion of the knowledgeable provincial official Ho Ch'ang-ling, the obsessive preoccupation of the bureaucracy.⁵⁸

It was widely recognized that these shortages were due, not to the shortfall of the people's tax payments, but to pilfering by officials themselves, who were forced to pay for the needs of their own demanding entourages, as well as satisfy their obligations toward their official patrons, even before they could pay proper attention to their own fortunes. Under the patronage system, 'gifts to superiors' (*k'uei-sung*) were a necessary feature of official life. In the atmosphere of the late eighteenth century, officials were unlikely to be penalized for shortages in their accounts. Indeed, as one censor wryly remarked, the bigger the shortage the better they were likely to be treated.⁵⁹ It appears, however, that the post-Ho-shen climate simply brought about a turn towards greater exploitation of the public, as magistrates desperately sought to fill up their deficits by exacting more from the taxpayers. Provincial governors filled their own deficits by docking the magistrates' 'incorruptibility

⁵⁷ This account appears in Li Yueh-jui, 'Ch'un-ping-shih yeh-ch'eng' (Unofficial record from the Spring Ice Studio), 56-8; and is reprinted in other unofficial sources. See Ch'iu, *I-wen*, 7.54-6; and Ou-yang Shao-hsi, comp. *Ch'ing i'an* (Pure discourse), 5.11-12b.

⁵⁸ Suzuki Chūsei, 'Shinmatsu no zaisei to kanryō no seikaku', in *Kindai Chūgoku kenkyū*, 2.201. Ho Ch'ang-ling, *Nai-an shih-wen ts'un*, 6 (letters) 1-3.

⁵⁹ Lo Chen-yü, *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, supplement, 2.116.

allowance' (*yang-lien* – a modest form of salary), and in response the magistrates simply squeezed more 'customary fees' (*lou kuei*) out of the common people. So deeply ingrained was this practice of passing on all fiscal burdens to the taxpayers that even the Tao-kuang Emperor, on accession to the throne in 1820, was forced by official pressure to rescind an edict freezing the 'customary fees'.⁶⁰

In the short run, the Ch'ing tax system was beautifully suited to systematic exploitation. Although the basic quotas (taxes each jurisdiction was to transmit to the central government) had been 'permanently' fixed in the early eighteenth century, the imposition of surtaxes for the expenses of local government had become an institutionalized and indefinitely expansible part of the system. The multiplication of those who drew their livelihood from government careers meant the multiplication of surtaxes. Hsia Nai's classic study of the late Ch'ing tax system reveals the system's elasticity in the hands of its expert official and clerkly practitioners. The impact of these systemic evils was all the more devastating in the highly monetized economy of Ch'ing times. The widespread commutation of grain tax and labour service payments into silver – a trend underway since the Ming – meant that the actual rates of taxation could easily be manipulated by officialdom simply by keeping exchange rates at a ratio favourable to the receivers, rather than the payers, of taxes. Through such manipulation, taxpayers might actually pay several times the official quotas in terms of grain. Control over prices and exchange rates were also widely resorted to by officials and yamen underlings who filled shortages in government granaries by forced purchase (*ts'ai-mai*) of grain at extortionately low prices set by themselves.⁶¹

Ironically, the pervasive influence of the money economy enabled this kind of routinized extortion to flourish even while maintaining the power of the peasantry to support it. The reason was the long-term inflation of grain prices, which worked to the advantage of the producers. During the course of the eighteenth century, prices rose some 300 per cent, and so enabled the peasants to cope with increasing tax demands. Among the more obvious reasons for this inflation was the increasing silver supply from European sources. Increasing populations in the major commercial centres may also have spurred the rise in grain prices. It is probably true that the empire-wide corruption of the Ho-shen years was fuelled by this century-long inflation, which enabled the agricultural sector to bear the exactions of the bureaucracy.

⁶⁰ Suzuki, 'Shinmatsu no zaisei', 249–50.

⁶¹ Hsia Nai, 'T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ch'ien-hou Ch'ang-chiang ko-sheng chih t'ien-fu wen-t'i', *Ch'ing-hua hsieh-pao*, 10.2 (1935), see esp. 410–12. Forced grain purchase is discussed in a censor's memorial of 1800, Lo Chen-yü, *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, 3.5b and 27b. For the manipulation of exchange rates in grain relief operations, see Wang Yün-wu, *Ssu-ch'ao tsou-i*, 1.45–6.

As the observant Feng Kuei-fen pointed out in retrospect, however, the prosperity of the Ch'ien-lung years, based as it was on 'subsidiary' and not 'basic' wealth (Feng had in mind the expansion of commercial activity), was exceedingly unstable and could fall as readily as it had risen. Inflation did, in fact, begin to level off after 1800, and prices began a precipitous reversal during the second quarter of the nineteenth century.⁶²

Like the inflation itself, the abrupt reversal of prices can probably be traced to the silver supply. By the 1830s, the effects of the opium trade were beginning to be felt in China's bimetallic monetary system as silver flowed out of the country to pay for illicit drug imports, and soon the monetary imbalance was seriously disrupting taxation and commerce. The rise of silver's value in relation to copper was damaging to nearly all social groups save speculators, exchange agents and usurers. Since taxes were paid by the peasants in copper cash or in grain, but were transmitted by officials in silver, the real rate of taxation depended upon how much cash or grain would be needed to meet a given quota of silver. As silver grew scarcer, and hence more valuable in terms of other commodities, real tax rates doubled or more, and small landowners were driven to ruin.

In such desperate circumstances there was simply no way the peasantry could meet the quotas and surtaxes imposed upon it. In the lower Yangtze region, perhaps the most heavily taxed area in the nation, provincial officials were forced to recognize the scope of the disaster. Consequently there emerged in that area a system of subterfuge in which provincial chiefs falsely reported natural disasters in order to secure tax remission from Peking. This process was actually begun during the 1820s under T'ao Chu and Lin Tse-hsü and became a regular procedure thereafter. Evidently it was considered easier than bringing about an authorized decrease in tax quotas, a measure not undertaken until the 1860s. Since the lower Yangtze provinces exhibited high rates of tenancy, it is not clear how much of this surreptitious tax-relief was actually passed on to the tillers. In any event, the impact of the deflation and monetary chaos, added to the endemic corruption in local government, was severe from the standpoint of state revenues. By the end of 1848, accumulated arrears in the land tax were about equal to the total reserves in the national treasury.⁶³

⁶² On the Ch'ien-lung inflation, see Wang Yeh-chien, 'The secular movement of prices and the peasant economy in China, 1644-1935', paper delivered at the Association for Asian Studies annual meeting, Chicago, 1973. Selected materials on the Ch'ing inflation in general are in Nankai ta-hsüeh li-shih hsi, comp. *Ch'ing shih-lu ching-chi tzu-liao chi-yao*, 410-33. Also see Feng Kuei-fen, *Hsien-chib-i'ang kao*, 9.3b-4.

⁶³ P'eng Tse-i, 'Ya-p'ien chan-hou shih-nien-chien yin-kuei ch'ien-chien p'o-tung hsia ti Chung-kuo ching-chi yü chieh-chi kuan-hsi', *Li-shih yen-chiu*, 6 (1961) 49. See also Wang Yeh-chien, *Land and taxation in imperial China, 1750-1911*, 59-61. On the effects of the mone-

Popular reaction to the deflation and the rise in real tax rates broke forth in widespread tax-resistance movements during the 1840s and 1850s, particularly in the central and lower Yangtze valley. Leadership often came from the lower elite – *sheng-yüan* and *chien-sheng* degree holders. Forms of resistance varied widely, from litigation, to mass petitions, to mob violence. Riots led occasionally to open revolt and the seizing of administrative cities. One such incident that has been well documented reveals the surprisingly moderate, loyalist character of many of these movements; no attempt was made to justify uprisings in terms of anti-Ch'ing political goals.⁶⁴

The position of the lower elite in tax-resistance movements was highly ambiguous. There seems little doubt that their frequent involvement in illicit tax-farming (*pao-lan*), as intermediaries between government and people, proved a vehicle for their involvement in tax-resistance. The outrageous official oppression of the time, in a context of monetary chaos, now seems to have furnished their own exploitative-managerial roles with a respectable social purpose: they were able to stand forth as buffers between local communities and extortionate tax-officers. This new role seems to have brightened the image of the tax-farmers and drawn a measure of popular support.⁶⁵

It would be mistaken, however, to ascribe to such local leaders a genuinely aroused social conscience or a commitment to oppose the state in the interest of local communities. The *sheng-yüan/chien-sheng* group lacked the social eminence and connections with which the upper gentry were able to secure favoured treatment at official hands. Thus they were a vulnerable group. At the same time they were a group with literacy and local influence, a key intermediary stratum in local administration. That they should have assumed the leadership of tax-resistance movements is not surprising. But as scholars (and sometimes tax-farmers) whose orientation was determined by the existing state system, their political outlook was ambivalent. The state invariably prevailed against them, and the movements generated no enduring tradition of protest. Nevertheless, they furthered the disruption of local society, deepened popular hatred of the Ch'ing bureaucracy, and thus paved the way for the advent of the Taipings, whose armies gathered hundreds of thousands of recruits in the

tary chaos on the tax system of Hunan during the 1850s, see Lo Ping-chang, *Tsou-i*, 1450–5. On the false 'natural disasters', see Feng, *Hsien-chih-i'ang kao*, 9.3b–4.

⁶⁴ Yokoyama Suguru, 'Chūgoku ni okeru nōmin undō no ichi keitai: Taihei tengokuzen no "kōryo undō" ni tsuite', *Hiroshima Daigaku bungakubu kiyo*, 7 (1955) 311–49; Li Ju-chao, *Cbing-shan yeh-shih*, in Hsiang, TPTK, 3.15–19; Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and its enemies in late imperial China*, 98–9; Sasaki Masaya, 'Kempo ninen Gen-ken no kōryō bōdō', *Kindai Chūgoku kenkyū*, 5 (1963) 185–299.

⁶⁵ Kuhn, *Rebellion and its enemies*, 98–9.

very areas of the Yangtze provinces where tax-resistance had been most intense.

THE ORIGINS OF REBELLION

Though it is beyond question that population pressure lay behind the rebellions of the late Ch'ing period, it is also remarkable that such rebellions were more readily ignited in the recently-settled border regions than in the densely-crowded deltas and valleys of the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers. Thus the effects of population pressure were transmitted through the massive internal migrations of Ch'ing times, and it was generally in areas that had experienced this steady human influx since the early eighteenth century that rebellion most readily began: the island of Taiwan, the mountainous borders of Szechwan, the back country of Kwangsi, the strongholds of the aboriginal Miao along the Hunan-Kweichow border. The social characteristics of these areas are still inadequately understood, but among them may be discovered a few common ingredients that contributed to the fermentation of rebellion: an intense community or sub-ethnic consciousness, sharpened by the heterogeneous origins of the border-region populations and often reinforced by linguistic differences; and a high degree of militarization, made necessary by banditry or communal strife in the unstable border region. The rebellions born amid these conditions spread to the more settled populations of the plains and deltas with varying degrees of success as the nineteenth-century social crisis deepened.

The Miao rebellions

Han and Manchu pressure upon the aboriginal societies of central and western China resulted partly from the effort of the Ch'ing state to extend regular bureaucratic governance into previously autonomous regions, and partly from the movement of Han settlers into the mountainous internal borders in search of agricultural land. The policy known as *kai-t'u kuei-liu*, or bringing the autonomous chieftainates into the regular bureaucratic system, began during the 1720s and provoked fierce resistance among the Miao aborigines. There ensued a series of Miao uprisings that continued through the eighteenth century and much of the nineteenth. The Miao response brought further coercion by civil and military authorities. Lands of rebellious Miao were confiscated by the state, and a chain of military garrisons was built to buttress government power in Miao areas. In the train of Ch'ing administrative and military control came Han settlers seeking land and Han merchants and usurers seeking profit.

The great Miao revolt of 1795 along the Hunan–Kweichow border was apparently occasioned by greatly increased immigration into the border area by ‘guest people’ (*k’o-min*), poor Han settlers seeking land. Although the government had tried to control this influx during the latter part of the eighteenth century, the pressures had apparently grown too great, and control too lax. By 1795, there was no effective barrier to mass immigration. The settlers, along with local officials and clerks, found the Miao easy prey, and Miao land began to pass rapidly into Han hands. Armed uprisings early in 1795, under the Miao leaders Shih San-pao and Shih Liu-teng, brought heavy Ch’ing troop contingents into the Miao areas. The conflict was long and brutal, and ended only in 1806 with the final crushing of Miao resistance.⁶⁶

The rebellion forced Ch’ing officials to turn their attention to the urgent problem of stabilizing Han–Miao relations in the border region. Fu Nai, the magistrate responsible for the ruthless suppression of the Miao, drew up regulations whereby Han–Miao relations would be minutely supervised. Military agricultural colonies (*t’ün-f’ien*) were set up, with the dual purpose of keeping settlers and Miao under military discipline, while at the same time providing a Han militia force to bolster government authority. Trade was to take place only in designated centres under strict official control. Miao headmen were to assume local posts such as bailiff, and Han yamen-runners were forbidden to enter Miao villages. The effort was to minimize contact between the races, while making land on both sides non-transferable. Local administrators later experienced considerable difficulty maintaining the integrity of the colonies, as crowds of immigrants continued to press into the area. Further conflict was virtually assured by the ruinous rents demanded of Miao tenants on government-confiscated land, and by Fu Nai’s deliberate policy of destroying Miao culture by introducing Chinese education and by forbidding the practice of traditional religious ceremonies. Major Miao uprisings began again by 1855, not to end for eighteen years.⁶⁷ These massive Miao uprisings, separated as they were from the Chinese cultural world, developed no lasting connections with rebellions among the Han population. Yet they were symptoms of the inexorable pressures being generated within late Ch’ing society as the Chinese began to encroach upon what seemed, at the time, to be their last frontier.

⁶⁶ On the origins of the Miao rebellion see O-hui *et al.* *Cb’in-ting p’ing-Miao chi-lueh* (1797), 1.1–3, 8–9. The imperial edicts in this official documentary history are most revealing. Also Ma Shao-ch’iao, *Cb’ing-tai Miao-min ch’i-i*, 34–51.

⁶⁷ Fu Nai, ‘Chih Miao’, in Ho Ch’ang-ling, *Ching-shih wen-pien*, 88.2b–3; Ch’ing-shih pien-tsu’an wei-yüan-hui, *Cb’ing-shih*, 4500–2; Lo Chen-yü, *Huang-Cb’ing tsou-i*, supplement, 1.7b–11b; Wang Yün-wu, *Ssu-ch’ao tsou-i*, 1.2; Ma, *Cb’ing-tai Miao-min ch’i-i*, 59–69.

The secret societies of the south

The brotherhood generally known as the 'Triads' was actually a loosely-articulated association of groups that went by a number of names, including Three Harmonies Society (San-ho hui), Three Dots Society (San-tien hui), Heaven and Earth Society (T'ien-ti hui) or collectively as Vast Gate (Hung men). The Triads emerged during the early Ch'ing, probably founded by Fukienese immigrants in Taiwan. During the eighteenth century they spread to mainland Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and by the early decades of the nineteenth century had penetrated the Yangtze provinces. The brotherhood found its initial adherents among labourers and boatmen on the inland waterways, among uprooted urban workers, and among petty functionaries in the government offices. It also formed a focus of allegiance for bandit and pirate gangs. The spread of Triad influence was clearly related to certain major trends of Ch'ing society, particularly internal migration, urbanization and expanding foreign and domestic trade. Each of these processes created masses of people whose traditional social ties had been weakened or severed, and to whom the pseudo-kinship structure of the secret societies could offer security, mutual aid and a format for organization.

From the point of view of the state, the most dangerous aspect of these secret societies was that their association with rackets and banditry might lead ultimately to rebellion. Yet the criminal and political aspects of the Triads were clearly separable. The lodges (*t'ang*) of the brotherhoods formed an ideal organizing framework for gangs of bandits, smugglers and coastal pirates, whose members were more or less separated from the matrix of settled society. Similarly, their internal communication and discipline were put to use in extortion and gambling rings in the market towns and cities. Freedom from prosecution was obtained by infiltrating the ranks of yamen underlings. The essential aim of secret society operations in these lucrative fields was coexistence with orthodox society in order to exploit it, not dedicated conspiracy in order to destroy it.

Yet the secret societies were also the repositories of the hopeless but persistent Ming loyalism of the southern provinces. Their ritual and their political orientation were restorationist ('overthrow the Ch'ing and restore the Ming'). Their anti-Manchu rhetoric reviled the northern invaders for having usurped the throne and defiled native Chinese culture. There is nothing in the ideology of these southern societies, however, to suggest a rejection of the existing social or political system. Their outlook was not only restorationist, but also somewhat conservative in its effort to reinforce internal discipline with rhetoric based upon traditional kin-

ship principles. Their egalitarianism was little different from that of the truly consanguinial family in which (ideally speaking) economic competition was suppressed in favour of mutual aid within the confine of the kinship group. Their views of monarchy and bureaucracy were entirely conventional. Ming restorationism remained a justification of sporadic local protest but hardly a vehicle for social change.

The social crisis of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did, however, bring forth a surge of Triad activism and a portentous change in the social character of the secret societies. In 1786 a major uprising broke out in Taiwan among settler groups under the Triad leader Lin Shuang-wen. Though this was quickly suppressed, Triad activity on the mainland expanded rapidly in succeeding decades, leading to local uprisings in numerous districts in Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Around the turn of the century, Triads became involved in the Annamese-sponsored piracy that scourged the southern coast. The early decades of the nineteenth century saw an extension of Triad influence into the mountainous southern borders of Hunan and Kiangsi, which lay athwart the trade and smuggling routes northward from Canton. By mid-century, the secret societies had to some extent penetrated the aboriginal minorities in the Hunan-Kwangsi border region.

More dangerous for the regime, however, was the secret societies' newly-developed ability to organize the settled peasantry in the rich counties around the Pearl River Delta. This process, which seems to have begun in the 1840s, marked a distinct shift of the societies' social base. Organizations which had thrived principally among the uprooted of the cities and trade routes and among the outlaws of the hills and coasts, now assumed an important place amid the settled society of the rich delta counties. The reasons are still unclear. Triad practitioners of martial arts (*wu-shu*, including the traditional 'boxing' skills) found ready patronage among feuding lineages. More important, perhaps, was the Triads' ability to extend the hope of collective protection and economic survival to those among the peasantry to whom the benefits of the orthodox lineage system did not extend. Lineage assets, in the form of common endowment lands and their proceeds, tended to come under the control of the rich and powerful; and their benefits seldom reached the poor peasantry. In an environment of overpopulation and fierce economic competition, peasants on the brink of destitution were offered a chance of survival through membership in local Triad lodges. Networks of Triad lodges also spread westward into the Kwangsi river valleys, where they served as headquarters for petty banditry and smuggling. A lodge's common treasury, under the control of a 'rice host' (*mi-fan-chu*), distributed the loot to

members. Though such organizations formed close and profitable links with roving bandits, they remained essentially local in orientation, arising as they did from the unfilled social and economic needs of village and market town society.

Such a network of adherents, linked by a common mythology, made possible a broader mobilization; and in the wake of the Opium War's disruption, the disintegrating society of Kwangtung gave rise to more ambitious Triad ventures. Beginning in the mid 1840s, bands of many thousands of Triads began to gather; walled cities were invaded; Canton itself was threatened. Suppression campaigns by local militia and government troops had only temporary success. The climax was the massive uprising known as the Red Turban revolt of 1854, in which some tens of thousands of Triads captured and held a number of hsien capitals, including the major city of Fatshan south-west of Canton. Yet, at the height of their success, the rebel leaders lost momentum. Their Ming restorationist slogans aroused no support among the local elite, and their efforts to institute civil government and curb looting alienated their own followers. Triads in walled cities were cut off from rural support by the vigorous campaigning of local elite-led militia, bolstered by lineage organizations. With the aid of a determined government suppression campaign, the Red Turban revolt was crushed by early 1855. With neither a new and convincing imperial pretension, nor a new social vision capable of both mobilizing and disciplining their followers, the secret societies were condemned to fragmentation and failure.⁶⁸

The White Lotus Rebellion

The White Lotus Society (Pai-lien chiao) was not a 'secret society' in the Triad sense, but rather a network of devotional congregations that served as the principal vehicle of popular religion in the belt of provinces reaching from Szechwan in the west to Shantung in the east. This sect had its origins in the eleventh century as a form of lay piety, heir to a much older tradition of Pure Land Buddhism. Its married clergy, vegetarianism and vernacular scriptures earned it the hostility of both regular Buddhist clergy and Confucian literati. Imbedded in local communities, the White Lotus creed was regionally diverse and broadly syncretic. To its original Amidist doctrine, the White Lotus added the creation myths and macro-

⁶⁸ An excellent description of the Red Turban revolt appears in Frederic Wakeman, Jr, 'The secret societies of Kwangtung, 1800-1856', in Jean Chesneaux, ed. *Popular movements and secret societies in China, 1840-1950*, 29-47. On the growth and character of Triad influence see Hsieh Hsing-yao, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien kuo ch'ien-hou Kwangsi ti fan-Ch'ing yüan tung* and Chung Wen-tien, *T'ai-p'ing-chün tsai Yung-an*, 159-65.

biotic regimens of folk Taoism, as well as the millenarian doctrines of Maitreya Buddhism and Manichaeism. These last two components seem to have been the means by which the sects became involved in rebellion. The descent of the 'future' Buddha, Maitreya (Mi-le-fo), was to usher in the final stage of world history and establish a regime of peace and plenty. And an incarnate Manichaeist deity, the 'prince of light' (*ming-wang*), was to bring about the triumph of light over darkness in an ultimate world cataclysm. Like the Triads, the White Lotus Society had a widespread, decentralized organizational base in local communities. Unlike the Triads, it embodied an ardent faith and a compelling eschatology capable of mobilizing great masses of followers against the existing state system.⁶⁹

Again unlike the Triads, the White Lotus Society could look back upon a major historical achievement: the great revolt of the mid-fourteenth century which helped to destroy the alien Mongol dynasty. Though ruthlessly suppressed under the successor Ming state, the society was repeatedly involved in uprisings in the tumultuous seventeenth century (most notably the Shantung Rebellion of 1622) as the Ming neared collapse. The society survived in local communities throughout the early Ch'ing period, but not until the last quarter of the eighteenth century did it show renewed signs of widespread activism.

The leadership of the White Lotus revival in the Ch'ien-lung reign was a loosely-articulated network of sect-masters, whose positions had commonly been gained through hereditary transmission and whose inter-relationships were cemented through teacher-disciple bonds. Supported by cash contributions from their followers, some became travelling preachers and spread White Lotus teachings to a number of provinces. The Hupei-Szechwan-Shensi area, the site of the coming rebellion, for instance, seems to have been extensively proselytized by men from Honan and Anhwei. Such missionizing was actually furthered by government persecution, as the sect leaders kept on the move to avoid capture. The progenitor of the White Lotus resurgence was Liu Sung, a Honan man who as early as 1775 had been identified as a sect organizer and banished to Kansu. His mission was carried forward by his principal disciple, Liu Chih-hsieh, evidently a magnetic personality and an able strategist, who shortly announced the discovery of a legitimate Ming scion and proclaimed Maitreya incarnate in a son of Liu Sung. These apocalyptic political symbols were powerful spurs to popular revolt. Ming restorationism (like the Sung restorationism of the Yüan period) seems to have

⁶⁹ Daniel Overmyer, 'Folk Buddhist sects: a structure in the history of Chinese religions' (University of Chicago unpublished PhD dissertation, 1971) is an important reassessment of the White Lotus tradition. A major treatise on the whole subject of traditional Chinese rebellions is Suzuki Chūsei, *Chūgoku ni okeru kakumei to shūkyō*. Also see his *Shinbō chūkishū kenryū*.

been an ancillary element, more an opportunistic appeal to Han ethnism than an integral part of the White Lotus creed. Liu Chih-hsieh was responsible for establishing numerous congregations in western Hupei, but was never able to centralize leadership in himself. One of his disciples broke from him and established his own following. Local congregations quickly developed their own leaders and apparently held only a spiritual reverence for itinerant prophets such as Liu.

In 1793 the government sensed the imminence of rebellion and ordered an investigation of White Lotus congregations all over central China. To the predatory elements in local government this proved a licence for extortion, and a reign of terror descended upon the villages. Forced to pay or die, many White Lotus congregations armed to defend themselves. In the south-west Hupei counties of I-tu and Chih-chiang, militarization was spurred by the Miao rebellion that had erupted in nearby Hunan and Kweichow in 1795. Under White Lotus influence these local defence associations became nuclei of resistance. Faced with intolerable official persecution (and, local officials hinted, in collusion with the Miao), the armed communities rose in open revolt in February 1796. The rebellion spread rapidly northward along the mountain border of western Hupei and soon engulfed the whole three-province border area of Hupei, Szechwan and Shensi. From the beginning the White Lotus lacked the ability to garrison and govern strategic cities. Administrative seats were taken and held, but never for long. White Lotus forces fell back upon fortified villages in mountainous border areas, raiding valley towns for supplies and recruits, and doggedly resisting Ch'ing armies sent to extirpate them.

The relationship between Chinese folk religion and rebellion has proved a knotty interpretive problem. Recent studies such as those by Suzuki and Overmyer⁷⁰ have shown that syncretic sects such as the White Lotus and its many local permutations were basically oriented toward the salvation of souls and the healing of disease, and that these functions formed the main focus of their community congregations. To define the historical links between these pious community sects and the outbreak of massive, anti-dynastic rebellions has been a central issue in the study of rebellion in traditional China. This issue has been complicated by the confusion that has existed between the forms and orientations of the Buddhist-influenced sects of the north and central provinces, and the secret societies of the south. If the Triads harboured a fully-developed covert anti-dynastic design, embodied in the rituals of the society and furnished with mythological backing, must it not also have been the case with the folk

⁷⁰ See previous note.

Buddhist sects? May not the ascetic regimens and pious sutra-chanting have served as a cover for deeply-hidden political designs?

The complexity of the White Lotus creed does suggest a plausible line of interpretation. The admixtures of Manichaeist and Maitreyan beliefs provided an apocalyptic strain that could play its part in history when social and political conditions were at their nadir. The advent of the saviour, whether the Manichaeist prince of light (*ming-wang*) or the 'future Buddha' (Maitreya – Mi-le-fo) could signal the coming transformation of all worldly institutions and ignite armed uprisings among the scattered congregations of believers. Deeply embedded in the outlook and doctrines of the sect, these millenarian prophecies could assume an overtly rebellious role at times of extreme economic distress or political oppression.

At such times there seems to have been an expansion of sect membership, with many new adherents sharing the millenarian vision but not necessarily partaking of the ascetic regimen and pious devotions of the original congregations. At the same time, the travels of leaders such as Liu Chih-hsieh may have achieved a somewhat greater coherence among the regionally diverse local groups. Individual congregations now responded to deteriorating social conditions by developing greater mutual reliance among their members, including militarization for mutual protection.⁷¹

Developments within the congregations do not, however, provide an adequate explanation for the military capacities the movement ultimately demonstrated. Only by reaching outside the faith and forming connections with groups accustomed to the ways of violence could the sects have given rise to major rebellion. These militarized groups with which the sects now allied themselves (termed 'military factions among the people' by Suzuki) must be clearly distinguished from the sects themselves. Though armed bands in the border regions shared some of the religious beliefs of the sects, the characteristics of such groups flowed from a different tradition: the carefully nurtured and transmitted 'martial arts' (*wu-shu*) of the common people, which included techniques of boxing and cudgel-fighting for self-defence. It was these groups rather than the individualistic, prayerful, salvation-oriented sects that formed the military backbone of rebellion. Though the key links between the 'military faction' and the religious sects have yet to be effectively documented, it seems likely that such links, when formed, were the requisites for the White Lotus and similar rebellions.

⁷¹ Suzuki, *Kakumei to shūkyō*, develops this general model on the basis of his study of Ming and Ch'ing White Lotus Rebellions. See especially 117–19, 205–20.

In the White Lotus case, the main component of the 'military faction' was the *kuo-lu* bandits, a group whose origins can be traced with some certainty back to the early Ch'ien-lung reign. Living in militarized bands in the forests of the three-province border area, the *kuo-lu* were nevertheless in some kind of regular relationship with peasant society. Specifically, they formed mutually profitable relationships with the leadership of the self-defence corps (*t'uan*) of the walled peasant villages, and with the yamen-underlings and *pao-chia* headmen in the infrastructure of local government. This armed Mafia preyed upon local society without warring against it. Since the *kuo-lu* are known to have played an important role in the White Lotus armies during the rebellion, it is reasonable to hypothesize that they had already formed a link with the religious sects of the area. In this sense they are analogous to the 'lodge-bandits' (*t'ang-fei*) of the Triad tradition in the south, who likewise consisted of armed groups that were closely bound up with the lives and activities of existing social units.

Closely tied to the *kuo-lu* (and perhaps forming a part of them) were salt smugglers and counterfeiters, against whom the state had carried out armed repression. Salt smuggling is of particular significance, since it lay at the roots of many of the rebel movements that emerged in north China during the nineteenth century, including the great Nien Rebellion of the 1850s and 1860s. The concern of provincial officials such as T'ao Chu with reform of the official salt system was prompted in part by the social disorder it was generating. This pattern of disruption also emerged in the southern provinces when opium became the empire's most valuable contraband during the 1830s and 1840s.

In assessing the relationship between the sects themselves and the White Lotus Rebellion as a whole, it is important to see beneath the surface of official estimates of rebel numbers. The proportion of rebels that actually formed part of the inner circle of believers must have been considerably smaller than one might suppose. Many local peasant uprisings that had nothing to do with the White Lotus were misclassified by virtue of the peculiar features of Ch'ing administrative law. An official whose administrative seat was captured by rebels was subject to serious penalties if the incident was due to his own maladministration, but merely lost his appointment if the rebels could be proved to belong to 'heterodox sects'. The bias in official reports was not surprising. It was estimated by a censor in 1800 that no more than 10 per cent of the White Lotus armies consisted of genuine sectarians.⁷²

Although Ch'ing armies had delighted Peking in 1793 by subduing the

⁷² Lo Chen-yü, *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, supplement, 2.1-2b.

Gorkhas of Nepal in an ambitious campaign to defend the Ch'ing protectorate in Tibet, their performance within China proper shortly afterwards demonstrated the degree to which the Ch'ing military had lost its keen edge. Leadership of the government's campaign against the Miao rebels fell initially to a Manchu, Fu-k'ang-an, who was related by marriage to the Ch'ien-lung Emperor and was also a close associate of Ho-shen. He was joined by Ho-shen's brother Ho-lin. Contemporary unofficial accounts charge that while they lived, military appropriations were diverted to line the pockets of officers and soften hardships in the field for those in high command. Misappropriation of funds was camouflaged by optimistic and apparently groundless reports of victory. The nature of the Miao campaign, and the White Lotus campaign which followed it, made it easy to avoid combat and falsify body counts. Chinese and Manchu regulars were fighting guerrillas by traditional tactics, which consisted primarily of search and destroy operations in manhunts for the guerrilla leaders. A disproportionate number of civilian casualties and the destruction of peasant villages were the inevitable price. The destruction in rural areas was in sharp contrast to the fate of the walled towns, which for the most part were never occupied by rebel troops and escaped prolonged siege. Generals preferred to withdraw to these fortified areas during rebel attacks, permitting the rebels to despoil the countryside at will and frequently denying sanctuary within the walls to peasant refugees. The countryside thus served as ransom for the towns, protecting the officer in command from the severe punishment consigned to those who lost a town to rebels.⁷³

The composition of the 'enemy' killed in battles was never clear. Officials critical of the conduct of these campaigns reported that most of the dead were not rebels, but peasants coerced into fighting (*hsieh-min*) – either by brute force or by expediency; and that in fact their opponents in battle tended not to be official regulars, but local mercenaries (*hsiang-yung*).

Both Fu-k'ang-an and Ho-lin were killed in battle in 1796, three years prior to Ho-shen's death. The following year, generals in the Miao campaign began to be transferred to the Hupei front to fight the White Lotus rebels, leaving about 20,000 official troops in Miao areas.⁷⁴ The continuing failure of official efforts to restore order on either front before 1800 seems clearly related to the misleading early reports of victories presented to the throne by officers in the field (reports which their successors were afraid to contradict), and to the general inability of the

⁷³ Yanō Jin'ichi, 'Hyakurenkyo no ran ni tsuite' (On the White Lotus Rebellion), in Haneda Toru, ed. *Naitō bakushi kanreki shukuga Shinagaku ronsō* (Collected essays in sinology in honour of the sixtieth birthday of Naitō Torajirō), 726.

⁷⁴ Meng, *Ch'ing-tai shih*, 288.

Chia-ch'ing Emperor to act decisively while his father remained alive. Both of these factors in turn appear to reflect Ho-shen's pervasive influence, despite the death of his close associates in the military.

Local officials were left to work out their own techniques of suppression. Drawing upon an administrative tradition dating from Ming times, they constructed a local control system based on strategic hamlets (*chai*). Into these they gathered people and grain, to deny them to the rebels. As eventually formalized by the most prominent of the strategic hamlet strategists, Kung Ching-han, this campaign became known as 'strengthening the walls and clearing the countryside' (*chien-pi ch'ing-yeh*). The organization of hamlets was based upon the existing *pao-chia* system, added to a new militia conscription system based on registration units known as *t'uan*. In raising militia, officials such as Kung relied upon the leadership of the local elite, many of whom were already raising forces to defend their home areas. The strategy was to bind such local leaders into the official system of responsibility by conferring on them brevet ranks and titles. This strategy was formally proposed to the throne in 1797 by two newly-appointed commanders in the White Lotus campaign, Ming-liang and Te-leng-t'ai. They recommended construction of small, local fortifications to provide peasants with sanctuary during rebellions. This, they argued, would enable hsien administrators to organize their own defence without recourse to the central military command. It would also protect the peasants from being forced to join rebel bands. The emperor rejected this suggestion, severely scolded its proponents, and reiterated his support of existing strategy: continued pursuit and capture of rebel leaders.⁷⁵

Not until two years later, following Ho-shen's death, was this same policy accepted when proposed by Le-pao and others; subsequently it served as the basis for the successful defeat of the White Lotus Rebellion.⁷⁶ Can the emperor's reversal be attributed to the removal of Ho-shen? Certainly the new policy posed an obvious threat to a military patronage network focused on the central government. It implied decentralization of decision-making and recruitment, and a diminishing need for military supplies and funds appropriated from the centre. Conversely, the need for such a decentralized system appears to have sprung directly from the inability of the centralized military apparatus to fight a guerrilla war. While Ho-shen's presence may have slowed its adoption, the *chien-pi ch'ing-yeh* strategy was another example of efforts to find solutions for problems which old-style bureaucratic organization was no longer capable of handling.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* 301-2.

⁷⁶ *Sbib-ch'ao sheng-hsun* (Sacred instructions from ten reigns), vol. 13, ch. 18.8a.

A complicating factor in the motives for adopting this strategy is the prominent role of the 'coerced populace' (*hsieh-min*) in official accounts. The notion of a peasantry forced unwillingly to rebel does not accord with the equally frequent contemporary references to the fact that 'official oppression has led to popular rebellion' (*kuan-pi min-fan*). The speed and the extent of the spread of the White Lotus Rebellion suggest that it was rooted in complex social problems of which Ho-shen's influence was only one manifestation.

Though much of the government's success in the final suppression of the rebellion can be ascribed to the tightened vice of local control, some credit must also be given to a noticeable, if short-lived, revival of the regular military forces. Government power in the White Lotus area was buttressed by some 7,000 tough banner troops, imported at great expense directly from Manchuria, and by relatively unspoiled Green Standard battalions marched in from Kweichow and Yunnan. Determined banner generals such as E-le-teng-pao, Ming-liang and Te-leng-t'ai, managed to instil a semblance of discipline among their men. For all their efforts, however, it was still found necessary to hire local mercenaries (*hsiang-yung*) to supplement regular forces. These mercenaries, some of whom were hardened outlaws, frequently served as the spearhead of Ch'ing power against the White Lotus.

Relentless Ch'ing attacks gradually changed the character of the campaign. Forced from their base areas and strongholds, the fragmented White Lotus armies were now pursued over portions of four provinces. Constantly in flight and cut off from local society by a spreading strategic hamlet strategy, they were hunted and destroyed. A rebel force that had once numbered over 100,000 was substantially annihilated by 1805. If one were to hazard a strategic comparison of the White Lotus with rebellions that were to follow two generations later, a major consideration would be the residual stability of rural society in the populous river valleys and basins. Here the power of the orthodox elite remained paramount. Though the rebels were able to gain a foothold in the unstable communities of the three-province border mountains, they proved unable to mobilize the wealth and manpower of lowland society, and thus never gained the momentum needed to challenge the regime successfully.

But in the long run the rebellion dealt the dynasty a damaging blow. First, it demonstrated that the regular military forces were incapable of putting down internal rebellion without the cooperation of the local elite, the imposition of new local control systems, and the hiring of mercenaries. The mercenaries were in the end an expensive and dangerous expedient. Some 10,000 were integrated into the regular battalions after the rebellion but proved mutinous and ungovernable. Thus it was the White Lotus

Rebellion, rather than the Opium War, that demonstrated the irreversible decline of Ch'ing military power. Second, the expense of the decade-long struggle was ruinous to the imperial treasury. The accumulated surplus of the late Ch'ien-lung period, perhaps 78 million taels, was wiped out by the cost of suppressing the rebellion, estimated at 120 million.

Nor was the White Lotus spectre put to rest. The decentralized cellular organization of the sect contributed to its remarkable survival powers. In 1813 the Heavenly Principle Society (T'ien-li chiao), a White Lotus sect, raised a short-lived but fierce revolt in Shantung, Honan, and Chihli under Lin Ch'ing and Li Wen-ch'eng. One contingent actually penetrated the palace enclosure in Peking. During the 1820s and 1830s, the Honan-Anhwei border region was continually embroiled in White Lotus risings, often in concert with local bandits and salt smugglers. All across north and central China burgeoned the seeds of the White Lotus: the Eight Diagrams Society (Pa-kua chiao), Boxers (I-ho ch'üan), Tiger-tail Whips (Hu-wei pien) and a myriad other local sects. Their unceasing rebelliousness and the government's unrelenting suppression were major themes of local history in the first half of the nineteenth century.

WEAKNESS AT THE CENTRE AND NEW TRENDS IN SCHOLARSHIP

The pervasive atmosphere of the 1820s and 1830s was one of corruption in officialdom, nourished and sustained by an elaborate patronage system that seems characteristic of Ch'ing government. There was acute awareness of the need for reform, and reform issues were repeatedly reviewed for debate on a scale that spanned the breadth of the bureaucracy. Statesmen at court who were articulate in their support of reform efforts included Ying-ho, Wang Ting and Ch'i-shan. Provincial officials submitting reform proposals included Juan Yüan, Ho Ch'ang-ling and T'ao Chu. Yet throughout this time a rigid and inflexible attitude at court, exemplified by the emperor himself, stood in contrast to widely disparate and experimental reform enterprises in the provinces, in many cases funded and encouraged by provincial leadership.

The Chia-ch'ing Emperor had begun his rule with a mandate for reform. What had happened? Clearly the emperor had underestimated the depth of the corruption spawned in the Ho-shen era. Further, the Chia-ch'ing Emperor ended his rule under the guidance of ageing advisers inherited from the Ch'ien-lung court, who were as preoccupied as he with the Ho-shen problem – and perhaps just as content to rest with the removal of the prime offender. Tung Kao, the last of these advisers, died in 1818, barely two years before the Tao-kuang accession.

When the new emperor took the throne in 1820, his confidence was won immediately by a prominent Peking official named Ts'ao Chen-yung (1755–1835) who, until his death, remained the emperor's closest adviser, serving concurrently as head of the Grand Secretariat and the Grand Council. No one has ever accused Ts'ao of corruption. He is depicted as a frugal, self-deprecating, upright bureaucrat whose worst failing was the obverse of his impeccable integrity: he was an uncompromising Confucian bound by tradition and convention. An apocryphal account of his influence on the bureaucracy records the earliest advice given to the newly-enthroned and anxious Tao-kuang Emperor. Ts'ao is said to have assured him that there was no need to agonize over the flood of official correspondence that reached him daily; that officials considered it their duty to memorialize about problems, even where none existed. Memorialists could not be admonished or punished, however, for that would be tantamount to ignoring forthright criticism, an unseemly posture for a Confucian monarch. Therefore one had to assure them that their complaints were heard, on the one hand; yet somehow reduce the volume of complaints, on the other. Ts'ao's solution was simple. The emperor was merely to scan memorials for errors in calligraphy or composition and punish the offender accordingly. In that way he could simultaneously demonstrate his own careful attention to detail, chastise the troublemaker, and ignore the issue in question.⁷⁷

Whether or not this strategy was ever proposed or effected, the message it conveys about the Tao-kuang bureaucracy is clear. Memorialists were led to concentrate on form rather than on content. Communication with the throne was heavily weighted with the perfunctory and stylized memorials that the Chia-ch'ing Emperor had fought so strongly. Ts'ao Chen-yung's pedantry was said to dominate the standards in the metropolitan examinations, where originality gave way to banality, and innovative essays were scorned.⁷⁸

A critic of the late eighteenth-century bureaucracy had once warned that if the patronage networks fostered under Ho-shen were not completely destroyed, they would spring to life anew when another corrupt minister rose to power.⁷⁹ True to this prediction, the Tao-kuang era saw

⁷⁷ This anecdote appears in Ch'iu, *I-wen*, 'Ming-jen i-shih, shang' (Stories about famous people, part one), 8–10. On Ts'ao's character see Yao Yung-p'ü, *Chiu-wen sui-pi* (Random notes on old tales), 1.10. A biography of Ts'ao appears in Arthur W. Hummel, ed. *Eminent Chinese*, 739–40.

⁷⁸ Ts'ao was said to have been responsible for the failure of the noted scholar Yü Cheng-hsieh in the metropolitan examination of 1833. The incident is recorded in a biography of Yü found in his collected works entitled *Kuei-szu lei kao* (Classified notes and essays of Yü Cheng-hsieh), in *An-hui ts'ung-shu*, vol. 7, ts'ü 9–18.

⁷⁹ See Hung Liang-chi, *Chüan-shih-ko wen, chia chi*, 10, supplement 8b, in *Hung Pei-chiang hsien-sheng i-chi*, vol 1.

the rise of an official frequently compared to Ho-shen, a Manchu bannerman and regular bureaucrat named Mu-chang-a (1782–1856). He, much as Ho-shen before him, was said to have orchestrated the vast constituencies of the Ch'ing bureaucracy in support of his own interests; he replaced Ts'ao Chen-yung in 1835 as head of the Grand Secretariat and the Grand Council.⁸⁰

There was an important difference, however, between bureaucratic corruption under Ho-shen and under Mu-chang-a. The central government in the Tao-kuang era was weaker. The imperial treasury was drained of silver reserves, which had shrunk from 60 million taels in the early part of the eighteenth century to 8 million by 1850.⁸¹ The strength of the imperial armies was eroded. The rule of the emperor had lost the majesty of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Imperial weakness was acknowledged implicitly in the initiative seized by provincial officials who sought reform, as was demonstrated explicitly in the decades of the 1840s and 1850s.

Leading provincial officials had different interests. Juan Yüan sought moral and intellectual regeneration through classical studies. T'ao Chu experimented with institutional changes in the regular bureaucratic administration. The diversity of the intellectual climate of the Tao-kuang period, which contrasts sharply with the official pedantry said to have been fostered by Ts'ao Chen-yung, was created in part by individuals like these and by the limited initiative they enjoyed as provincial officials in an administration immobilized by dissension and inertia at the centre.

Eighteenth-century scholarship had been dominated by the schools of empirical research and Han learning. Not all scholars in the eighteenth century did textual criticism, nor did all scholars confine their studies to Han commentaries on the classics. But intellectual respectability and indeed scholarly reputation tended to be defined by those prevailing trends. By the early nineteenth century there were signs that this kind of scholasticism – indeed the very consensus it represented – was breaking down. Because the central government had ceased patronizing the compilation of vast compendia like Ch'ien-lung's *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*, no longer were scholars from all over the country congregating in Peking to work on standardized projects. Further, regional literary and philosophical

⁸⁰ Hsiao, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih*, 2.887. Mu-chang-a's preserves were the customs revenues at the treaty ports (after 1842) and the Yellow River Conservancy. He was said to have controlled all appointments out of the Hanlin Academy. At court he was an acknowledged enemy of two Grand Councillors, Wang Ting (d. 1842) and his successor Ch'i Chün-tsao. See Li Yueh-jui, *Ch'ün-ping-shih*, 63; and Ou-yang, *Ch'ing t'an*, 5.12b–13.

⁸¹ Ping-ti Ho, *Population*, 216.

schools had begun to take issue with the pedantry of textual criticism. The institutional and social problems of the time provided the spur for a new period of intellectual vitality.

Although most scholars of the early nineteenth century continued research on classical texts, the new intellectual currents of this period took the form of a reaction against two aspects of eighteenth-century scholasticism. First, the school of Han learning was criticized by eclectic Confucian thinkers for its rejection of Sung philosophy and its preoccupation with commentaries written in the Eastern Han dynasty. Second, other nineteenth-century critics argued that the 'practical knowledge' or 'solid learning' (*shih-hsüeh*) advocated by eighteenth-century scholars was not only useless but irresponsible, insofar as it diverted the attention of the scholar class from its real business of service in society and government. While later scholars, citing the censorship and purges under K'ang-hsi and Ch'ien-lung, have attributed shortcomings in eighteenth-century scholarship to Manchu oppression, these early nineteenth-century critics of textual research were Ch'ing loyalists whose research and writing sought ways to strengthen and rejuvenate the Ch'ing state. Such critics and their interest in statecraft appear to have represented a new direction in scholarship.

Meanwhile the prevailing textual research (*k'ao-cheng*) orthodoxy had already been diluted by the introduction of organized counter-currents. Both the T'ung-ch'eng literary school and the Ch'ang-chou New Text school expressed in different ways a dissatisfaction with the narrow, literal interpretations and the etymological interests of textual research. A revived interest in abstract thought and philosophical discourse – which had become anathema among early Ch'ing scholars reacting against the intellectual climate of the late Ming – was reflected in their concern for grasping the 'broad meaning' (*ta-i* or *i-fa*) of classical and literary works. A similar relaxation of the anti-Ming stigma was shown in the renewed interest in the study of the metaphysics (*li-hsüeh*) of the Sung philosophers. Philosophical eclecticism was common among the teachers of the late eighteenth century, among them Juan Yüan, Chuang Ts'un-yü and Yao Nai.⁸²

These changes in the academic world were accompanied by social and political changes that both altered the position of the scholar in society and redirected scholarly thinking toward problems in government. Not only were scholars finding it more difficult to win positions in government, but government service in the last quarter of the eighteenth century was beginning to grow less attractive. The effects of the corruption under Ho-shen were most keenly felt at the local level, where the magistrates

⁸² See Hao Chang, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and intellectual transition in China, 1890-1907*, 14-20.

and prefects shouldered the final responsibility for collecting taxes and keeping order. The pressure from higher authorities to embezzle funds, complex litigation, and personal responsibility for the suppression of rebellion, all constituted liabilities that many scholars were unwilling to assume in exchange for the perquisites of office. Instead, in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a growing number of prominent scholars began to take positions as aides (*mu-yu*) on the private staffs (*mu-fu*) of high officials in the provinces.

The *mu-fu* was a late Ming institution that had grown in importance during the Ch'ing period.⁸³ The *mu-yu* that composed it were experts in legal, fiscal, or literary affairs who served as unofficial advisers employed by bureaucrats in the provinces. *Mu-yu* were paid by their official employers, not by the central government, and were expected to travel with their employers from post to post. The size and number of *mu-fu* increased with growing official responsibilities at the provincial and local levels. By the late eighteenth century, the total number of these aides was already estimated to be 7,500.⁸⁴ In the absence of a reliable census, it may be assumed that in the nineteenth century their number continued to grow, partly because of the demands imposed on local officials by the administrative crises of the time, by internal disorder and the Western incursion, and by new fiscal, military and commercial responsibilities assumed by provincial government during and after the Taiping Rebellion. The decisive role of *mu-yu* in the formulation of policy during these years is marked by the prominence of aides such as Wei Yüan and his contemporary, Pao Shih-ch'en, who researched and outlined reform programmes in the salt gabelle, grain transport, frontier defence, water conservancy and local administration. The significance of their work is measured not only by the extent of their interests but also by the physical range of their activity.

WEI YÜAN AS AN EXEMPLAR OF STATECRAFT AND NEW TEXT STUDIES

To view Wei Yüan (1794–1856) as simply a *mu-yu* would of course understate his role. Not without reason has his influence in early nineteenth-century thought been compared to that of Ku Yen-wu or Tai Chen in

⁸³ Miao Ch'üan-chi, 'Ch'ing-tai mu-fu chih-tu chih ch'eng-chang yüan-yin' (Reasons for the growth of the *mu-fu* system during the Ch'ing dynasty), *Ssu yü yen*, 5.3 (Sept. 1967). See also Watt, *District magistrate*, 143–4; Kenneth E. Folsom, *Friends, guests, and colleagues: the 'mu-fu' system in the late Ch'ing period*, 41–7; and Jonathan Porter, *Tseng Kuo-fan's private bureaucracy*, 23–4.

⁸⁴ Watt, *District magistrate*, 56, 266 (note 48).

earlier periods.⁸⁵ It is tempting in fact to see in Wei Yüan the confluence of all the major currents of the early nineteenth century: not only in his role as a statecraft writer and as an adherent of the New Text school, but also as a mirror of the changes confronting the society of his day.

Wei Yüan was born in Hunan, where he distinguished himself as a student before coming to Peking at the age of twenty-two. Sixteen years later, in 1831, he moved to Yangchow, which remained his home for the rest of his life. He numbered among his friends and mentors a prominent group of Hunan scholar-officials (including Ho Ch'ang-ling and T'ao Chu) and a select body of Peking officials and intellectuals (including Lin Tse-hsü, Kung Tzu-chen, Liu Feng-lu), many of whom later engaged his services while holding provincial office. Wei's scholarly career began in the conventional manner with classical studies. He showed an early interest in Neo-Confucian thought, but by the age of thirty-two, the year of the grain transport crisis of 1824, he began his career as an expert in statecraft with the submission of a detailed critical proposal advocating the adoption of the sea route. His advice was solicited for that purpose by Ho Ch'ang-ling, then financial commissioner in Kiangsu, who in the same year commissioned him to compile a collection of writings on statecraft. This project was completed the following year and given the title *Collected writings on statecraft of the reigning dynasty* (*Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien*), a broadly selected compendium of Ch'ing authors.⁸⁶

The *Collected writings*, together with his later study of Western geography, the *Illustrated treatise on the maritime kingdoms* (*Hai-kuo t'u-chih*, see chapter 5, p. 218), are Wei's best-known works. The *Collected writings* is important not only because of its influence, but also because it provides a comprehensive conceptual definition of 'statecraft'. Divided into eight parts, the work begins with two theoretical sections on scholarship and the nature of the Chinese polity before proceeding to specific institutional and administrative problems. These remaining parts are classified according to the areas of jurisdiction of the Six Boards. Preliminary content analyses of the *Collected writings* have shown that the bulk of the work focuses on finance (especially grain transport), public works and the military administration.⁸⁷ However, the preliminary sections treating classical studies and political theory should be no less significant for re-

⁸⁵ An excellent account of Wei Yüan's role in scholarship and government is Ch'i Ssu-ho, 'Wei Yüan yü wan-Ch'ing hsüeh-feng' (Wei Yüan and the intellectual climate of the late Ch'ing), *Yen-ching hsüeh-pao*, 39 (Dec. 1950) 177-226.

⁸⁶ Short reviews in English of the contents of the *Collected writings on statecraft*, by Frederic Wakeman and Peter Mitchell, respectively, have appeared in *Ch'ing-shih wen-i'i*, 1.10 (Feb. 1969) 8-22; 2.3 (July 1970) 40-6.

⁸⁷ Jane Kate Leonard, 'Statecraft reform in early nineteenth-century China', (unpublished paper, 1974), 4-8.

vealing how practical statecraft was reconciled with traditional scholarly interests. These sections and the body of the *Collected writings* await further study.

During the three decades that followed this publication, Wei Yüan produced an astonishing range of proposals for institutional reform, in which he drew upon his exhaustive culling of official archives and private collections. In 1831 he was invited to Yangchow to advise T'ao Chu on plans for the reform of the Huai-pei salt administration. Sometime during these years he began the draft of a work completed in 1842, the year of the Treaty of Nanking. Entitled *Record of imperial military achievements* (*Sheng-wu chi*), this was an account of the major military campaigns of the Ch'ing dynasty from its founding until the Tao-kuang reign. Like the *Collected writings*, its chronicles were based upon a combination of private and official writings. Wei's purpose in writing the *Record* was more than descriptive. In his critical use of private sources as a check upon the accuracy of official documents, and in his own preface and the topical essays that concluded the work, Wei analysed problems in the Ch'ing polity, and particularly in the Ch'ing military, that might account for China's defeat in the Opium War.

In traditional fashion, Wei associated China's external vulnerability with internal weakness. He was concerned particularly with the recruitment of talent in the military, in view of the Han Chinese preference for civilian office and the ethnic lines that divided Ch'ing military organization. Couching his arguments in historical perspective, and countering widely-accepted norms in Chinese culture, Wei insisted that China could become both wealthy (*fu*) and powerful (*ch'iang*) by adopting new policies that would improve the calibre of her soldiers, especially officers; provide for the construction and regular deployment of naval forces like those of the West; and stabilize the monetary system and eliminate enormous treasury deficits. These policies included specialized training, higher salaries and prestige, and flexible regional recruitment for military personnel (this last in order to take advantage of the disproportionate number of candidates for military examinations in some regions). Wei also called for careful monitoring of military rosters to ensure against desertion and false registration, both rich sources of graft in the military administration. In his proposals for fiscal reform, Wei advocated expansion and improvement of native silver mines as the best means of reducing China's dependence on foreign currency supplies and of counteracting the drain of Chinese silver in the opium trade. He also urged more responsible accounting procedures in the use of treasury funds, curtailed spending, and an end to the customary periodic tax remissions that had become a

conventional gesture symbolizing imperial benevolence. In his frustrated and scornful references to the writing of some of his Ch'ing predecessors, Wei Yüan made no allowance for earlier ideological or political factors that might have shaped their interests. To him, their ignorance of foreign nations and lack of interest in the strategic geographical features of areas outside China proper was incomprehensible and even frivolous. Equally irresponsible, in his view, was a tendency to understate or omit imperial defeats in official accounts of military campaigns.

Wei Yüan's interest in New Text scholarship was another reflection of his distaste for 'useless' scholasticism, although New Text studies in his day still had more in common with the mainstream of the Han school of textual research than with the utopian, messianic sidestream later associated with the New Text movement under K'ang Yu-wei.⁸⁸ Classical studies in Wei's time, as in all periods, served as a medium for political and factional conflict as well as for scholarly discourse. In this case, New Text scholarship became a weapon in the attack on Eastern Han scholasticism and at the same time a vehicle for new directions in scholarship. The empirical research movement of the previous century had been heavily influenced by the thought of Hui Tung (1697–1758), the founder of the so-called school of Han learning. Hui Tung, in rejecting the Sung Neo-Confucian canon, advocated in its place a revival of the standard Han commentaries as the source of orthodox interpretation in classical studies. Although few were as rigid as Hui Tung in his exclusive preoccupation with Han scholarship, Hui's influence did focus attention on the philosophy and scholarship of Eastern Han commentators like Cheng Hsüan and on the surviving version of the classics which they had annotated.

This standard canon was a synthesis of many versions of the classics, including those known as the 'Old Text' and 'New Text', terms referring to the calligraphic style in which the texts were originally written. 'Old' in this case meant a style used only in the Chou period; 'New' referred to the more modern Han script. The New Text version was transcribed from memory and its interpretation standardized in discussions at court by scholars appointed by the early Han emperors. Transcription from oral recitation was deemed necessary at that time because all the classics were thought to have been destroyed during the Ch'in dynasty. Towards the end of the Western Han appeared a set of classics, written in an archaic pre-Ch'in script, which were hailed for a time as the true version

⁸⁸ Early nineteenth-century New Text scholarship still awaits a comprehensive study. A short account of the history of the New Text movement that attempts to draw together its major interpreters in this period forms one chapter in Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *History and will*, 101–14. A standard history of the New Text controversy is Chou Yü-t'ung, *Ching chin-ku wen shieh* (New and Old Texts in the study of the classics).

and were eventually incorporated into a standard orthodox canon. In the process, most of the New Texts of the Western Han, including three versions of the *Book of poetry* (*Shih-ching*) fell into disuse and were lost in succeeding dynasties.

Not until the Sung period was the authenticity of the Old Texts called into question, and not until Yen Jo-chü (1636–1704) began systematic etymological analysis of the *Book of history* (*Shang shu* or *Shu-ching*) in the seventeenth century was it proven that portions of the Old Text version were actually forgeries.⁸⁹ By the late eighteenth century, the textual researches initiated by Yen and the rising concern about the authenticity of the Old Texts had spurred the growth of a small scholastic movement at Ch'ang-chou, Kiangsu, which claimed a special interest in the New Text classics. Only one of these – the Kung-yang commentary on the *Spring and autumn annals* (*Ch'un-ch'iu*) – survived in its entirety. The Kung-yang thus became the focus of the research of New Text scholars. The founder of the Ch'ang-chou school, Chuang Ts'un-yü, was one of those who were disillusioned with Han learning. He preferred an eclectic approach that incorporated selectively the work of Sung philosophers as well as commentaries from both the Western and Eastern Han dynasties. His students, particularly Liu Feng-lu (1776–1829), subsequently became interested in the Kung-yang commentary as an authoritative and orthodox statement of Western Han philosophy and historical interpretation. Liu and his circle contrasted what they viewed as a subtle, moralistic approach to historical materials in the Kung-yang (where 'what was left unspoken was more important than what was spoken') with the Eastern Han commentators' preoccupation with terms and definitions. In their view, Eastern Han scholarship was concerned with mere events (*shih*), while the Western Han commentators sought to interpret the significance (*i*) of events.

Under Liu's influence Wei Yüan became interested in Western Han philosophy, particularly the writings of Tung Chung-shu. These interests led him to a critical analysis of the texts of the *Book of poetry*, and the *Book of history*, in two works entitled *Shih ku-wei*, and *Shu ku-wei*. In these works he attempted to reconstruct 'ancient subtleties' (*ku-wei*) in interpretation which had been lost or obscured after the Western Han. Both of these works follow, in format, the empirical research tradition in their painstaking phrase-by-phrase comparative analysis of text and commentaries. However their standing as works of critical scholarship is impaired by the

⁸⁹ Yen was by no means the first to question the authenticity of the extant *Book of history*, but he was the first to discredit the Old Text version through systematic textual analysis without recourse to ideological appeals. See Tai Chün-yen, *Yen-Mao ku-wen Shang-shu kung-an* (The controversy over the Old Text of the *Book of history* between Yen Jo-chü and Mao Ch'i-ling).

fact that most of Wei's information on the Eastern Han New Texts was perforce based on secondary sources. As pieces of evidence, therefore, they reveal Wei Yüan's own view of history more than that of his Western Han forebears. That he felt this classical controversy worthy of detailed and arduous research is a measure of the continuing importance of classical interpretations in politics as well as scholarship at that time. Unquestionably Wei Yüan viewed New Text scholarship as an attack on eighteenth-century Han learning. At the same time, he continued to view the classics as an ultimate source of guidance for political action. He was unable to advocate new directions in the political order without seeking ultimate sanction in classical sources. His insistence upon the crucial effects of changing and unique circumstances in history had to find its theoretical precedent in the classics.

Wei Yüan's conception of changing historical circumstances and the necessary adjustment of old institutions to the new demands of every age is one frequently associated with the rise of New Text studies, though it has historical precedents at least as early as the Sung period. Wei Yüan, like Kung Tzu-ch'en who was another student of the New Texts, formulated a theory of change in which time cycled repeatedly through three epochs (*san shih*): a grand antiquity (*t'ai-ku*), a middle antiquity (*chung-ku*) and an age of degeneration (*mo-shih*). The events of his own lifetime had convinced him that another *mo-shih* was imminent, but he felt that wise counselling and enlightened leadership could, as in the past, speed the transition to the next *t'ai-ku* era.⁹⁰

Wei Yüan did not blame the Manchus for the problems of his day. On the contrary, in his view the Ch'ing rulers had successfully eliminated the major abuses that had plagued the Ming state. In one eloquent analysis, Wei praised the Ch'ing regime for its abolition of abuses common under its predecessor: principally eunuch influence and heavy taxes. So deep was the Ch'ing 'concern for the people's economic welfare' that they had not only forgiven taxes repeatedly, but also had managed the Yellow River Conservancy since Ch'ien-lung times without resort to corvée labour. Border regions had been successfully pacified. Peace and order were so common a condition that 'never have people born in our time heard of oppressive government, or seen the point of a sword'. At court, officials were free to speak out in remonstrance without fear of punishment. In all, Wei concluded, Ch'ing government 'is infinitely superior to that of the Ming dynasty'. One may wonder at such fulsome praise in the wake of the Ch'ien-lung literary persecutions, the long, sordid Ho-shen

⁹⁰ See Peter Mitchell, 'The limits of reformism: Wei Yüan's reaction to Western intrusion', *MAS*, 6 (1972) 180-1.

scandal, and the corrupt and cruel suppression campaigns against internal rebels. Yet it is entirely possible that, by the standards of late imperial China, Wei considered Ch'ing political achievements to mark a high point in dynastic consolidation and fiscal restraint.

Despite these achievements, Wei went on, 'disasters in the empire continue to arise from unexpected sources'. Such disasters included mismanagement of the grain transport system and the repeated flooding of the Yellow River due to unmanageable silt deposits. 'This kind of expenditure for water conservancy was never experienced by previous dynasties'. The routes to civil office were 'clogged' and the budgets of military forces 'distorted'. Foreign contact had brought further misery: 'The introduction of opium smoking, the flow of silver to other countries, and the resulting corruption in the grain and salt administration and the increasing hardship for officials and commoners alike – were all unknown in previous dynasties.'

Thus the problems of the late Ch'ing, in Wei's view, derived not from inept or malevolent government (in terms of 'concern for the people' the Ch'ing could be likened to the proverbial 'three ages'), but from situations unprecedented in Chinese history – in particular the foreign commercial and military presence on the coast, to which could be traced the monetary and military crises; and the uncontrollability of the Yellow River, whose disastrous silting (as Wei did *not* point out) was the result of erosion from deforested and ill-cultivated hillsides upstream – by-products of China's demographic catastrophe.

Implicit in Wei's view is the conviction that even these new problems were amenable to solution, provided that the proper talent could be recruited and put to use. In the face of these challenges, Wei found it outrageous that the energies of China's literati were all 'channelled into useless pursuits'. The examinations emphasized philology and etymology, and officials were evaluated by irrelevant criteria: in the Hanlin, in terms of 'calligraphic talent', and in the administrative bureaucracy, in terms of 'managing a clerical staff and keeping records'. Wei's call for reform was skilfully drafted to emphasize the basic merit of the dynasty by all traditional criteria, the unprecedented nature of the challenge, and the inadequacy of the institutional response. It sounded the keynote of the statecraft approach to reform: to strengthen the state through new responses to new problems, all within a framework of undeviating loyalism.⁹¹

⁹¹ Wei Yüan, 'Ming-tai shih-ping erh-cheng lu-hsu' (Treatise on the administration of fiscal and military policy in the Ming dynasty), *Ku-wei-t'ang wai-chi*, 3.4.

FRONTIER DEFENCE AS A NEW FOCUS OF CONCERN

The concern of early nineteenth-century literati like Wei Yüan with the problems of frontier defence had a solid base in the eighteenth-century experience. Most of the material included in the *Collected writings* is in fact derived from the long Ch'ing military involvement in the far north-west and Inner Asia, about which Wei himself, as a chronicler of Ch'ing military campaigns, was expert. There seem, however, to have been certain special qualities in the frontier studies of Wei's generation. Wei himself was convinced that the 'prosperous age' (as he euphemistically put it) of late Ch'ing was losing sight of frontier dangers and needed to be awakened up.⁹² As he was writing, Turkestan was already embroiled by a revolt led by khojas or chiefs of saintly lineages (see chapter 7), a disturbance that lasted from 1825 until 1828 and probably lent impetus to frontier studies. But the solutions now urged by Wei and by his friend Kung Tzu-ch'en (whose essays form the largest single group in the frontier section of the *Collected writings*) went well beyond conventional discussion of strategic geography. Both advocated developing Eastern Turkestan (the region of present-day Sinkiang) through emigration from the crowded internal provinces. Kung offered a massive plan for forced colonization and the transformation of these western regions into a regular province, a proposal which was actually more concerned with China's internal demographic pressures than with the needs of frontier defence.⁹³

The upsurge of interest in Inner Asian frontier studies was centred in Peking, where it was stimulated by the writings of Hsü Sung, a prolific writer on frontier geography who had himself lived and travelled in the Ili region. In Hsü's circle of influence was Chang Mu, a scholar well known to Wei Yüan, whose systematic catalogue of Mongol tribal areas was later praised as combining the virtues of the meticulous Han-school empiricists with the practical usefulness of the statecraft writers.⁹⁴ This Peking group intersected the circle surrounding Ch'eng En-tse, an official widely esteemed for his conduct in education and the examination system and a former tutor to the imperial family. Ch'eng's many-sided empirical scholarship had led him to predict imminent disaster for Ch'ing society. It was this sense of rapid decline, and the consequent impatience

⁹² Ho Ch'ang-ling, *Ching-shih wen-pien*, 80.2.

⁹³ Kung Tzu-ch'en, 'Hsi-yü chih hsing-sheng i' (A proposal to establish a province in the western regions), in Ho Ch'ang-ling, *Ching-shih wen-pien*, 81.6b-9; Wei Yüan, 'Ta jen wen hsi-pei pien-yü shu' (A letter in answer to an inquiry about the north-west borders), *Ching-shih wen-pien*, 80.1-2.

⁹⁴ Chang Mu, *Meng-ku yü-mu chi* (Nomads of Mongolia), preface by Ch'i Chün-tsao, dated 1859. See the CP edn (Changsha, 1938), 1-2. The work was completed after Chang's death by Ho Shao-chi, a scholar with close ties to the Changsha statecraft group.

with the sloth and impracticality of their contemporaries, that apparently characterized members of Ch'eng's circle. Ch'eng gathered around him a group of scholars whose disparate interests included empirical research, particularly Inner Asian frontier geography, and pioneer intelligence work on the maritime nations. It was in this circle also that some of the earliest theories of New Text scholarship were enunciated by Liu Feng-lu, Wei Yüan and Kung Tzu-ch'en, and that the wide cleavages between proponents of Han learning and Sung learning were bridged.⁹⁵

Through personal and native-place ties, these Peking scholars must have formed political alliances at court. Ch'eng En-tse was a native of She-hsien, Anhwei, which made him a compatriot of Ts'ao Chen-yung, who had known Ch'eng's father. Ch'eng and his circle, including Chang Mu, maintained close ties also with Ch'i Chün-tsao, an official who later became a grand councillor and who also maintained a policy of opposition to Mu-chang-a. Lin Tse-hsü and Kung Tzu-ch'en likewise came into conflict with Mu-chang-a in the course of their careers. The specific nature of these relationships and their effects on imperial policy-making await further study.⁹⁶

Military defence of the realm, and practical scholarship to that end, were encouraged by a scholar-official from another locale: the internal aboriginal borders of the south-west. The Hunan scholar Yen Ju-i (1759–1826) attained only the middling academic rank of *yu-kung-sheng* but became one of the most influential statecraft activists of the early nineteenth century and a leader in the suppression of the White Lotus. His entrance into the bureaucracy occurred through a special palace examination in 1800, in which he submitted a lengthy critique of the orthodox military strategies against the White Lotus, advocating instead a local militia and land-assignment policy not very different from the strategic-hamlet measures that were ultimately adopted. Yen had originally been brought from a teaching career into the fight against rebellious Miao in the hills of his home region, Hsü-p'u in western Hunan.⁹⁷ Besides his interest in military science, Yen was expert in the geography and ethnology of that area. His work on Miao suppression, which contains detailed information about

⁹⁵ Ch'ü Chin (pseud.), 'Tao-kuang hsüeh-shu' (Scholarship in the Tao-kuang period), in *Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien hsüeh-shu tsu-hsiang lun-chi* (Collected essays on scholarship and thought in China during the past three hundred years), 1.345.

⁹⁶ The role of the Hsuan-nan Poetry Club as one focal point of such political alliances is discussed by James Polachek in a forthcoming dissertation on the politics of the Chia-ch'ing-Tao-kuang era. On Ch'eng En-tse, see Ch'ü, 'Tao-kuang hsüeh-shu', and epitaphs printed in Ch'eng's complete works, *Ch'eng shih-lang i-chi* (The collected works of the late Ch'eng En-tse), in *Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng*, vol. 96, no. 2212, 5–7.

⁹⁷ On Yen's anti-Miao activities, see Wei Yüan, *Sheng-wu chi* (1842 preface), 7.32b–33. For biographies see Ch'ing-shih kuan, *Ch'ing-shih lieb-chuan*, 75.45; Ch'ing-shih pien-tsan wei-yüan-hui, *Ch'ing-shih*, 4502.

Miao life, is distinguished by his willingness to delve beneath the surface and describe the culture of the disparate tribal areas in their concrete uniqueness. This facility was but slowly developed by other statecraft scholars with respect to the oceanic barbarians of the West. Yen himself later became concerned with maritime defence after serving as adviser on pirate suppression on the southern coast. His *Essentials of coastal defence* (*Yang-fang chi-yao*) was evidently compiled several years before Wei Yüan's *Collected writings*. It covers the strategic geography of the entire China coast, drawing material primarily from Ku Yen-wu, the early Ch'ing geographer Ku Tsu-yü, and the Ming expert on military organization, Ch'i Chi-kuang, whose work was often to be cited by later nineteenth-century officials.

From their separate perspectives, the writings on the Inner Asian frontiers and on the internal borders sprang from a revived conviction of the political utility of scholarship. Both drew upon a long tradition of strategic geographic study, now invigorated by a new awareness of Ch'ing weakness. It was perhaps inevitable that such strategic concern would be turned to the novel problems of dealing with the oceanic frontier, as Wei Yüan was shortly to do. He was to be aided in this transition by the fact that statecraft eschewed statements of value in favour of statements of utility, an insulating property that was essential in dealing with despised barbarian cultures, from whatever quarter.

Yen Ju-i had studied at the leading academy of Changsha, the Yüeh-lu shu-yuan. This academy and its sister institution, the Ch'eng-nan shu-yuan, seem to have exercised a strong influence in shaping that concern for public administration which characterized the Hunan elite during the nineteenth century. From the late Ch'ien-lung reign through the 1840s, the heads of the Yüeh-lu academy were men of solid experience in government. Lo Tien (1718–1808) had been a censor and a particularly successful educational commissioner. Widely known as an expert trainer of eight-legged essay performers, he was at heart a searcher for the truth of the classics, using standard Han-school techniques of textual study. Later the Yüeh-lu academy obtained the services of Yüan Ming-yüeh (*chin-shih* 1801), a specialist in strategic geography and a friend of both Yen Ju-i and T'ao Chu. As an imperial diarist during his service in Peking, Yüan had unparalleled opportunities to observe events at the head of government.

His successor, Ou-yang Hou-chün (*chin-shih* 1799), had served in the Board of Revenue for fifteen years and was respected as unusually knowledgeable in public administration. His twenty-seven-year term as director of studies at Yüeh-lu is said to have produced over 3,000 student-

disciples. Though we still know nothing specific about the curriculum of this school, it is clear at least that its directors cannot be characterized as either Sung or Han school doctrinaires, and that all had in their backgrounds a broad acquaintance with practical affairs of state.⁹⁸

There is indeed enough evidence to suggest that a new spirit was moving in Changsha during the early decades of the nineteenth century. It was in Hunan, where the prestige of Han-school scholasticism had never been as great as in the lower Yangtze provinces, that Wang Fu-chih's example of activism and uncompromising moralism had survived since the seventeenth century. Just as Yen Ju-i was setting the tone of practical scholarship through applied frontier studies, the Changsha scholar-official T'ang Chien (1778–1861) was becoming the moral leader of a revival of Sung ethical philosophy. T'ang, a friend of Wei Yüan's patron Ho Ch'ang-ling, promulgated a stern and somewhat narrow reverence for Ch'eng-Chu philosophy, in which rigorous, methodical mind-training served to focus the consciousness on ethical precepts. But T'ang's was also a life of action; known as an energetic and capable official, he exemplified the dual relevance of the Chu Hsi doctrine, in which self-cultivation was to be balanced by a vigorous life of study and state service. This puritanical and demanding creed, along with the activism and practical scholarship of Yen Ju-i, lay in the background of T'ang's most famous student, Tseng Kuo-fan, who was to emerge as leader of the loyalist forces in the dynasty's time of distress after 1850.

Another important local academic centre in this period was the Hsüeh-hai T'ang at Canton, founded by Juan Yüan in 1820. Juan Yüan had been one of the provincial appointees of the new Chia-ch'ing administration. He regarded himself as a scholar and a patron of letters, much in the eighteenth-century manner cultivated by the brother of his guarantor Chu Kuei. Juan was also, however, a skilled administrator with an eye for talent. He had influence at court and his reputation inspired confidence in areas where he held office. After 1799 he held a number of provincial posts, in two of which he founded academies which became renowned centres of education: the Ku-ching ching-she in Hangchow (1801) and the Hsüeh-hai T'ang.

Juan's notions of education are illustrative of the transitions in the scholarly climate at that time. Classes were oriented toward mastery of the classics through etymological and philological research stressing Han commentaries. Emphasis was on 'solid learning', factual information, and an effort to apply the principles of the classics to contemporary

⁹⁸ *Cb'ang-sha hsien-chih*, 11.32 ff. Li Huan, comp. *Kuo-ch'ao ch'i-hsien lei-cheng*, 90.40–2; 132.43; 138.35–6b.

problems. Local scholarly traditions were revived and restudied. The differences that distinguished the Ku-ching ching-she from the Hsüeh-hai T'ang were both chronological – the former antedated the latter by twenty years, and geographical – Hangchow was a cultural and political centre of great historical importance, while Canton was a port of trade and a provincial capital on the frontier of south China. There were differences too in the instructors who headed these academies when they opened. The two superintendents at Hangchow in 1801 were Wang Ch'ang and Sun Hsing-yen, neither of them local people, both *chin-shih* degree holders, both veterans of official careers at court and in the provinces. Both had spent long years in Peking at work on historical archives and on the Ssu-k'u editorial board, and both were scholars renowned throughout the country.

The eight superintendents of the academy at Canton, twenty years later, lacked this cosmopolitan polish. Only two of the eight were *chin-shih*, seven were natives of Canton. Only one had served in official posts higher than local educational offices, and he was a Han bannerman whose career was spent partly in military service. In short, they were not men who had distinguished themselves as members of a national literary/official community. Their careers were shaped in local politics and scholarship. Hsiung Ching-hsing, for example, was a poet who had obtained the *chü-jen* degree but failed to rise higher in the examination system. He was dissatisfied with his official position as a department director of education, which he felt a compromise of his talents; he also practised mounted archery and boxing out of the conviction that most scholars were too weak and delicate. His colleague Lin Po-t'ung, another *chü-jen*, was a scholar who had served as a department director of education and as a private tutor for official families in the Canton area. In 1810 his advice on the suppression of pirates on the Kwangtung coast had been solicited by the governor-general, and for his services he had been awarded an honorary title. Lin was a philosopher as well as a military strategist, and one of the first scholars at Canton to advocate an eclectic position between Han learning and Sung Neo-Confucianism.

A third member of the teaching staff, Tseng Chao, attained only the *pa-kung-sheng* degree and served in similar local educational posts. He was first hired by Juan Yüan as a tutor to Juan's sons. Later he taught at the academy, and in 1841 was appointed a consultant to the governor-general at Canton to plan the fortifications for the city's defence against the British. Following the Opium War, Tseng submitted a ten-point report on the condition of the city's defences. With Lin Po-t'ung and Wu Lan-hsiu, another of the original eight superintendents at the Canton academy,

Tseng assisted Liang T'ing-nan in the compilation of a gazetteer on coastal defence for Kwangtung. Liang himself later became a member of the academy's teaching staff. Hsü Jung, the most prominent of the eight superintendents, was a Han member of the Plain Yellow Banner stationed at Canton. He did not obtain the *chin-shih* degree until 1836, after leaving his position at the academy. The pupil of a well-known Kwangtung poet, he was known for the quality of both his poetry and his military treatises on pirate suppression, which he produced in abundance.⁹⁹

This tiny enclave of military strategists who were also poets and scholars teaching in a frontier commercial city can hardly be called typical of their society. But they do represent some of the important changes that were taking place in China in their time. The centre of wealth in the south-east was beginning to shift in the early nineteenth century from Yangchow, domain of the salt merchant, to Canton, realm of the Cohong. The centre of crisis was about to move from the Inner Asian frontiers, home of the barbarian nomads, to the south-eastern coast, the sphere of the foreign invader. Canton, in a brief period of time, had risen to prominence as a source of income for the central government, particularly for the Imperial Household Department, and as a focal point of strategy for China's defences.

The early nineteenth century is usually viewed backwards, over the historical shoulder of the events of the 1840s and 1850s – the Opium Wars, the Taiping Rebellion. But it is more accurately understood from a perspective that looks ahead, out of the context of developments of the late eighteenth century. From that direction we are made to see more sharply the limits of our understanding of a number of important problems; among them, the ways in which traditional scholarship accommodated itself to the actual practice of governing.

The period carries with it a wealth of 'unofficial' and apocryphal historical materials which remain largely untapped, but which clearly point the way toward a better sense of the intensely personal world of Chinese politics. It comes as no surprise that policy-making consisted of more than institutional and administrative considerations. Our failure to ex-

⁹⁹ On the Hsüeh-hai T'ang, see Yung Chao-tsu, 'Hsüeh-hai t'ang k'ao' (A history of the Hsüeh-hai Academy), *Ling-nan hsüeh-pao*, 3.4 (June 1934) 1–147; and Lin Po-t'ung and Ch'en Li, eds. *Hsüeh-hai t'ang chih* (A gazetteer of the Hsüeh-hai Academy). On the Ku-ching ching-she, see Juan Yüan's preface to the first collection of literary work published by the academy, which Juan edited, *Ku-ching ching-she wen-chi* (Prose collection of the Ku-ching ching-she academy), in *Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng*, vol. 81, no. 1834–8. Biographies of Wang Ch'ang and Sun Hsing-yen appear in Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, 805–7, and 675–7. See also 510–11 for a biography of Lin Po-t'ung. For other biographies, see Ch'ing-shih kuan, *Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan*, 72.61b (Wu Lan-hsiu), 69.49b–50b (Tseng Chao), and 73.52b (Hsiung Ching-hsing and Hsü Jung).

plore this dimension is the measure of the inadequacy of our grasp of governmental organization and operation in late traditional times.

The standard view of the Chinese polity in this period is one marked by an absence of pluralism. Seldom are the interests of individual groups recognized or documented; factional struggles have not received the attention that is now being paid them by students of modern Chinese history. The institutional and administrative difficulties of the early nineteenth century afford us a documentary context for exploring the role of factions and interest groups in an earlier setting. Such problems as nascent anti-Manchu sentiment among Han Chinese officials, cleavages between bureaucrats at court and those in the provinces, and the functioning of patronage networks at various levels of government, all await investigation. Such an investigation will doubtless lead us to modify our holistic view of Chinese scholar-officialdom.

Repeatedly in the study of this period, the question of dynastic decline presents itself, not only to us but to the sources that inform us. For the historical sense of dynastic decline and the widespread feeling that 1775–80 was a turning point in Ch'ing history – a turning downward – pervade the political and social commentaries written by officials and scholars of the early nineteenth century. Their efforts to alter this course did not, however, assume the momentum or the self-consciousness of a restoration. The people seeking to change existing institutions or practices did not constitute a reform party or even regard themselves as reformers. Their efforts were sporadic and confined to limited spheres. Their success was only fleeting, if success was achieved at all.

Contemporaries frequently explained what was happening in their society in terms of the dichotomy of 'public' (*kung*) and 'private' (*ssu*). In their view, the proper realm of public interest, controlled by the government, was shrinking under encroachments from private interests. These included such obvious groups as the patronage networks, salt smugglers and sub-bureaucratic personnel (clerks and runners), who took the public resources of the state – tax revenues, waterworks projects, grain and salt distribution systems – and transformed them into sources of private profit. Yet the shift from public to private seems to have been more profound than even these observers realized. Instead of public employment, scholars were now turning to private employment. Instead of using conscripts, the canal system was hiring private labourers. In the place of effete hereditary soldiers, the army rolls were increasingly composed of paid militiamen. Tax collectors purchased their grain from private traders; grain tribute administrators leased boats from private shippers.

In other words, commercialization as well as corruption, increasing

social complexity as well as decadence, were among the forces altering Chinese society and the distribution of power within it, on the brink of modern times. As the monarchy lost its capacity to defend its realm against the assertion of private interests, the role of the central government itself in dominating and defining the sphere of public interest was being irreparably damaged.

CHAPTER 4

THE CANTON TRADE AND THE OPIUM WAR

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRADE

The essence of the Canton system by which China's European trade was regulated from 1760 to 1834 was hierarchic subordination: first, of the foreign traders to the licensed Chinese monopolists, known collectively as the 'Cohong'; and second, of the Cohong members to the imperially-appointed superintendent of maritime customs at Canton, known to Westerners as the 'Hoppo'. In legal-political terms, power was exerted downward in this hierarchy. The imperial officials at Canton, not only the Hoppo but also the governor of Kwangtung and the governor-general (or 'viceroy') of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, issued orders and regulations to the Cohong members and might jail or disgrace them for non-compliance; and they customarily refused any direct contact with the British East India Company's Select Committee at Canton, preferring to transmit orders to them via the hong merchants.

In economic terms, however, power was more equitably distributed because of a discrepancy between the formal Confucian rationale for the Canton system and the real interests of its participants. The system had grown up as an expression of China's traditional effort to achieve stability in foreign relations by permitting a limited trade to those who either presented tribute or were quarantined at entrepôts on the frontier, as the Russians were at Kiakhta (Mai-mai-ch'eng) and the Europeans after 1760 at Canton. In public Ch'ing policy expressions, commercial interests were subordinated to political *raisons d'état*. But in private, even Ch'ing emperors viewed the Canton trade as an important source of personal profit. Although the Hoppo was mistaken by foreigners for a representative of the Board of Revenue (Hu Pu), he was actually delegated by the Imperial Household (Nei-wu Fu) to transmit as much as 855,000 taels of the annual Canton customs duties to the ruler's privy purse.¹ His performance as

¹ Te-ch'ang Chang, 'The economic role of the Imperial Household (Nei-wu-fu) in the Ch'ing dynasty', *JAS*, 31.2 (Feb. 1972) 258; Preston M. Torbert, 'The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department: a study of its organization and principal functions, 1662-1796' (University of Chicago PhD dissertation, 1973) 110-12.

superintendent of maritime customs was judged according to his ability to fulfil the emperor's private quota, and therefore depended to some degree upon keeping the Canton trade open. International incidents which threatened to close the port jeopardized the Hoppo's fiscal duties. Similarly, the bankruptcy of Cohong merchants by 'squeezing' more money from them than they could afford also went against the Hoppo's best interests, because the Cohong alone possessed enough trading capital to finance the trade.

The Cohong's capital came from profits earned by selling tea and textiles to monopoly trading organizations like the British East India Company (EIC). The EIC paid in part for these purchases with imported goods like woven cloth. But while the value of these imports averaged only \$3.5 million a year, the EIC annually exported about \$7 million worth of Chinese goods. The \$3.5 million balance was made up with American silver currency originally brought to China by the EIC. After 1805 the EIC ceased carrying silver to Canton because it could instead rely upon 'private merchants' or free traders who sold mechanical instruments, Indian cottons and exotica from south-east Asia to the shopkeepers of Canton. These private merchants were forbidden by the Chinese government to export their cash profits from Canton, so they simply turned the silver over to the EIC in return for bills of exchange which could be cashed in London or India. The EIC, of course, used the silver to continue purchasing the vast quantities of tea which it sold in England. Three developments altered this balanced system of economic interests: the increasingly private corruption of the Ch'ing customs superintendents, the growing credit instability of the Anglo-Chinese monopolists, and the rise of the free trade in opium.

CORRUPTION AND THE CONSOO FUND

Although the Chinese officials in charge of foreign relations profited from trade, they formally denied any profit motive of their own. Emperors, too, feigned disinterest in trading revenue while actually pressuring their Hoppo to secure that income for them. The emperor's private gain was the empire's public loss. For Hoppo frequently failed to meet their regular Board of Revenue customs quota in order to pay the emperor his 'surplus' duties. As the eighteenth century drew to an end, this kind of private corruption grew apace, with each Hoppo doing all he could during his three-year term to line his own pockets as well. Gradually, a 'Canton interest' developed that siphoned funds from the trade into the pockets of all the officials—high and low—who were involved with the foreigners or the Cohong.

To protect themselves, the Cohong merchants or hongists in 1775 had set up a secret fund (known later to the EIC as the 'Consoo Fund', i.e., a fund of the *kung-so*, 'guild hall', or Cohong as an entity), into which each member of the guild was to pay a tenth of his trade profits, to be used in time of need to meet the exactions of the officials. By 1780 this fund had become publicly known and officially established as recipient of a regular 3 per cent levy on foreign imports, an addition to the tax structure ostensibly to ensure repayment of hong debts to foreigners.

The creation of the Consoo Fund inaugurated the last great phase of the Canton trade, from 1780 to 1833. The fund itself was a protective device of the hongists, made official in reaction to the early growth of private investment outside a monopoly framework. The workings of the fund, however, were an index of the social disorder that swept across China after 1796. The last years of the Ch'ien-lung period saw the first signs of traditional dynastic decline: high office was sold for bags of pearls, army registers were padded with false names, and local taxes purloined. After a series of floods and famines, much of central China's peasantry was unsettled by the White Lotus rebels, who revolted in the Szechwan-Hupei border region from 1795 to 1803. This turmoil spread to Kwangtung in the form of Triad Society uprisings in 1802, and pirate raids along the coast. Cantonese corsairs, their numbers swelled by adventurers who had failed to restore the Nguyen (Juan) dynasty in Tongking, actually besieged the Pearl River delta from 1804 to 1809.² The throne tried in traditional fashion to alleviate the social dislocation and famine, and pay the extraordinary military expenses needed to put down the rebellions. Officials and wealthy merchants were asked to 'contribute' money. In fact, quotas were simply assessed on each level of the officialdom, and on merchant guilds. The Cohong's payments were made from the Consoo Fund.

In 1807, for example, Consoo payments were for 'tribute' to the emperor, amounting to 55,000 taels; for imperial military campaigns, 61,666 taels; for Yellow River flood repair and coastal piracy suppression, 127,500 taels; for presents to ministry officials, 5,400 taels; and for clocks and 'singsongs' (music-boxes and mechanical toys which became the 'established vehicle of corruption between the Officer and his Superiors in the Capital'),³ 200,000 taels. It will never be known exactly how much money the hongists handed over during these years, but the EIC at least ascertained that the total *open* payments of the Consoo Fund between 1807 and 1813 were 4,988,000 taels. Nor were these assessments any protection

² Frederic Wakeman, Jr, *Strangers at the gate: social disorder in south China, 1839-1861*, 23-4; Lo-shu Fu, *A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations (1644-1820)*, 598.

³ H. B. Morse, *The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China*, 3.155.

for the wealthier members of the Cohong like Puankequa. Personal contributions, up to 100,000 taels at a time, were still demanded of individuals.

ANGLO-CHINESE MONOPOLISTS

All of this increased the credit instability of the hongists, and the East India Company's advances became, more than ever, the key to the monopoly trading mechanism. Every year, funds for 50 per cent of the next year's tea contract, and for 90 per cent of the silk, were handed over to the Cantonese brokers. Since they passed on a portion of this to tea or silk wholesalers in order to secure the rest of the next year's contract in advance, each hongist was a credit bearer. If rumours of a particular broker's insolvency began circulating, then he could maintain credit with the inland tea and silk men only by getting more money from the English as a sign of their confidence in his stability. But more money meant higher advances, and higher advances meant giving the man a greater share in the following season's contract. In accepting that share, the particular hongist also had to agree to take a proportionally higher amount of British woollens. The broker then had to try to unload the unwanted woollens on consignment to Canton textile hongts. That, in turn, stretched his credit even further, adding to the instability that kept him tied to the East India Company from one season to the next. By 1783 the EIC's power over the trade was so great that its Select Committee realized that not even the Hoppo could create a price cartel against them.⁴ Of course, none of this reduced the Hoppo's power to extort money from the hongists, because a new kind of Anglo-Chinese monopoly system had been created. The EIC now invested so much money in a given merchant that it simply could not afford to let him go bankrupt, since it thereby lost all hope of seizing its 'collateral': the years of future tea trading which he had mortgaged to the EIC. Hence, the company's practice of advances linked its fortunes so closely to the merchants that the Hoppo no longer could, or needed to, sell monopoly rights. Rather, he used the brokers as surrogates for the English, knowing that the EIC would indirectly pay their fines and duties for them.

For all of the Select Committee's frantic concern to resuscitate expiring hongists so as to keep the tea-chests coming, the East India Company made very little money from the trade itself, though by the 1830s the British government was obtaining 10 per cent of its revenue from the tea taxes. The EIC earnings were simply not that great. Between 1780 and 1790 the entire profits of both the India and China trades were rather less

⁴ *Ibid.* 2.93.

than £2 million – a return of only 5 per cent on the original stock. This of course did not include the private perquisites which made the EIC a source of profit to so many individuals connected with it – the private trade of supercargoes and EIC officers on the East Indiamen, the payments to certain families who held the right to sell these ‘hereditary bottoms’, or shipping rights, to the company at high prices, and the like. But in any case the EIC continued in business at Canton because the company ruled India, and China was the best medium of remittance for surplus Indian revenue needed to service the £28 million in debts engaged in London to pay the cost of conquering India in the first place.


The organ of remittance was now the agency house. To keep its own servants from controlling private Indian trade, the East India Company had introduced the agency system in 1787. In 1832 its origin was described as follows.

The Agency Houses were chiefly formed of gentlemen, who had been in the civil and military services, who finding their habits better adapted for commercial pursuits, obtained permission to resign their situations and engage in agency and mercantile business. They received the accumulation of their funds in the Company’s services. They lent them to others or employed them themselves for the purposes of commerce, they were in fact the distributors of capital rather than the possessors of it. They made their profits in the usual course of trade and by difference of interest in lending and borrowing money and by commission.⁵

By 1790 there were fifteen of these private trading firms in Calcutta to control the ‘Country trade’ within India, which had also expanded eastward to the straits and to China. To meet the needs of the trade they set up banks and insurance companies, acted as agents for foreign investors, remitted private fortunes, financed indigo cultivation, and so forth. Indigo, used in the dyeing industries of Europe, was a major form of remittance, hampered only by the outrageous freight rates charged by the ‘shipping interest’ which owned and ran EIC vessels. When indigo sales suffered a slump in 1801, many of these agency houses began to rely heavily on sending cotton and opium to Canton.

Since the EIC monopolized tea purchases in China, the commodities carried from India to China by the Country trade (licensed in India by the Company and conducted by private firms) all had to be exchanged there for low-value goods like sugar or tutenague (zinc, sometimes alloyed with

⁵ Evidence of Mr Bracken before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 24 March 1832. Quoted in H. Sinha, *Early European banking in India*. See also Blair B. King, ‘The origin of the managing agency system in India’, *JAS* 26.1 (Nov. 1966) 37–48; Amales Tripathi, *Trade and finance in the Bengal presidency, 1793–1833*; and Dilip Kumar Basu, ‘Asian merchants and Western trade: a comparative study of Calcutta and Canton 1800–1840’ (University of California at Berkeley PhD dissertation, 1975) 209–50.

The triangular trade with China

lead, copper, etc.), or for specie itself. Large-scale banking was therefore introduced to place the balance of the profits. There were three ways in which the EIC could use these extra gains to acquire specie or generate profits, which were now so necessary at Canton to maintain the voluminous shares and advances used in the trading system. First, one of the Indian presidencies could advance rupees to an agency house, which bought Indian cottons to sell in Canton for Spanish dollars, that were then placed in the EIC factory treasury minus the Country traders' profits. Secondly, the Canton factory could accept specie from a Country trader in exchange for bills on London or Bengal. Finally, credit could be transferred 'in treasury': (1) if the EIC owed an advance to hongist X, (2) X could buy cotton or opium from Country trader Y, (3) whereupon X would transfer his EIC debt to Y, and (4) Y would remit to London by bill of exchange on the Court of Directors there.

At first glance, the Country traders seem to have resembled Chinese counterparts during the Ming and Ch'ing periods, who worked within the interstices of state monopolies. But, unlike his Chinese counterpart, the Country trader was indispensable. The most basic, the most fundamental, the most constant reason for this was simply that the English could find nothing manufactured in Europe which the Chinese would consume in quantities proportional to the gigantic English demand for tea. As a result,

the EIC monopoly system, *by itself*, was unable to finance the trade. All exchanges, save for the direct transport of tea, worked through the Indian agency house and its Canton representatives, the 'private English'.

THE END OF MONOPOLY

As China and England pulled farther apart, their trading representatives drew closer together. By 1810, the Select Committee and the Cohong seemed wedded into a single Anglo-Chinese guild. Competition between them was irrelevant. Indeed, both sought mutual aid against the encroachments of new English and American private traders who did their business outside of a monopoly system which they regarded as outdated and obstructive.

In 1785, the first United States ship had reached Canton. The War of Independence over, their privateers out of work, and the Antilles closed to their vessels, the shippers of Salem, Boston and New York looked to the China trade with eagerness. Their small sloops and schooners first carried ginseng; then, after 1787, furs from Nootka. After 1806, when the seals and otters of the Pacific north-western coast of America were exterminated, sandalwood was collected from Hawaii and Fiji until it too was exhausted by 1830. Americans travelling around Cape Horn also began to sell European goods in Spanish American ports for Mexican silver, which was then carried to China for the purchase of tea, silk and porcelain. This added another two or three million dollars a year in silver supplies for the Canton trade, and made it possible for the volume of American exchanges with China to rise meteorically. American shipping rates were so cheap in relation to those of the EIC that the Americans could pay the tea tariffs in England and still undersell the Company. By 1820, all but a tiny portion of the Canton trade was divided between the EIC, the Country traders, and the Americans.

The Americans themselves had no wish to step into EIC shoes and pay hongist prices raised high to fill the Consou Fund. Rather, they looked for dealers outside the Cohong, especially the shopkeepers whose firms clustered around the Canton factories. In 1818, however, a shopkeeper was discovered trying to buy raw silk on his own, and the Hoppon insisted that henceforth the hongists, as security merchants for foreign ships, should guarantee all outside brokers. This played into both the Cohong's and Select Committee's hands, as most of the shopkeepers therefore moved back inside the city walls. Ten years later, a salt merchant tried to form a new foreign trading house to deal with the Americans, financed with capital from those same shopkeepers. When the Hoppon seemed about to

acquiesce in an especially large bribe from that merchant, the East India Company – like some seventeenth-century ‘privileged merchant’ – used the governor-general to ruin the combine. However, the Select Committee’s appreciation of these benefits of official Chinese intervention in the trade was not shared by London.

Distance gave the Court of Directors greater perspective on the sinicization of their trading organization at Canton. In 1810, for example, the Directors discovered that 3.5 million taels had been advanced to the hongists. The Select Committee had always argued that such advances reduced the next season’s tea prices by at least 3.5 per cent. London now asked why so much money was tied up at Canton for this small gain, when the Indian Presidencies had to borrow money at 12.5 per cent interest. The logic was irrefutable, and by 1818 the Select Committee finally admitted that the tea business was so stable that advances were no longer necessary.⁶ Cash cropping had spread throughout parts of Fukien, central China and Kwangtung, where more and more farmers were responding to the world demand for tea by engaging in monoculture. As a result, the Canton factory almost nonchalantly ceased handing the hongists specie when they signed the next year’s contracts. Cash was still given to the brokers for Consol payments, but even this was stopped after a secret meeting of the Select Committee in March 1825. If a hongist became insolvent in the future, it was judged best simply to drop him to fend for himself. The old monopolistic Canton system was coming to an end, as Country traders introduced more and more capital into the city, permitting hongists to borrow at less usurious rates from private creditors. Interest rates dropped from 20 per cent per annum to 12 per cent and the EIC’s artificial crediting devices were no longer necessary.⁷ Thus, without great fanfare, the century-old trading connections between the Anglo-Chinese monopolists were severed, and the two corporations were rather quickly divorced. The Cohong continued to look to the future, but the Select Committee was aware that its time was over as a guaranteed monopoly, and that the moment had arrived to begin pulling out.

On 13 July 1813 parliament had abolished the EIC’s India monopoly, and allowed it to retain its China monopoly only for another twenty years. In the boom that followed India’s opening to free trade, scores of new agency houses were founded in Calcutta and Bombay. Many of these invested in the Country trade to China. The private English merchants in Canton had begun years before on the margin of the regular commerce, importing London singsongs, Middle Eastern myrrh, Madras sandal-

⁶ See Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, *Agricultural change and the peasant economy of south China*, 215–16.

⁷ Morse, *Chronicles*, 4.257.

wood, Malayan tortoiseshell and the like. Their staple had been Indian raw cotton, sold in competition with the Nanking crop to the weaving industries of south China. Then the India boom collapsed. A world trade depression in 1827–8, along with the replacement of indigo by Prussian blue in European dyeing plants, ruined almost all the great Calcutta agency houses. Furthermore, the owners of the Country firms at Canton (many of whom were Scottish kinsmen of the Calcutta merchants) found the Chinese market for their own goods weak and unstable. Singapore had been growing so rapidly since 1819 that Canton became glutted with articles of the Straits' trade. Indian cotton, once their mainstay, could no longer compete with Nanking musters, as the latter were now brought south to Kwangtung by junk instead of overland, lowering the transport costs. Even singsongs were not selling, because the Cantonese had learned how to copy them. Nevertheless, the Country firms were coming to play such an important role in Cantonese banking that the failure of this particular kind of trade did not ruin them. In addition to shipping treasure and engaging in the kinds of bullion brokerage described earlier, the private houses invented new types of exchange. After 1826, for example, silver dollar imports had fallen because of the drying up of the Spanish American source of silver supplies and the American turn towards internal investment.⁸ Merchants like Dr William Jardine, therefore, began to encourage Americans to sell their own United States cotton in London for bills on Baring Brothers, which were brought to Canton for investment. Jardine then credited the Americans locally and cashed the original bills in London, providing still another form of remittance for private investors in China. This kind of banking business saw the Country firms through the world credit crisis of the late 1820s, but it did not provide them with enough profit to grow rich. That happened only when the Cantonese private houses began to invest directly in the third great Indian export crop, opium.

THE OPIUM TRADE

Opium had been used medicinally in China since the T'ang period. In 1620, Formosans started mixing it with tobacco and its use as an addictive drug spread to the south-eastern coast. Though opium imports were prohibited by the Ch'ing government in 1729, the Portuguese continued to bring in small quantities of the drug from Indian ports like Damao and Goa. In 1773, the EIC decided to create an opium monopoly of its own in eastern India, advancing money to ryots to grow Patna opium of a

⁸ W. E. Cheong, 'Trade and finance in China, 1784–1834, a reappraisal', *Business History*, 7.1 (Jan. 1965) 41.

higher quality than the Portuguese Malwa opium from west India. By 1796, however, the Chinese were so upset about the drug that the EIC decided not to risk its tea monopoly by importing opium directly into China, but rather to sell it at public auctions in Calcutta to private English, who thenceforth did the actual peddling in the Country trade to the east of India. From 1800 to 1818, therefore, the traffic to China moved through Macao, hardly exceeding 4,000 chests per year. (A chest usually weighed 140 pounds.)

As of 1819, however, the drug trade suddenly boomed. Competition between Malwa and Patna had lowered prices, increasing consumption, which further increased demand. 'Opium is like gold', wrote an agent. 'I can sell it any time.'⁹ In 1820, the scholarly Governor-General Juan Yüan cracked down on the traffic. Sixteen Chinese dealers were arrested in Macao, and one of them described the workings of the entire racket, complete with details of bribes to high officials. During the ensuing scandal, the European contraband system came full circle when the central depot for opium distribution was moved to that little island where the Portuguese had first landed in 1517: 'da Veniaga' – Lintin Island, in the waters outside the Bogue. From 1822 to 1830, the opium trade out of this depot took another great leap forward, reaching a high of 18,760 chests per year. But much of this was non-Company Malwa, bought by syndicates in Damao. After trying to keep the native princes in central India from selling to these syndicates, the EIC finally agreed in 1831 to transship Malwa through Calcutta for a transit fee. Opium now flowed freely from all of India to Canton, and by 1836, total imports came to \$18 million, making it the world's most valuable single commodity trade of the nineteenth century.

Although the vast quantities of this drug were unloaded onto floating 'hulks' at Lintin, far from the supervision of Chinese officials, the drug had to be sold via Canton. Dozens of Chinese wholesale dealers (*yao-k'ou*) bought certificates in the city from Country firm officers, then exchanged these certificates at the fortified hulks for actual opium, which was carried away on 'scrambling dragons' (*p'a-lung*) or 'fast crabs' (*k'uai-hsieh*): forty-oared boats, armed to the teeth, crewed by fierce Tanka rivermen. These fought or bribed their way inland up the river system to dry-land distribution points, run by gangsters and Triads. But even so efficient a system failed to handle all India could provide. Intent on profit, the leading Country trader, Dr Jardine, decided in 1832 to send his ships north to sell opium directly off their decks at small coves on the Fukien and Chekiang coast. These heavily armed, sleek, coastal clippers thus created new markets, new addicts, pushing the sales of the drug ever higher.

⁹ Michael Greenberg, *British trade and the opening of China, 1800-1842*, 118.

During the first decade of the nineteenth century, China had gained about \$26,000,000 in her world balance of payments. From 1828 to 1836, \$38,000,000 flowed *out* of the Middle Kingdom. It was opium that turned the balance, and ended by financing much of England's further colonization of India. In 1830, the auditor-general of the East India Company declared that every year at least £4,000,000 had to be carried back from India to England. Most of this surplus territorial revenue was transferred first in the form of opium, which was sold in Canton, and then sent home as teas, which in turn added another £3,300,000 in tariffs for the British government. After centuries of trade, the West had finally found something the Chinese would buy in large quantities. Moralists might feel a guilty twinge at the thought of the nature of this product, but was not the drug the staple of the Country trade? And was not the Country trade in turn the epitome of those values every Anglo-Saxon of the age valued most highly: self-help, free trade, commercial initiative? Thus were twinges ignored, moralists scorned, and doubters derided. If anything, the free traders felt more was due to them. Manchester was on the rise, and the Country traders chafed at restrictions the Select Committee almost took for granted. Jardine wrote to a friend: 'The good people in England think of nothing connected with China but tea and the revenue derived from it, and to obtain these quietly will submit to any degradation.'¹⁰ But those days were over, were they not? In 1833, after four years of petitions, public lectures, rallies and lobbying, the free traders saw the abolition of the East India Company monopoly through parliament. China, too, was now open to English free trade.

Or was it? The battle had been won at home, but at Canton the restrictions remained. The city still held the foreigners outside its walls, in thrall to its officials. And beyond Canton, just out of reach, lay the great internal market of China: 400 million people. Just think of it – the manufacturers of Manchester told each other – an extra inch of cloth on every Chinaman's shirt-tail, and our mills will be kept busy for decades! If only the barriers could be forced. If only England could find a safe harbour, seize an island and turn it into a protected entrepôt free of corruption and extortion. The China trade was potentially the most important in the world, argued the private merchants of Canton in a petition to the Commons in December 1830. It was time to place it 'on a permanent and honourable basis'. The failures of the embassies of Macartney in 1793 and Amherst in 1816 'will forcibly suggest to your Honourable House how little is to be gained in China by any refinements of diplomacy'.¹¹ Even the EIC Select Committee, cleaning up and preparing to move out,

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 177.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 178.

had come to feel that diplomacy's sister, war, was the answer. Western and Chinese monopolists had suffered together for over a century, but now that age was past. A war could be easily won, the Select Committee declared, and would 'place our intercourse on a rational basis'. For, 'the Chinese people are very far from inimical to the British connection. . . . A hostile feeling has only sprung up from the jealousy of the government.'¹² Remembering how much they had shared, the supercargoes fully believed that the common Chinese, oppressed by magistrates and taxed by Hoppo, could not help but approve what internal Chinese merchants had been unable to carry out for centuries: the destruction of bureaucratic restraints on commerce, even if it meant force of arms.

Had the English examined their own motives more carefully, they would have realized how grievously they misunderstood the Chinese. From the days of the first Portuguese carracks, European merchants had been animated by profit, religion and pride of country. Mercantilism and nationalism had gone hand-in-hand. Now, as it turned into doctrine in the nineteenth century, imperialism combined both more tightly than ever. Trade would follow the flag. No one stopped to think that when the flag finally did reach Kwangtung, the Cantonese might have to choose country over trade.

On the eve of the Opium War (1839–42), Ch'ing foreign policy rested on three long-standing assumptions: China's superiority in warfare, her skill in 'civilizing' outsiders, and her possession of precious trading goods to bring foreigners to accept tributary status. All three were anachronistic, but the last was most out of date by 1839, because it had been suited to the commercial intercourse of a pre-industrial age. Once, foreign merchants had come just for Chinese goods. Now Western manufacturers were beginning to look for Chinese markets. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce pointed out in a memorial to the foreign secretary in February 1836 that Canton offered an outlet for £3 million of Indian goods a year, 'which enables our Indian subjects to consume our manufactures on a largely increased scale'.¹³ This English reversal of the millennial supply-and-demand relationship between Europe and East Asia was still more intended than actual, but an insistent cry for the abolition of all Chinese barriers to Western commercial intrusion mixed smoothly with that nineteenth-century amalgam of Whig liberalism and Manchester enterprise which came to be known as 'free trade'. And its spokesmen, as aggressive pamphleteers and lobbyists, perfectly reflected the nationalism of the age, demanding in the same breath trading privileges and equal diplomatic intercourse.

¹² Morse, *Chronicles*, 4.316–17.

¹³ Greenberg, *British trade*, 194–5.

THE NAPIER AFFAIR

The Act of 1833 which abolished the East India Company monopoly also provided for the appointment of a British superintendent of trade in Canton. For this post, Lord Palmerston as foreign secretary named a Scottish lord, naval officer and sheep-farmer named William John Napier. Well-meaning but new to things Chinese, Napier was sent to Macao with conflicting instructions that reflected his superior's reluctance to choose between war (which would disrupt the existing trade) and passive compliance (which would confirm the monopolistic, single-port trading policy of the Ch'ing). On the one hand, Napier was told that he must not endanger Britain's existing relations with China; but then, almost as an afterthought, Palmerston added that, 'Your lordship will announce your arrival at Canton by letter to the Viceroy.'¹⁴ For decades, direct intercourse between Chinese officials and foreigners had been forbidden by the Canton trading regulations. Now, Palmerston was casually ordering an innovation which China would be certain to oppose, without preparing to back up the demand with force. Unaware of these implications, Napier arrived in Canton on 25 July, 1834, to present a letter of announcement. It was promptly rejected, and Governor-General Lu K'un ordered him to return to Macao at once. Napier refused, and Lu had the trade halted. When Napier still remained, the governor-general ordered the trading factories to be blockaded and cut off from supplies. Napier then disobeyed Palmerston's orders by commanding two warships to fight their way up the Pearl River, and by sending off to India for troops. In the meantime, Lu K'un blocked up the river, assembled sixty-eight war junks, and secured the emperor's permission to use force. Napier, weak with malaria, held out against the embargo and blockade for seventeen days. When he finally lost the support of his own merchants, he backed down and left ignominiously for Macao. There he died of fever on 11 October.

The Napier affair had two major consequences. It convinced Ch'ing officials that the English traders were helpless hostages to a bold blockade of the factories, and it also made Napier's successors realize the folly of challenging the Canton system without contingency plans for war. The next chief superintendent, Mr John Francis Davis, announced to Palmerston that he would pursue 'absolute silence and quiescence' pending further instructions.¹⁵ However, this quiescent policy did not please the Country traders in Canton, and after enduring three months of their carping

¹⁴ H. B. Morse, *The international relations of the Chinese empire*, vol. 1, *The period of conflict, 1834-1860* (London, 1910), 121.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 146.

criticism of his 'spinelessness', Davis resigned. His successor served quietly throughout 1835 and 1836 waiting for instructions that never came. He had only one thought – keep the trade going even if this meant accepting all its restrictions.

The powerful free trade lobby wanted much more. Since the abolition of the EIC monopoly, trade had increased in dollar value, but largely because Cantonese prices were soaring.¹⁶ The English traders were having a hard enough time underselling the mills of Lowell, Massachusetts – not to speak of having to pay higher and higher prices for Chinese goods. This inflation was a sign of Western trading weakness, for the abolition of the English monopoly really meant the end of effective corporate bargaining power and credit devices which had kept prices down. Furthermore, the free traders soon discovered that hongists were secretly sacrificing 7 per cent on English piece goods for the sake of ready cash. While this was clear warning of an impending credit crisis (the bankruptcy cases of 1836), it also revealed another consequence of the abolition of the EIC monopoly. No longer was there a single collective group of English company representatives concerned with protecting individual hongists from the levies of the Hoppo. Free trade therefore removed an important prop from Chinese mercantilism and thereby threw the Canton system entirely out of order. In effect, *laissez-faire* on one side required corresponding dissolution of restraints on the other to restore the functional balance of the trade.

This was realized, but the Country traders' chief conviction was that markets were being shut to them, that they were prey to the whims of extortionate officials, and that Napier and the British flag had been insulted. It was the last, of course, that they used in public campaigns and petitions to convince their countrymen of the righteousness of their struggle. The arguments for war were first stridently sounded in the *Canton Register*; and, by 1835, James Matheson had carried these cries back to England. At first, he got little sympathy from the foreign office, then under the Duke of Wellington. But the Whigs were soon back in power again, and Matheson found a readier ear in Lord Palmerston. The new foreign secretary had the Manchester and Liverpool mill-owners to contend with, while the thought of a more forceful China policy clearly suited his own sense of flamboyance. He was not naïve enough to believe that this could be foisted off on an English public which was evangelistically sensitized to the evils of the opium trade unless a *casus belli* were provided by the

¹⁶ The value of total imports carried by American and English ships increased from 1832 to 1837 by 64 per cent to a value of \$37.7 million. Exports, on the same basis, increased by 79 per cent to \$34.9 million. Silk prices rose approximately 25 per cent; and tea, 55 per cent.

Chinese. However, he could press a bit harder, and thus he was amenable to the offer of Captain Charles Elliot – once of the Royal Navy and at that time assistant superintendent in Macao – to pursue a policy somewhere between Napier's obduracy and Davis's passivity. On 15 June 1836, Palmerston named Elliot superintendent. Six months later that appointment reached Macao.¹⁷

Elliot was one of those fortunate individuals who are usually able to believe that a 'reasonable' solution can be found for even the most difficult problems. Unfortunately, this optimism was not sustained by attention to detail, nor by the kind of patience for niceties which is often required for successful diplomacy. His instructions ordered him, like Napier, to cease using the petitionary form of address; but because Lu K'un had been replaced as governor-general by the apparently more concessive Teng T'ing-chen, Elliot felt it worthwhile to play by Chinese rules for the sake of communication. After submitting a deferential 'petition', he was therefore recognized by Teng as superintendent and allowed to proceed to Canton. Elliot was delighted until Palmerston scolded him. The foreign secretary correctly supposed protocol to be the essence of the tribute system, and so harshly forbade the use of the petition for inter-governmental communication. Teng T'ing-chen, in turn, could not yield. As he told the emperor: 'If I suffer them to proceed on an equal standing with the provincial officials, that will mean to allow the barbarian nation to rival the Celestial Empire.'¹⁸

Elliot hoped to break the deadlock with a military *démarche*. Without precise instructions, Rear-Admiral Maitland arrived with two British warships from the Indian fleet in July 1838. Elliot waited for some sign to confirm his hope that this minor show of force was going to transform Chinese attitudes. Teng was naturally alarmed by Maitland's presence; and when a minor incident occurred, he permitted one of his colonels in the water forces to apologize formally to the English admiral. This was enough for Elliot, and the English ships left for India in early October.

Elliot now believed he had accomplished something, but no one else was fooled. The Chinese felt that they had called the English bluff, while the Country traders knew that a mere visit of the fleet would never bring about the war they wanted. As early as 1835, they had understood that His Majesty's government would not go to war as long as revenues from the China trade continued to flow in. Only if opium – the monetary catalyst

¹⁷ It took about eight months for dispatches to come full circle between Canton and London. After 1841, when steam vessels and the 'overland' route from Alexandria to Suez were used, it took from two to three months one way.

¹⁸ Translated in Pin-chia Kuo, *A critical study of the first Anglo-Chinese war, with documents*, 234–5.

of the English-Indian-Chinese trade – were curtailed, would Palmerston have to make that decision which the free traders awaited so eagerly. The initiative, therefore, rested with the Chinese authorities who had already begun to suppress the drug traffic with some vigour.

THE OPIUM DEBATE

By 1836 about 1,820 tons of opium came into China every year. Addiction seemed to increase from day to day. The degree of addiction has never been estimated accurately because there are no reliable figures on how much opium an average smoker used per day. In 1836 foreigners estimated that there were about 12.5 million smokers. In 1881 a more careful check by Sir Robert Hart put the figure at 2 million smokers, or about 0.65 per cent of the population. Most contemporaries felt this figure was far too low. In his own careful study, Jonathan Spence takes a 10 per cent smoking population as a reasonable figure for the late 1880s. Perhaps 3–5 per cent were heavy smokers, giving an 1890 figure of 15 million opium addicts.¹⁹

Back in 1820 the foreign affairs expert Pao Shih-ch'en had claimed that the city of Soochow had 100,000 addicts. Now, in 1838, Lin Tse-hsü was insisting that at least 1 per cent of China's population used the drug. But the figures these literati cited were not as important as the *appearance* of ubiquitous opium smoking. In urban centres or along the routes of trade and in densely-populated river deltas, its existence could not be ignored. Since addiction was costly, it went with leisure time and extra income. Therefore, it was usually found among wealthy members of the gentry, officials of the central government (some said one-fifth were addicts), yamen clerks (Lin Tse-hsü estimated a four-fifths addiction rate) and soldiers. While the court was terrified at the thought that the entire government was rotten with addiction, it was also alarmed by the economic consequences of the increasing export of bulk silver (sycee). China had a roughly bi-metallic currency system in which 1,000 copper cash were legally supposed to exchange for one silver tael; but the price of silver was gradually rising, so that by 1838 it took about 1,650 copper cash to buy one tael. Because land taxes were usually paid in copper but assessed and transmitted to the central government in silver, farmers therefore had to pay increasingly higher taxes without any growth of income for the state.

There were purely domestic reasons for this changing ratio of exchange. For example, declining production of Yunnanese copper mines had forced

¹⁹ Jonathan Spence, 'Opium smoking in Ch'ing China', in Frederic Wakeman, Jr and Carolyn Grant, eds. *Conflict and control in late imperial China*, 143–73.

the government to mint cheaper coins. This debasement and corresponding devaluation created a demand for more units of cash, so that during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, eight times as many coins were minted annually as in the early eighteenth century. In response to Gresham's law, silver was thereby driven out of circulation, which increased the demand for it and hence its value.²⁰ But even though this debasement of the intrinsic value of copper currency completely accounts for the loss in its exchange value, the discrepancy was blamed by Ch'ing officials entirely on China's adverse balance of silver payments caused by the trade in opium. This economic concern was compounded with other arguments. Opium, for example, was viewed as an agent of barbarian aggression, a 'moral poison' which debased people's minds. Like 'heretical religion' it dissolved the proper social relationships (*lun-li*) which distinguished man from the beasts, and Chinese from barbarians. If people continued to sink ever deeper into the selfish languor of the addict, argued the censor Yüan Yü-lin in 1836: 'Fathers would no longer be able to admonish their wives; masters would no longer be able to restrain their servants; and teachers would no longer be able to train their pupils. . . . It would mean the end of the life of the people and the destruction of the soul of the nation.'²¹

Furthermore, traffic in the drug brought officials into contact with gangsters, and debased public office. This was especially true of Kwangtung, where a special patrol fleet to catch opium-runners had been established in 1826. Within a short time these junks were allowing the smugglers' 'fast crabs' to slip past them for fees of 36,000 taels a month. The patrols were therefore abolished in 1832, then revived five years later when Teng T'ing-chen was trying his best to curtail smuggling. The trouble was that these naval patrols attracted any unscrupulous officer with an eye for a quick profit. Even the commander of the fleet, Rear-Admiral Han Shao-ch'ing, conveyed opium for a percentage of the gains. The great merchant houses of Canton were also implicated. They did try to keep from becoming too closely involved in drug for fear it would jeopardize their legal business, but in the end it mattered little. So many traders were engaged in the traffic – Fukienese wholesalers, Cantonese cloth pedlars, Shansi bankers – that all were indiscriminately grouped together in official eyes.

Beneath the surface of the public record lurks the suspicion, as yet undocumented, that the Canton interest, originally sustained by the port's

²⁰ John K. Fairbank, *Trade and diplomacy on the China coast*, 77. Frank H. H. King, *Money and monetary policy in China, 1845–1895*, 140–3.

²¹ Kuo, *First Anglo-Chinese war*, 213.

monopoly of Western trade, had become dependent on opium and, by siphoning its profits into the palace, had spread this dependence to Peking. The fact that corrupt interests and high moral principles so often co-exist in the world's centres of power makes such a link-up plausible. In the Chia-ch'ing reign (1796–1821), the customs surplus quota of 855,000 taels, due to the imperial household every year from Canton, was more than a third of the total quota (2,261,000 taels) of surplus to be collected by the twenty-one customs houses all over the empire. One may surmise that, with so many Canton officials profiting, the Hoppo would be obliged to get and transmit a share to the court.²² Moreover, from the early days of Ch'ing trade, the mercantile elements of the south-east had been closely linked with coastal criminals. This association had become attenuated as the Canton system stabilized. Now it was renewed, and Ch'ing officials, sent down to govern this region, became more than ever convinced that there was an entire network of local 'traitors' helping the barbarians to corrupt China.

Opium had been ineffectively prohibited in the eighteenth century. When the Tao-kuang Emperor ascended the throne in 1820, he was appalled by the contravention. His indignation was shared by Juan Yüan, then governor-general of the Liang-Kuang, who had driven the opium smugglers out of Macao to Lintin Island. Throughout the 1820s, however, reports continued to come in of the drug's spread; open sales in Peking itself, opium divans in Shansi province, smuggling near Shanghai, even the hills of Anhwei red with poppies. By 1830 the emperor had also become aware of the rising cost of silver south of the Yangtze, and the following year he ordered that opium imports via Canton be stopped by arresting the smugglers, and that native cultivation be suppressed by re-invigorating the *pao-chia* system and rewarding informers.²³ Neither tactic succeeded in diminishing the attraction of extraordinary profits, and by 1836 it was clear that 'strict' enforcement of existing laws was not stemming the spread of the drug. Therefore, on 17 May of that year, an official at Peking, Hsü Nai-chi, boldly suggested that prohibition was not the answer. If one ignored the moral question, then loss of silver bullion was the real problem, and that could be prevented by legalizing the opium trade for barter. The emperor promptly asked other high officials to

²² Te-ch'ang Chang, 'The economic role of the Imperial Household in the Ch'ing dynasty', 258.

²³ *Ch'ing shih-lu ching-chi tzu-liao chi-yao* (Selected economic materials from the Ch'ing *Veritable Records*), 533. Memorials and edicts of the opium debate are given here, 527–33; and more completely in Chiang T'ing-fu, comp. *Chin-tai Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih-liao chi-yao* (A source book of important documents in modern Chinese diplomatic history), 1.24–36. The best critical study of this question is by Hsin-pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*.

discuss the question and sat back to listen to the debate which was to go on, in one form or another, for the next two years.

The first question was legalization. There were two bodies of opinion. The Legalizers argued that 'idealistic' enforcement of the ban was impractical, unless the emperor was willing to rule by terror. Continued prohibition would simply engender official corruption. Far better to come to grips with reality, obtain the drug by barter and place it under the monopoly control of the Hoppo. In that way, state revenue would be increased considerably. This last point did appeal to the Tao-kuang Emperor, who was a notorious economizer; but he also consciously modelled himself on sage rulers of the past and was very conscious of his moral responsibilities. Hence, he was even more susceptible to the opposing argument of the Moralists, that infraction of a law was no reason for its annulment. The times might be bad, but that was all the more reason for a bold effort at moral regeneration. If opium were legalized, on the other hand, everyone would start smoking it.

The emperor agreed with the Moralists and ordered his officials in Canton to enforce the laws more energetically against native smugglers and dealers. This campaign succeeded better than Peking realized. By January 1837 traffic was almost at a standstill and throughout that year as many as two thousand dealers were arrested as the provincial judge, Wang Ch'ing-lien, went about closing down divans. In fact, the drug was actually a glut in the hands of the Country traders and its price dropped radically. But the foreign community, in spite of the deportation of one of their number for smuggling, still believed that the Chinese were somehow not entirely serious and would recognize the fiscal soundness of legalization. Above all, they continued to feel reasonably immune from arrest. While this immunity was the crux of the problem, its dimensions were changed entirely by the Tao-kuang Emperor's understandable suspicion of the optimistic reports emanating from Canton, and by his impatience for a final, a total solution. On 2 June 1838, another Peking official, Huang Ch'ieh-tzu, provoked the second stage of the opium debate, over methods of eradication, when he asked the emperor to decree the death sentence for addicts. So far, only traffickers and cultivators had been punished. This was not enough, Huang argued. As long as there was a demand, unscrupulous people would strive to meet it. Therefore, that demand must be extinguished, even if it meant deaths by the thousands or millions.

This time the Moralists were answered by Pao-hsing, the Tartar-general (Manchu general) of Mukden. How, he asked, do you actually find out who the smokers are? The only ones to benefit from a law like this would be yamen policemen and clerks, who could use it to extort money from

hapless innocents, or as a way of settling old scores. No, the ones to be attacked were still the dealers and smugglers, for they were the key to the problem. Existing laws should be enforced carefully instead of issuing new and dreadfully severe ones. This was reasonable advice, but the emperor knew that ever since 1820 the smugglers had supposedly been arrested, yet the drug had continued to pour into China. It was easy to talk of enforcement, but something else had to be devised to make sure it was carried out. On the other hand, the Moralists' advice did appear radical, for it meant state intervention at the lowest level of society. That not only smacked of Legalism; it also meant putting a powerful weapon in the hands of sub-officials who could not be counted on to use it wisely. Was there no one then who could provide a reasonable solution?

In answer, another voice was heard on 10 July 1838: that of Lin Tse-hsü, governor-general of Hupei and Hunan. Descended from a prominent Foochow line which had fallen on to hard times, Lin already had an outstanding government career record. In 1804, at the age of nineteen, he had acquired his first higher degree. Then, five years as a governor's secretary were followed by three more years as a Hanlin compiler in the capital. After that came routine promotions at a slightly faster pace than normal in recognition of his vigorous efficiency: provincial examiner, censor, circuit intendant, salt commissioner, provincial judge, provincial treasurer, conservancy director and so forth, until – at the relatively young age of forty-seven – he was made a governor. Within five years he had risen to governor-general. His record was absolutely clean. In 1838 Lin Tse-hsü had had no experience in dealing with the West; he glowed with the confidence of a man who had never made a serious mistake in his life. Within his own context, he was a deeply ethical man with a strong sense of worldly mission. This was partly inspired by his immersion in the most serious intellectual circles of the empire. At the capital, he and the famous political theorist, Wei Yüan, had organized a literary club with several other scholars who were all heavily influenced by the 'Modern text' (*chin-wen*) school of Confucianism (see above, p. 151).

The Modern text school went back to Han times, when there had been a harsh controversy over the reliability of the extant Confucian texts. One group of scholars insisted that the canon written down in the 'modern' script of the day was the true version of the classics. Another school believed the authentic texts to be those uncovered in a wall near Confucius's birthplace and written in the 'ancient' style. The latter movement eventually prevailed, partly because the Modern text commentators championed the *Kung-yang commentary* to the *Spring and autumn annals*, which was a much more utopian interpretation of Confucian thought than

the more mundane *Tso commentary*. The controversy, which was as important to the development of Confucian thought as the Arian heresies were to medieval Catholic doctrine, died down by the third century AD. The Modern text glosses remained immured until the eighteenth century, when they were revived by a philologist named Chuang Ts'un-yü. A once-removed disciple of his, named Kung Tzu-chen, continued to expound the textual doctrines of the school during the Opium War period; and Kung, a close friend of Lin Tse-hsü, was a member of those same progressive literary circles that were beginning to sense the deadening weight of orthodox Ch'eng-Chu Confucianism on the Ch'ing empire. Dimly felt at first, to be boldly expressed by K'ang Yu-wei in the 1890s, was the emotional need for moral engagement – not in the 'empty' speculation of Sung metaphysics, nor in the dry pedantry of the Han School of Ch'ing philology, but in the day-to-day world of governance. Commitment was called for, and along with it, adaptability to changing times. Sanction for this adaptability was found by Modern text thinkers in the classical notion of 'harmonizing with the times' (*ho-shih*), which occurred often enough in the canon to make credible their theory that Confucius himself believed one should use the ancient only in a modern context. Past models were not to be slavishly followed, but rather modified for current use by the tactic of 'citing the past to reform the system' (*t'o-ku kai-chih*).

For Lin Tse-hsü, this notion made it much easier to conceive of using Western learning and weaponry to defend Chinese culture. But he was even more deeply influenced by the inexpressible mixture of mysticism and moralism which pervades Modern text writing. If the 'gentleman', the Cultivated or Superior Man, perceives the moral intent of Heaven correctly, then he can act opportunely to summon the awesome energy of Heaven's Way, of the cosmos itself, to wreak miracles. The sage, in short, is the agent of Heaven. Thus, we read in Wei Yüan's writings:

A bamboo sprout can break through solid ground and in less than ten days attain its stature. A lotus leaf is born in the water and overnight can grow several inches. Both utilize the Void. Indeed, the power of the Void, of space, can hold up Heaven and bear the Earth. Earth yields to water, water to fire, and fire to the wind. Thus, the emptier something is, the stronger it may be. Is not the Superior Man's learning, in its emptiness, like this? . . . First the Yin, then the Yang, that is the Way of Heaven – and the sage always helps Yang in order to repress Yin. First public order, then disorder; that, too, is the Way of Heaven – and the sage must extirpate disorder in order to return to the just way. How can he then be possibly at variance with Heaven's Way?'²⁴

There is always a gap between secular thought and action, between the

²⁴ Wei Yüan, *Ku-wei t'ang nei-chi* (Inner writings of the Ku-wei studio), 2.6.

student of philosophy in his speculative mood and that same person writing out a routine memorial. But Lin Tse-hsü let more show through than most. Remarkably well-integrated for his times, he later found faith in the belief that Heaven was on his side during the war with the English; just as months before then, he had used this same moral zeal to convert the Tao-kuang Emperor to his schemes of opium reform.

By 1838 the monarch was angered by his officials' irresolution and frustrated by the inconclusiveness of the debate. What he wanted was a lucid weighing of both sides of the question, followed by decisive action; and this was precisely what he saw in Lin Tse-hsü's 10 July memorial, which cut right through the centre of the argument. On the one side, Lin agreed with Pao-hsing. Death was an extraordinarily brutal punishment for opium smoking. But, after all, the drug was an extraordinary danger to the health of the body politic. Because the drug-taker was a morally-ill individual, it was not right to execute him for breaking the law. However, it was right to terrorize him into giving up his habit by *threatening* him with death. 'To get rid of the habit of smoking is not a difficult task; what is difficult is to reform the mind. If we want to reform that mind which constantly tends to neglect the law, how can we refrain from promulgating laws that will threaten the mind?'²⁵ Until this moment no one had discussed the psychology of addiction nor the problem of rehabilitation. Lin stressed both. He realized, for example, that in spite of the threat of execution, habitual smokers would keep putting off the torment of quitting until it was too late. Therefore, the addict had to be helped out by the state. Sanatoriums would be opened, and the year between the promulgation of the death sentence and its execution would be divided into four phases with increasingly harsher penalties. At the same time, the campaign against traffickers in the south should be intensified. For, in spite of addiction elsewhere, the key point remained Canton. Foreign smugglers there should be treated no differently than native ones. They were, after all, behind the evil. It was time to stop dealing with them so tenderly and to bring them truly under Chinese jurisdiction.

This multifaceted programme promised results, and Lin was shortly invited to the capital. There he was granted an unusually high total of nineteen personal audiences with the emperor. On 31 December 1838, Lin was named imperial commissioner. An edict gave the emperor's reasons for this extraordinary appointment:

Yesterday We issued a decree particularly entrusting the Governor-General of the Hu-kuang, Lin Tse-hsü, with the mission of hurrying to Kwangtung province

²⁵ Kuo, *First Anglo-Chinese war*, 220.

to investigate and manage maritime affairs. He has furthermore been appointed Imperial Commissioner for Frontier Defence, and all of the water forces of that province are thereby united under his command. After Lin Tse-hsü reaches Kwangtung, he must reverently obey Our order to exert all his strength to resolve this matter by clearing up the source of this fraud. This does not only refer to that province's opium brokers and fast crabs, or its opium houses, warehouses, divans and other glaring aspects of corruption. It also means that he must, according to the place and circumstances, radically sever the trunk from the roots.²⁶


These were sweeping instructions. They could be interpreted to mean that Lin was empowered to involve China in warlike actions if necessary. Undoubtedly his ruler and he discussed that possibility, though they were unaccustomed to the notion of 'going to war' in the modern sense of a formal declaration of hostilities. They thought of the English more as recalcitrant rebels, whom Lin was going south to manage and pacify. If circumstances demanded it, he would resort to force, but this was not to be desired. As he explained to the emperor in September 1839, 'Opium must be completely suppressed, while risks should be avoided which might give rise to hostilities on this frontier.'²⁷ And a sure way to avoid those risks was flexibly to combine the carrot and the stick, 'leniency and rigour'. This, like his analysis of opium addiction, rested on psychological principles. The foreigners could be frightened into acquiescence by a proper display of the moral supremacy of the Ch'ing empire. In both senses, therefore, Commissioner Lin's great strength in the emperor's eyes was his confident conception of opium eradication as a campaign of moral suasion using psychological techniques. Exactly how this was to be done was not spelled out by his ruler. The Tao-kuang Emperor was approving the man as much as the policy, and Lin would be judged by his results like any other imperial commissioner. Of these results, Lin had no doubts at all. Moral rectitude, decisive and unhesitating action, would awe the English as easily as it awed native opium dealers. 'War' was never the question.

SEIZURE AT CANTON

Even before arriving in Kwangtung, Lin Tse-hsü ordered the arrest of seventeen Cantonese offenders, and the investigation of yamen personnel implicated in the traffic. Like most high officials, the imperial commissioner was deeply convinced that Canton was a cesspit of corruption and

²⁶ *Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo* (A complete account of the management of barbarian affairs), Tao-kuang period, 5.17 (hereafter, *IWSM-TK*).

²⁷ Kuo, *First Anglo-Chinese war*, 250-1. Also see Hsin-pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, 140.



MAP 7. The Pearl River delta and estuary in the nineteenth century

crime. The hongists were simply slightly wealthier smugglers than most. Therefore, after a fast, sixty-day trip from the capital, he moved into the Yüeh-hua Academy, and turned directly to local scholar-officials for help in what he expected to be a strenuous campaign against all of the racketeering interests of the city. From the moment he arrived until the end of his tenure, he unhesitatingly used those Cantonese gentry to try to extirpate opium consumption. There were dangers in this, because permitting a village notable to establish an opium suppression committee with powers of arrest meant putting a great deal of power in hands which were not easily controlled. Hence, there were many cases of false arrest and harassment as vengeful neighbours informed on each other, and lineages slandered competing clans for the sake of old vendettas or disputed property claims. All of this Lin had foreseen in his famous July memorial, but he then explained that these were necessary evils which had to be endured for the sake of curing a much more dangerous social malady. What he did not seem to realize was that it also subtly disturbed the

balance of power in rural Kwangtung between magistrates and local notables, who now began to assume police powers on their own. This appropriation of judicial and military authority was not to become blatant until the 1850s, but by then it would be too late to keep overweening power out of the gentry's grasp. Nevertheless, for all of this feverish activity, these detentions, arrests and seizures, Commissioner Lin did not succeed in eradicating the opium habit. Indeed, the attack on native smokers soon lost immediate relevance as the other phase of his programme – the assault on foreign dealers – ran into difficulties.

Lin's early effort to cut off the import of the drug was expressed in two decisions: first, to use the hongists in their capacity as security merchants (in effect, native hostages) to 'control' the foreigners; and, second, to single out and detain the key figure behind the traffic on the English side. Lin thus personalized the conflict between China and the West. On 18 March 1839 he took his first step by informing the hong merchants that they had three days to persuade the foreigners to turn over their opium stocks to the Chinese government and sign bonds promising never to handle the drug again. Otherwise, one or two of the hongists would be executed, and the rest lose all their property. This was a familiar tactic to the Europeans, who cynically suspected duplicity on the part of the hongists. At length, on the chance that Lin was really serious, the foreign community agreed to a token surrender of 1,056 chests. But Lin Tse-hsü had now come to believe that the key supplier he sought was Lancelot Dent, head of the second largest Country firm and president of the British Chamber of Commerce. On 22 March, therefore, Lin issued an order for Dent's arrest and seized two Chinese merchants as hostages to be decapitated in the Englishman's stead unless he turned himself over to the local authorities.

News of this quickly reached Captain Elliot at Macao, who immediately assumed the worst. If this was not war, he felt, then it was 'at least its immediate and inevitable preliminary'.²⁸ Ordering his available warships to move to Hong Kong and prepare for hostilities, he left Macao on 23 March with a small escort and dramatically arrived the next day at the Canton factories just in time to endure Napier's punishment: a Chinese trade embargo, labour boycott and blockade of the factories, which was to hold 350 foreigners in thrall for the next forty-seven days. Elliot, for all his courage, was now in a desperate situation. His overriding concern was for the survival of those under his charge, and it was not difficult to imagine that the thousands of Chinese troops cordoned around the

²⁸ Hsin-pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, 162. An enthralling account of the foreign community's reaction to Commissioner Lin is given in Peter Ward Fay, *The Opium War 1840–1842*, 142–79.

factories were preparing to massacre them all while he stood by helplessly – his ships and his few troops far out of reach. Thus on 26 March, when Lin made it clear that the English would be released whenever he got his opium, Elliot was positively relieved. The next day, he commanded all the Country traders to surrender their stocks of the drug to him. The merchants were delighted. Because of the arrest of traffickers, not a chest of opium had been sold in Canton during the previous five months. Since Elliot had promised that Her Majesty's government would stand good for the cost of the drug (how this was later to infuriate Palmerston!), the English merchants pledged him even more than they had in stock: 20,283 chests, valued at \$9 million. By 5 May Commissioner Lin had already begun to destroy part of this stock and was sufficiently convinced of British good faith to lift the blockade, allowing the foreigners to leave Canton if they wished.

THE TREND TOWARDS WAR

Lin Tse-hsü was buoyant with success. The barbarians, 'trembling in awe', had become obedient once again. Every manifestation of this subservience was reported to the emperor. As Lin sat in his shaded pavilion and supervised the daily destruction of huge quantities of drug in sea-water ponds filled with lime, he watched every foreign curiosity-seeker. A doffed hat, a rueful shake of a foreigner's head, was taken as absolute evidence of 'willingness to submit'. The barbarians, like misled Chinese peasant rebels, would defer respectfully to the decisive, righteous behaviour of an imperially-appointed official.

However, these signs of deference had to be transformed into more definite guarantees, and for this Lin put greatest stock in the signing of bonds. If a foreigner did sign, and smuggled thereafter, then he could expect to be executed. The bond, in other words, was designed to bring the barbarians under *acknowledged* Chinese jurisdiction. Yet at the same time, Palmerstonian foreign policy contended that an Englishman, no matter where, no matter what the circumstances, could expect the protection of his own government from arbitrary foreign prosecution. The issue, therefore, was extraterritoriality. Lin himself realized this when he asked Elliot: 'How can you bring the laws of your nation with you to the Celestial Empire?'²⁹ But for each British merchant it was not so much the abstract principle of jurisdiction as the actual fear of personal arrest that kept him from signing. Since the Country traders dared not yield, they could not afford to remain in Canton lest Lin suddenly decide to blockade

²⁹ Hsin-pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, 182.

them again. Accordingly, Elliot asked Macao for sanctuary. The Portuguese governor had little love for the English and no wish to become embroiled with Commissioner Lin; but he finally did give in to Elliot's life-and-death arguments. By 4 July the entire English community had moved to Macao. Lin Tse-hsü was not at first dismayed by this. Trade, as always, would bring them back, and then they would *have* to sign the bonds. In the meantime, he arranged and rearranged his books, wrote poetry, practised calligraphy, and kept his journal up to date. The entry for 12 July 1839 reads: 'Sudden changes from fine to rain. Wrote a poem using the same rhymes as the governor-general in a poem of his. Heard that at Kowloon point sailors from a foreign ship beat up some Chinese peasants and killed one of them. Sent a deputy to make inquiries.'³⁰ This laconic notation marked the opening of the Lin Wei-hsi murder case.

Five days earlier a mob of English seamen had gone on a drunken spree at a little village called Chien-sha-tsui, where they sacked a temple and beat several Chinese farmers with sticks. One of the peasants, Lin Wei-hsi, had died the day after from a heavy blow across the chest. The guilty party should be punished, but who among the many sailors had killed him? And would the charge be homicide or manslaughter? These questions of individual responsibility bothered the English; but Lin argued firmly to Elliot that: 'If the principle that a life is not to be paid for with a life is once admitted, what is it going to lead to? If an Englishman kills an Englishman or if some other national, say a Chinese, does so, am I to believe that Elliot would not demand a life to pay for a life? If Elliot really maintains that, after going twice to the scene of the murder and spending day after day investigating the crime, he still does not know who committed it, then all I can say is, a wooden dummy would have done better, and it is absurd for him to go on calling himself an official.'³¹ By Chinese magisterial standards Elliot was clearly incompetent, but at least he was doing his own duty to protect regulars of the Royal Navy. In fact, his actions were entirely dictated by precedent. The Lin Wei-hsi murder case was only another instance of the continuing conflict over criminal jurisdiction between Chinese and Westerners.

Contrary to Western ideas of the time, Chinese law was remarkably humane. Premeditated murder was punished with decapitation, homicide with strangling, manslaughter with demand for compensation, and killing in self-defence not at all. However, European factors and Chinese authorities could seldom agree whether a death in an affray was homicide

³⁰ Translated in Arthur Waley, *The opium war through Chinese eyes*, 55.

³¹ *Ibid.* 61-2.

or manslaughter. The Chinese usually insisted it was the former. Incidentally, in the early nineteenth century, stealing over one shilling in England was punished with death.³² However, Chinese assignment of guilt was often arbitrary by European standards. In 1784, for example, a salute fired by the Country ship, *Lady Hughes*, accidentally killed a Chinese bystander. It was impossible to tell which gunner had delivered the fatal charge, but the Chinese had to have a culprit so that the crime would not go unpunished. To them, the act was far more important than the motive, just as redressing a wrong was more important than punishing the perpetrator. What sounded like *lex talionis* in the 'life for a life' doctrine, was the desire to restore the ethical balance of a just reign by exchanging the victim's injured spirit for the culprit's life. Consequently, when the supercargo of the *Lady Hughes* could not produce the guilty gunner, he was seized as 'forfeit' instead. Eventually a hapless gunner was turned over to the Chinese and executed. The same kind of thing happened again in 1821 to an unwitting Italian crewman (Terranova) aboard an American ship, so that by the 1830s, Westerners were determined not to surrender a man to the local authorities unless he had already been tried by his own people and clearly proved guilty of homicide.

The Lin Wei-hsi case not only symbolized the extraterritorial issue, but also became a major irritant, fretting the tensions of that hot summer in 1839 when the English and Chinese regarded each other suspiciously across the Macao barriers. In the end, no murderer was surrendered, and Lin became concerned that as long as the English could remain comfortably in Macao, they would keep on resisting him both over this and over the bond issue. He therefore carried his factory-boycott tactics one step further on 15 August by cutting Macao off from produce and supplies, while simultaneously moving two thousand extra troops into the adjoining district city of Hsiang-shan. The Portuguese buckled quickly, ordering the English out; and on 24 August, Elliot and his countrymen took to their ships and anchored across the bay near Hong Kong. Now Lin felt he could successfully use the coastal exclusion methods of the early Ch'ing. 'No doubt', he told the emperor on 27 August, 'they have on their ships a certain stock of dried provisions, but they will very soon find themselves without the heavy, greasy meat dishes for which they have such a passion. Moreover, the mere fact that they will be prevented from going ashore and getting fresh water is enough by itself to give power of life and death over them.'³³ To keep the English from landing for provisions, water troops and newly recruited naval militia were cordoned

³² See Randle R. Edwards, Harvard PhD dissertation in preparation.

³³ Translated in Waley, *Opium War*, 64-5.

along the shoreline. As supplies ran low, Elliot grew desperate. On 4 September, he took a small fleet to Kowloon and told the Ch'ing junk commander there that if provisions were not handed over in thirty minutes, he would sink his fleet. When the deadline passed, he opened fire and routed the Chinese squadron.

These were the first shots of what was still an undeclared war but, as Elliot waited for instructions from England, they did not give Lin pause. Not only were the details of the engagement unclear, but the Chinese commissioner also felt sure that a few English merchants would be willing to submit to signing the bonds for the sake of renewed commerce. Elliot himself had realized from the beginning that the mere principle of extraterritoriality might seem less important to merchants than their profits – especially if their competitors, the Americans, picked up their annual tea contracts. Therefore, he had begged the United States merchants to leave Canton along with the English in the name of their future common interest. Robert Bennett Forbes, the leading North American trader, had answered in turn that, 'I had not come to China for health or pleasure, and that I should remain at my post as long as I could sell a yard of goods or buy a pound of tea. . . . We Yankees had no Queen to guarantee our losses.'³⁴ Once the British were out of the city, the Americans earned windfall profits. Hearing of this from the Hong Kong anchorage, English merchants whose hands were clean of opium began to fidget at Elliot's embargo. Finally, just after the Kowloon incident, the consignee of the *Thomas Coutts* bolted from the English ranks to sign an opium bond. In short order the *Royal Saxon*, loaded with rice from Java, decided to follow suit.

To Lin this was clear evidence that Elliot alone protected the crooked opium interests. Lin thus wrote and circulated an open letter to Queen Victoria, morally adjuring her to stop the opium trade, in the belief that the home government had been beguiled and misled by Captain Elliot.³⁵ Now, as he had predicted, the rest of the profit-seeking English who were not part of the smugglers' gang would return to Canton and submit to official control. There still remained the murder case, but that could easily be cleared up by sending Admiral Kuan T'ien-p'ei's men to board one of the merchant ships anchored at Hong Kong and seize a foreigner at random as hostage for the real criminal harboured by Elliot. As Kuan's flotilla of twenty-nine imperial war junks began to assemble for this raid at Ch'uan-pi (Chuenpi) near the opening of the Bogue, Elliot assumed

³⁴ Cited in Hsin-pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, 206.

³⁵ No copies seem ever to have reached the Queen. See Hsin-pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, 135; translation in Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's response to the West*, 24–7.

they were preparing to attack all of the fifty-odd trading vessels moored under his flag. Therefore, he sailed upriver on 3 November 1839, to disperse the Chinese fleet. Just as the two lines of warships swung into confrontation, the *Royal Saxon* unwittingly and coincidentally sailed past on its way to Canton. To enforce the embargo, HMS *Volage* promptly put a shot across the merchant ship's bow. Admiral Kuan then intervened, perhaps even to protect the *Royal Saxon*, and Elliot's guns were turned on the junks. After a short and withering barrage which destroyed four of the Chinese ships, Kuan's fleet scattered and sailed away, ending what came to be known as the Battle of Chuenpi.

However, war was still not formally declared by either side. The emperor was told of the naval engagement but not the defeat, which convinced him that there was no longer any point arguing about peasant murderers or opium bonds. Rather, it was time to cease dealing with these troublesome British altogether and expel them forever from China. There was no question that this could easily be done because his own Commissioner Lin had explained to him that the barbarian warships were too large to sail within the rivers of China and that their soldiers could not fight ashore. 'Furthermore, besides guns, the barbarian soldiers do not know how to use fists or swords. Also their legs are firmly bound with cloth, and consequently it is extremely inconvenient for them to stretch. Should they come on land, it is apparent that they can do still less. Therefore, what is called their power can be controlled without difficulty.'³⁶

In truth, the English were overwhelmingly superior. Their base in India provided ready troops and supplies, and on the China coast they had the newest weapons of the day, shallow-draught iron steamers like the *Nemesis*, which could easily turn its guns on upriver towns. Their field artillery was accurate, intense and deadly. The infantry's smooth-bore flintlocks, already far more efficient than Chinese matchlocks, were being replaced at that time by percussion-lock muskets. Even their tactics were better. The Chinese, once geniuses at siege warfare, consistently held fixed coastal fortress positions with artillery riveted in place to face massed frontal attacks. Time and time again, all that the English had to do was to land under supporting naval fire, and attack from the flank with the disciplined precision of close-order drill in order to seize the emplacements or break the enemy line.

In contrast, the armies of the Chinese empire were undermanned and badly trained. Forces drawn from the twenty-four Manchu, Chinese and Mongol Banners were stationed as idle garrison troops at strategic points

³⁶ Kuo, *First Anglo-Chinese war*, 251.

throughout the country under the command of Manchu generals ('Tartar-generals'). Meantime the Chinese Army of the Green Standard (descended organizationally from the Shensi and Fengtien units which had conquered most of China in the seventeenth century), though divided into land and water troops under provincial commanders-in-chief, existed in full strength only on paper. Registers were padded with false names, market-place coolies hastily recruited to pass muster, and periodic military exercises held, of great pomp and little circumstance, emphasizing sword drill formalized into operatic dances. Whenever a major campaign was launched, disparate units under jealous local commanders had to be brought together under a single marshal, who was often a civilian with no way of knowing the peculiarities of the troops he led. In actual battle the brigades were as likely as not to desert and ravage the countryside, striking more fear into civilian hearts than into the enemy.

During the war there were to be various attempts to remedy these weaknesses. One was to recruit local militia. Lin Tse-hsü especially emphasized this solution in Kwangtung, characteristically believing that the popular 'zeal' of these local braves could almost by itself defeat any enemy.³⁷ In order to save on military costs, the emperor extended the recruitment of these militia to the other coastal provinces in the summer of 1840; but many of the irregulars were former bandits, salt smugglers or rural hoodlums who used their militia rank to prey on local villages. Another remedy for military impotence in the face of Western gunboats and cannon was to turn to the mysterious techniques of Taoist magic and Chinese temple boxing. For instance, masters of the martial arts, who claimed they could stay underwater for ten hours without breathing, were hired to lie on river bottoms and bore holes in British hulls.³⁸ And, in the same desperate search for extraordinary methods, a few Chinese even tried to adopt Western military weapons and tactics. Lin Tse-hsü bought several hundred guns from Europeans as well as a foreign vessel which was used in war games, and he also had Western news items translated so as to gauge enemy intentions.³⁹ However, most officials of the period self-consciously regarded this kind of experimentation as a treacherous denial of Chinese cultural supremacy.

While the Ch'ing dynasty reacted paralytically to the first shots of the Opium War, news of the crisis was reaching England. Captain Elliot had

³⁷ Lin Tse-hsü, *Lin Wen-chung kung ch'üan-chi* (Complete works of Lin Tse-hsü), 1.3b. For poetry glorifying these militia, see A-Ying, comp. *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng wen-hsiieh chi* (Collected literary materials on the Opium War).

³⁸ For a discussion of some of these 'arts' and their possible military uses, see Lin, *Lin Wen-chung kung ch'üan-chi*, 1.22b.

³⁹ See examples in Ch'i Ssu-ho *et al.* ed. *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng* (The Opium War), 2.365-343.

tried to convince London in his dispatches that the time had come for 'immediate and vigorous measures'⁴⁰ to legalize opium and force Lin's clique out of power. As a mirror-image of his opponent, the British superintendent was certain that Commissioner Lin alone was behind the crisis. A military display, Elliot mistakenly believed, could count on the support of the populace, thereby discrediting Lin in Peking's eyes so that an accommodation could be reached with his replacement. But Palmerston was prepared to go much farther than this. The 'Forward Party' was growing ever more vocal among the Whigs. Dr William Jardine, the wealthiest trader in Canton, had returned to London in January 1839, in time to exploit the opium seizure issue. As the head of a merchant delegation financed with a \$20,000 war chest, he backed a clever pamphlet campaign which depicted the 'siege in the factories' as another Black Hole of Calcutta and a deadly insult to that Victorian bible, Her Majesty's flag. He also was instrumental in lining up the support of three hundred Midlands textile firms to ask Palmerston to intervene at Canton. The extent of this desired intervention was outlined by Jardine in a private meeting with Palmerston on 26 October: a blockade of China's ports to obtain reparations, an equitable commercial treaty, the opening of four new ports and the occupation of several islands like Hong Kong. By then, Palmerston needed no urging. Eight days earlier, he had already sent Elliot the news that an expeditionary force would reach China by the next March to blockade Canton and the Peiho below Peking. Jardine's advice was therefore welcomed. Indeed, from then on Palmerston constantly consulted that merchant prince's London branch for intelligence; and the later strategy of cutting China in two at the Yangtze was similarly inspired. For the next four months, plans continued to mature until, on 20 February 1840, Palmerston formally appointed two plenipotentiaries to head the expedition: Captain Elliot and his cousin, Admiral George Elliot. They were instructed to obtain 'satisfaction' for the factory siege, reparations for the opium, payment of all hong debts, abolition of the Cohong, expenses for the entire expedition, and security for British merchants which would be guaranteed by the cession of an island. To force the Chinese to grant all this, the country's major ports should be blockaded, and Chusan (the island outside Hangchow Bay near Ningpo) captured and held as surety.

Parliament had not been formally consulted. On 7 April 1840, therefore, the Tory opposition moved that this unjust war had been caused by the shortsightedness of the Queen's current advisers. Thomas Babington Macaulay, youngest member of the cabinet and a favourite of London

⁴⁰ Hsin-pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, 190.

society, answered for the Whigs. The Englishmen who had been blockaded at Canton, he declared to the gallery:

belonged to a country unaccustomed to defeat, to submission or to shame; to a country which had exacted such reparation for the wrongs to her children as had made the ears of all who heard it to tingle; to a country which had made the Bey of Algeria humble himself in the dust before her insulted consul; to a country which had avenged the victims of the Black Hole on the field of Plassey; to a country which had not degenerated since the great Protector vowed that he would make the name of Englishman as much respected as ever had been the name of Roman citizen. They knew that, surrounded as they were by enemies, and separated by great oceans and continents from all help, not a hair of their heads would be harmed with impunity.⁴¹

In short, *Civis Romanus sum*. To this another rising politician, the young Tory, Gladstone, answered:

A war more unjust in its origin, a war more calculated to cover this country with permanent disgrace, I do not know and I have not read of. The right honourable gentleman opposite spoke of the British flag waving in glory at Canton. That flag is hoisted to protect an infamous contraband traffic; and if it were never hoisted except as it is now hoisted on the coast of China, we should recoil from its sight with horror.⁴²

But Palmerston adroitly managed to shift the focus of the debate by denying that his government supported the nefarious opium traffic. He insisted that all they wished to do was guarantee the security of future trade and the safety of English citizens. The important thing to remember was that Great Britain had been insulted. Withal, the Tory anti-war resolution was defeated by only five votes, but that was scant consolation to the Ch'ing half-a-world away.

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WAR

The first stage of the formal Opium War lasted from June 1840 until January 1841. British strategy was straightforward: bypass Canton and move north to take Chusan Island, then sail to the mouth of the Peiho near Tientsin and present a note from Palmerston to the Chinese emperor. By 21 June, sixteen British ships of war, four armed steamers and twenty-eight transports carrying four thousand soldiers had assembled off Macao. A small force was left behind to blockade Canton, and the rest left immediately for Chekiang. Most Cantonese believed the English had been frightened off by Commissioner Lin's new shore batteries, but on 5 July the British fleet reappeared off Chusan. At first the sub-prefect there

⁴¹ Cited in Edgar Holt, *The Opium Wars in China*, 98–9.

⁴² *Ibid.* 99–100.

thought the ships had come to trade and there was great rejoicing in the small port at the thought of the profits to be gained.⁴³ Then the British naval commander, Sir James Bremer, demanded the city's surrender. When the Chinese brigade-general refused, Chusan was bombarded for nine minutes. Afterwards troops moved ashore through the shattered buildings and bodies to loot and occupy the town without resistance.

Palmerston had expected the capture of Chusan to shock the Chinese into immediate surrender. This did not happen. Since Chusan's garrison had been routed by naval artillery, the loss of the island did not destroy the myth that Englishmen could not fight ashore. Moreover, many first thought it was strictly part of a plan to open nearby Ningpo to British trade; for at this stage of the war the English were still narrowly viewed as piratical traders rather than being taken seriously as potential conquerors. However, this sense of security evaporated as soon as the fleet moved on towards the Peiho. By 9 August the Grand Council was thrown into a furore as it received reports of the ships' progress up the coastline. The Tao-kuang Emperor and his closest Manchu advisers began to feel that the English might even be thinking of capturing Peking itself. At all costs they had to be removed from striking distance of the capital. Therefore, on 30 August, when the British were about to force their way past the Taku forts guarding the mouth of the Peiho, an envoy named Ch'i-shan agreed to receive the English plenipotentiaries ashore and initiate talks.

The decision to negotiate was not so much a break with Lin Tse-hsü's policy of 'aweing' the barbarians into submission, as it was a disavowal of Lin himself. Palmerston's letter had so angrily attacked the commissioner that the court believed the English would be satisfied completely if he were dismissed. This was not a difficult decision to make because the emperor himself was furious at what he took to be Lin's blundering. Not that he disagreed with his official over the need for 'firmness'; but in spite of Lin's constantly optimistic predictions that the English would not or could not fight, the situation in the south had suddenly slipped out of the imperial commissioner's grasp. It was not 'war' which upset the monarch. It was the transference of 'rebellious' hostilities from a provincial jurisdiction to the very heart of the empire. Where now, the emperor wished to know, were all of Lin's promises of a quick and easy solution to the opium question?

You speak of having stopped foreign trade, yet a moment after admit that it is still going on. You say you have dealt with offenders against the laws, yet admit

⁴³ Ch'i, *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng*, 4.630.

that they are still at large. All this is merely an attempt to put me off with meaningless words. So far from doing any good, you have merely produced a number of fresh complications. The very thought of it infuriates me.⁴⁴

Lin tried to shift the blame for war to Elliot. The British superintendent, caught in criminal activity, had acknowledged his shame by turning the opium over voluntarily, then deceived his own government by saying it had been wrongfully seized. (The emperor later had this allegation investigated by Ch'i-shan, who disproved it.) War was the result, but now that it had finally come, he – Lin – would accept full responsibility. All he asked for was the commission to retake Chusan, drive the British out, oppose the barbarians at all costs. For, in his eyes, 'their appetites are insatiable; the more they get, the more they demand, and if we do not overcome them by force of arms there will be no end to our troubles'.⁴⁵ Perhaps the emperor might have privately agreed with this assessment,⁴⁶ but he could no longer believe that Lin Tse-hsü was the man for the job. In any case, the English were at Taku demanding the commissioner's dismissal. On 4 September, therefore, the emperor decreed:

In the preceding year, the Imperial Commissioner did not fully understand the Holy mind of the Great Emperor and consequently failed to manage affairs with propriety. He is now put under trial and surely he will be punished severely. Therefore there is no obstacle in the way of the redress of grievances.⁴⁷

Lin did not leave Canton until 3 May 1841, for adjudication. On 1 July he was condemned to exile in Ili, near the Russian border in central Asia. However, he was to be recalled to high office in 1845 and to serve his emperor for five more years before dying a natural death.

Any official in Lin's position would have failed – and suffered – equally. Each appointment to the post of imperial commissioner during these years was an embodiment of the emperor's resolve to have peace and order without compromise of his own terms. The history of the Opium War, therefore, was the repeated battering that this resolve received at English hands. Eventually, that will would break, but until then his deputies faced a contradictory demand: pacification without appeasement. This was Lin's dilemma and also his successor's tragedy.

Ch'i-shan, the man chosen to replace Lin Tse-hsü, was a marquis of the Borjigit clan who held the envied governor-generalship of Chihli and was one of the richest men in China. A scholar of great cultivation and an official of noted bargaining skill, he had been the one who passed Palmerston's note on to Peking. At that time, the emperor had to admit that the

⁴⁴ Waley, *Opium War*, 117.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 120. Also Kuo, *First Anglo-Chinese war*, 266–8.

⁴⁶ Lin Ching-yung, *Lin Tse-hsü chuan* (A biography of Lin Tse-hsü), 443.

⁴⁷ Kuo, *First Anglo-Chinese war*, 259–60.

English did have understandable grievances, but these were due to the kind of treatment they had received, not to the nature of their relations as such. After all, their fundamental demands were entirely out of the question. An island to be ceded? That was ridiculous. New ports? That was against 'established rules'. Pay the hong debts? The government had nothing to do with mercantile speculation. Indemnity for opium? It was contraband in the first place. Without precedents, the emperor could not negotiate with these unprecedented enemies. Instead, he stressed again and again that the major job at hand was to remove the danger, to get the barbarians back to Kwangtung. It was left to Ch'i-shan's oral dexterity to spirit the English back south.

Ch'i-shan himself was certainly aware of the dangers facing the empire and tried more than once to make the emperor understand that the nature of the barbarian problem had changed radically since the eighteenth century. Yet his appreciation was only quantitative. He saw China entering one of those long periods of frequent barbarian incursions, tragically familiar to students of his country's history, and felt that somehow the English had to be squeezed back into a slightly new, but familiarly shaped, barbarian control system. For the moment, since he could not loosely offer concessions which the emperor forbade, he at least had to devise some temporary way of getting them away from Tientsin. This, as he stated quite plainly to the Grand Council, was to be done by flattery and 'soothing', a variant of tributary methods which in fact became the first step towards the 'soft' barbarian-management (*chi-mi*, 'control through a loose rein') policy of the next decade. Since it stressed the use of adroit compliments to forge close personal ties with barbarian negotiators and thereupon arouse a feeling of personal obligation, it was also an expression of Chinese social customs which relied upon a special sense of personal camaraderie (*kan-ch'ing*) to mitigate hostile conflicts of principle between political or economic groups. This system was putatively applied to the English by Ch'i-shan and was fully developed by the later foreign policy expert, Ch'i-ying. In both cases, it succeeded only in postponing the ultimate reckoning of the conflict over ends, which was rendered all the more unpleasant when the English envoys realized, with jilted resentment, that the charming Chinese diplomats who had claimed to be their friends were simultaneously explaining to Peking how difficult it was to overcome one's natural abhorrence of these crude and physically noxious foreigners in the line of duty. But for the moment it worked. On 17 September 1840, Ch'i-shan was able to report that the English warships would return to Canton to complete the negotiations there. The emperor, delighted with the news, sent Ch'i-shan himself south by land to con-

summate the 'management'. His artifice had been so successful that it seemed, just by itself, all that was needed to deal with the English.

Guessing at imperial intentions, the Elliots were convinced by Ch'i-shan's affability that Lin's 'war clique' had been replaced by a 'peace party' of more reasonable men. They did not adequately realize that as soon as pressure was relieved in the north, the emperor's alarm would decline and the bellicose elements at court would grow bolder. Therefore, the Canton round of negotiations, which were initiated in December by Captain Elliot (who was now the sole plenipotentiary), posed acute problems for Ch'i-shan. Back in Peking, younger hotheaded censors and some of the older conservatives were insisting on extermination of the English. Worst of all, a few were hinting darkly that Ch'i-shan himself was an appeaser, hoodwinked and perhaps even corrupted by the foreigners. In Canton, however, the English with all their military superiority were pressing for concrete concessions of which the most dangerous to grant was the occupation of Hong Kong. Ch'i-shan, therefore, first tried to make Peking realize how desperately hopeless the military defences of Canton were. Then, he made a terrible miscalculation. He believed that he could ultimately keep from handing over Hong Kong, and even get the English to return Chusan, in exchange for an indemnity and the opening of a new port like Amoy to European trade. By stressing the importance of not turning Chinese territory over to foreigners, he hoped to convince his ruler of the unimportance of mere commercial and monetary gestures of appeasement. However, even before he had heard from Peking (there was a one-month's communication lapse between the two cities), the English made it quite plain that they would insist upon taking Hong Kong anyway. Feeling Ch'i-shan needed a reminder of his military impotence, Elliot even had his forces capture the Bogue batteries on 7 January 1841. Ch'i-shan now desperately realized that only the Bogue forts stood between the English and Canton. To stave off what he believed would be a massacre, he helplessly agreed to the Convention of Chuenpi on 20 January 1841. This agreement called for the cession of Hong Kong, a \$6 million indemnity, direct official intercourse on an equal basis, and the opening of the Canton trade on English terms. Elliot was triumphantly gratified. In his own eyes, the problem of Sino-English relations had been entirely solved without undue bloodshed. However, his sense of victory was premature. When the dispatches finally cleared, it was to turn out that neither government would accept the convention.

As of early January, the Tao-kuang Emperor had already come to feel that the English were 'outrageous and not amenable to reason'.⁴⁸ Even if

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 272.

one were gentlemanly with these louts, they continued to hold on to their piratical conquests and even dared attack Kwangtung's forts. Negotiations, therefore, were designed simply to exhaust them with words and give the government troops in the south time to re-arm for the final subjugation. On 6 January, he ordered four thousand reinforcements to Canton from neighbouring provinces; and by 30 January, had appointed his cousin, I-shan, to head an Army of Extermination to annihilate the enemy. This decision reached a flabbergasted Ch'i-shan two days after he had agreed to let the English occupy Hong Kong. He back-pedalled frantically. First he managed to persuade most of the officials at Canton to join him in signing a report to Peking that Canton had barely escaped being captured. The defending forts, protected with obsolete artillery, were built on islands open to attack from the rear. The vaunted 'water braves' which Lin Tse-hsü had recruited either got seasick or had to be bribed to fight; and the city itself was full of traitors. After all, according to the terms of the Convention of Chuenpi, Elliot had agreed to return Chusan and the Bogue batteries, and now they would have an even longer breathing space to prepare for the emperor's desired 'work of extirpation'. But then Ch'i-shan lost the support of one of his most important colleagues. As gossip began to circulate among the Cantonese of the imperial commissioner's having taken a huge bribe in exchange for Hong Kong, the governor of Kwangtung, I-liang, reported to the capital that Ch'i-shan had kept the cession of the island a secret from him. When that memorial reached the emperor on 26 February, he exploded with rage. 'In governing the country as the Emperor,' he wrote, 'I look upon every inch of our territory and every subject as belonging to the empire. Ch'i-shan usurped the power to cede Hong Kong.'⁴⁹ The convention was denied (though the English now held Hong Kong in fact), Ch'i-shan's vast properties were confiscated, and he was taken out of Canton on 13 March in chains.

When he received a copy of the convention back in London, Palmerston decided that Elliot had completely disregarded his instructions. By capturing Chusan, he had been in a condition to dictate his own terms, but instead had exchanged that important base for the dry and rocky island of Hong Kong. Queen Victoria, then aged twenty-two, wrote to her cousin, Leopold of Belgium: 'The Chinese business vexes us much, and Palmerston is deeply mortified at it. *All* we wanted might have been got, if it had not been for the unaccountably strange conduct of Charles Elliot . . . who completely disobeyed his instructions and *tried* to get the *lowest* terms he could.'⁵⁰

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 284.

⁵⁰ Cited in Morse, *International relations*, 1.272, from *Letters of Queen Victoria*, 1.261.

Hence, Elliot was to be replaced by a stolid, 52-year-old Irishman, Sir Henry Pottinger, who had served for years as a political agent in Sind. His instructions from Palmerston⁵¹ were most explicit. After recovering Chusan and being absolutely sure that those with whom he dealt had full powers to negotiate, he was to obtain the following concessions: opium compensation (\$6,189,616), hong debts (\$3,000,000), expeditionary costs (approximately \$2,500,000), the opening of at least four new ports, retention of Hong Kong and the cession of more islands where goods could be landed free of duty, British consular representation in each treaty port, the abolition of the Cohong, and – if at all possible – legalization of opium ‘for the interest of the Chinese government itself’.⁵²

THE RANSOM OF CANTON

Although Pottinger was appointed in May 1841, he did not reach Hong Kong until August. In the interim, Elliot faced the force assembled by imperial order at Canton. Ch’i-shan had been replaced by a triumvirate: the emperor’s cousin, I-shan; a Manchu noble named Lung-wen; and a 70-year-old, stone-deaf Chinese general named Yang Fang who was famous for having captured Jehangir in Kashgaria in 1828. Throughout February troops continued to pour into Canton. Redoubts were rebuilt, waterways dammed, local militia recruited, and the Cantonese gentry encouraged to prepare for a patriotic defence of their city. Nevertheless, Yang Fang, the first to arrive in Canton, realized almost immediately how hopeless the military situation was. The Chinese navy had virtually dissolved, the walls of the New City were crumbling, the newly-cast five-ton cannon from the Fatshan foundries had no mountings, and the troops were unreliable.

All of this activity convinced Elliot that the Convention of Chuenpi was not being honoured. Once again, he moved his fleet upriver; and, on 2 March, after blowing up several forts along the way, reached Canton. And once again the Chinese representative had to negotiate the city out from beneath British naval artillery. Yang Fang had no choice but to agree to reopen the trade, even though he dared only hint of the agreement in memorials to Peking. The arrival of the other bellicose members of the triumvirate on 14 April made this temporary truce untenable. Yang Fang had to go along when I-shan and Lung-wen began to prepare fire-

⁵¹ Though Palmerston was replaced by Lord Aberdeen when Peel’s ministry was voted into office on 8 September 1841, the demands continued in force. Aberdeen was much more cautious than Palmerston but he came in too late to change an established policy. Palmerston was back in Whitehall within the year.

⁵² These instructions are given in full as Appendix K in Morse, *International relations*, 1.655–99.

rafts and to arm more local militia. Thus, when Elliot again saw the truce threatened and demanded an end to these preparations, he received no answer. However, on 21 May 1841, before he could act, the extirpation campaign was finally launched by I-shan, who sent flaming rafts downriver toward the English fleet anchored at Whampoa. In the ensuing battle, seventy-one Chinese war junks were destroyed and sixty shore batteries seized. Then, protected by the *Nemesis*, troopships moved around the city to land forces which occupied the northern heights just outside Canton's old walls. The provincial capital below them was thereby entirely at the mercy of their field guns. At that point, after so many Chinese breaches of promise, the commanding English general, Sir Hugh Gough, felt they should go on immediately to occupy the city. Elliot, still believing in the sentimental support of the 'unoffending populace', wished to spare Canton the slaughter.⁵³ The plenipotentiary of course prevailed. On 27 May, a convention was signed in which the three Chinese commissioners and all extra-provincial troops agreed to leave the city, and a 'ransom' of \$6 million was promised within the week to save Canton from destruction. When this was carried out, the British returned to their ships and awaited the arrival of Pottinger.

The May attack on Canton was not of immediate military significance for the English, but it was to carry great consequences for the Chinese. First, in the wake of the assault, with its looting and disorder, the normally rowdy local robbers and pirates of the delta became much bolder than before.⁵⁴ Large portions of the Liang-Kuang – especially the hilly border area between the two provinces – were soon almost lost to bandit gangs. The years from 1841 to 1850 thus saw a crescendo of social disorder that actually precipitated the Taiping Rebellion.⁵⁵ Second, a tradition of anti-foreign resistance was created which profoundly affected China's later relations with the West. While the English and Indian troops north of Canton were waiting for the Chinese authorities to fulfil the conditions of the ransom agreement, they despoiled some of the local temples and raped several women in and around the rural marketing centre of San-yüan-li. Such specific incitements, together with pervasive popular anxieties about the war, helped to transform relatively benign stereotypes about foreigners into xenophobic racism. The most immediate consequence of this was the summoning of about twenty thousand inflamed peasants by the local gentry during the last two days of May to try to massacre the foreign soldiers with hoes, mattocks, crude spears and knives. Before a serious

⁵³ Elliot to the Earl of Aberdeen, 18 November 1841, FO 17/46 and Elliot to Gough, incl. 3, in disp. 21, 24 May 1841, FO 17/46, Public Record Office, London.

⁵⁴ *IWSM-TK*, 29.23.

⁵⁵ Wakeman, *Strangers at the gate: social disorder in south China, 1839–1861*, 117–31.

uprising occurred, the prefect of Canton ordered the gentry leaders to observe the truce and disperse their irregulars. The militiamen sullenly withdrew, convinced that they could have beaten the enemy had the official not intervened. Subsequent popular tales and official reports embellished this belief even further, to such an extent that many Chinese felt their country would actually have won the war if the San-yüan-li militia had been allowed to fight. At the time, of course, the prefect had dispersed them because Elliot was threatening to bombard the city of Canton; but instead of being hailed as a saviour, he was called a cowardly official who had 'sold out his country'. In short, helpless officials were becoming popular scapegoats for the barbarians' victory.

The same sequence of events was to be repeated when the anti-foreign movement spread to the north during the late 1860s; too often the well-meaning local official was fully aware what price could be exacted by the European gunboat anchored in the river outside his yamen window, while gentry proclamations at his street-side gate blazoned his 'treacherous' protection of foreign missionaries from the vengeance of a 'righteous' popular mob. Then, as incidents grew to such a point that local officials could no longer be individually blamed, the dynasty was dragged into the accusation. The latent anti-Manchuism of some segments of the population made it even easier to believe that a 'foreign' ruling house was appeasing the barbarians to save its own skin at the expense of the Chinese people. In this sense, the San-yüan-li incident was the first in a long series of popular disturbances which would culminate in the anti-Manchu nationalism of the Republican revolutionary movement.

THE FINAL PHASE OF THE WAR

Pottinger reached Hong Kong on 10 August 1841 to direct an expeditionary force coming via the Indian Ocean and Singapore that, by the end of the war, would include twenty-five ships of the line, fourteen steamers, nine support vessels and troopships carrying ten thousand infantry. He soon led the first two thousand men and part of the fleet north to the important Fukien port of Amoy. The commander of that region, Yen Po-shou, should have been eager to see them, because he had already persuaded the emperor to spend two million taels on defences there. Fifty large junks, three 'impregnable' forts and nine thousand infantry were supposed to shatter the English forces as soon as they approached. When the expeditionary fleet anchored off Amoy's approaches on 26 August, Admiral Parker did find the granite ramparts impenetrable to his shells, but the Chinese gunners could not keep a concerted fire going long enough

to prevent landing parties from taking the artillery emplacements. The city itself lay behind a narrow, easily defended pass which Yen had not thought to fortify. Instead, the British slipped through and quickly occupied the hills surrounding the city. The next day, they marched into it. Total English casualties: two dead, fifteen wounded.

Leaving a garrison behind, the fleet moved on to Palmerston's priority target, Chusan. General Gough was much more cautious here because the island had been heavily refortified when the Chinese took it back after the Convention of Chuenpi. Still, he was able to capture the city by 1 October, just three days after his first reconnoitre. Though Gough was wounded in the attack, only two English soldiers were killed. Now it was only necessary to take the nearby port of Ningpo in order to control completely that portion of the Chekiang coast. After capturing the fort at Chen-hai which guarded the river mouth, the British force moved up to Ningpo on 13 October. Yü-ch'ien, the imperial commissioner for military operations in that province, soon received the news that the city's cannon had overheated and his troops had fled without resistance. About the time he was trying to commit suicide, the bandsmen of the Royal Irish Guards were playing 'God save the Queen' on Ningpo's broad walls. That pleasant port city then became the headquarters for the expeditionary force during the winter as the English rested and refitted. By now, Pottinger's plans – inspired by Jardine's intelligence – called for moving his ships up the Yangtze to cut China in two and blockade grain shipments for the capital where the Grand Canal crossed the Yangtze. Since most of his available forces were tied down to garrison duty in the four captured cities, he decided to wait until late spring or early summer for available reinforcements to arrive from India. This gave the Chinese time to mount a spring counter-offensive.

The emperor had decided that the fall of Ningpo was perhaps not such a stroke of misfortune after all. The barbarians were now committed to land warfare, which was China's forte, and a massively organized imperial military campaign in Chekiang could probably wipe them all out. Since so many of his officials had lied to him about their defeats (Yen Po-shou, for example, claimed to have recaptured Amoy), he felt it absolutely necessary to have someone in command whom he could trust. He therefore selected as commander-in-chief his cousin, I-ching, who was an excellent calligrapher and essayist, but whose military experience was largely confined to the directorship of the Imperial Gardens and Hunting Parks, and to the command of the Peking gendarmerie. I-ching's specialty was planning and preparations, which he attacked enthusiastically. As soon as he reached Soochow, he began to organize the twelve thousand regular troops and thirty-three thousand militia under his command into an

encampment. Since he depended on local notables for provincial intelligence, he posted a wooden box outside his headquarters to encourage the gentry to drop their calling cards and offer their services. A large staff of fervid but inexperienced young scholars, whose studies of the classics were interrupted by this moment of crisis, was thus assembled, each officer jealously claiming the right to a personal bodyguard and other perquisites of rank. The chain of command, therefore, was entirely unclear, particularly since regular units, assembled from several provinces, refused to take orders from each other's commanders. But this fragmentation was ignored behind the bright pennants, embroidered robes and glistening weapons of the army. Spirits rose among the scholars as they made the camp round of tea parties, banquets, and poetry contests. There was no question of victory. In fact, a month before the troops actually went into combat, a painter of repute depicted the triumphant battle scene in that beautiful glowing academic style of the Northern Sung. I-ching himself even held a scribal contest which kept him busy for days trying to decide which announcement of the coming victory was the best written. The one he finally chose included descriptions of fictitious engagements and citations for each unit commander. True, the emperor's cousin did feel some concern about the best day for battle, but that problem was solved most propitiously for him one day in Hang-chou, when he consulted the oracles in a local temple and drew a divining slip which spoke of tiger omens. Obviously, therefore, the time to strike was between 3 and 5 a.m. on 10 March 1842: a tiger-hour on a tiger-day in a tiger-month during a tiger-year – and also, incidentally, the height of the spring rainy season. Thus, by the eve of battle, most of the troops who had slogged painfully into position over mud-filled ruts were out of reach of mired supply convoys and had not eaten for days. Exhausted, soaked and starving, they readied themselves for the offensive.

The attack was to be three-pronged. The original battle plans, which included some new reinforcements, called for thirty-six thousand men to rush the western and southern gates of Ningpo, fifteen thousand to seize Chen-hai, and ten thousand marines to cross by war junks and fishing boats to retake Chusan. In fact, while 60 per cent of the entire army was detached as bodyguards for the general staff, I-ching kept his own personal reserve of three thousand men around his headquarters at Shao-hsing, the famous wine-making town. The remaining reserves were held by I-ching's chief of staff at a bridge halfway between Ningpo and Chen-hai. Thus, only about four thousand men actually attacked each city, and even then no one wanted to be in the vanguard. By default, the frontal assault on Ningpo was left to seven hundred aborigines from Szechwan.

They were instructed to retain the element of surprise by holding their fire until the very last moment, but because their leaders barely spoke Mandarin, they understood that they were not supposed to carry guns at all. And so it was that these Golden River aborigines strolled into the land-mines of the British engineers and the howitzers of the Royal Irish armed only with long knives. As the English opened fire, other inexperienced Chinese troops were pushed on to the aborigines' rear so that thousands piled up at the West Gate where blood began to run through the streets. The English were sickened by the slaughter as they mowed down line after line of the panicked Ch'ing infantry in the most dreadful massacre they had seen since the siege of Badajoz.

In the meantime, the Chinese troops at Chen-hai were doing much better. They might even have taken the city if I-ching had thrown in his reserves. But, in a twist of irony that hardly needs pointing out, his chief-of-staff commanding those reserves lay in a litter at Camel Bridge feverishly puffing opium, and by the time his forces were needed, had fallen into a comatose stupor. His officers and men fled at the first sound of cannon-fire. That only left the Chusan marines, many of whom had never been aboard a vessel at sea in their life. As soon as they left port, most became seasick and the commander, terrified to face the English, sailed up and down the coast for the next twenty days, periodically sending in false battle reports. Thus ended the last Chinese offensive of the war, and with it any real hope for an honourable peace. Thereafter, in spite of some gallant fighting, the Ch'ing would be entirely on the defensive against Pottinger's long-planned Yangtze campaign.

The Yangtze campaign, which lasted from 7 May to 20 August 1842, moved in simple stages through one of the most densely populated regions in all of China, teeming with millions of people whose fertile lands supported the richest scholastic elite of the empire. On 18 May Chapu and its Manchu bannerman garrison were taken. Shanghai, undefended, was found abandoned on 19 June. On 20 July the key Yangtze defence point and Manchu garrison town of Chen-chiang (Chinkiang) was also captured. With that, the Grand Canal was blocked, the empire cut in two, and Nanking – once southern capital of the Ming and a symbol of the realm – lay open.

Panic and chaos had spread around the foreigners' advance. General Gough tried very hard to keep his men from indiscriminate looting and raping. Chinese sources report that some Indian looters were shot by their officers. The British did have a foraging system which rewarded the donator of food with a placard which was put on his gate and was supposed

to guarantee immunity from looting. But this was usually ineffective.⁵⁶ The troops repeatedly got out of hand, stripping city residences, conscripting labour crews, drunkenly violating local women. Even worse were the Chinese camp followers, hoodlums of the delta, who moved into conquered cities on the heels of the English, plundering houses bare and often setting them afire when their work was done. Knowing what to expect, many urban dwellers therefore fled in advance to the countryside, leaving the garrisons behind them without any means of getting provisions from the cities' now-deserted marketplaces. Soldiers without food, demoralized by tales of the foreign devils' magic, then began to speculate about 'traitors' in their midst.

For, in traditional Chinese military history, one of the standard ways to reduce a defended city was to bribe or convince 'inner allies' (*nei-ying*) to open the city gates from within. Since many officers had already accounted to the emperor for defeats like the fall of Ningpo by blaming it all on traitors, Manchu generals were disposed to believe that the English relied heavily on fifth-columnists. This association between foreigners and traitors went back to the earliest days of Sino-Western trade, and traditional military lore only reinforced the belief that Europeans had particularly effective ways, including opium addiction, of recruiting Chinese allies. There was certainly evidence enough of this to satisfy Manchu officials who regarded Han Chinese as potentially rebellious in any case. It was common for the riff-raff, the underground elements of Ch'ing society, to attach themselves to any alternative embodiment of political or military authority. Moreover, through maritime commerce and the opium traffic, the criminals, petty merchants and secret society members of the port cities had become closely linked with Westerners. This was to become quite apparent in the Red Turban uprising around Canton during the mid-1850s.⁵⁷ Thus, when Pottinger made the Pomeranian missionary, Karl August Gutzlaff, magistrate of occupied Chusan, every unscrupulous individual in the city seized the opportunity to exploit this new protector who was unattached to any of the usual power groups (gentry clubs, yamen clerks and runners, established gangs) of the district.⁵⁸ For example, Gutzlaff's chief of police was a notorious procurer who used his new position to extort protection payments from the wealthy.

News of this sort was inflated into ubiquitous rumours. Throughout

⁵⁶ See Ch'i, *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng*, 3.129 ff. Part of this account is also translated in Waley, *Opium War*, 186–96.

⁵⁷ Frederic Wakeman, Jr, 'The secret societies of Kwangtung, 1800–1856', in Jean Chesneaux, ed. *Popular movements and secret societies in China 1840–1950*, 29–47.

⁵⁸ Ch'i, *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng*, 3.427. This was by no means restricted to the nineteenth century. The Red and Green gangs of Shanghai in the 1920s had a similar relationship with the French chief of police in that concession.

the Yangtze valley, traitors were seen on all sides: junkmen, salt smugglers, bandits, market toughs. This had a disastrous effect on Ch'ing defences as military commanders began investing half their effort in searching out potential defectors. Worst of all was the Tartar-general at Chinkiang who was certain that the city's Han traitors would fall upon the Manchus from the rear the minute the British attacked from the front. After he ordered suspicious-looking individuals to be arrested on sight, the inhabitants of the city began running in fear whenever they saw Manchu soldiers approaching. Some soldiers evidently responded by murdering any who fled and turning in their bodies for rewards. Similar reigns of terror occurred elsewhere. At Shanghai, for example, the sound of English gunfire was mistaken by some of the populace for a massacre of the city's residents ordered by the Chinese authorities.

For all their panic, however, the Manchus resisted with ferocity in actual battle. At Chapu the English were astonished by the vigour of the 1,700 Manchu defenders, and shocked by their Rajput-like reaction to defeat. There and at Chinkiang (where there were 1,600 banner-men), the Manchu soldiers killed their own children, cut their wives' throats to save them from rape, and hung themselves from the barracks' rafters rather than surrender. General Gough wrote among that stench of death, 'I am sick at heart of war.'⁵⁹

DEFEAT: THE TREATY OF NANKING

The failure of the spring counter-offensive had caused a major policy debate at the Ch'ing court. As a result, officials who had opposed Lin Tse-hsü's policies were either recalled from disgrace or appointed to higher positions directly concerned with foreign affairs. The aged imperial clansman I-li-pu, who had been degraded along with Ch'i-shan, was now sent to Chekiang. The influential Mu-chang-a, practically a premier at this point, was sent to Tientsin. On the other side of the fence, Wang Ting, who had been Lin's major supporter at court, died in June and was said by some to have taken his own life. Still, the emperor could not bring himself to make a complete about-face. All that had been drummed into him by his boyhood tutors, all that he understood of the policy of his ancestors, all of the advice that was poured into his ears by the more 'righteous' elements at court, came down to one simple principle: a 'good' emperor does not yield to force. Appeasement is an abnegation of one's moral responsibility to the empire and to one's line. The history of dynasty after dynasty showed that conciliation of a rebel always led ultimately

⁵⁹ Holt, *Opium Wars*, 147.

either to conquest or to a popular loss of trust in the right of the ruling family to hold the throne. So had the Ming fallen, and so – feared the Tao-kuang Emperor – would his house fall if he failed his charge. This axiom of imperial policy was not changed by the Opium War, but it was adulterated; for there came a moment when it seemed possible, in the name of expediency, to set aside scruples and come to temporary terms with the West. What was stressed, therefore, was the immediate yes-or-no choice of submission. Since so much emotional energy was devoted to arguing this back and forth, the terms of the peace were hardly noticed.

Even then, defeat was difficult to concede. It was always possible, for example, to find hope in a shift of circumstances or even resolution in despair. After Chapu the militant young censor, Su T'ing-k'uei, reported that the British had just been defeated by the Nepalese in India.⁶⁰ For a while, therefore, the emperor thought of taking advantage of this to reconquer Hong Kong. Then, as the Yangtze campaign progressed, he grew to feel that even a fight to the death was better than knuckling under to such naked force. Hence, even as he brought clansmen like Mu-chang-a and I-li-pu into more prominent positions, the emperor was still dreaming of military victory on his own terms.

This ambivalence was represented by the duality of his appointments that dismal spring. On the one hand, I-ching was retained as commander in Chekiang to continue the war along the coast, while Ch'i-ying was appointed on 7 April as imperial commissioner to negotiate for peace in that same area. Ch'i-ying was an imperial clansman, close to the emperor, who had held many high posts at Peking, which incidentally added to an already large family fortune. A man of the world with exquisite manners, he could be expected to succeed at this kind of delicate diplomatic assignment. However, he faced two obstacles. First, there was still a strong current of opinion at court which demanded total victory. He must avoid Ch'i-shan's tragic example by not getting too far ahead of Peking opinion. Second, he had somehow to get in touch with Pottinger, who was moving rapidly up the Yangtze. As soon as he heard that Shanghai had fallen, Ch'i-ying rushed in that direction; but the expeditionary force had already swept on. Finally, on 28 June one of his agents managed to speak with Morrison, the British interpreter, who explained to him once again that Pottinger would not meet with Ch'i-ying and I-li-pu because he did not believe that they were genuine plenipotentiaries. Nothing less than explicit imperial evidence of their full powers to negotiate a peace would satisfy him.

⁶⁰ For Su T'ing-k'uei's biography, see Chang Ch'i-yün, ed. *Ch'ing Shih* (History of the Ch'ing dynasty), 4589–90. Su's memorial probably referred to the massacre of sixteen thousand soldiers under English command during the withdrawal from Afghanistan in January 1842.

Ch'i-ying's report of this barbarian impertinence infuriated his ruler. For several days it actually seemed as though the emperor had decided to continue the war in spite of the hopeless situation along the Yangtze. Perhaps what finally made expediency appear more palatable were Ch'i-ying's assurances that, even as Nanking was about to fall to them, these conquerors had no appetite for political control. Did it, after all, make sense to risk the loss of the empire for mere trading rights? Appeasement was morally distasteful, but – as Ch'i-ying was to put it later: 'In settling the barbarian affairs this time, we are governed at every hand by the inevitable and we concede that the policy is the least commendable. What we have been doing is to choose between danger and safety, not between right and wrong.'⁶¹

This argument worked. By 15 July the Tao-kuang Emperor's mind was changing; by 26 July, when news of the debacle at Chinkiang was confirmed at Peking, he granted Ch'i-ying full powers to negotiate a treaty. Armed with this guarantee, Ch'i-ying rushed to avert the attack which the British were even then about to mount on Nanking. Waiting outside that city, they had heard that imperial reinforcements were being gathered to fight them, and had lost faith in the envoys' pleas to wait. At dawn on 11 August, as the assault was about to begin, a group of breathless emissaries reached the expeditionary camps along the river bank. Ch'i-ying, they announced, would soon arrive and negotiate. Let the English hold their fire. China would meet their terms.

In the negotiations at Nanking in the late summer of 1842, the Ch'ing negotiators – Ch'i-ying, I-li-pu and the local governor-general, Niu Chien – were essentially mediators between the British invaders and the court at Peking. Their task was to produce harmony by assuaging the fears and reassuring the pride of both sides. Ch'i-ying had first of all to maintain harmony with his two colleagues, who had separate staffs and their own personal concerns. His major problem was to find emissaries who could talk with the British interpreters, J. R. Morrison, the son of the first Protestant missionary, and Charles Gutzlaff. He sent forward his emissaries in three waves: the first were mere messengers, Chinese military who had carried messages before and were known to the British. To begin negotiations, a second type was now sent forward in the person of a retainer of I-li-pu named Chang Hsi. This man was a personal representative, already known to the British from earlier negotiations in 1840–1, and essentially a talker who could try to draw the British out and fathom their intentions. This he did by exchanging civilities with Morrison and then matching threat with threat. According to Chang Hsi's diary, Morrison

⁶¹ Kuo, *First Anglo-Chinese war*, 298.

threatened that the British would go on all the way up the Yangtze if necessary, while Chang Hsi countered that the emperor, if necessary, would arm the populace and rouse the countryside against them – ‘every bush will be a soldier’.⁶² Neither of these moves, of course, was seriously intended.

The British demand for negotiators who could make serious commitments was finally met by sending to them officials of apparent rank who could work out details, to the point where the principals on either side could finally meet and agree. To facilitate this, the Ch’ing negotiators found it convenient to wear insignia of rank higher than they were actually entitled to. The British knew enough to check the insignia but had no way to check their legitimacy. In similar fashion the Ch’ing envoys at Nanking had to manipulate and mislead their superiors in Peking. Indeed they were stretched thin across the cultural gap between the opposing parties.

Thus they reported to the emperor in the first instance only the British demands to which the emperor had already given some measure of assent or consideration – an indemnity, diplomatic relations on terms of equality, and trade at the five ports and Hong Kong. Later they reported the British demand for abolition of the Cohong and the setting up of a treaty tariff and consuls at the ports. When they signed the Treaty of Nanking on board Pottinger’s vessel, HMS *Cornwallis*, on 29 August 1842, they still did not have imperial acquiescence to the opening of Foochow and the permanent residence of foreigners at the new trading ports. In the outcome, as we shall see, Foochow was to have no foreign trade for a decade, and at Canton even entrance into the city, to say nothing of residence, was not secured until 1858. Again, the treaty signed by the British was written out in Chinese with an equal raising of characters to give equality to England and China. But these egalitarian forms were not carried over into the treaty text sent to Peking. The emperor, in fact, had ordered his minions at Nanking not to see the British at all until their entire fleet had departed, but his negotiators’ main concern was to get the treaty signed so that the fleet would indeed depart. In this they eventually succeeded, but only after another month of negotiations at Nanking about the future shape of the treaty system. So much had to be done in the way of practical arrangements to carry out the new charter for foreign trade and contact that the two teams of negotiators agreed to work out the details of the tariff and regulations of trade and have them confirmed in a supplementary treaty at a later date.

Thus the Treaty of Nanking was only a preliminary document that

⁶² Ssu-yü Teng, *Chang Hsi and the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, 39 et passim*. This detailed diary is one of the few inside accounts yet available of the Chinese side of Sino-foreign negotiations.

enunciated principles on which the new system was to be erected. Its main provisions were: (1) an indemnity of \$21,000,000 to be paid in instalments; (2) the opening for trade of the five ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai; (3) equal intercourse between officials of corresponding rank; (4) British consuls at each port; (5) abolition of the Cohong monopoly; (6) a uniformly moderate tariff to be imposed on both imports and exports; and (7) cession of the island of Hong Kong to be British territory. China's door had finally been opened but the negotiators had still to arrange the terms on which the British could move in.

CHAPTER 5

THE CREATION OF THE TREATY SYSTEM

PERSPECTIVES ON THE TREATY SYSTEM

The unequal treaty system was set up in China at a time when the Chinese common people did not participate in a national political life. In the middle decades of the nineteenth century they were still schooled in the traditional ways of Confucian culturalism: government was an affair of the emperor and his officials, supported by the local élite. A modern type of nationalism received little expression under this old order. Instead, the Ch'ing regime was primarily concerned to retain the loyalty of the Chinese landlord-scholar ruling class and with its help to suppress any disorder or anti-dynastic rebellion that might arise among the rural populace. In this context the pacification of British rebels on the seacoast was at first a marginal, relatively minor problem. The Ch'ing aim in the late 1830s had been simply to stop an evil, the Anglo-Indo-Chinese opium trade.

This trade, constantly supplied by the British government opium manufacture in India, was to have a life of more than a century, until given up in 1917. The most long-continued and systematic international crime of modern times, it provided the life-blood of the early British invasion of China. For the first war the leading opium traders not only helped Palmerston work out the aims and the strategy, they also supplied some of the wherewithal: opium vessels leased to the fleet, captains lent as pilots and other staff as translators, hospitality always available as well as advice and the latest intelligence, and silver from opium sales exchanged for bills on London to meet the army and navy expenditures. Since opium found Chinese distributors as rapidly as it seduced addicts, the British, Indian, American and other drug merchants had only to bring it to China, and the Chinese would do the rest without involving the British government.

That government's aim in the treaty settlement was a more general one, to get rid of the institutional structures of the tribute system. The Treaty of Nanking, 1842 abolished the restriction of Sino-foreign trade to Canton and to the licensed Cohong monopoly there, and inaugurated state-to-

state diplomatic relations. Indian opium and foreign aggression had begun to break down the barriers of China's exclusiveness. China having lost the war, the opium evil continued to grow, while the British, having won, tried to create new institutions for Sino-foreign contact. This they did during the next two decades, sometimes in concert and sometimes in conflict with the Ch'ing court and Chinese local officials, as well as with Frenchmen, Americans and Russians. The growth of these new institutions from 1842-4 to 1858-60 centred in the five early treaty ports.

The two decades of the 1840s and 1850s constituted the first phase of a new order in China's foreign relations. From the Western point of view, it was a creative and beginning phase in which an institutional structure was gradually worked out. Later phases saw the treaty system grow into a more and more important element in the Chinese state and society. From the modern Chinese point of view, the treaties were vehicles of imperialist invasion. In the succeeding generation from the 1860s to the 1890s the treaty ports became urban centres of a Sino-foreign condominium and hybrid culture, all of which had an increasing effect on China as a whole. In the third generation from the 1890s to the 1920s the foreign influences transmitted primarily through the treaty ports became an invading flood that contributed heavily to the disruption and transformation of China's traditional state and society. This period saw the emergence within the ports of a bourgeoisie and sprouts of liberalism. Foreign activity within China reached a high point. Finally, the fourth generation from the 1920s into the 1950s saw the treaty system first largely supplanted by Japanese aggression and then superseded by the Communist-led revolutionary order of a new day. Continuing over so crowded a century, the system had gone through several phases.

The treaty system interlude in modern China thus occurred during a century of 'dynastic interregnum' when the central power of Ch'ing dynastic rule declined, political disorder ensued, and a new central power was by degrees re-established under a radically different system of party dictatorship. This was eventually combined with the political activation of the rural and urban masses and the widespread application of modern technology for economic growth. In this broad perspective the treaty century saw the onset and then the height of imperialist penetration of China as well as the phases of the Chinese people's increasingly-revolutionary response to it. Under the treaties, China's sovereignty was increasingly impaired; with the rise of nationalism and revolution, it was by degrees reasserted. In this process of challenge and response, the treaty ports became the main foci, although at the start they were merely peripheral centres of coastal trade and foreign contact. The formative decades of the

treaty system in the 1840s and 1850s must therefore be seen as the opening phase in an intricate and portentous growth of foreign influence on Chinese life, even though this era of foreign influence, special privilege, domination and eventual exploitation, was itself only an interlude in the continuing history of the Chinese people.

One principal task incumbent upon present-day students of mid-nineteenth-century Chinese–Western relations is to keep realistically in view the mid-nineteenth-century ‘West’ with which China had to deal. The West of that day was still primarily agricultural and from today’s point of view ‘undeveloped’ in respect of industry, transport, communications, literacy, medicine, public health and the degree of democratic participation in political life. Britain, for example, had a population of 22 millions at mid-century. But its government and public life were still dominated by some 500 aristocratic families, who owned about half the total acreage, while some 1,300 gentry and landed commoners owned much of the rest. Despite the Reform Bill of 1832, Britain at mid-century was still a country run by this wealthy nobility who had skilfully coopted the new leaders of business, while rapid population growth steadily added to the impoverished mass of landless and voteless labourers on the farms and in the new city slums.

The domestic rebellion and disorder in mid-century China seemed to be the exact opposite of the contemporary British progress in producing coal, iron, textiles, and railways. Yet in human terms of welfare and security, the Chinese populace before the rebellions and the British masses entering city and factory life, may not have been so far apart as has been generally assumed. The real contrast between the 400 millions of China and the 22 millions of Britain lay first, in the motivation of their ruling classes, and second, in the power available to them.

Both the motivation and the power of the British invaders of China derived from British India. The leading agency houses in China had developed as offshoots of the older-established East India agency houses that proliferated in London, Bombay and Calcutta after the India trade was opened to them in 1813. Leaders of the British community in Hong Kong – Jardine, Matheson, Dent and others – came from this background and did their business with friends and relatives – often Scotsmen – who were their correspondents in the other centres of British trade. This entrepreneurial community not only went into banking, insurance and shipping but also developed its own free press and espoused the ideals of free trade¹ a generation before its triumph in Britain with the repeal of the corn laws in 1846 and the navigation laws in 1849. The private traders’

¹ Michael Greenberg, *British trade and the opening of China, 1800–1842*, ch. 6.

ideals were acquisitive, aggressive and sanctioned by religious faith. (As an opium-ship captain noted in his journal: 'Dec. 2. Employed delivering briskly. No time to read my Bible.')

²

British military power in China was, from the first, Anglo-Indian.³ The war against the Afghans in 1839–42 overshadowed the war in China. Warfare against the Sikhs in 1845–8 continued to expand British rule in India. Before coming to China in 1841 Sir Henry Pottinger had received a baronetcy for his work in Sind, which was annexed in 1843. In short, by the time the British used force in China their style and values had been shaped by successful experience in India. They came as a ruling elite, superior, self-confident, often arrogant, thoroughly convinced that the secret of power was prestige – the reputation of having power in reserve, and being ready to use it when necessary. They were also accustomed to developing their trade by dealing with local aristocrats and finding collaborators among them.

During the mid-century decades, British China policy was chiefly guided by Lord Palmerston, who was either foreign secretary or prime minister during two-thirds of the thirty-six years from 1830 to 1865.⁴ His talented energy was devoted not only to Britain's national interest but also to the middle-class cause of liberal constitutionalism. In protecting the Ottoman Empire against Russian expansion he made use of the concert of Europe. While China was peripheral to his main concerns, Palmerston's policy there had similar tendencies – to demand constitutional rights for British citizens, by force if necessary, and to act in concert with the other powers, always 'convinced that right and justice were on his side'.⁵

In this context of British self-confidence, the new treaty system in China was intended partly to foster the established interests, and partly to express the ideals, of Britain's worldwide commercial expansion. Specifically, the British aim was to give stability and opportunity to the triangular trade between British India, China and the British Isles. This meant safeguarding the China market for Indian opium exports and the Chinese supply of teas and silks for London. But the instinct of the British treaty makers was to find security for *trade* (which they believed would help the spread of modern civilization to all peoples) in the rule of *law* (which they felt was

² John K. Fairbank, *Trade and diplomacy on the China coast*, 69, quoting Jardine Matheson and Co. archives.

³ Peter Ward Fay, *The Opium War 1840–1842*, pt 3; Jack Beeching, *The Chinese Opium Wars*, 132.

⁴ Palmerston was foreign secretary November 1830 – December 1834, April 1835 – September 1841 and July 1846 – December 1851. He was prime minister February 1855 – February 1858 and June 1859 – October 1865.

⁵ Sir Charles Webster, *The foreign policy of Palmerston 1830–1841*, 792. Britain's China policy has not yet been studied in its global context.

of universal validity and applicability). The first treaties thus emerged as a charter of rights primarily for merchants.

Some of these rights were those normally accorded to foreign treaty-power nationals within the European state system, such as the reciprocal right to 'enjoy full security and protection for their persons and property within the Dominions of the other' state (Treaty of Nanking, article 1); or the right of British subjects in China 'to reside . . . with their families and establishments' at the five ports and to trade there 'without molestation or restraint' (article 2). These individual rights of residence and trade, normally expected to be granted between sovereign states in the nineteenth century, had also been granted in general practice to foreign nationals in China for many centuries past, but they had not been so fully codified in treaties. In 1689 the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk had provided for reciprocal rights of travel and trade (article 5), but the final commercial settlement in the Treaty of Kiakhta in 1727 (article 4) had provided for a strictly-controlled and regulated trade by caravan to Peking or at two frontier emporia, in a manner comparable to the Canton system before 1842.⁶

Most of the new British treaty rights projected on to the coast of China the ideals of free trade: that British merchants should have access to a free market and trade 'with whatever persons they please', as opposed to trading with an official trade monopoly (Treaty of Nanking, article 5), and that they should be taxed according to a 'regular Tariff of Export and Import Customs and other Dues . . . publicly notified and promulgated for general information' (article 10).⁷ In order to realize these ideals in practice in the coastal ports of China, the British asserted a number of ancillary rights which taken together constituted a system of consular jurisdiction over British nationals (extraterritoriality), backed by the presence of naval vessels. In this way a new foreign society-cum-power-structure gradually found lodgment and grew up on the China coast.

One secret of the British success in China was the tacit community of interest between the British and Ch'ing administrators. Each side represented a conquering power that had learned to rule its conquests by qualities of moral commitment and administrative skill. The superior moral prestige of the ruler of course lay at the heart of imperial Confucianism, the ideology of the Ch'ing state. The treaty settlement was thus a *modus vivendi* worked out between representatives of two aristocratic, British and Manchu, empires. In this respect Pottinger and Ch'i-ying understood each other.

⁶ Joseph Sebes, S.J., *The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689)*, 154, 285, citing W. Fuchs; Mark Mancall, *Russia and China, their diplomatic relations to 1728*, 252.

⁷ On these points the Chinese and English texts of the Nanking Treaty substantially agree; see China, Imperial Maritime Customs, *Treaties, conventions etc. between China and foreign states*.

Behind Ch'i-ying's appeasement programme of negotiation at Canton stood the senior grand councillor and top Manchu official at Peking, Mu-chang-a (1782–1856), who had emerged in the 1830s as the Tao-kuang Emperor's chief minister (see page 146). They were the same age and very intimate. Mu-chang-a had held nearly every post of power and profit in Peking. He had opposed Lin Tse-hsü's root-and-branch anti-opium policy, and stood behind the conciliatory efforts of his fellow-bannermen Ch'i-shan and Ch'i-ying. Like them, he knew little of the provinces, the real China, but kept his eyes sedulously on the Ch'ing dynastic interest. To deal with non-Chinese on China's borders had been a Manchu speciality throughout the building of the Ch'ing empire; it continued to be so in the 1840s. Like tribal chieftains on China's land frontiers, the British were taken into the power structure of China's maritime frontier. The future growth of British power could not be foreseen.

THE TREATY SETTLEMENT OF 1842–4

In the post-Nanking negotiations which worked out the details of the British treaty system in 1842–3, the two sides had very different aims within the framework of their preliminary agreement at Nanking. After their initial fears that Britain had territorial designs, the Ch'ing negotiators had become convinced that the British sought only trade, not territory, just as they claimed. China's aim was therefore to appease the British with trade concessions but to set precise treaty-based limits to their activities and so keep them under control through material inducements. This was an application of the well-established *chi-mi* or 'loose rein' policy so often employed against the barbarians of Inner Asia. It combined two things: (1) concessions of commerce and personal intercourse, to buy off the foreign warriors with trade privileges and friendship, and (2) the setting of limits, by invoking the rules of civilized hierarchic behaviour and China's general cultural superiority. The treaties, once made, could also be invoked to set limits.

Were these conventional tactics, designed to neutralize warlike outsiders, accompanied by any rethinking of Ch'ing policy towards the West? The Court record offers little new. But outside the appeasement-minded Ch'ing establishment, vigorous minds responded. Most notable was Wei Yüan, a reformer devoted to making the old administrative system work. Wei had already had experience seeking to reform the key sectors of grain transport and the salt gabelle (see page 148). He now turned his attention to the problem of the outer world.

Using translated materials given to him by his friend Lin Tse-hsü in mid-1841, Wei Yüan organized new and old data to make an *Illustrated*

treatise on the maritime kingdoms (*Hai-kuo t'u-chih*). He pictured the eastward extension of European trade and fortified ports, and its upsetting impact on China's south-east Asian tributaries. This led to disorder on the China coast. It should be countered by inducing the Europeans to check one another and the Asian states to resist them. China should use Western weapons and training in self-defence and also build up her own maritime power. Completed shortly after the war, along with his companion history of Ch'ing military exploits (*Sheng-wu chi*), Wei's work, though often misinformed, was a many-faceted pioneer effort to get a new focus on the problems posed by international trade and Western gunboats.⁸ Though Wei Yüan expanded his *Treatise* in a last edition of 1852, his wide-ranging look at the world outside China was soon overshadowed. Reforms to help China face the Western onslaught gave way to the dynasty's struggle simply to survive rebellion.

Ch'ing negotiators in the decade after Nanking therefore used their traditional repertoire of tactics on a day-to-day basis with a minimum of intellectual creativity. They tried to keep their foreign adversaries in an inferior position in terminology and matters of protocol – for example, by granting interviews only in the demeaning environment of a warehouse or only with junior officials. When forced to it, they could make concessions only as acts of benevolence without acknowledging foreign rights. The representatives of the Ch'ing empire could also explain the impossibility of actions that might arouse overt popular opposition, a concept readily intelligible to the rulers of India. But the initial effort was to use personal friendship.

The imperial clansman Ch'i-ying, who handled the new treaty relations from 1842 to 1848, had approached his task in the spirit of the ancient classic on the Art of War, the *Sun-tzu*, 'if you know yourself and know your adversary, a hundred battles will be a hundred victories'. This pithy aphorism (*chih chi, chih pi, pai chan, pai sheng*) became the slogan of the era. As Ch'i-ying put it, 'to control the barbarians, one must first know their nature. . . . It is like the men who catch tigers in Kirin province. In their hands they have no bits of iron. They just take a leather robe and put it over the tiger's head and so the tiger is caught alive. . . . Today, if we thoroughly know their nature, we can get hold of their minds and subdue their courage.'⁹ But Ch'i-ying's application of this strategy was

⁸ On *chi-mi* see Lien-sheng Yang in John K. Fairbank, ed. *The Chinese world order*, 31-3. On Wei Yüan, articles by Jane Kate Leonard and Peter M. Mitchell in *MAS*, 6.2 (April 1972) 151-204; Wang Chia-chien, *Wei Yüan tui Hsi-fang ti jen-shih chi ch'i bai-fang ssu-hsiang*.

⁹ Memorial from Ch'i-ying received 19 May 1842, *IWSM* Tao-kuang (hereafter, *IWSM-TK*), 47.22b; 23b line 10-24a line 41. Cp. *Sun-tzu*, 3, 'Mou-kung', cited in Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Tzu: the art of war*.

one-dimensional. Instead of studying writings on Britain's commercial expansion, he tried first to control the British headman with the bonds of friendship. In his correspondence with Pottinger and especially in his unprecedented five-day visit to Hong Kong in June 1843, the imperial commissioner was most ingratiating. He affected a great intimacy with Sir Henry, addressing him in letters as his '*yin-t'i-mi-t'e* friend' (i.e., borrowing the English term in sound). He even expressed the desire to adopt his eldest son and secured an exchange of the portraits of their wives (Ch'i-ying later explained to the emperor that 'the English barbarians think much of women and little of men'). The virtuosity of his barbarian-taming is indicated in his parting communication to the British plenipotentiary. It reads almost like a love letter.

We two have now been engaged in the same work for upwards of a year, and have alone been known to each other as men whose hearts are entirely devoted to their country: thus actuated by no selfish motives, influenced by no wish to deceive, in speaking or transacting business our hearts appear to be stamped with each other's impress, so that there is nothing which we may not consult about; in time it may be said of us, tho' our persons seem *two* yet our hearts are absolutely as *one* . . . The time of parting is at hand and I know not in what year or in what spot I may again have the pleasure of meeting you face to face, the thought of which is almost insupportable.¹⁰

This performance by a Manchu grandee was in the great tradition of personal diplomacy by which a militarily weaker but culturally superior Chinese ruling class had often coopted and neutralized barbarian invaders. If Pottinger had been a Mongol, Ch'i-ying's procedures might have amazed him less, for they echoed the ancient record of China's foreign relations. For example, Han appeasement of the aggressive Hsiung-nu had used the *ho-ch'in* 'peace and friendship' policy by which China paid the Hsiung-nu fixed annual gifts (plus a Chinese princess for the chieftain) in return for a pledge to stop raiding the border. *Ho-ch'in* was 'another type of "unequal treaty" in Chinese history' which reappeared at times of China's military weakness. When the Han succeeded in moving from *ho-ch'in* relations to the full tribute system, they 'required a hostage prince from the Hsiung-nu as a surety of their submission.'¹¹ Ch'i-ying (Keying in British dispatches), having no son himself, proposed to adopt Pottinger's and take him to Peking. Told that the boy must first finish schooling in England, he replied, 'Very well, he is my adopted son from this day – Frederick Keying Pottinger.'¹²

British aims in the negotiations of 1842–3 were both more simple and

¹⁰ Ch'i-ying to Pottinger in Pottinger's 142 of 1843, FO 17/70.

¹¹ Ying-shih Yü, *Trade and expansion in Han China*, 10, 43.

¹² Pottinger's 74, 5 July 1843; 85, 19 July, FO 17/68; also Pottinger's 142 of 1843, FO 17/70, cited in Fairbank, *Trade and diplomacy*, 1.111–12.

concrete, and more far-reaching – to establish by treaty law a system of rights which would facilitate British expansion in trade and contact generally. The most immediate concern was with commercial opportunity, just as Jardine had advocated. The treaty tariff was negotiated essentially between the British and the Canton interest. Howqua IV (Wu Ch'ung-yüeh) was active on the Chinese side, while Alexander Matheson headed a committee of British merchants dedicated to abolishing the old system. However, they lacked intimate knowledge of the actual charges on the trade which the hong merchants had formerly paid. The tariff was actually worked out by one of Jardine's former agents (Robert Thom), who bargained with the Hoppo and others at Canton. The new tariff rates were low by almost any standard and not protective, since both export duties and import duties were still to be levied in the old Chinese fashion. The principal change was not in the rates of the old imperial tariff, but rather in the effort to wipe out the special fees and perquisites, the whole system of squeeze, which was so deeply imbedded in the Canton system. When it came to inland transit dues (those taxes which might be levied on foreign goods after they had left the treaty ports on their way to interior markets), the treaty provided that these should not exceed a certain 'percent on the tariff value', but since information was lacking, the percentage in question was finally left blank in the treaty clause. As might have been expected, the British were quite unable to prevent the taxation of their goods at points beyond the treaty ports. 'Free trade' could not be imposed upon the Chinese empire.

The new procedures to supplant the Canton system were laid out in the General Regulations of Trade, published along with the tariff on 22 July 1843: British vessels would deposit their papers with British consuls, who thus, in effect, would take the place of the 'security merchants' of the Cohong formerly responsible for each ship at Canton. The Chinese government would have no responsibility for its merchants' debts. Meanwhile the British government provided for its consuls to have jurisdiction over all British subjects. This formalized the principle of extraterritoriality which had long been asserted against Chinese criminal jurisdiction at Canton.

The Supplementary Treaty between Britain and China was signed by Pottinger and Ch'i-ying on 8 October 1843 at the Bogue (Hu-men-chai). It restricted British trade to the five ports, permitted residence there and limited travel outside. It provided for local trade between Hong Kong and Canton, for stationing gunboats at all the ports, for consular help in the prevention of smuggling, and for extraterritoriality and the extradition of criminals. It included a most-favoured-nation clause so that

later treaties with other powers would equally benefit the British. Even so, the Supplementary Treaty later showed several discrepancies between its British and Chinese versions, partly because the British interpreter, J. R. Morrison, had died without an adequate successor.¹³

The British aim was to capitalize upon their military and naval power to secure commercial opportunities. How this effort ran into limitations is indicated in the case of Hong Kong. The British hope was that this island, now a part of the British empire, could serve as a warehouse for storing British goods, from which they could penetrate the entire Chinese coast. For this purpose, they wanted to attract the Chinese junk trade to their new island harbour, and they tried to write this into the Supplementary Treaty. In its Chinese version, however, the treaty made it crystal clear that Hong Kong was foreign territory and all Chinese merchant vessels going there must secure passes from the Chinese customs houses at one of the five treaty ports. By refusing passes, the Chinese authorities could stifle such legal trade, and this is what they did. In response, the British met this Chinese non-cooperation by issuing sailing letters from the British authorities at Hong Kong to give protection to the vessels of British subjects resident there. This was a new device, originally created for the small craft carrying passengers and sundries between Canton, Hong Kong and Macao. The British unilaterally expanded the practice and were soon giving the use of their flag to both Chinese- and foreign-owned small craft registered in Hong Kong and plying the entire China coast.

The main thing left out of the treaties at Nanking and the Bogue was opium. The British government argued that since the trade plainly could not be stopped by China, it should be legalized and taxed as the best way to regulate it. To this the Tao-kuang Emperor in conscience, of course, could not agree. Opium, therefore, remained unmentioned in the early treaties, while the opium trade got a new lease of life under a system of informal regulation beyond the scope of treaty law. Coastal opium stations where armed 'receiving ships' (floating drug warehouses) lay at anchor outside the new ports, became established in business long before the treaty ports were opened. By April 1843 the Shanghai authorities 'had appointed an anchoring place near Wusung . . . trade was exceedingly brisk . . . many inferior mandarins had visited the ships'.¹⁴ Yet Pottinger

¹³ The English and Chinese texts of the Supplementary Treaty, published by the Customs (see note 7 above) were 'verified from the originals in the British Legation' (p. xvii). This Customs Chinese text, when compared with the summary that received imperial approval at Peking (*IWSM-TK*, 69.27-34b, memorial and edict of 15 November 1843), shows many discrepancies. See in Fairbank, *Trade and diplomacy*, 125.

¹⁴ Pottinger's 40, 29 April 1843, quoting a correspondent 'in no way connected with trade', FO 17/67.

in November 1842 had prohibited British trade at the new ports until they were officially opened with consuls installed. The senior British naval officer on the still-occupied island of Chusan noted that the opium traders 'hitherto have been allowed to go along the coast between this and Macao without port clearance and no questions ever put to them . . . as long as they . . . did not go near any of the five prohibited towns'.¹⁵ But when the officer found them in April 1843 outside Shanghai, which had not yet been officially opened to trade, he ordered them to leave within twenty-four hours.

This precipitated an object lesson for observers of both countries. Pottinger disavowed this literal-minded naval action. The officer was reprimanded and recalled, as was the Shanghai taotai who had conscientiously cooperated with him. The British navy was henceforth to overlook the existence of the opium trade. By 1845 there were 'eighty clippers engaged in carrying opium to and from Hong Kong'. Meanwhile, James Matheson instructed his chief opium-ship captain not to flaunt this 'victory' over the Navy and 'to make every effort . . . to please the mandarins, such as moving from one anchorage to another when they require it, and not approaching too near to their towns. The opium trade is now so very unpopular in England, that we cannot be too cautious in keeping it as quiet and as much out of the public eye as possible.'¹⁶

As a result, the British commercial invasion of China thenceforth proceeded in two channels, those of the legal trade and those of the illegal opium trade. Legal trade was carried on at the five new treaty ports. The opium trade flourished at double that number of receiving stations on the coast outside the ports, where two or three dozen receiving ships usually lay at anchor. By 1860 the trade had doubled in volume, from 30,000 to 60,000 chests imported annually. But opium traders were warned by Pottinger not to go north of Shanghai, evidently as the result of an informal agreement with the big opium houses, and probably also with the Ch'ing authorities. Thus the rule of law on the China coast was to be left standing on one leg only. Worse still, the growth of British and also American trade with China continued to depend on opium imports as the chief means of laying down funds for tea and silk exports.

¹⁵ Capt. Charles Hope, 21 April 1843, in Haddington to Aberdeen, 12 August, FO 17/75.

¹⁶ James Matheson to Captain McMinnies, 22 April 1843, Coast Letter Book 22/4/43, Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge; see also David Edward Owen, *British opium policy in China and India*, and Jonathan Spence, 'Opium smoking in China', in Frederic Wakeman, Jr and Carolyn Grant, eds. *Conflict and control in late imperial China*.

OPENING THE TREATY PORTS

The ports were opened under the new system only by degrees – Canton on 27 July 1843; Amoy, 2 November; Shanghai, 17 November; Ningpo, 1 January 1844; and Foochow in June 1844. The American and French treaties signed on 3 July and 24 October, added only embellishments to the treaty system.

Caleb Cushing, for the Americans, tried to get his treaty by threatening to go north for it; once he gave up the threat, he got his treaty at Canton. Having little else to do, but being a smart lawyer, he spelled out the terms of extraterritoriality in more definitive fashion and inserted several provisions that, in the absence of any American base like Hong Kong, would aid American participation in the coastal trade of China. In the new ports the Americans used a cheap, makeshift system of merchant consuls that gave little support to the British effort at consular enforcement of treaty law.¹⁷

Théodose M. M. J. de Lagrené, for France, mainly devoted himself to the cause of Catholic missionaries and their toleration by the imperial regime. Ch'i-ying's first tactic was to forestall Lagrené's going north to Peking by prolonging negotiations until too late in the season. At the same time, Ch'i-ying recognized that the French envoy needed some concession more than the British and Americans had already received. In finally agreeing to tolerate Christianity, which would revoke the Yung-cheng Emperor's ban, Ch'i-ying told the French with tears in his eyes, 'You have induced me to make a concession . . . which . . . may cost me my life. . . . It is up to you to save . . . and help me.' He then tried to get Christianity restricted to the ports but without ultimate success.¹⁸ Imperial decrees of 1844 and 1846 permitted Chinese to practise Roman Catholicism again and restored to use certain churches confiscated in the Yung-cheng period. Protestant Christianity received equal toleration, but missionaries were not to travel inland from the treaty ports. The French subsequently installed consuls at Canton and Shanghai. Since little trade developed, Consul Montigny at Shanghai devoted himself to asserting the dignity of his office and the interest of France.

The policy of Ch'i-ying in dealing with America and France was to

¹⁷ For translated documents, Earl Swisher, *China's management of the American barbarians, 1841–1861*. On Cushing's negotiations, E. V. Gulick, *Peter Parker and the opening of China*, ch. 8; Ting Ming-nan *et al.*, 'Ti-i-tz'u Ya-p'ien chan-cheng' (The first Opium War), *Cbung-kuo k'o-hsüeh-yüan Li-shih yen-chiu-so ti-san-so chi-k'an* (Bulletin of the Third Section of the Historical Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences), 1 (July 1954) 114–42, espec. 143–6.

¹⁸ Angelus Grosse-Aschhoff, *The negotiations between Ch'i-ying and Lagrené, 1844–1846*, 74. The definitive account is Louis Tsing-sing Wei, *La politique missionnaire de la France en Chine 1842–1856*, 305.

apply 'impartiality' so that both should have the same rights as the British through the most-favoured-nation clause and not be beholden to Britain for the enjoyment of equal privileges. The principal aim of his policy was to keep France and the United States separate from Britain in the hope that, in time, they might be used against her. He also saw to it that Canton remained the locus of China's diplomatic contact.

Along with this diplomacy was combined a Ch'ing programme for military reconstruction along the coast, including naval training, use of firearms, and installation of new batteries and garrisons. But the impetus to acquire Western arms, which Commissioner Lin had represented, gradually diminished, for Ch'i-ying's programme of pacification seemed to work all too well. No great effort was made to build Chinese military power on new lines.¹⁹

In dealing with the foreigners at the new ports, Ch'i-ying's principal problem was to find and appoint reliable and talented members of the official class who could command the trust of the court as well as the foreigners and at the same time be loyal to him and able to work with local interests. He used chiefly the subordinates who had been his aides at Nanking. His ablest negotiator at Canton was Huang En-t'ung, the principal Chinese concerned with the Supplementary Treaty, who had risen through the normal channels to become a salt intendant at Nanking and in 1842 was provincial judge and acting treasurer there. He became governor of Kwangtung in 1845.²⁰ Others who had been at Nanking were sent to Shanghai and Ningpo with the rank of intendant (taotai). The new figure to emerge at Amoy was the Fukien provincial treasurer, later governor, Hsü Chi-yü, a scholar who began to compile from Western sources a new world-geography with forty-four Western-style maps, '*A brief description of the oceans roundabout*', *Ying-huan chih lueh*. A metropolitan graduate (*chin-shih*) of 1826, Hsü had served ten years in the Hanlin Academy and been favourably known to the chief architect of appeasement, Mu-chang-a. After serving as taotai in coastal Fukien during the war, Hsü was posted in the spring of 1842 as judicial commissioner to Canton, where he stayed for a time with his classmate (also a *chin-shih* of 1826), Huang En-t'ung. Posted back to Fukien in 1843, Hsü thereupon used his official contacts with foreign consuls and missionaries to acquire the facts about their world. Though his book of 1848 was more concise and accurate than Wei Yüan's work (see page 219), it became popular only

¹⁹ On the abortive naval reforms, see John L. Rawlinson, *China's struggle for naval development, 1839-1895*, ch. 2; Lü Shih-ch'iang, *Chung-kuo tsao-ch'i ti lun-ch'üan ching-ying*, 16-38.

²⁰ Ch'en Ch'in, 'Huang En-t'ung yü ya-p'ien chan-hou wai-chiao' (Huang En-t'ung and Chinese diplomacy after the Opium War), *Shih-hsüeh nien pao*, 3, 2 (Dec. 1940) 111-41.

in the 1860s when its author was brought from retirement into the new Tsungli Yamen at Peking.²¹

These men, selected for their special capacities to deal with the foreigner, continued at the ports to be in much the same position of mediators as the Ch'ing negotiators had been in at Nanking. They were men-in-between who ran great dangers in dealing with the foreigner at all, and in many cases, eventually suffered for it. Like latter-day 'China specialists' in the West, these 'barbarian specialists' were the men who could test out and develop the folklore concerning the alien culture. Chinese suppositions about the 'barbarian nature' came from a long background of Inner Asian experience: barbarians were naturally unpredictable, indeed, 'unfathomable'. This was partly because they were such greedy opportunists, led hither and yon by their own materialism, and partly because they were naturally treacherous and deceitful, not trained to act by the established norms of civilized intercourse. Truly they had 'the nature of dogs and sheep' (*ch'üan-yang chih hsing*). The British stress upon trade indicated a most upside-down situation – 'barbarians consider the merchant important and the official unimportant. Everything they wish to undertake must first be schemed out by the crowd of merchants.' This was because 'the whole country of England makes its living from the trade of the merchant crowd. Superiors and inferiors compete against each other. No one seeks anything but material gain.'²² This crassness indicated moral underdevelopment, but at the same time, provided a weakness whereby the British could be haltered and tamed (*chi-mi*). The first treaties were rationalized as a means for doing exactly this. As the British trading interest became better established in the treaty ports, it could be viewed as a hostage to fortune, and sufficient Chinese pressure upon it could keep the foreigner in line – a sound enough theory, but wanting the necessary basis in Chinese power.

Taming the foreign invader at the new ports seemed the more feasible because the Chinese oecumene had not yet been shattered intellectually. These outer-outer barbarians were still occasionally referred to in official documents as *Ying ni*, 'the English rebels', members of, but offenders against, the world order centred at Peking. Their further resort to violence would be 'disobedience' (*fan-hsün*).²³ Indeed the treaty port system was not thrust *de novo* into the Chinese scene but actually grew out of it in the first instance. The new treaty provisions for residential and trading areas at the ports, for a consul's jurisdiction over his nationals, and for most-favoured-nation impartiality in dealing with foreign countries, were all

²¹ Fred W. Drake, *China charts the world: Hsü Chi-yü and his geography of 1848*.

²² *IWASM* Hsien-feng (hereafter, *IWASM-HF*), 7.24.

²³ See, e.g. Ch'i-ying's order (*cha*) to local officials to sue for peace, 20 May 1842, doc. 145 in Sasaki Masaya, ed. *Aben sensō no kenkyū, shiryō hen*.

extensions of Chinese tradition and did not, as institutions, initially run counter to old custom. During the 1840s when the ports were newly opened, tribute missions continued to come to Peking from Korea every year, from Liu-ch'iu in seven different years, and from Vietnam and Siam each in three different years. All the tributary formalities and records were maintained down to the last detail, including the homage paid by Mongol and other dignitaries of Inner Asia through the Li-fan Yüan. The Opium War may figure today as a cataclysm in retrospect; it was not so recorded at the time. The king of Liu-ch'iu complained when a Frenchman was left there in 1844 and again when a British medical missionary became established there in 1847; the emperor observed that 'France and England ought not to annoy our dependent countries'. Unless it could be stopped, 'we certainly would be neglecting the grand idea of soothing and managing the outer dependencies'.²⁴ But Peking now lacked the power to assert this old idea. The words continued to be written down; their efficacy was slipping.

THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY IN THE PORTS

From the foreign point of view, the treaty ports formed a single expanding community on a new frontier, not a wild frontier of nature but a populous one of culture. Preceding generations of Western traders had selected these ports as potential points of ingress into the channels of Chinese commerce. Amoy and Ningpo had been well known to the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. During the 1840s and 1850s, however, Canton and Shanghai were the major ports and the three places in between remained mere outposts. The foreign community at Amoy in the first decade under the treaties remained about twenty-five persons, and those at Foochow and Ningpo each about a dozen. The opium receiving stations, separate and outside the ports, were hardly more populous. The old-established centre, Canton, had some three hundred foreign residents, but it was the capital of two provinces and residence of many officials and great families, a symbol of government prestige as well as local patriotism, far more resistant and defensible than Shanghai. The real centre of foreign growth was at the mouth of the Yangtze. Shanghai in the mid-1840s had a population of a dozen firms and a hundred foreigners, more or less. By the mid-1850s it had grown to some seventy firms and over three hundred foreign residents, not counting families, with eight consulates and thirty-six Protestant missionaries.²⁵

²⁴ John K. Fairbank, 'The early treaty system in the Chinese world order', in Fairbank, ed. *The Chinese world order*, 267.

²⁵ William Fred Meyers *et al.* *Treaty ports of China and Japan*, 364. On the early ports see H. B. Morse, *The international relations of the Chinese empire*, vol. 1, *The period of conflict 1834-1860*; and

At each port the foreign community centred about the foreshore or bund, where shipments moved ashore to the godowns (warehouses) within the compounds of the foreign trading firms. Each foreign community was outside the local Chinese city in a position on the water, whence might come its help, and somewhat defensible by land. The British consuls early demanded the right to hoist their flags over consulate buildings leased within the walled cities and they succeeded in doing so everywhere except at Canton. But at Amoy the foreign settlement actually grew up on 'Drum Wave Island', Kulangsu, in the harbour; at Foochow on the island of Chung-chou in the Min River; and at Ningpo on the riverbank across another stream from the walled city. When the foreigners settled on the banks of the Whangpu north of the walled city of Shanghai, they were between two subsidiary streams, and on their inland frontier they dug out still another, known as Defence Creek.

By mid-century China's treaty port community totalled about five hundred foreigners. They were mainly organized in some two hundred firms, including both those that provided local services of all sorts and those engaged in the international trade. Men greatly outnumbered women. About half were from the British Isles and another quarter from India, including Parsees, making three-quarters from the British empire. Americans were comparatively few in number, yet their shipping was second only to that of Britain and at Shanghai carried almost half the trade. The repeal in June 1849 of the navigation laws had permitted American vessels to carry goods directly to Britain or between British colonies, so that after 1 January 1850 American clipper ships competed in the tea races to London.

Christian missions were numerically a minor part of the scene, yet their contribution to the foreign community was considerable both spiritually and intellectually. Catholic missionaries with French encouragement moved steadily but quietly to revive their position and enlarge their constituencies in major centres of the interior. In 1839 there had been about thirty Catholic missionaries in China, half Lazarist and half under the Société des Missions Étrangères, nearly all of them French. Ten were at Macao, the main base for training, supply and communication. Ten were in Szechwan, three in Kiangsi, three in Hupei, others in Fukien and Mongolia among their local constituents. Like some Protestants, they occasionally found passage along the coast on opium vessels. By 1845 there were seventy-six European Catholic missionaries in China. Jesuits in

Fairbank, *Trade and diplomacy*. For a comprehensive list, see Yen Chung-p'ing, *Chung-kuo chin-tai ching-chi shih t'ung-chi tzu-liao hsian-chi* (Selected statistical materials on China's modern economic history), 41–8 (ports), 49–56 (concession areas).

particular were active again at Shanghai.²⁶ Meanwhile, the first generation of Protestant missionaries, which had been still only a dozen in 1839, remained after the war largely confined to the treaty ports. In contrast to the Catholic fathers who went inland in Chinese dress and lived in Chinese style, the typical Protestant kept his family with him and retained much of his Western way of life. Through its longer experience of proselytizing in China, the Catholic Church had learned many Chinese ways. At the same time, it was more purely devoted to saving souls and building families and communities of believers, and less concerned with medicine and education as means to conversion. The more individualistic Protestants brought more of their own material culture with them and remained closer to their foreign community. In the end, this would make them more subversive of Chinese tradition.

As extensions of a foreign world on to the Chinese maritime frontier, the treaty port settlements relied upon their communications almost as much as the contemporary outposts in the American West depended upon the pony express and caravan trails. Along the China coast, however, almost all communication was by sea. The mail from Britain via the 'overland' route across the isthmus of Suez took two to three months, a month less than the four months' passage by sailing ship around the Cape of Good Hope or around Cape Horn from the Atlantic homeland. Side-wheel steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental (P and O) Company soon began to reduce the time. The mail reached Hong Kong under steam in 1845 and Shanghai in 1850. Nonetheless, this was the great age of the clipper ship and on the China coast the opium clippers, on their frequent regular runs to supply the receiving stations, carried both mail and travelers to the ports, to say nothing of the newspapers from Hong Kong, or after 1850, the weekly *North China Herald* from Shanghai. Residents in the smaller ports indeed found the opium captains to be their best means of cashing cheques.

The British government, having opened China by force, was the active party in the creation of the treaty port structure. Yet the Sino-foreign trade had its own dynamism, and the British consuls in each port found themselves hard put to keep up with new commercial developments. Under the treaties they bore the formal responsibility of leadership, but the British assault upon China's old institutions in the name of Western trade and civilization (the two being considered indistinguishable) was really a joint undertaking between merchants and consuls.

The British merchant community was led by the rival British agency

²⁶ Peter Ward Fay, 'The French Catholic Mission in China during the Opium War', *MAS*, 4.2 (1970) 115–28. Fay, *The Opium War*, ch. 8, 23.

houses of Jardine, Matheson and Company and Dent and Company, whose opium ship captains cooperated in the 1840s to maintain a duopoly in drug sales. Their major American competitor was the Boston firm of Russell and Company. All three pursued a wide spectrum of activity, both in the opium trade and in the legal treaty port trade, developing their own fleets of clipper ships, their own services of banking and insurance, and their large port facilities of godowns and even dockyards. These capacities and their capital accumulations soon led them into local investment in real estate and consumer goods industries.

Smaller firms in the international trade operated less broadly. By providing market information to their constituents abroad, these China agency houses sought their risk capital for investment in cargoes, on which the house would profit only through its commissions on consignments of goods shipped to and from its correspondents. Profits for both principal and agent depended not only on market possibilities in China and abroad, and all their competitors' responses, but also on the fluctuations of exchange rates, essentially between gold and silver but attached particularly to variable units of account in China. The Spanish Carolus dollar, scarce and overvalued, was abandoned for the Mexican dollar at Canton in 1853, and in 1857 Shanghai merchants abandoned dollar coinage entirely and accepted the Shanghai tael, a unit of account payable in silver bullion.²⁷ Exchange transactions could be handled only by foreigners and Chinese working closely together.

Jardine's big establishments were divided not only into the resident partners' 'senior mess' and a 'junior mess' of British clerks and assistants, but also had offices and quarters for the Chinese staff of compradors, shroffs (money handlers), and many servants. The firm's various departments would handle tea, silk, piece goods (textiles) or 'muck and truck' (miscellaneous Chinese exports). In short, a big trading firm would outshine the British consulate in size of staff and buildings. The firms were the dominant element. They believed themselves to be what the treaty port was all about.

Foreign taipans (heads of firms) were entirely dependent on their Chinese counterparts. Cantonese compradors carried on the Chinese side of the foreign merchants' business in the new ports partly because they knew the tea and opium trades intimately and even more because they could guarantee one another in the necessary Chinese fashion. From the Chinese point of view the comprador was the principal trader. Under his contract with the foreign firm, he proceeded to hire his own staff, deal with Chinese

²⁷ Stephen C. Lockwood, *Augustine Heard and Company, 1858-1862*. On port currency, Frank H. H. King, *Money and monetary policy in China, 1845-1895*.

merchants from the interior, secure market information, conduct exchange transactions, take responsibility for all Chinese personnel and for warehoused goods, and even deal with the Chinese customs house on behalf of the firm. The comprador could thus become not only the foreigners' agent in the Chinese scene, but also a broker *par excellence*, able to develop his own operations as an independent trader. Sooner or later his profits and investments would probably launch him on an independent career as a new type of Chinese merchant who could flourish in the treaty port community under the general protection of the foreign influence there. While some of the old functions of the hong merchants of Canton were thus performed by the British consul as security for his country's vessels and nationals, the major trading function came to be performed by the comprador, who handled most of the foreign firms' local activities.²⁸

The British consulate, with a staff of consul, vice-consul and one or two assistants or interpreters, recruited largely from well-to-do families in England, had special supervisory and disciplinary roles to perform. Under the General Regulations of Trade, it was fully occupied in facilitating commerce. The consul was expected to settle the fees payable to the pilots that guided ships into and out of port. He received a ship's papers and notified the Chinese customs of its arrival, returning the ship's papers on its departure. The consul also requested the examination of imported goods and heard appeals over the amount of duties assessed. He was expected to cooperate with the Chinese authorities in settling the standard of coinage, and he kept standard sets of weights and measures available at the consulate. He was to give certificates permitting trans-shipment of goods from one vessel to another. It was also his duty to control British seamen in port, and to hear grievances against both Chinese and British subjects; and he alone could punish British criminals. He had various other duties in cooperation with the Chinese authorities: to enforce the port limits, supervise the renting of land and houses, prevent smuggling, extradite criminals and, in general, stand between China and British nationals. Since all this contact with the Chinese government involved the use of Chinese, both spoken and written, the consul depended upon his British interpreter as his right-hand man. Vigorous personalities like Thomas Francis Wade, Harry Parkes, Horatio Nelson Lay, Robert Hart, Walter Henry Medhurst, Jr and Thomas Taylor Meadows, all rose by this route.

British superiority in the foreign community was confirmed by the

²⁸ Yen-p'ing Hao, *The comprador in nineteenth century China; Bridge between East and West*, 51 *et passim*.

American practice of commissioning merchants to be consuls, for a merchant consul faced an immediate conflict of interest. In Chinese eyes he had some of the ambivalence of an old style hong merchant who had purchased a mandarin button. Despite his official status, he remained at heart a merchant, as did also the English traders who usefully acquired consular status to represent Spain, Peru, the Netherlands, Prussia or other states that got treaties with China but had no officials on the spot.

The treaty system had been set up by gunfire and had to be maintained by gunboat diplomacy. This may be defined as the technique of supporting allegedly legitimate demands for one's treaty rights by the threat of using naval force. Its classic expression was in the Tsingpu affair at Shanghai in 1848. Three missionaries visited this city, which was within the radius of proper foreign contact outside Shanghai. They were attacked by grain junk men and rescued only by the local magistrate. HBM's consul, Rutherford Alcock, demanded redress, but the Chinese authorities hesitated to move against the thirteen thousand or so grain junk sailors who were then at hand to carry the annual tribute rice to Peking. The consul therefore stopped payments of trade duties under the treaties, placed his single ten-gun brig of the Royal Navy to blockade the fourteen hundred junks laden with rice and ready to leave the port, and demanded the seizure of ten chief offenders within forty-eight hours. Alcock then sent Harry Parkes in another gunboat that arrived just at this point to demand redress from the governor-general at Nanking, over the head of the local taotai. As a result the governor-general removed the taotai and had several offenders put in the cangue (a broad board locked around the culprit's neck) for a period of a month in the foreign settlement. This bold readiness to use force even against vastly superior numbers was fully backed by the foreign community, though less admired in Hong Kong and London. Alcock stoutly maintained it was the only way to protect Englishmen in China, and later generations of Shanghai-landers would, in the main, agree with him.²⁹

Gunboat diplomacy betrayed the unresolved struggle as to who should call the tune in Sino-Western contact. Fundamentally this was a cultural conflict in the broadest sense. Britain wanted, not to rule the Chinese empire as a colony, but to get it to follow British ways of international contact and free trade under a rule of law, which would open the door to British commercial profit. But to do so would require a revolution in China's ancient society, and it was therefore stoutly resisted.

²⁹ Morse, *International Relations*, 1.392-3, summarizing from British bluebook on *Insults in China*.

BRITAIN *v.* CANTON

The mid-century British coercion of the thinly spread Ch'ing government weakened its prestige and so endangered its authority. The San-yüan-li incident of May 1841 (see chapter 4, page 202) had been a premonition: the Ch'ing officials' seeming appeasement of foreign invaders aroused further xenophobia and eroded that popular acquiescence in Ch'ing rule which constituted Heaven's mandate to the dynasty. Throughout the 1840s, therefore, the imperial officials at Canton, facing two ways, had to temporize in between the British and the gentry-led Cantonese populace.

During the war and especially just after the San-yüan-li incident, gentry and villagers had joined in setting up militia bureaux to sustain their local defence associations (*t'uan-lien*). For this purpose they organized north of Canton a central bureau to coordinate a dozen associations already established in neighbouring market towns that included more than eighty villages. This new bureau (named the School of the Association for the Approaching Era of Peace, Sheng-p'ing she-hsüeh) with official approval collected extensive funds and recruited thousands of mercenaries.³⁰ This militarization of the countryside under gentry leadership seemed to create an immovable barrier to the irresistible British.

The 300 or so foreigners at Canton were still confined to the 800-foot riverfront of the old area known as the Thirteen Factories, with about four acres of open space. Efforts to lease houses elsewhere were usually thwarted. They could row on the river but generally felt stifled by the press of population. Englishmen therefore went into the countryside for very practical reasons – exercise, recreation and sport, especially hunting wildfowl. The resulting incidents soon filled the British blue books on *Insults in China*.

Since entrance within the Canton city walls had been steadily denied foreigners in the tribute era, maintaining this prohibition became a symbol of Cantonese defiance after 1842. Both sides contributed to a continual series of stonings, beatings and riots, in which foreign temerity and arrogance were generally matched by Cantonese arrogance and hostility. In April 1847 the British minister, Sir J. F. Davis, finally resorted once again to gunboat diplomacy and brought British warships from Hong Kong to assault the Bogue forts. Within thirty-six hours these forces spiked 827 Ch'ing cannon, came up to Canton, and occupied the Factories. But the most they could achieve was a promise from Ch'i-ying that the city gates would be opened after two more years. The 'Davis raid' thus proved ineffective. Eight months later six Englishmen on an outing in a

³⁰ Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and its enemies in late imperial China*, 71–6.

militia area were killed. Ch'i-ying at once sent forces, occupied the village, and punished the murderers. But his continual effort to keep the British mollified by supporting their treaty rights of peaceful intercourse made him seem an appeaser in Canton, while Peking correctly feared such appeasement would lose the loyalty of the populace. He was recalled early in 1848 and his Chinese successor, Hsü Kuang-chin, pursued a policy of relying on the popular xenophobia.

When the British, early in 1849, again demanded entrance to Canton, Hsü activated a defensive militia mobilization throughout the city as well as among the villages, and this high state of public spirit, defying the foreigner, won the emperor's support. Since Palmerston was not ready for another war, Britain backed off. Governor-General Hsü and the doughty governor, Yeh Ming-ch'en, received imperial honours and gentry praise: the British for more than a decade had 'trampled on our border country; seized and hunted after our men and women'; unless these officials had commiserated with the people 'and roused them by encouragement, it would have been impossible for the public determination to become as strong and firm as a walled city'.³¹ The result was a stalemate. During the 1850s the treaty settlement remained ineffective at Canton. Western trade continued, as it had for more than a century, without resolving the Anglo-Cantonese enmity, while a great rebellion erupted inland. A new structure of Sino-foreign relations could not be created in this old milieu.

DISORDER ON THE CHINA COAST

The establishment of the new British authority on the Chinese maritime frontier began a shifting of loyalties, both a growing alienation from the Ch'ing and some signs of allegiance to the foreigner. Helping this process was the very essential participation of Cantonese merchants and servants in the Western expansion. As the Jardine, Dent and Russell firms expanded their trading activities within the ports in legal goods, and outside at the anchorages in opium, their working staffs consisted largely of Chinese assistants recruited from the south. Cantonese and Fukienese merchants also moved into Shanghai independently in both the legal and illegal branches of the trade.

The Cantonese who accompanied the spread of Western trade were not only an exotic element whose speech and customs were alien to the Yangtze

³¹ Frederic Wakeman, Jr, *Strangers at the gate*, 104, quoting a printed Chinese pamphlet distributed 11 May 1849. The imperial authorities' Chinese correspondence with successive British ministers and their notices to the Canton gentry and populace have now been collected from the British archives by Sasaki Masaya, *Aben sensō go no Chū-Ei kōsō, shiryōben kō*.

delta. Many were also hustlers and racketeers in the growing underworld of the foreign trade. Cantonese and Fukienese from Amoy who had gone overseas and acquired British nationality as residents of Hong Kong, Singapore, Penang or other places in Malaya were able to claim the consul's extraterritorial protection. This created a whole class of Chinese who were in between East and West, able to deny Chinese jurisdiction whenever they could claim foreign protection, even though the Chinese custom persisted to treat all Chinese anywhere as subjects of the empire. Foreign-protected Canton and Amoy men thus became privileged characters on the China coast, possessed of foreign arms and foreign connections, whom Chinese officials would have to think twice about coercing. Of the British subjects registered at the Amoy consulate in the early years, the great majority were of Chinese race and from Singapore, Malacca or Penang. When wearing foreign dress, these Anglo-Chinese were customarily considered to be under foreign protection. By a simple change of costume they could claim immunity from Ch'ing control or, alternatively, melt into the local population.

But this use of British cover for illegality was only one symptom of a broader trend – the organization of dissidence in south China, first on the routes of trade and later among the settled populace. As the growth of population and trade outdistanced the growth of government administration, secret societies met the increasing need for mutual help and protection among travelling merchants (*k'o-shang*) in legal trade as well as among smugglers of opium and the yamen underlings, boatmen and bandits who shared their profits.

South China secret societies were generally affiliates of the Triads or Hung men (see p. 134). Triad lodges were largely autonomous, not under central control, and cooperative only when they felt like it. But their secret brotherhood had an esoteric language, passwords and signs by which members, though strangers, could identify each other, all of which was especially helpful to people moving about on dubious business. The loose Triad network, having no central head, could not really rival the government but neither could the government wipe it out. It flourished as a vehicle for local crime.³²

In this way a lawless Chinese element began to flourish along the routes of trade in the penumbra of the Western commercial expansion. Triads flocked to Hong Kong, where the British tried to keep them under control. The creation of a new authority in Chinese waters represented by

³² Frederic Wakeman, Jr, 'The secret societies of Kwangtung, 1800–1856', in Jean Chesneaux, ed. *Popular movements and secret societies in China 1840–1950*, 28–47. Chinese documents from the Public Record Office, London, have been published by Sasaki Masaya in *Shinmatsu no himitsu kessha shiryō-ben* (Collected documents on late Ch'ing secret societies).

the British navy attempted to set up a new rule of law, but it inevitably gave cover to disorderly elements at the same time. For example, the same Canton and Amoy men who helped in the growth of the opium trade also assisted in developing the coolie trade. The African slave trade had been abolished; but cheap labour was still needed on new plantations. The result was a new industry that shipped contract-Chinese labourers in foreign vessels from Amoy, Swatow, Canton or Macao to provide a labour supply that could open up plantations in Malaya, Sumatra, or Java, as well as in Peru or Cuba. It was pushed by unscrupulous British merchants like James Tait of Amoy, who was protected by extraterritoriality as a British subject and who also gained immunity and influence by being the consular representative of both Holland and Spain.

Piracy now began to flourish with the growth of trade in coastal waters. By 1850 the Amoy consul estimated that at least 3,000 Chinese pirates were active on the coast of Fukien. British gunboats regularly went on pirate-hunting expeditions and brought batches of culprits into port for delivery to Chinese magistrates. In four years British ships captured some 139 pirate vessels and were paid by the British government a bounty or head money of £20 apiece for each of some 7,000 pirates killed or captured. This activity was only partly on the high seas. It represented still another substitution of British for Chinese authority. But pirate-hunting ran into difficult ambiguities. Chinese fishing fleets began to arm themselves against piracy, and some armed vessels could act ambivalently in either role as fishermen or pirates.

The practice of convoy developed as a protection against piracy and inevitably became a racket also. Armed vessels under British sailing letters issued at Hong Kong began to contract to protect Chinese fishing fleets and trading vessels. For example, the schooner *Spec*, 105 tons, seventy feet long, nineteen feet wide and eight feet deep, with one deck and two masts, carried an armament of nine guns, plus twenty-three muskets, five pistols, ten cutlasses, four pikes and five spears, with a crew of eleven. Owned by William Davidson of Ningpo, it flew the British flag and carried a sailing letter, good for one year, from the governor of Hong Kong. The master, mate and gunner were Englishmen, but most of the crew from Manila. Unafraid of any Chinese vessel, the *Spec* could act as a law unto itself, but it had to discriminate between pirates and legal fishermen on the strength of Chinese evidence. Inevitably it was drawn into Chinese feuds, and the British flag was exploited for private ends, to which the master, mate and gunner were not necessarily averse.³³

Soon the enterprise of British individuals in convoy work ran into com-


³³ Fairbank, *Trade and diplomacy*, 338-46; ch. 17-18, *passim*.

petition from other foreigners, the Portuguese at Macao. By mid-century a dozen or more of their armed lorchas (vessels with European hull but Chinese rig) congregated at the mouth of the Ningpo River and, despite Portuguese attempts at regulation from Macao, carried on all manner of extortion. In the early 1850s, the British–Portuguese rivalry that had developed in the convoy business was complicated by the arrival off Ningpo of a Cantonese pirate fleet under the notorious Apak (Pu Hsing-yu) with two dozen vessels. Though appointed to the imperial navy in the customary effort to buy him off, Apak continued to blackmail his way into the convoy business. Unfortunately, the local Chinese authorities could not get the Cantonese and Portuguese to destroy each other, and the situation remained out of control.

Against this background, with the opium trade expanding illegally, along with the coolie trade, piracy and convoy, the Western legal trade in China, so carefully nurtured by the new treaty system, was threatened with corruption and disorder. When so much was going on outside the law, the enforcement of the treaty tariff became less and less feasible. An unscrupulous foreign merchant could overawe the Chinese customs collectors with threats and then compromise with them to mutual advantage – why not? No Chinese customs house could be expected both to abandon its own traditional system of perquisites and enforce a foreign system against foreigners whom it could not control. Yet as the treaty tariff became steadily less enforceable, the trading interests of the big houses that depended upon it grew steadily more important. Shanghai became the focus of a new growth, in which foreign aggressiveness and Chinese weakness combined to create new Sino-foreign, treaty port institutions.

THE RISE OF SHANGHAI

The rapid rise of Shanghai to become the metropolis of China, starting from the status of a small county town, was due to the convergence of several factors. One, of course, was geographic. Situated on a broad stream, a dozen miles from where it entered the Yangtze estuary, Shanghai provided port facilities, a safe harbour, and ready communication with the interior by waterways spreading inland. It was at the crossroads of the Chinese shipping trade up the Yangtze as far as Szechwan and along the coast of China from Canton to Manchuria. Internationally it was a mid-point, equally accessible by sea from Canton, Tientsin and Japan. It served both as a funnel for the trade of the great Yangtze valley and central China and as a distribution point for the whole of east Asia. Locally the rise of Shanghai was made possible by the food surplus produced in the



MAP 8. The growth of Shanghai

fertile rice-growing region of the Yangtze delta, the region from which the food supply of Peking was sent northward over the Grand Canal or by sea around the Shantung promontory. This most productive region in all China had the capacity to feed a metropolis.³⁴

In the early 1850s Shanghai became a focal point where a new balance of forces in Sino-Western relations permitted the establishment of British dominance. Britain's contribution to the rise of Shanghai was made first of all by the Royal Navy which guaranteed the security of Chinese as well as foreign property, and then by British merchants, who made money and offered their Chinese assistants and counterparts a chance to do the same. The British consuls gave legal, institutional form to the forces at work. But they were only *primus inter pares*, aided by the American and French consuls, to say nothing of American and other merchants. The Chinese

³⁴ Rhoads Murphey, *Shanghai, key to modern China*; Ch'en Te-ch'ang, in *Li-shih yen-chiu*, 1957, no. 1, p. 58, makes the point that Shanghai was a noteworthy port as early as the thirteenth century.

contribution had several essential ingredients – Chinese merchants who attracted the capital of landlord-gentry throughout the rich Yangtze delta, Chinese rebels who posed immediate questions of disorder and provoked foreign intervention, and finally, opportunistic, profit-oriented Ch'ing officials nominally representing a government too weak to control them.

Shanghai had been a *hsien* (county or district) city since the Yüan period. The gazetteer of 1871 recorded a county population estimate of something over half a million in 1813 and little more in 1852.³⁵ The foreign settlements got started in an area north of the city wall, between it and the confluence of the Soochow Creek (in Chinese the Wu-sung River) with the broader Whangpu (see map, page 238). Arrangements between the early foreign consuls and the *taotai* (whose circuit embraced Soochow and Sung-chiang, the heart of the Yangtze delta) had been rather informal. Unlike later arrangements at other ports, the Shanghai consuls did not secure concession areas formally leased by the Ch'ing regime to their governments, which the consuls could then lease in turn to foreign nationals. (For example, Tientsin would eventually have eight concession areas and Hankow five.) Instead, at Shanghai although the French, British and Americans at first claimed separate areas, the early Land Regulations provided that foreigners, while not permitted to buy land, could negotiate perpetual leases directly with Chinese landowners, report them through their consuls, and receive titles directly from the *taotai*. Although the French settlement area became known as the 'French Concession' and was administered by the French consular authorities, it also began in this piecemeal fashion, not as a single concession. Meanwhile the predominant British in the spirit of free trade welcomed all nationalities as well as their consuls in the original 138 acres of the British settlement, which thereby as it expanded became an international municipality under the jurisdiction of the entire treaty-power consular body. The resulting International Settlement, a unique institution, became in time a tribute to the pragmatism of the British, who dominated it; but it went through twenty years of gestation in the process of taking shape.³⁶

From 1843 to 1853 the small settlement areas generally excluded Chinese residents except as servants or in service trades. Chinese residents in early 1853 were estimated at only 500, but in March the Taipings' capture

³⁵ *T'ung-chih Shang-hai hsien chih* (1871) 5.9b. On the development of Shanghai *hsien* since its establishment in 1190, cp. Shang-hai t'ung-she, ed. *Shang-hai yen-chiu tzu-liao* (Shanghai research materials), 1.53 *et passim*.

³⁶ Summary in Richard Feetham, *Report of . . . to the Shanghai Municipal Council*, ch. 2.

of Nanking let loose a flood of refugees. Thousands of homeless Chinese were soon camped along the Bund or in boats off the jetties; mat sheds, shops and new streets of cheap housing proliferated to accommodate them; and the foreign settlements suddenly became a Sino-foreign city. The refugees from the Taipings included not only commoners but also landlord and merchant families of wealth and position. During the following decade displaced gentry added to the Shanghai community and so accelerated the movement of lower Yangtze landlord families into foreign contact and foreign trade. This produced in time some community of interest between Western merchants and Chinese ruling class elements. Westerners who had leased land at Shanghai now profited by sub-letting it to Chinese real estate operators and builders. By mid-1854 some 8000 Chinese residences had been added to the 150 foreign establishments.

This admixture of Chinese, far outnumbering the Western residents, did not pull the Shanghai settlement back under Chinese jurisdiction. On the contrary, the foreign settlements became more than ever a haven of refuge after the old walled city of Shanghai was seized by Cantonese-Fukienese rebels of the Small Sword Society (Hsiao-tao hui) on 7 September 1853. Until French and Chinese imperial troops dislodged the rebels seventeen months later, in February 1855, the foreign area at Shanghai was surrounded by disorder and rebellion.³⁷ While the foreign consuls asserted their neutrality, they had to assume increasing responsibilities of local government including the administration of justice in cases involving Chinese residents. They inflicted moderate fines or imprisonment for minor offences and handed more serious cases over to the Chinese authorities. The *taotai* at this time was Wu Chien-chang, a Cantonese formerly in the Samqua firm of the Cohong, who had purchased his post and remained involved in trade with Edward Cunningham and others of Russell and Company. On 7 September 1853, he was rescued from the city by his American friends; thereafter he continued to collaborate with them. A new Sino-foreign community of interest now grew up at Shanghai. Western imports languished except for opium, but tea and especially silk exports were stimulated by the Taipings' disruption of the domestic Chinese demand and of the export route to Canton.

All this created a local Chinese readiness to acquiesce in the autonomy and assist in the defence of the foreign settlement. This mutuality of Sino-foreign interests became the secret of Shanghai's successful independence. By 1854 the ingredients of a new order were present and taking shape in new institutions.

³⁷ *Shang-hai Hsiao-tao-hui ch'i-i shih-liao hui-pien* (Shanghai 1938) includes extensive translations from NCH and other Western accounts.

One element in this new mixture of institutions was the principle of the foreign inspectorate of customs, whereby the Ch'ing imperial customs hired foreigners to be Chinese civil servants and to see that foreign merchants obeyed the tariff and trade regulations. This great invention was of course the product of a long development. In the first phase after 1842 the British consuls had tried to see that their merchants paid the treaty tariff duties. But this 'consular interference for the prevention of smuggling' soon provoked an outcry from merchants who found that they could browbeat or seduce Chinese customs collectors to compromise on tariff charges to their mutual benefit. 'Chiselling the emperor' of his duties in this way annoyed the law-abiding foreign trader as unfair competition, but it proved impossible to manipulate the Chinese custom house into honesty, particularly when the dishonest foreigner might threaten force and the best-intentioned customs collector lacked it. By 1850 the British government was thoroughly baffled by the Sino-foreign evasion of duties on the legal trade. The equal enforcement of the treaty tariff, cornerstone of the treaty system, was disintegrating.

During the next phase in the early 1850s the British consul at Shanghai, Rutherford Alcock, tried to coerce the Chinese customs by withholding the payment of duties, but this only undermined the treaty system. A third phase began with the rising of the Small Sword Society on 7 September 1853, when the custom house stopped functioning. Alcock kept the trade going by taking from his merchants promissory notes for the amount of duties owed by treaty. When the taotai Wu, who was also superintendent of customs, mustered imperial support and demanded payment, Consul Alcock's 'provisional system' of promissory notes eventually had to be abandoned. But the Chinese government was not able to resume collection of the lucrative duties on foreign trade at Shanghai, and so Wu started collecting them on foreign goods in the interior beyond the view of the consuls. If continued, this would destroy the treaty port system.

Meantime, by April 1854 imperial troops besieging the rebels in the walled city had begun to forage and threaten foreigners in the foreign settlement area north of the city walls. The Ch'ing authorities were unable to control them, and on 4 April Consul Alcock and his American and French colleagues pulled together a mixed force of about four hundred sailors and volunteer merchants, advanced with four artillery pieces, and cleared the western boundary of the settlement in the so-called 'battle of Muddy Flat'. Unlike the Canton factories ghetto, the Westerners could dominate the scene at Shanghai.

Statesmanship was brought into this military-commercial scene by the

arrival of a new American commissioner to China, R. M. McLane, who for once cooperated closely with the British in negotiations with the provincial authorities. Finally the British, American and French consuls at Shanghai were able on 12 July 1854, to negotiate with Wu Chien-chang a compromise which created a new institution. As customs superintendent, he undertook to employ 'foreign inspectors' nominated by the consuls to set the foreign merchants' duty payments, which would then be received by the Chinese customs bankers as before. As one inducement Wu was offered the prospect of collecting some 1,200,000 taels or £391,000 due from the promissory notes for duties accumulated under the 'provisional system' and later. (After much legal procedure, only one-third of the American duties, 118,125 taels, and none of the British, were ever paid.) But in the end, from all these mixed motives, there emerged a custom house that was impartially honest and efficient. The foreign consuls got their rule of law, the Chinese government its trade revenue. Although the 1854 regulations gave the consuls control over the custom house, the British government backed away from this responsibility. Soon it was agreed that, although foreign nationals, the foreign inspectors were working purely for the emperor of China.³⁸ This innovation had been possible at Shanghai partly because the Chinese authorities, in most precarious circumstances, were represented by a wily rogue who had grown up in the Canton trade rather than with the Confucian classics.

A second innovation was required by the enormous influx of refugees, which created a crisis of municipal administration. As Chinese residences proliferated for rich and poor, all the urban ills and special evils of a sailors' port also accumulated. Protection against fire and disease and maintenance of civil order became equally pressing, and in July 1854 the consuls agreed with taotai Wu on a 'new code of municipal and land regulations'. Building upon the earlier arrangements, these now provided that the consuls should convene an annual meeting of land renters to make provision for building roads, jetties and bridges, keeping them repaired, cleaned, properly lit and drained, and also to establish a police force. This annual meeting would be empowered to assess taxes on land and buildings, and wharfage dues on goods landed. The committee charged with this duty was given a legal capacity to sue defaulters and report its annual accounts. Thus was created a traders' republic with authority to tax and to police the foreign settlement under the treaty-based jurisdiction of the foreign consuls and with the acquiescence of the Chinese government. Aggressive foreigners at Shanghai could create new institu-

³⁸ Stanley F. Wright, *Hart and the Chinese customs*, 91–110; Fairbank, *Trade and diplomacy*, 431–61.

tions there when the imperial officials were weak and local Chinese interests not yet entrenched.

During the decade of continued disorder after 1854 Chinese capital was drawn to Shanghai as the new centre of Sino-Western mercantile co-operation. The comprador merchants from Canton were soon rivalled by merchant bankers from nearby Ningpo, an older emporium which had been the medieval port of entry for trade with Japan and still dominated much of the coast trade from Hangchow Bay to Manchuria. Unlike the Shansi banks which worked closely with officialdom in the interregional transfer of funds, especially in north China, the Ningpo merchant banks (*ch'ien-chuang*) grew up in the lower Yangtze region in connection with the coastal and foreign trade. Developed from money-changing shops of earlier times, they facilitated trade by issuing drafts redeemable in copper currency or silver taels and so creating credit. In particular, the Ningpo banks met the need for credit by developing the transfer-tael system, by which merchants recorded their daily transactions with one another in their bank passbooks, which were then audited by the banks every evening, so that transactions could be settled and payments transferred in the accounts. This created a rudimentary clearing house for credit instruments.

Ningpo bankers had become prominent in the trade of Shanghai early in the nineteenth century and began to play a prominent role in the Shanghai bankers guild. When the opening of the treaty ports stimulated coastal as well as international trade, the local financiers of the tea and silk trades at Shanghai were largely Ningpo men who could rely on the accumulated resources of old merchant families of the Ningpo region. The opium trade fostered the use of promissory notes and bank drafts, while the disruption of trade in the lower Yangtze by the Taiping Rebellion gave further opportunity to the Ningpo-Shanghai bankers. Foreign merchants with their own banks in the treaty ports found it essential to cooperate with the native banks in order to use their clearing house association. Such foreign connections in turn helped the native banks to remain relatively independent of their own government's control.³⁹

OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WAR AT CANTON

The contrast in the Western experiences at Canton and at Shanghai throws light on the foreign role in mid-century China. The primary Ch'ing concern at this time was the spread of rebellion, which expressed deep-

³⁹ Susan Mann Jones, 'Finance in Ningpo: the Ch'ien chuang, 1750-1880', in W. E. Willmott, ed. *Economic organization in Chinese society*, 47-77.

seated ills in China's political economy. As Mr Kuhn indicates in the next chapter, the old order suffered from multiple deficiencies both of structure and of circumstance, to which the Confucian-trained scholar-ruling-class eventually responded with considerable vigour and inventiveness. During the civil war and turmoil of the 1850s within the major provinces, accordingly, the Western merchants, missionaries and military on the coast seemed quite peripheral – only a border problem. Few in numbers though irresistible in firepower, they could fight their way up to Canton, or even, in the end, to Tientsin and Peking, but they could not displace Chinese populations nor rule them without Chinese help. In short, like the Mongol and Manchu invaders of earlier ages, the British could force their way into the power structure of China's composite ruling class and in time play a part in the government of the empire. But they could do this only with Chinese help, only by making a mutual accommodation with the ruling establishment, and only so long as the Chinese populace was not mobilized against them by modern nationalist sentiment. In 1860 the Anglo-French occupation of Peking would force the dynasty to accept the foreigners' treaty privileges and special status in Chinese life, stretching and reshaping the imperial polity. But until 1860 Peking remained domestically embattled and obdurately xenophobic. The Western invaders were still treated as a nuisance to be brushed off while the dynasty struggled to suppress rebellion.

The new Hsien-feng Emperor, who ascended the throne in March 1850 at the age of nineteen, was soon overcome by disaster and proved incapable of wise or strong leadership. Supremely ignorant of the outside world, he was impressed by the success of Hsü Kuang-chin (the governor-general and imperial commissioner at Canton in charge of foreign relations) in mobilizing popular anti-foreignism to keep the British out of the city. In May 1850 a British protest against Hsü's disregard of the treaties was delivered at Tientsin addressed to Mu-chang-a and Ch'i-ying as the officials chiefly responsible for the 1842–4 treaty settlement. The young emperor's response was to denounce and degrade these trusted officials of his father for having given in to the British. Thereafter he supported Hsü and his close colleague, the governor of Kwangtung, Yeh Ming-ch'en, in their policy of avoiding interviews with Western envoys. At the same time he ordered the Shanghai, Nanking and Tientsin authorities to refer all diplomatic contact to the imperial commissioner at Canton. This hard line at Peking led Palmerston in 1851 to consider armed retaliation, but he was dismissed as foreign secretary in December and his successors in London felt less involved in the Anglo-Chinese struggle.

The Anglo-French expedition to China of 1858–60 grew out of the

frustration of a cooperative effort at negotiation for treaty revision in 1854. Several factors made possible this diplomatic effort: British disillusionment as to the chances of trade with the Taiping rebels at Nanking, Anglo-French diplomatic cooperation and military absorption in the Crimean War against Russia during 1854 and 1855, and the presence in China of an American envoy (Robert M. McLane) less suspicious of British perfidy than his predecessor and ready to cooperate with his French and British colleagues. By 1854 foreign opinion, on balance, had found little to hope for from the triumph of the Taipings, and British government policy had settled upon neutrality and non-intervention. France and the United States concurred, and so all three powers sought to further their interests in China through treaty revision. The result was that the three envoys between May and November 1854 tried to get around Yeh Ming-ch'en, who was now governor-general at Canton, by variously presenting complaints and proposals at Foochow, Shanghai and finally, Tientsin. These efforts facilitated the local settlement at Shanghai already noted, but they got nowhere with the court at Peking. After February 1855, when Palmerston came into power as prime minister, the British activists in China grew increasingly restive.⁴⁰

Yeh Ming-ch'en meanwhile had been hard put to deal with rebellion around Canton. Stubbornly committed to resisting the British claim to enter the city, Yeh in Western accounts became a byword for pig-headed non-intercourse, but recent studies suggest that his real achievement during his decade at Canton was to maintain imperial military control at a time when nearby Kwangsi and Hunan and even the Pearl River delta were convulsed by rebellion. Partly because of Yeh's defence of Kwangtung, the Taipings erupted northward from Kwangsi to the Yangtze during 1852. Yet their example inspired a series of risings in Kwangtung. Yeh's efforts to meet these by taxing the gentry to pay the militia coincided with hard times in the Canton area. The rebellion in south China helped divert Fukien teas and Anhwei-Kiangsu silks to the shorter export routes to Shanghai, and so, on the old transport routes south to Canton over the Mei-ling and other passes, boatmen and porters were consequently thrown out of work. Secret societies affiliated with the Triads, like the Small Sword Society that seized the cities of Amoy and Shanghai in 1853, now found their chance. During 1854, the Canton region was engulfed in the revolt of the Red Turbans (Hung-chin). The city itself was saved from pillage only by the loyalty of the rural militia bureaux, which were superimposed upon the local lineage (clan) structures and so

⁴⁰ W. C. Costin, *Great Britain and China 1833-1860*, 141 ff., 180 ff.; J. S. Gregory, *Great Britain and the Taipings*, chs. 1-4.

could screen and organize the people while also supplying relief, controlling prices, and fostering production. All this was accomplished under gentry leadership sanctioned by the throne in principle and by the governor-general in practice. Yeh seems to have been both upright and vigorous in maintaining the examinations, rewarding gentry of merit, and punishing those who committed excesses. But once the Red Turbans had been suppressed, with executions running into scores of thousands in 1855, the Canton gentry remained in a new position of local power, able to support their mercenary and militia forces with trade taxes, while the peasantry were more impoverished than ever. Officially-sanctioned gentry-led militia had been joined by gentry-paid mercenaries who too often behaved like enemies of the common people.⁴¹

The case of the lorcha *Arrow*, which became a *casus belli* in October 1856, exhibited the hybrid features that were becoming typical of the Anglo-Chinese relationship. As a lorcha the vessel had a foreign hull and Chinese rig. The owner was a Chinese but he resided in Hong Kong. The master (Thomas Kennedy) was British but the twelve crew members were Chinese. The *Arrow* had been registered in Hong Kong, but this annual registration had expired eleven days earlier, yet by a colonial ordinance it was entitled to fly the British flag until it should return to Hong Kong. In fact, however, the British flag was probably not flying nor was it pulled down, and the *Arrow* had engaged in piracy. Yeh Ming-ch'en claimed that his police in seizing the crew had captured with them a notorious pirate, such as he had been executing by the hundreds. But Consul Harry Parkes had just returned from England, where Palmerston had agreed that Britain must take a 'high tone' and demand instant Chinese redress for the slightest insult. The consul was backed by his minister, the governor of Hong Kong, Sir John Bowring, a leading liberal of the day, who had come to China first as consul at Canton. Bowring fused his passion for free trade with Harry Parkes' resolute and ruthless faith in gunboat diplomacy.

In October 1856 British naval forces again seized the Bogue forts, and fought their way up to the Factories. They bombarded Yeh's yamen with one gun at ten-minute intervals, breached the city wall, sent a raiding party through the yamen, and generally showed their firepower. But Yeh Ming-ch'en defied them and refused to negotiate. Rather unfairly, considering his achievements, his wooden inflexibility in this crisis was later commemorated in a local jingle: *pu-chan, pu-ho, pu-shou; pu-ssu, pu-hsiang, pu-tsou*, 'He

⁴¹ Wakeman, *Strangers*, chs. 13–15; J. Y. W. Wong, 'The political career of Yeh Ming-ch'en 1807–1859' (St. Antony's College, Oxford DPhil dissertation 1971), citing archives of the Canton governor-general's yamen captured in 1858 and now in the Public Record Office, file FO 682; see his book, *Yeh Ming-ch'en*, Cambridge University Press, 1976.


would not fight, he would not make peace, and he would not put up a defence; he would not die, he would not surrender, and he would not flee.⁴²

Mutual intransigence now led into stalemate. In October 1856 Yeh had closed the Canton custom house and trade came to a halt. In December the Factories were burned. By late February 1857 the British parliament was debating Bowring's actions at Canton. Gladstone and Disraeli won a motion against the government but in the ensuing general election, Palmerston got a majority, which seemed to endorse the further coercion of China. Yet in June the expeditionary force en route to China had to be diverted to help suppress the Indian Mutiny, and so the attack on Canton was delayed until December 1857. By that time France had joined in to avenge the judicial murder of a missionary (Fr Chapdelaine, in Kwangsi in February 1856).

Once they were finally on the scene, the Anglo-French forces totalled about 5,700 men. Bombarding the city on 28 December, they soon mounted the Canton city walls and marched round them. On 4 January 1858, they even sent columns through the city to capture the governor and governor-general. They shipped the obstinate Yeh Ming-ch'en to Calcutta, where he died the next year. The cautious and rather colourless governor, Po-kuei, a Mongol who had seen more than twenty years' service in Kwangtung, they installed in his yamen as one of the first puppet administrators of modern times. In his name an allied commission, naturally dominated by its one Chinese-speaking member, Harry Parkes, governed Canton for three-and-a-half years until October 1861. This joint administration re-opened the port to trade in February 1858 after seventeen months' closure. It kept order within the city by sending through the streets joint patrols of Chinese police and foreign marines, while Chinese legal cases and other routine business continued to be dealt with at the governor's yamen. Po-kuei's proclamations were vetted by Parkes in a back room.

Peking blamed Yeh for the disaster. The court knew in a general way that Governor Po-kuei was under foreign control, but did not discharge or replace him, though others were sent to try to recapture Canton. With purblind optimism Peking hoped that the Cantonese rural militia could drive out the invaders, whereupon the new governor-general, Huang Tsung-han, could assume a middle position and limit the foreigners' demands by virtue of the implacable opposition of the populace. This was an application of the Chinese version of popular sovereignty, that any

⁴² Quoted by Tu Lien-che in Arthur W. Hummel, ed. *Eminent Chinese*, 905. On the Arrow see J. Y. Wong, 'The Arrow incident: a reappraisal', *MAS*, 8.3 (1974) 373-89; J. Y. Wong, 'Harry Parkes and the Arrow War in China', *ibid.* 9.3 (1975) 303-20.



MAP 9. The Peking-Tientsin area in the mid-nineteenth century

regime depends upon popular acquiescence, Heaven's mandate. As the militants put it, 'The foundation of the state is wholly in the hearts of the people, and this is precisely what the British are afraid of.'⁴³ To elicit such gentry-led popular xenophobia was not difficult, but to coerce the invaders was something else. The Ch'ing government needed as always to show its own military prowess, but this it could not do. The Kwangtung militia bureau, which it secretly encouraged, finally mounted an attack on the walls of Canton on 21 July 1858, only to be driven off by British artillery. Meanwhile the peace party had prevailed at Peking, where the treaties of Tientsin had already been accepted (see below).

With no further imperial support, the militia movement now faced the coercion of allied patrols. By the end of 1858 these penetrated farther and farther into the countryside around Canton, marching through the towns and villages to show the flag of a new authority. When 700 British marines approached a militia headquarters and were finally fired upon in January 1859, the British sent 1,300 troops and six gunboats, and in three days of

⁴³ Memorial of Chu Feng-piao and others, presented 30 June 1858, *IWSM-HF*, 27.31b.

fighting seized and burned the headquarters and the village that harboured it. Militia contributions began to dry up. The Canton populace, whose xenophobic wrath had for so long kept these strangers outside the gates, grew accustomed to the Anglo-French maintenance of order. The gentry-led militia movement in the countryside petered out. Here as at Shanghai the barbarian, *faute de mieux*, was being accepted into the local power structure.

THE SETTLEMENT OF 1858

Having won the test of wills at Canton, the British and French allies spent the next two years bringing Peking to terms. The provisioning of the expeditionary forces meant business contracts for British and American firms. Their taipans housed and entertained the military commanders and diplomatic envoys, to whom missionaries also offered their services. Merchant and soldier, statesman and man of God, all formed one community, representing their civilization.

The allies began by proceeding north from Shanghai, though Peking had told them as usual to return to Canton. In April 1858 they arrived off Taku, at the mouth of the river below Tientsin, with several thousand troops in sailing vessels and a score of steam gunboats. No war had been declared; they simply demanded negotiations. In particular Elgin demanded that the Ch'ing negotiators have 'full powers' such as he had from his own sovereign. This idea was strange to China and illogical given the emperor's proximity, but it was part of Elgin's aggressive efforts to get a binding settlement. To back it up, his gunboats broke through the river barrier, seized the Taku forts, and ascended to Tientsin. There the Ch'ing plenipotentiaries, after much protest, finally signed new treaties in June 1858 with Britain, France, Russia and the United States. The Russian and American envoys came along in their own vessels as unarmed neutral observers and secured in similar treaties nearly all the privileges for which the allies had fought.

The key British negotiator at Tientsin, along with T. F. Wade, was the young interpreter, Horatio Nelson Lay, son of the first consul at Canton, who since mid-1855 had been the principal foreign inspector in the Shanghai customs, and was now 'on loan' from this Chinese post to assist Lord Elgin.⁴⁴ When the aged grandee, Ch'i-ying, was sent by the court in a last-ditch effort again to work his charms upon the British, Lay, aged twenty-six, quoted to him his own memorials to the emperor, seized in the Canton yamen, in which Ch'i-ying had depicted the barbarians' uncouth-

⁴⁴ Jack J. Gerson, *Horatio Nelson Lay and Sino-British relations 1854-1864*, citing papers of Lay, Lord Elgin and Sir F. Bruce.

ness; he was accordingly discountenanced. This damaged the dynasty's posture also, and after a trial the emperor let Ch'i-ying strangle himself.

Lord Elgin wanted to establish a British envoy in Peking in order to bypass Canton and press the imperial government to enforce the treaties, as a means not only to foster trade but also to curb the conduct of British subjects. In China he felt bitter at those who 'for the most selfish objects, are trampling under foot this ancient civilization'. Later he wrote, 'I have seen more to disgust me with my fellow-countrymen than I saw during the whole course of my previous life.' British diplomacy, he felt, having secured the treaty privileges, must check their misuse. This view of the Englishman's burden in China reinforced his vigorous insistence on having a resident minister in Peking. This was his (and Lay's) own idea; both London and the other envoys at Tientsin were willing to settle for occasional visits to the capital; to this the court was also agreeable, providing the rules for tribute missions were followed.⁴⁵

At Peking the resident minister issue raised a furore of denunciatory memorials from war-minded civilian officials. By asserting the equality of sovereigns, resident ministers would topple the tribute system and so destroy the proper order of things (*i-chih*). At an imperial conference of 23 June the largely uninformed advocates of war, confronted with the fact of allied military power, still denounced the treaty's resident minister clause. But it was included in the British treaty which the Ch'ing negotiators signed at Tientsin on 26 June, without imperial approval, in order to forestall an allied advance on Peking; the emperor approved the whole treaty on 3 July.

Once this imperial edict had confirmed the treaty clauses accepted at Tientsin, the foreign troops and diplomats departed even more quickly than they had at Nanking in 1842. Lord Elgin sailed off to Japan to inaugurate Anglo-Japanese relations. The new tariff and trade regulations were negotiated at Shanghai in late October (signed 8 November) by a Chinese team that included the Canton merchant-officials Wu Ch'ung-yüeh (Howqua IV) and P'an Shih-ch'eng as well as the Shanghai taotai Hsüeh Huan and Governor-General Ho Kuei-ch'ing (nominally at Nanking, actually at Ch'ang-chou). Between them these Chinese negotiators represented both the continued Cantonese interest in the profits of foreign trade and the Lower Yangtze officials' urgent concern for customs revenues to use against the Taipings.

⁴⁵ On Elgin's struggle to control the China hands, see Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *China's entrance into the family of nations: the diplomatic phase 1858-1880*, ch. 5. For quotations, T. Walrond, *Letters and journals of James, eighth Earl of Elgin*, 212-13, 252-3.

In sharp contrast the Hsien-feng Emperor now advocated a 'secret plan' posited on the naïve belief that the greedy British would give up their treaty clauses providing for a resident minister, inland trade, inland travel and indemnity in exchange for an imperial exemption from all customs duties on British trade with China. This simple-minded concept, which Hsien-feng abandoned only with reluctance, showed how little the court understood the interests now at play in Anglo-Chinese relations. In January 1859 Ho Kuei-ch'ing was made concurrently imperial commissioner in charge of Western relations: the court saw this only as substituting Shanghai for Canton, and refused Ho's suggestion that the new post should be a full-time diplomatic job. The principal Tientsin negotiator, Kuei-liang (1785–1862), now succeeded at Shanghai in persuading Elgin to make the British minister's residence at Peking optional rather than mandatory. In return he agreed to let the British explore the Yangtze without waiting for the exchange of treaty ratifications. Accordingly in the last weeks of 1858 Elgin with Lay and others sailed, in a fleet of five war steamers, 600 miles up the Yangtze past Chinkiang, Nanking, Anking and Kiukiang to Hankow, in order to select the best new ports for trade. This precipitate exploration of the Yangtze naturally alarmed the imperial officials struggling there against the Taipings. (The Tientsin treaty had provided for opening Chinkiang to trade a year after its signing but no other ports till after the Taipings had been defeated.) Elgin's feat of exploration arranged during the Shanghai tariff settlement, suggests the strength of the combined British and Chinese interest in trade expansion.

The improved and expanded charter of foreign privileges thus put on paper at Tientsin and Shanghai in 1858 was again chiefly a British creation. It levied indemnities totalling about 16 million taels, roughly tripled the number of treaty ports, confirmed the unusual right of foreign participation in China's coastal and riverine carrying trade, permitted foreign travel in the interior under passports, opened the Yangtze (as noted above) as far as Hankow once the rebellion had been suppressed, provided for tariff duties of 5 per cent *ad valorem* (except as otherwise enumerated) and a single transit duty payment of half that amount, urged the extension of a unified foreign inspectorate of customs to all the ports, and finally, legalized the opium trade. The steady growth of this trade in the midst of disorder had reached the point where the foreign and Chinese opium importers had jointly sought the protection of the treaty ports, where the Chinese local authorities were now levying a regularly publicized opium import duty.

The new treaties specified a great many other arrangements that ex-

perience had shown to be desirable for foreign trade in China. But most of all they demonstrated how far a community of interest had grown up between the foreign merchants and their governments and the Ch'ing officials at the treaty ports. This common interest centred around the suppression of rebellion and the regulation of trade expansion, which would spell profit to foreign merchants, revenue to Chinese authorities, and survival to the dynasty.

On the British side, in his negotiations in 1858, Lord Elgin found himself between two interest groups: the chauvinist, expansive-minded treaty port merchants on the one side, and on the other, certain British administrators in the foreign office, Hong Kong and the consulates, who desired to set up a workable system of trade privileges, not too excessive for the Chinese government to accept and thereafter maintain. Since the foreign inspectorate of customs had proved its value as a revenue producer and a mechanism for mediation of commercial disputes between foreign merchants and Chinese tax collectors, it was one thing the negotiators of both sides could agree upon.

THE IMPERIAL POLITY *v.* TRADE EXPANSION

In essence, Elgin in 1858 was demanding two things, that the China market be opened more widely for Western commerce and that the Chinese state enter the modern state system. In revising the treaties at Tientsin, his major aim had been to secure the residence of an envoy at Peking, or at least his occasional visits there, so that the system of treaty rights could be supported by diplomatic pressure. Only a minister at Peking, the British were convinced, could get around the Cantonese xenophobia and secure imperial enforcement, from the centre, of the rights of trade, travel and contact which the British merchants and missionaries desired in the provinces. (Later some diplomats would admit that they had had an exaggerated idea of the imperial power over the provinces.) Since the British minister did not propose to kowtow at Peking, this demand implied the end of China's age-old assumption of the emperor's superiority over all outside rulers. Yet the British had no desire to weaken China's central government any more than necessary to secure trading opportunities and a modern type of relationship. Britain wanted no territorial control and opposed the prospect of partition or dismemberment of China's outlying regions. (This had already been foreshadowed by the Russian advance of the 1840s and 1850s down the Amur to the Maritime Province, and into central Asia.)

On the Chinese side in 1858, the Ch'ing court faced a domestic crisis

of rebellion that seemed all but mortal – so severe that by August 1860 it would give a Chinese, Tseng Kuo-fan, wide military and fiscal powers to command the whole effort to destroy the Taipings in the lower Yangtze heartland (see chapter 6). Peking's acquiescence in the Anglo-French demands of 1858 must be seen in this context of domestic priorities. As summarized in retrospect in January 1861, the Taiping and Nien rebels seemed to Peking a mortal disease within the body; Russia, nibbling away at Ch'ing territory, was a threat to the bosom; while Britain, with its violent demands for trade, was only 'an affliction of our limbs'.⁴⁶ There was never a real alternative to appeasing the British and French by giving them their treaties, once they showed their military superiority.

Nevertheless, the Ch'ing tradition of empire was not lightly to be given up, least of all by the informal council of Manchu princes that met periodically in Peking to advise the emperor. The whole court had generally gone along with the heightened xenophobia and non-intercourse policy of the early 1850s. Only as the allied forces advanced from Canton to Tientsin had opinion divided into diehard and pragmatic wings. In general, ignorant memorialists out of power were most fanatically belligerent, whereas the unhappy few who had to negotiate were most aware of foreign firepower and most ready to counsel prudence.

In particular, the Nanking governor-general, Ho Kuei-ch'ing, better informed about the Westerners at Shanghai, recognized the strictly commercial ambitions of the British and advocated a settlement with them so as to get their help against the Taipings. Like the 'Canton interest' of pre-treaty days, a 'Shanghai interest' had now emerged on the Chinese side. It was represented by trade-minded Shanghai taotais like 'Samqua' (Wu Chien-chang) and Hsüeh Huan, a Szechwanese who held principal posts at Shanghai from 1849 and in the hierarchy of Kiangsu province from 1858. This new breed of mercantile officials, pragmatists if not opportunists, found an overlap of interests with ambitious British administrators like young Lay, who had risen also as a middleman between East and West. As the Chinese-speaking foreign inspector at Shanghai, he had developed wide contacts with local Chinese officials. He not only brought them mounting customs revenues but also information and advice on the whole foreign problem. While Western merchants condemned his arrogance, and some consuls hated him as a rival in status, the British authorities valued his knowledge of Chinese local affairs and supported the extension to all ports of the foreign inspectorate principle.

⁴⁶ Memorial of Prince Kung and others, received 13 January 1861, *IWASM-HF*, 71.18 ff., partly translated in Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's response to the West*, 48.

Lay had in fact worked out the new trade regulations of 1858 with Hsüeh Huan, which promised increased revenues just at the time when the lower Yangtze provinces were most hard pressed for funds to combat the Taipings. In this way Ch'ing officials in the treaty port provinces were ready for a variety of reasons to support a peace policy at court whenever the fortunes of war dampened the hopes of the war advocates.

Appeasement was supported first of all by the men who had to deal with the barbarian problem. The aged Kuei-liang (1785–1862), one of the most experienced Manchu administrators, who had been governor-general in four different posts, had been the principal signer of the Tientsin treaties. The Ch'ing commander-in-chief at Tientsin, Senggerinchin (Seng-ko-lin-ch'in), a high Mongol retainer of the Ch'ing, submitted starkly realistic reports of the allied military power. At the capital the Hsien-feng Emperor's brother, I-hsin, later known to foreigners as Prince Kung, eventually became the leading advocate of realism, in opposition to the majority of princes. Yet once the Tientsin treaties had been accepted and the allied withdrawal in the summer of 1858 had relaxed the pressure, bellicosity had re-emerged.

The main sticking point at Peking was now the issue of state-to-state equality, the same as it had been for so long at Canton. Though impressed by foreign power, the court could only envisage the foreign ministers coming to Peking under the old rules for tribute envoys – wearing Chinese costume, travelling by the post stations, escorted by Chinese officials, and as guests of the Chinese government, once in three or five years. Anything more than this would damage the proper dignity (*t'i-chih*) of the regime. Since the imperial rule depended so largely on its prestige, this loss of dignity would seriously erode its basis of power in the Chinese state and society. Even as late as March 1859 the emperor was still prescribing that barbarian envoys coming to Peking should have a retinue of not over ten persons, who should not bear weapons and in Peking should not ride in sedan chairs or form a procession.⁴⁷

By mid-1859, there was a wide gap between this intransigence at Peking and the practical Sino-foreign collaboration then going on at Canton and Shanghai. As would be the case in 1900, the treaty system continued to function in commercial centres under foreign naval domination while being violently opposed at the political-ideological centre of the empire, in Peking. At Canton the failure of the militia movement to expel the barbarians led to the recall of Huang Tsung-han as imperial commissioner to recover Canton in May 1859. In that month the puppet-governor (Po-

⁴⁷ On Ch'ing policy considerations, see Hsü, *China's entrance*, chs. 6–7; and Masataka Banno, *China and the West 1858–1861: the origins of the Tsungli Yamen*, 29–30.

kuei) died and the post of Canton governor and acting governor-general was formally given to a moderate, Lao Ch'ung-kuang, who was capable of pursuing China's interest while cooperating with the allied commission.

As one example of the Sino-foreign cooperation necessitated by the conditions of the time, Lao joined with Parkes and Alcock, who was now British consul at Canton, to try to control the coolie trade. By 1859 the evils in this trade had reached frightening proportions. British interest in securing contract labour to work in colonial areas like the British West Indies had led during the 1850s to a dual policy, first, to encourage China to relax its ban on emigration and second, to devise regulations to mitigate the evils attending it. But now Chinese crimps in Canton were seizing people in broad daylight just outside their doors in order to sell them to the foreign coolie shippers. Righteous Chinese mobs killed some kidnappers and Chinese officials executed others. Yet local unemployment, destitution and the demand and opportunity overseas, all combined to keep the emigration going. The problem was how to inspect and regulate the procedures so that legitimate emigration might occur without kidnapping and coercion.

For this purpose Governor-General Lao in effect legalized emigration locally, and eventually British and Chinese officials jointly supervised the licensing and inspection of emigration houses ('barracoons') and the free signing of contracts in their presence. This Canton system, however, was flouted by other foreigners and Chinese, at Macao and places on the coast beyond the control of Lao or Parkes, where receiving ships traded in 'pigs' or human exports, much as they had formerly handled opium imports.⁴⁸ The attempt to control this Sino-foreign connivance in a public evil gave the Chinese and British local authorities still another common interest.

Meantime at Shanghai Ho Kuei-ch'ing, as the new imperial commissioner in charge of relations with the treaty powers, continued to work out the details of the amplified treaty system. For this purpose he had welcomed H. N. Lay back from Elgin's staff, explaining to Peking that because Lay was so vigorous against smuggling and consequently so unpopular as customs inspector, he had gone with Elgin, and at Tientsin had 'made a great display of violence and ingratiated himself'; yet on return to Shanghai 'was as compliant as ever in our employ'.⁴⁹ Ho's appointment to handle foreign relations had also brought the Shanghai trade-minded officials into power. The Shanghai taotai Wu Hsü in February instructed Lay to hire foreign customs personnel with a guaran-

⁴⁸ Robert Lee Irick, 'Ch'ing policy toward the coolie trade, 1847-1878' (Harvard University PhD dissertation, 1971) 110-61.

⁴⁹ Memorial of Ho Kuei-ch'ing received 5 October 1858, *IWASM-HF*, 30.44 ff.; Swisher, *China's management*, 522.

tee of three-years' salary. On 23 May 1859, Ho Kuei-ch'ing, as imperial commissioner finally appointed Lay to be chief inspector of customs (or inspector-general, as Lay translated it) to carry out rule 10 of the Trade Regulations: that 'one uniform system shall be enforced at every port', the person appointed to administer it being quite independent of the British or any other foreign government. Lay had already accompanied Elgin up the Yangtze in late 1858 as his interpreter and had been in the south to discuss setting up foreign inspectorates at the other ports. In May 1859 also the Canton Hoppo, Heng-ch'i, had asked that a foreign inspectorate be established there. He had got advice from taotai Wu Chien-chang and his successor Wu Hsü at Shanghai. The upshot was that Lay brought the Shanghai regulations to Canton, saw Lao Ch'ung-kuang and Heng-ch'i, and got the Canton customs to adopt the Shanghai rules from 24 October 1859. In December the throne received Lao's conclusion that in order to levy duties on the Canton trade, in the face of Sino-foreign collusion, the only way was 'to follow the Shanghai system and employ foreigners to control foreigners'. Consul Alcock at Canton had meanwhile transferred a young interpreter, Robert Hart, from the allied commission back to the consulate. (On 30 June 1860, Hart would resign from the British service to work for Lay in the Canton customs.)⁵⁰ All this had gone forward before the rupture at Taku in June 1859. China's foreign relations were running on two tracks.

The unexpected hostilities off the mouth of the Peiho at Taku below Tientsin in June 1859, when treaty ratifications were expected to be exchanged at Peking, were partly due to imperfect communications. Seng-gerinchin had fortified Taku with foreign cannon and expected the envoys to take a route to the north via Pei-t'ang. But the British and French envoys' instructions called for entering Taku and this, when challenged, they tried to do by force. Inadequately prepared and with their landing force soon stuck in the mud, on the tidal flat, the British suffered 432 casualties and lost four gunboats. The British minister, Sir Frederick Bruce, Elgin's younger brother, later admitted that his right to go to Peking as provided in the treaty he brought for ratification, was not yet legally established. The real issue, as usual, was a test of wills.

This unexpected Ch'ing victory at Taku put the war advocates at Peking again in the ascendant. In August 1859 the Tientsin treaties were abrogated so as to avoid the four things still most distasteful – permanent diplomatic representation in Peking, opening of the Yangtze to trade, foreign travel

⁵⁰ *IWASM-HF*, 45.37–37b, memorial received 2 December 1859. By October the Hoppo Heng-ch'i had invited Hart to be deputy commissioner at Canton, see enc. 1 in Canton's 39, FO 682/1785. Lay's appointment as inspector-general was reconfirmed by Prince Kung with imperial approval in January 1861.

in the interior, and an indemnity. These things were not in the American treaty, and the American minister (John E. Ward) had exchanged treaty ratifications in Peking on 16 August 1859, by dint of travelling there from Pei-t'ang with a small retinue by cart, tribute style. The court wanted Britain and France to follow this example.

In London the Taku fiasco raised doubts in Parliament as to the need for a resident minister, but the Russell government wound up asserting its absolute necessity. Taku sanctioned the British hard line. Elgin had earlier been fêted in London for opening China with minimal bloodshed; now he had to go back and really do it. The Anglo-French response to the Taku defeat was to bring back to north China in the summer of 1860 an even larger expeditionary force – over 60 French ships with 6,300 troops, 143 British transports with 10,500 troops, plus a formidable Cantonese coolie corps of 2,500 men recruited from the Hong Kong underworld. The allied plenipotentiaries, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, refused all negotiations at Shanghai. Their 200 sail converged upon the coast outside Tientsin and on 1 August they landed unopposed at Pei-t'ang, north of Taku. Thence they soon reduced the heavily defended Taku forts and on 25 August began entering Tientsin.

THE SETTLEMENT OF 1860

Just as Elgin had relied upon Lay to play the 'uncontrollably fierce barbarian' in 1858, so he now relied upon Parkes as his chief interpreter and representative. The durable Kuei-liang and other Peking envoys came to Tientsin to propose terms, but the court tried as stubbornly as ever to salvage the essential elements of tributary procedure, proposing that the foreign envoys (even with 400 guards of their own) should be escorted to Peking and lodged and supplied there according to the Ch'ing regulations. While exchanging communications, the allies refused to stop their advance or consider any terms until they reached T'ung-chou, the head of canal navigation a dozen miles east of Peking. Negotiating there with Parkes on 17 September the Manchu prince (Tsai-yüan, the sixth Prince I) who had now superseded Kuei-liang, found that the allies demanded an imperial audience to exchange ratifications. At the same time the allies found Senggerinchin's troops had prepared an ambush, and therefore attacked them. Thus 18 September was a breaking point. Parkes and his party of twenty-five British and thirteen Frenchmen were seized and jailed in irons. On 21 September the allied forces defeated the imperial troops again, closer to Peking, and next day the emperor fled beyond the Wall to Jehol, leaving his brother Prince Kung to pick up the pieces.

Parkes was held and pressured, though not actually tortured, for three weeks while Elgin and Gros had to temporize, awaiting munitions from Tientsin. Since Harry Parkes, now aged thirty-two, had been the chief foreigner in the government of Canton for two-and-a-half years, the bitter-end resisters at Peking not unnaturally prized him as a powerful chieftain. They sent his erstwhile colleague as Hoppo at Canton, Heng-ch'i, to reason with him every day. In the final crunch, when the distant emperor ordered the execution of the hostages, Heng-ch'i got Parkes and twelve others out alive. The rest were killed, and Elgin and Gros, determined to penalize the emperor personally and ostentatiously, burned his summer palace, Yüan Ming Yüan, north-west of the city, which had already been looted by the foreign armies.

Peking in the autumn of 1860 saw a diplomatic tangle. French rivalry with Britain was intense in Europe at this time. Thirsting for empire, the French were already getting a lodgment in Vietnam while standing forth in China as the protectors of Roman Catholic Christianity.⁵¹ Meanwhile skilful Russian diplomats, playing both sides to their own interest, had advised both the allied invaders and the Ch'ing defenders. The Russian Orthodox Church mission in Peking gave them an inside vantage point from which to try to mediate, or seem to mediate, between the antagonists while they sought confirmation of their own territorial claims in the north-east (see chapter 7). In the local pecking order the Americans were near bottom, having exchanged treaty ratifications in 1859 in an ignominious fashion, while the British, bearing the major burden, were at the top and called the tune.

I-hsin, Prince Kung (1833-98), had grown up quite close to his half-brother the Hsien-feng Emperor and at first had been quite warlike; in now favouring compromise with the invaders he found himself in a minority at court. At the age of twenty-seven, inexperienced outside the capital, he now had to juggle the fate of the dynasty. With the advice of more experienced Manchus, especially Kuei-liang and Heng-ch'i, he negotiated the Conventions of Peking, which confirmed the 1858 treaty documents while adding to the indemnities and ceding to Britain the Kowloon peninsula at Hong Kong. Winter was approaching, supplies were dwindling, and Elgin and Gros were under pressure of circumstance to withdraw their forces. In November 1860, soon after the conventions were signed, the Anglo-French forces departed, leaving behind only a garrison at Tientsin. British diplomacy was thenceforth devoted to supporting the party of Sino-foreign peace and compromise, now headed by Prince Kung. The British had avoided a blockade which would have harmed the trading class with whom they were dealing so successfully in

⁵¹ John F. Cady, *The roots of French imperialism in eastern Asia*.

the south. Now they sought to strengthen the power holders in Peking with whom they had made their settlement. Thus was confirmed the beginning of another era of synarchy.

The final turn towards the new order was not taken for another year. The Hsien-feng Emperor refused to return to Peking, thus avoiding the issue of audience and the kotow from the foreign ministers resident there. In August 1861 he died, and the leading princes at Jehol took power as co-regents for the new child-emperor. But in November the two empresses dowager acting with Prince Kung in a *coup d'état* seized the regent princes and executed their main rivals for power (see chapter 9). A new leadership thus took control of the dynasty. It now dealt with new foreign envoys in Peking and new Chinese commanders of armies battling the Taipings in central China. The invaders were pacified, but Ch'ing survival still depended on suppressing the great rebellion.

Further study should show that the major event of the late 1850s in China's foreign relations, unremarked beneath the eye-catching manoeuvres of gunboats, soldiers and diplomats, was the build-up of the Sino-foreign trading community. The volume and value of trade increased, even though erratically, in this period of warfare and instability, while personnel emerged on both sides capable of working together for common ends: merchants, compradors and treaty port mandarins on the Chinese side; merchants, consular officers and missionaries on the foreign side. Thus the English-educated Cantonese, Tong King-sing, who would later be Jardine's chief comprador and then head of Li Hung-chang's Chinese government steamship line, was interpreter and chief secretary in the Shanghai customs from 1857 to 1861. Hsüeh Huan, the Shanghai taotai from 1857, would be governor of Kiangsu and imperial commissioner in 1860-2 and in the Tsungli Yamen at Peking in 1863-7. Examples could be multiplied.

The unequal treaty system thus inaugurated by gunboat diplomacy – meaning military and naval coercion – gave to the foreign treaty powers a considerable measure of sovereign licence in China. These features were established by 1860: consular jurisdiction over treaty power nationals (extraterritoriality), foreign administrative control of concession areas in treaty ports, foreign warships in Chinese waters and troops on Chinese soil, foreign shipping in China's coastal trade and inland navigation, and tariffs limited by treaty. In later years additional foreign rights and privileges would further reduce the scope of Chinese sovereignty.⁵²

⁵² For various definitions of the scope of the unequal treaties see Hungdah Chiu, 'Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese views of unequal treaties', in J. A. Cohen, ed. *China's practice of international law*.

Superior foreign power – commercial, financial, military, industrial and technological generally – would increasingly impinge upon China's traditional society, state and culture with devastating effect.

In looking back over the first phase of this process, we may note several aspects of Ch'ing weakness: first, Ch'ing military power and administrative capacity vis-à-vis the Western powers disintegrated in an era dominated by domestic rebellions. Internal disorder (*nei-luan*) truly invited foreign trouble (*wai-huan*). Second, the underlying weakness was intellectual-institutional, that is, an habituated ignorance of foreign realities and a wilful refusal to take them into account. This was evidenced most notably in the purblind adherence to an imperial polity of asserted supremacy over all foreign sovereigns. Peking refused intercourse on equal terms until it was perforce extorted on unequal terms.

The treaty system after 1860 must be viewed as a special sector of the Chinese polity in which Chinese sovereignty was not extinguished, but was overlaid or supplanted by that of the treaty powers. In the traditional sector of the political economy throughout the hinterland, there was little immediate change. Similarly in relations with nearby states tribute missions continued to come to Peking as though nothing had happened. Between 1860 and 1894 tribute was presented from Korea in twenty-five years, from Liu-ch'iu in eight years, from Annam (Vietnam) in five years, from Nepal four times and from Burma once. But meanwhile in the modern growth sector along the coasts and up the navigable rivers, and especially in the treaty ports, a new mixed polity took shape. Gunboats represented the foreign authority in the treaty ports and on the water routes. This growth of foreign military power in China later inspired the gradual building up of Ch'ing military forces with Western arms, eventually with steamships to form a navy, but it was too late to keep the foreigner out.

In its economic aspects, the mixed Sino-foreign order was at first mainly confined to the foreign trade, where Chinese merchants joined with their foreign counterparts. There was also a foreign consular element in the administration of the new cities that grew up at the ports. Since the British minister at Peking and his consuls in the treaty ports, with their nearby gunboats of the Royal Navy, now formed a constituent element in the Chinese power structure, it was perfectly feasible for the Chinese Maritime Customs Service under its inspector-general to work closely with both the Chinese and the foreign elements. One must think back to the rich repertoire of historical precedents for the use of non-Chinese to control China's foreign trade. After the Mongol conquest of the Southern Sung, for example, the *ortaq* ('partners') or corporations of central Asian muslim merchants, who exercised tax-farming privileges in a 'partnership

with the Mongolian nobility', began by the late 1280s to play 'the leading role . . . in maritime commerce'.⁵³ After 1860, the customs commissioners in the ports were administrative colleagues of the Chinese superintendents of customs, but social confrères of the foreign consuls. Robert Hart, at Peking, was an employee of the Tsungli Yamen and adviser of its head, Prince Kung, but at the same time a fellow national and close adviser also of the British minister.

THE TREATY SYSTEM IN PRACTICE

As the Manchu negotiators, the young Prince Kung and his aged colleagues Kuei-liang and Wen-hsiang, dealt with the British in the late autumn of 1860 they began to see how the dynastic interest could be preserved in the face of civil war and foreign invasion. While the allied forces withdrew from north China, the British secured Ch'ing permission to inaugurate trade on the Yangtze beyond Chinkiang to Hankow, without waiting for the suppression of rebellion there as required in the treaty. This ultra-treaty concession represented a convergence of motives: Lord Elgin and the new British minister, his younger brother Sir Frederick Bruce, could meet the Shanghai merchants' demand for access to China's vast interior market; the Chinese provincial authorities battling the Taipings could count on an increase of maritime customs revenue to be collected on the Yangtze trade at Shanghai, and the Ch'ing dynasty, as Prince Kung put it, 'not only need not worry about [the British] being harmful but on the contrary might even make use of them'.⁵⁴ T. F. Wade surmised Peking's reasoning to be that since British trade privileges had been granted by Peking, Taiping taxation of trade would be resisted and Taiping-British hostility would result.

With Peking's permission a British expedition led by Harry Parkes with Admiral Hope and ten naval vessels went up the Yangtze in February-March 1861 and arranged for British trade, under passes granted by the customs, with the ports of Chinkiang, Kiukiang and Hankow. Arms were specially controlled. The Taipings at Nanking also agreed to permit British trade on the River. Duties on the new Yangtze trade were to be collected at Shanghai or Chinkiang. But the Yangtze trade at once increased the problem of customs regulation. British and American merchants were securing special consular permits to fly their national flags on hired Chinese vessels carrying teas down the Yangtze. This concession

⁵³ Herbert Franz Schurmann, *Economic structure of the Yüan dynasty*, 4, 224.

⁵⁴ *IWSM-HF*, 70.5. Britten Dean, *China and Great Britain: the diplomacy of commercial relations, 1860-1864*.

to foster legal trade was soon being used by unscrupulous foreign smugglers 'to evade native customs by hoisting the British flag . . . and evade Maritime Customs by posing . . . as native craft'.⁵⁵

Bruce and Prince Kung, aided by Hart, negotiated new trade rules in mid-1861: British trade on inland waters was facilitated while the evils of smuggling and selling contraband to rebels were discouraged. Prince Kung reported to the throne that 'in this rapprochement Hart (Ho-te) has been of the greatest help. Although a foreigner, Hart is naturally well-bred and agreeable and what he says makes a lot of sense. He is also very eager to get the inspector general's salary, and so is quite willing to work hard as an intermediary.'⁵⁶

From this time policy disputes between aggressive British merchants and their government became a regular phenomenon. Lord Elgin in 1858 had exhumed from the Hong Kong archives the 1852 report of W. H. Mitchell which argued that China's commercial self-sufficiency made the merchants' hopes for enormous sales in China quite illusory. With all trade barriers removed, prophesied Lord Elgin, 'the manufacturing West will be in presence of a population the most universally and laboriously manufacturing of any on the earth'.⁵⁷ Hopes should not be too high. But both the British and the Ch'ing had extremist elements to contend with and try to keep within bounds. The British administrators' main problem was to placate the firms that invoked doctrines of free trade as the sanction for exploitation of Chinese markets by every means available, legal and illegal. Meanwhile the Ch'ing had to contend not only with patriotic or xenophobic scholar-gentry who wanted to drive off the British but also with the very different element of 'Chinese traitors', traders and opium smugglers who put profit above all.

By the early 1860s the treaty system's potentialities were becoming evident: not only were foreigners dominant in China's foreign trade and exchange; foreign land renters owned real estate in trading centres like Tientsin and Hankow as well as Canton and Shanghai, which were becoming China's major cities; foreign steamships, the latest product of technological progress, competed with Chinese junks in coastal and riverine waters by offering greater speed and protection against piracy and better arrangements for insurance; foreign merchants by securing transit passes that exempted foreign-owned goods from likin charges could be

⁵⁵ Dean, 54.

⁵⁶ *IWSM-HF*, 79.21. For Hart's earliest available Chinese correspondence as a Ch'ing official (in a florid but precise style), see the papers of the Shanghai taotai Wu Hsü, *Wu Hsü tang-an-chung ti T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao hsün-chi*, 204.

⁵⁷ Quoted by Nathan A. Pelcovits, *Old China hands and the foreign office*, 18, from Elgin's address at Shanghai, in FO 17/287.

the patrons of Chinese merchants inland; the treaty tariff strictly limited China's taxation of foreign trade while the new Maritime Customs Service would ensure equal terms of competition and provide modern harbour and navigation facilities, trade statistics and some mediation of disputes; meanwhile, the increasing speed of steamships and extension of the telegraph and cable by degrees from Europe to the Far East brought the China trade more fully into the world market and subject to its vicissitudes. Protected by extraterritoriality in both his person and his property, the foreigner in China was thus in a position after 1860 to sustain and augment his role as part of the empire's multi-racial ruling class. The result was less an exploitation of China in a colonial style – which would have stressed the extracting of raw materials and profits and providing of jobs for a Western officialdom – than it was a privileged foreign participation in the attempted Westernization of Chinese life. This was to have psychological repercussions at least as important as the economic effects. By default of the conservative mandarin and scholar-gentry, foreigners within the gates were in a position, or so they hoped, to become in some cases 'modernizers' of the country.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ On Robert Hart's efforts see *The IG in Peking. Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese maritime customs, 1868–1907*, ed. by John K. Fairbank, Katharine Frost Bruner, and Elizabeth Macleod Matheson. On the subsequent frustration of many treaty port ambitions, see Rhoads Murphey, *The outsiders: the Western experience in India and China*.

CHAPTER 6

THE TAIPING REBELLION

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Taiping Rebellion (1851–64) was in many respects the hinge between China's pre-modern and modern histories. Its gigantic human catastrophes in the interior formed a backdrop for early Sino-Western treaty relations along the coast, and, along with the treaty system itself, gave notice of the imminent collapse of China's traditional order. Some themes of the rebellion had deep historical roots, while others grew from problems peculiar to the Ch'ing period. The enormities of social injustice, the decline of imperial and local administration, and the loss of bureaucratic morale are themes common to dynastic crises. Soaring population growth and massive internal migration were Ch'ing problems whose effects had been felt in social disorder and inter-ethnic conflict since the eighteenth century. Yet foreign contact itself had provided a new historical catalyst: an alien religion that generated a furious assault on China's existing social structure and values. The way this assault was met by the ruling elite conditioned the political and social environment of China's modern history.

The social background

The anarchy that gripped Kwangsi province by the 1840s stemmed partly from the disruptive effects of foreign contact, and partly from the region's unique social complexity. From 1795 to 1809 the south and south-eastern coasts had been scourged by bands of pirates, some sponsored by impetuous rulers of Annam (Vietnam). In Kwangsi these corsairs forged onshore links with Triad chapters (see chapter 3, p. 134), and a complex pattern of outlawry began to emerge. It was not long thereafter that the south China underworld entered the more lucrative field of opium distribution, as the drug traffic began to flourish in the 1820s and 1830s. The post-Opium War decade introduced new forms of social dislocation into neighbouring Kwangtung province. Thousands were thrown out of work when the opening of Shanghai diverted trade away from its traditional

routes northward from Canton. Mercenaries hired to fight the British were suddenly demobilized, and many could survive only as bandits. Finally, gangs of hardened pirates from coastal regions were forced by British naval power to migrate inland. By the mid-1840s, outlaws from these several sources, many under Triad leadership, had found their way westward into Kwangsi. In the Kwangsi river system they made their new habitat, and as 'boat bandits' (*t'ing-fei*) injected a new component of violence into the already unstable environment.

That environment was becoming increasingly volatile as a result of the merging of the secret-society and sectarian movements discussed above (chapter 3) with inter-ethnic enmities. This was a portentous development, for it meant that alienated social groups were now exposed to new complexes of ideas that could give political content to their struggle for survival. Signs of this new pattern first became visible in the ethnically heterogeneous Hunan-Kwangsi border area. In 1836 the southern Hunan districts of Hsin-ning and Wu-kang were torn by a rebellion led by Lan Cheng-tsun, a tribesman of the Yao minority who was also chieftain of a White Lotus cult recently imported from Szechwan. Lan's uprising was suppressed, but the cult survived, to emerge later under another Yao leader, Lei Tsai-hao. Lei's group was more complex. Besides elements of Lan's old group, it included Triad cadres (*t'ieh-pan*) and formed links with Han Triads across the border in Kwangsi. The rebellion of Lei Tsai-hao, which broke out in 1847, thus represented a successful penetration of minority groups by the Triad Society.¹

Lei's uprising, too, was mercilessly suppressed, this time by militia corps led by local gentry. But the fires of revolt in the border area burned on. Famine in 1849 brought renewed violence, led this time by one of Lei's old Triad followers, Li Yüan-fa. Li himself seems to have been a Han, but he had not forgotten the movement's beginnings in the distressed minority settlements. After vainly besieging the city of Hsin-ning, he and his followers set forth on a long odyssey through thirteen districts of Hunan, Kweichow and Kwangsi, seeking to mobilize the poor of both Han and aboriginal stocks. With Li's ultimate defeat, the tragedy of the Hsin-ning rebellions was played out. But the pattern of sectarianism among minority groups was soon repeated, this time in a form that was to leave a deeper historical impression: the infusion of a new sectarian tradition – of hybrid Sino-Western origins – into the immigrant Hakka (*K'o-chia*, guest people), a linguistically distinct subethnic group.

¹ *Hsin-ning hsien-chih*, 1893 edn, 16.6–9. On earlier relations between Triads and Yao, see conflicting accounts of a Yao rebellion of 1832 in southern Hunan: Wei Yüan, *Sheng-wu chi*, 7.41–5; and Hsu K'o, comp. *Ch'ing-pai lei-ch'ao*, 66.10–11.

Kwangsi society in the late 1840s was becoming rapidly militarized as a result of chronic banditry and the rising tide of vendettas between Hakka and Punti (*pen-ti*, indigenous) communities. Throughout the countryside emerged a mélange of armed groups. Besides the mobile bandit gangs (*ku*), local Triad lodges (*t'ang*) armed themselves for petty banditry and self-defence. Local gentry, convinced that they could expect little aid from a corrupt and incompetent officialdom, formed local defence associations (*t'uan*), which assumed a leading role in community affairs and mobilized defence militia. The militia of some so-called *t'uan* were themselves little different from outlaws and took advantage of occasions for smuggling and robbery. Thus on the local level the *t'ang* and the *t'uan* were analogous forms of organization, not always clearly distinguishable. To the Hakkas all these contenders were hostile. Tension was heightened by a new sect that had taken root in Hakka communities, known as the God-Worshipping Society (Pai Shang-ti hui), which was militantly iconoclastic and, to some perspicacious local gentry, obviously heterodox and dangerous.

The fragmentation of rural Kwangsi took place under the eyes of increasingly helpless bureaucrats, who sought to avoid risks by remaining uninvolved. Convinced that the rivalry between gentry *t'uan* and God-Worshippers was just another form of southern vendetta, they handed down a blanket prohibition against fighting. Reports of banditry, when not blandly ignored, were investigated a safe interval after the bandits had departed. In 1850 exasperated Kwangsi gentry sent a delegation to Peking and won limited official endorsement for their own local defence efforts. The result was that wide areas of rural Kwangsi drifted outside official control. Neither tax collection nor the maintenance of order, the two main tasks of the district yamen, could be carried out effectively. The strong preyed unchecked upon the weak, and it was from this anarchic world that the Taiping Rebellion emerged.

Hung's visions and the Chin-t'ien uprising

The greatest rebellion of the Ch'ing period, though long gestated in the social crisis of the age, was born amid the curious and fortuitous events in the early career of its founder. Hung Hsiu-ch'üan (1814–64) was born in Hua-hsien, some 30 kilometres north of Canton, the son of a small peasant proprietor whose Hakka forebears had migrated from eastern Kwangtung in the eighteenth century. Studious and ambitious, Hung attended the Canton prefectural examinations for the first time in 1827 at age 14; but like most of his fellow aspirants, failed to get the *sheng-yüan*

degree. In 1836 he tried again, but failed. While in Canton for the second attempt, he encountered a foreign missionary (possibly the American, Edwin Stevens) preaching the Gospel, and was handed a set of nine slim volumes entitled *Good words to exhort the age* (*Cb'üan-shih liang-yen*), a work fateful for his future and that of his nation.

The author of this tract was Liang A-fa (1789–1855), a Cantonese of meagre education but zealous temperament who had met the British Presbyterian missionary Robert Morrison in Canton while working as a printshop engraver. In 1815 Liang had followed Morrison's colleague, William Milne, to Malacca, where Milne subsequently founded the Anglo-Chinese College. There Liang's restless religious urges had turned him briefly to Buddhism, which he studied under a Yunnanese monk, but under Milne's insistent proselytizing he was gradually converted to Protestantism of a fundamentalist evangelical strain. Once baptized, he became a missionary and preacher. His *Good words* appeared in 1832, published in both Canton and Malacca.²

Liang's tract was, as far as we know, the only textual source for Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's religious vision, and probably the only source before 1847, when Hung obtained a translation of the Bible. Its contents are therefore of particular importance for the history of the Taiping Rebellion. The arrangement of the work is quite unsystematic, with long quotes from the Morrison–Milne translation of the Bible (in an opaquely literal classical style) interspersed with exegetical sermons by Liang in the vernacular. Biblical material is presented out of sequence, with little heed to the chronological framework of the prophetic tradition or the Gospel story. The epistles of the Disciples are the largest source, with the Old Testament prophets, the Book of Genesis and the Four Gospels in lesser proportions. The character of Jehovah is strongly delineated, but that of Jesus is largely ignored. The work's stark fundamentalist message hammers home the omnipotence of God, the degradation of sin and idolatry, and the awesome choice between salvation or damnation.

Underlying its evangelical surface, Liang's *Good words* embodies serious political implications. There is, first, the repeated suggestion that Chinese society as a whole stands at the brink of disaster as a result of a long process of moral decline – an unmistakable suggestion, to a Chinese reader of the 1830s, of the low point in a dynastic cycle. Second, and perhaps more compelling, the work conveys repeatedly a confusion between heavenly and earthly kingdoms. The biblical term 'Heavenly Kingdom',

² On Hung's early life see Franz Michael and Chung-li Chang, eds., *The Taiping Rebellion: history and documents*; and Chien Yu-wen, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ch'üan-shih*, 1–22. On Liang A-fa, see the introduction by Ssu-yü Teng to the 1965 Taiwan facsimile reprint of *Cb'üan-shih liang-yen*, 1–24. My analysis is based on this edition.

for instance (rendered *t'ien-kuo*), is glossed as referring to both the land of the blessed after death and the congregation of the faithful on earth. And throughout the work, the sequential confusion of the biblical material suggests that the coming of the Messiah was not simply an historical event that happened at a single point in the past, but rather an apocalyptic world crisis that might occur any number of times.

The impact of this book upon Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, though ultimately cataclysmic, was long delayed. He evidently glanced through the work shortly after receiving it, but then put it aside. A year later (1837) he suffered a third failure at the Canton examinations which left him exhausted and deeply depressed. After being carried home from Canton in a sedan chair, he poured out to his parents his feelings of guilt and worthlessness. He then lay abed for days in a psychotic state, in which he dreamed of an ascent to Heaven where he was given a new set of internal organs and thereby purified and reborn. A venerable man with a golden beard handed him ensigns of royalty and a sword and adjured him to exterminate demons and to bring the world back to the true teaching. Filled with an ecstasy of supreme righteousness and invincible power, Hung ranged in a fury over the cosmos, slaying evil spirits as instructed. With him on these quests was sometimes a man of middle age, whom he thought to be his elder brother. When finally his hallucinations abated, he seemed once again in contact with the outer world, but was unmistakably transformed in character and had full recollection of his dreams. A feeling of powerlessness and worthlessness had evidently been transformed, through his fantasies, into its opposite: a conviction of total power and purity. He was generally feared to be imperfectly recovered from madness.

The process by which this intense inner experience was rationalized into a coherent view of the outer world proceeded very gradually. For six years after his illness, Hung continued to function in his accustomed setting, though evidently freed from the crippling inner tensions that had troubled him earlier. Indeed, we find him in 1843 sitting again for the examination in Canton. This time, however, failure turned him not against himself but against the system that had victimized him. He now returned home in an angry mood, apparently determined to prepare for the examinations no longer.³

To what extent Hung's political orientation was affected by the recent Opium War is impossible to determine precisely. It would be remarkable had the conflict been without effect upon him, for Kwangtung was seeth-

³ There is little evidence to support Chien Yu-wen's assertion (Chien, *Ch'üan-shih*, 41) that Hung was now committed to the destruction of the Ch'ing regime. The poem Hung wrote supposedly during his journey home, though indeed suggestive of grand political designs, is of uncertain date.

ing with contempt for the Ch'ing. Just across the border of Hung's native district had arisen a vigorous anti-British militia movement (see chapter 4), the leaders of which despised the Manchus for their weakness before the barbarians. But Hung's outlook was affected more decisively by his rediscovery, shortly after his fourth examination attempt, of Liang A-fa's tract, which had been gathering dust on his bookshelf since before his illness. In place of symbolic fantasy-images, Liang's book now provided an ordered world outlook and a messianic mission. Hung was now converted, but in a remarkable way: he understood the book to be a direct call from God to himself. He now saw his fantasies in terms of Christian doctrine: the venerable man with the golden beard was Jehovah; the middle-aged man, Jesus; and he himself, the second son of God, entrusted with the sacred mission of bringing the world back to His worship.

There are, however, insufficient grounds for assuming that the political implications underlying Liang's tract made any immediate impression upon Hung. In fact, Hung's writings of the 1840s clearly indicate that he saw his task as the conversion of the Chinese people to Christianity, an event that would occur solely through a revolution of the spirit and without the agency of any earthly institution. Furthermore, Hung evidently considered that conversion could best be accomplished by reconciling Christianity with the Confucian tradition. His tracts of the mid-1840s convey a Christianity that was little more than worship of Jehovah, abandonment of idolatry, and clean living. He condemned such evils as licentiousness, unfiliality, homicide and gambling – all familiar targets of Confucian moralism. A lengthy poem extols 'correctness' of conduct, using the term *cheng*, a Confucian epithet meaning orthodox and upright. Though these writings embody a certain apocalyptic tone, it is one fairly compatible with that of traditional Confucian utopianism. Unlike Liang A-fa, Hung was a product of the standard literary training of the degree aspirant; and had not yet entirely transcended his deeply-ingrained self-image as a bearer of the orthodox higher culture. The politicization of his vision and the absorption of the *Good words'* rebellious undertone were not to take place until Hung's revelation had become firmly embodied in the beleaguered Hakka communities of Kwangsi.⁴

Nevertheless, Hung was now an ardent believer, and his heterodoxy soon lost him his position as schoolteacher. He now set forth on a missionizing journey westward towards the Kwangsi hill country, accom-

⁴ The writings referred to here are in the *Tai ping imperial declaration* (*T'ai-p'ing chao-shu*), published in 1852 but containing material thought to have been written around 1844–6, in Hsiang Ta *et al.* ed., *T'ai-p'ing I'ien-kuo* (hereafter *TPTK*), 1:87–98; translated in Michael and Chang, *The Tai ping Rebellion*, 2.24–47.

panied by a converted school friend and cousin, Feng Yün-shan. By mid 1844 Hung and Feng had reached the district of Kuei-hsien, in southern Kwangsi, where they settled with relatives in a Hakka community; here Hung and Feng sought to extend the new faith. In September Hung decided to return home so that his hosts might not be further burdened. Feng was to follow, but fortune led him to neighbouring Kuei-p'ing district, where he settled among Hakkas near a mountain called Tzu-ching shan. He remained there for several years and by 1850 had converted numerous Hakka communities in the hill country.

Feng's extraordinary talents as an organizer were well employed amid the bitter communal strife of those hilly Kwangsi districts. Society there was highly militarized: partly because of the ethnic diversity of the area (which included a number of genuine aboriginal groups); partly because of the deterioration of local government; and partly because of the tradition of intercommunity vendettas (*hsieh-tou*) that the immigrant Hakkas had brought with them from the eastern districts of Kwangtung. Militia corps became a necessary and regular feature of village life. In the struggles between indigenous and Hakka peoples, the Hakka were disadvantaged in several ways. They lacked the corporate lineage structure of the rich indigenous landlords, which could support armed men on a regular basis. They may also have suffered from their dispersed (non-nucleated) settlement patterns, occasioned by their economic position as settlers on scattered parcels of marginal land. During the feuds of the 1840s these poor and indefensible Hakka communities were sometimes utterly displaced from their holdings. Where settlement patterns and wealth were to the advantage of their enemies, language-group solidarity enabled Hakkas of all classes to assemble an impressive armed force at moments of crisis. In the present case, it was ideology as well as dialect that enabled the scattered and defenceless Hakkas to meet their challenges in the late 1840s, when communal tensions grew to crisis proportions.⁵


Feng organized his converts into a multi-village network of local congregations, which together formed the 'God-Worshipping Society' (Pai Shang-ti hui) with headquarters at Tzu-ching shan and branches in many districts. This was one answer to the superior organization of the indigenous people in the form of corporate lineages and fortified settlements. In some ways it resembled a secret society of the traditional sort, with its network of local lodges. Some of its organizational methods may indeed have been similar to those of the Triads. But the God-Worshippers

⁵ *Hsun-chou fu-chih*, 1874 edn, 4.14a–b. An important analysis of Hakka settlement patterns and ethnic conflict is Myron L. Cohen, 'The Hakka or "Guest People": dialect as a sociocultural variable in south-eastern China', *Ethnohistory*, 15.3 (1968) 237–92.

were hardly likely to fit into local society in the Triad manner. Their imported creed, with its stark duality between the saved and the damned, mirrored their own alienated position in that polarized social environment. And now the apocalyptic political implications of Liang's tract, which Hung himself had been unready to accept, came to the fore as faith became organically bound to social reality.

Hung Hsiu-ch'üan himself, now back in Kwangtung, immersed himself in study and writing. In 1847 he went to Canton to seek the tutelage of the American Baptist missionary Issachar J. Roberts, under whom he studied the Bible for several months, probably in the new translation by Walter Medhurst and Karl Friedrich Gutzlaff, which was somewhat clearer than the old Morrison–Milne version that Liang A-fa had used. Still without means of support, Hung soon left Canton and returned to Kwangsi. Though he may have carried with him a Bible, it is doubtful that he carried a clear view of the revolution he was soon to lead. But when Hung reached Kwangsi in the autumn of 1847, he found there a situation vastly changed from that of three years earlier. Feng Yün-shan's organizing talents had produced 'branch associations' of the God-Worshipping Society in some dozen districts. Chin-t'ien, a small village at the foot of Tzu-ching shan, became the headquarters of this growing organization.

Circumstances now temporarily deprived this organization of its founders. Feng was arrested by a local militia leader, charged with sedition, and ultimately deported to Kwangtung. Hung journeyed to Kwangtung himself to plead Feng's case before the governor-general. The two eventually met in their native Hua-hsien, where they remained for seven months, not to return to Kwangsi until the summer of 1849. This was a fateful interlude in the evolution of the Taipings. In the absence of its spiritual and temporal chiefs, the God-Worshipping Society brought forth new leaders. Among them the most powerful was Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, an illiterate charcoal-burner of complex character and boundless ambition, who had already established himself as a local tyrant in the neighbourhood of Tzu-ching shan. Others included Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, a poor peasant and Yang's chief lieutenant; Wei Ch'ang-hui, from a rich landlord family that had come into conflict with the law; and Shih Ta-k'ai, an educated man from a wealthy peasant household. Yang and Hsiao in particular developed the implications of Hung's visions by establishing their own positions as spokesmen of Jehovah and Jesus. The Hakka communities were now in full flood of religious ecstasy, an ecstasy that their leaders readily bent to the service of political authority. The movement now had a group of chieftains who relied still upon Hung's original inspiration but cultivated



MAP 10. The Taiping and Nien Rebellions

their own independent power. The fatally-fragmented character of the Taiping leadership group can thus be traced to the absence of its founders during a critical period of development.

There now ensued a period of rising militancy among the God-worshippers. Idol-smashing and proselytizing heightened tensions between the Hakka communities and their neighbours. Amid civil chaos and economic disaster, the God-Worshipper congregations began to organize military units for protection, units which came increasingly into collision with other militarized groups in rural Kwangsi. Under the famine conditions of 1849–50, tensions exploded frequently into open warfare. It was becoming clear to the leadership of the God-Worshippers that it was no longer possible to survive in the Kwangsi environment, and it was probably during this critical period that they reached the decision to revolt. While military organization proceeded during 1850, Feng Yün-shan began to be overshadowed as chief military and executive officer by Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, who now emerged as a formidable figure with both spiritual and temporal authority. Yang's outstanding military capacities served the movement well. His ruthlessness and ambition were, within a few years, to prove its ruin.

In July 1850, the Chin-t'ien leaders summoned God-Worshipping congregations from all over southern Kwangsi, and Hakka communities began to converge from a number of districts. Their possessions sold, their homes forsaken, they consigned themselves and all their property to the 'united military camp'. Many were already organized in military formations under their local leaders, who were given appropriate places in the command hierarchy. The assemblage at Chin-t'ien was not entirely peasant in composition, but included contingents of rural workers: charcoal-burners and unemployed miners who had already formed their own God-Worshipping congregations. A number of redoubtable Triad chiefs sought to join; but only one, the pirate Lo Ta-kang, succeeded in reconciling himself to the draconian discipline and puritanical code of the God-Worshippers. The others soon decamped: an episode suggestive of the continuing difficulties the Taipings were to have in making common cause with traditional heterodox groups. Though the Taipings were able to absorb Triad groups from time to time on the basis of a shared hatred of the Manchus, the two movements never merged into anything resembling a united revolutionary force.

It was inevitable that the powerful military camp at Chin-t'ien – some 20,000 strong – should come into direct conflict with the government. After several victorious engagements with Ch'ing troops, the leaders of the God-Worshippers proclaimed the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace

(*T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo*) on 11 January 1851, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's thirty-eighth birthday. Though its formal outlines were as yet crudely drawn, a political regime had at last emerged from Hung's messianic vision, a regime that claimed dominion over all the empire.

The march to Nanking

The Taipings soon launched a crusade northward towards the economic heartland of China – the rich provinces of the lower Yangtze valley. Conflicts with Ch'ing forces were by no means always victorious. The rebels suffered serious losses and were sometimes unable to subdue strategic walled cities. But the disorganized and poorly regimented Ch'ing armies failed to divert them from their larger strategic purpose.

The initial Ch'ing military response was both late and inadequate. Though the anarchy in Kwangsi had been visible at least a year earlier, it was only in October 1850 that the court appointed an imperial commissioner to unify rebel-suppression efforts. This was Lin Tse-hsü, who had finally emerged from his post-Opium War disgrace as the official most likely to stem the tide. Already old and ill, Lin died *en route* to his post, which was then filled by a series of commissioners less energetic and competent, of whom none was able to coordinate the ill-assorted mobs of provincial forces and mercenaries that converged on Kwangsi. Good generalship might have dealt the Taipings a fatal defeat at Yung-an, a small Kwangsi administrative city where the rebels were besieged from September 1851 to April 1852. But divided counsels and indecision on the Ch'ing side enabled them to break out, whereupon they marched northward to the Kwangsi provincial capital, Kweilin, which they besieged unsuccessfully. Heading north-eastward towards the Hunan border, they were ambushed (10 June 1852) by a mercenary battalion under the gentry-militarist Chiang Chung-yüan, a near-disastrous encounter in which the movement's outstanding political organizer, Feng Yün-shan, was killed. But lack of coordination among their antagonists again gave the rebels respite, and they escaped eastward into Hunan. There during the summer of 1852 they greatly augmented their forces from among the local populace, drawing into their ranks many members of the Triad Society. The passage into Hunan had moved them over a crucial divide: out of the Kwangsi river systems and into the Yangtze tributary network.

It was during the crusade to Nanking that the Taiping Kingdom transformed itself from a relatively small, provincial rebellion into a vast movement that swept up treasure and recruits from broad reaches of central China. By the time Taiping armies brought Changsha, the pro-

vincial capital of Hunan, under siege in September 1852, their ranks had swollen to about 120,000. That siege broken, the Taipings surged on to Wuchang, Hupei's capital, which they sacked and abandoned; in the process, their numbers rose to 500,000. Proceeding downriver by land and water, they took and abandoned numerous administrative centres along the watercourse. On 19 March 1853, they breached the walls of Nanking, which they occupied and renamed 'Heavenly Capital'. The strategic city of Chinkiang (whose capture had been a key element in the British victory of 1842) fell soon afterwards. A contemporary Ch'ing intelligence report estimated that, with the fall of Nanking and Chinkiang, more than 2,000,000 persons had been swept into the Taiping organization.⁶ The impoverishment and social polarization of central China, already apparent in the turmoil of the tax resistance movement of the 1840s, had brought its inevitable results.

The period of two-and-a-half years, from the mobilization at Chin-t'ien until the establishment of the Taiping 'Heavenly Capital' at Nanking, may be compared to the Exodus of the Israelites or to the 'Yenan Period' of Chinese Communism: for during this interval emerged the guiding ethos of the Taiping Kingdom along with many of its characteristic institutions. The early months at Chin-t'ien produced an official system almost wholly military in character. Ranks and functions were modelled partly on the *Rites of Chou*, a text of late antiquity that purported to depict the political organization of the early Chou period, and embellished with an assortment of titles dating from various historical periods along with some wholly new improvisations. During the siege of Yung-an, this early military organization was given a more plausible political format. The major leaders (formerly called 'marshals') were now to be 'kings' (*wang*), including one each for the four directions plus an 'assistant king'. Hung himself retained the chief designation of 'Heavenly King' (*t'ien-wang*).

Hung's position was now ambiguous. His spiritual primacy over the other kings was recognized in his superior title; yet he ordained that he be called merely 'sovereign' (*chu*) and that the appellation of divinity (*shang*) be reserved for Jehovah and Jesus. The leadership group was thereby established as a band of brothers, with somewhat diminished status for the movement's founder. Further, the new arrangement recognized the dominant positions of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing and Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, who had robed their military and executive powers in priestly authority, entering trances now and again to transmit divine commands. Yang and Hsiao were given the prestigious 'eastern' and 'western' kingships, and

⁶ On Taiping numbers see Chang Te-chien, *Trei-ch'ing hui-tsuang*, which dates in part from 1854, reprinted in Hsiang, *TPTK*, 3, 31-348; particularly 281-97.

Yang was recognized as supreme commander over the armies of the various kings.⁷

It was during the Taipings' encirclement at Yung-an that they flourished before the people of China a decisive summons to revolt. Besides formally inaugurating their own calendar, a traditional prerogative of legitimate regimes, they issued a series of broadsides announcing the advent of the new order and detailing their charges against the Manchus. The rebellion was proclaimed to be a national uprising against alien oppressors. The appeal was to national pride in the face of usurpatious rule by China's 'traditional enemies' – the northern barbarians – who had fastened upon China a cruel and corrupt government and had befouled her culture with alien uses. One may well ask whether, desperate for popular support, the Taipings hid their religious message under more traditionally acceptable nationalist appeals. An examination of these 1852–3 documents leads to the opposite conclusion. Though the religious content was mixed with a strong dose of ethnic nationalism, there was no effort to hide it. Hung was pictured as a dynasty-founder with a new kind of mandate – one direct from Jehovah (*Shang-ti*) – and the Manchus as the embodiment of a kind of supernatural devilishness that went beyond the simple vileness of a usurping barbarian. The essentials of Christianity were laid out in no uncertain terms. The Taipings were seeking broad support, but not at the expense of their divine mission. Though the documents hint at their willingness to accept for the moment the services of men who shared only their nationalist aims, the Taipings openly revealed their ultimate intention to build on earth a heavenly kingdom that would embrace all.⁸ The Yung-an documents were not, however, successful in working out a convincing synthesis between politics and eschatology. Indeed, the uninitiated must have had great difficulty understanding the logical connection between the nationalist and the religious components of the Taiping creed. As an intellectual construct, the Taiping message is notably unimpressive.

Many of the values developed on the march were embodied in Taiping society within the walled city of Nanking, the only place where the full rigour of the Taiping system could be realized. There the quality of life was determined partly by military considerations, and partly by the rigid puritanism characteristic of the movement's early years. In good fundamentalist style the Taipings proscribed wine, opium and tobacco. Men and women were strictly segregated; sexual relations even between husband and wife were punishable by death. Many of the women were organized into their own military units and took their places on the battle

⁷ *T'ien-ming chao-chih shu*, in Hsiang, *TPTK*, 1.66–8.

⁸ *P'an-bring chao-shu*, in Hsiang, 1.159–79.

line. After 1855, however, sexual segregation was abandoned; it was apparently bad for morale, especially since it had never been observed by the top leadership echelons. But there persisted a disdain for certain elements of the traditional family system, particularly the inferior status of women, who were now enjoined from binding their feet and given access to certain official careers. The injunction against footbinding was a contribution of Kwangsi Hakka culture, in which foot mutilation was not practised.

The quality of Taiping political life was also conditioned by the early years on the march, during which political authority was inextricably mixed with religious zeal. This mixture led unavoidably to an arbitrary and absolutist political style, in which major decisions were announced as the result of direct intervention by God, transmitted through Yang and Hsiao, who entered trances at strategic moments. Yang's style suffused the Taiping monarchy in its early years and was unquestionably one of the many factors that made it distasteful to China's elite.

It seems likely that the Taiping social message exercised far greater influence upon the peasantry than either Han ethnism or religious zeal. Taiping social and economic thought is an example of how a body of foreign doctrine may find affinities in a host culture and so flourish within it. Hung's early writings under Liang A-fa's influence show the clear imprint of the Christian concept that men are, in some ultimate sense, equal before God, and that their deserts on earth ought to reflect that fact. Selfishness, along with the concept of private ownership and exploitation of the world's resources, were condemned on the premise that all ownership is God's alone. Such conceptions found a resonance in Chinese utopian thought. Hung's early writings discussed not only the universal obligation of man to God, but also that of man to man, which transcended particular local and kinship boundaries. Like many another critic of the Chinese social system, he quoted at length the passage in the *Book of rites*, in which Confucius extols the 'great harmony' (*ta-t'ung*) of the ancients: 'In the days when the Great Way was practised, . . . men treated all other men as their own kin'.⁹ Likewise, when God's way is practised, 'the world will be as a single family'. The abolition of restrictive boundaries among men, a recurrent theme of Chinese utopian thought, was constantly restated in terms of the brotherhood of men under the supreme deity.

But the vision of universal brotherhood was not the sole element of the Taiping social message. There was also a more unabashedly levelling strain, one that burst directly from the social misery of rural China. This

⁹ *T'ai-p'ing chao-shu*, 92.

strain was alien to the wistful utopianism of the classics; it resounded instead to the rough irreverence of Chinese banditry, which saw in extremes of wealth and poverty ample justification for revolt. Chang Chia-hsiang, the pirate who coursed bloodily through the Kwangsi waterways in the late 1840s (and who later sold out to the Ch'ing) is credited with the verse,

The upper classes owe us money,
The middle classes ought to wake up,
But, lower classes, follow me!
It beats renting an ox to plough barren land!¹⁰

The Taipings did their best to suppress pure banditry within their own ranks by rigid military discipline. Although such indelicate sentiments found no place in the formal body of Taiping social theory, however, they appear to have formed an insistent counterpoint to the more dignified Taiping pronouncements as the rebellion spread through the central provinces. It is clear that the force of the Taiping appeal grew not only from their avowed hatred of Manchus and Chinese bureaucrats, but also from a general popular animus against the rich and powerful. A gentry diarist, recording conditions around occupied Nanking, found that hatred of officials and hatred of landlords contributed in roughly equal proportions to popular support of the Taipings.¹¹ In a system where wealth and power were seen to reinforce each other at every point, the Taipings' apocalyptic style was enough to draw after them a vast army of the poor.

The Taipings' ideal society was set forth in *The land regulations of the heavenly dynasty* (*T'ien-ch'ao t'ien-mou chih-tu*), which was apparently written during the march to Nanking. The family was to remain the basic unit of organization: groups of twenty-five families, each headed by a 'sergeant' (*liang ssu-ma*) were the building blocks of local society. But land was to be allotted according to population, all adults (including women) to receive equally productive shares. The land itself and all its fruits were state property, or, more precisely, God's property to be managed and allocated by the state. In each twenty-five-family group was to be established a state treasury, to which reverted all wealth, save what was needed (presumably in prescribed amounts) for family subsistence. It was stated and restated that the economic goal of the system was the equal and ample enjoyment of God's material blessings. The necessary conditions were abolition of private land ownership and state manipulation of the labour

¹⁰ Quoted in Lo Esh-kang, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-kang*, 45.

¹¹ Li Wen-chih, ed. *Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh shih tzu-liao*, 1.125, quoting Wang Shih-to, *I-ping jib-chi*.

force. In theory, 'the land in the empire is to be cultivated in common', by which was justified the 'transfer' of manpower from labour-shortage areas as occasions required. There is no doubt that the document was inspired by a hope of doing away forever with the ruthless economic competition and exploitation of Ch'ing rural society and of achieving in their place a truly communal order. But within it are also shadows of the statism that underlay the 'equal field system' of early T'ang times, in which equal allocation of land was primarily designed for the enhancement of government revenues through efficient allocation of labour. Not far beneath the surface of Taiping social theory lay the interests of the theocratic state.¹²

A perplexing problem in the *Land regulations* is that the idea of periodic reallocation of land is nowhere mentioned. The logic of the system and its historical exemplars seem to require it. Yet the political temptation to attract peasant support by seeming to promise perpetual private ownership may have been too strong for the Taiping leadership to resist. As it stands, there is no doubt that the Taiping land programme must have had a wide appeal to the poor peasant and landless labourer. The statist tone of the document was entirely in keeping with the Chinese tradition of heavily bureaucratized solutions to economic problems. On balance, the egalitarian social message of the early Taiping doctrine must have been at least as attractive as its anti-Manchu ethnism. Practically speaking, the anti-Ch'ing and anti-landlord messages were hardly distinguishable by those who considered themselves victims of a system in which power and property were so closely entwined.

In terms of its stated goals, the Taiping movement was indeed a profound social revolution, in which economic competition was to be utterly stamped out, the family stripped of its economic and social pre-eminence, and the state invested with a new kind of legitimacy and a more pervasive power. Yet even in the hopeful early years there were signs that the Taiping system might have been unable to suppress, over the long term, the accumulation of private wealth and privilege. Though the doctrinal foundation of the movement contained much appealing social utopianism, there were disturbing contrary trends visible from the rebellion's earliest days. Sumptuary laws promulgated at Yung-an point directly to the emergence of a new class of luxury and privilege, whose private lives were not straitened by the austerity demanded of the rank and file. Resplendent dress, well-stocked harems and superior diet were asserted to be the prerogatives of the top leadership echelons. These edicts were but a foretaste of the general exemption from the ban on

¹² *T'ien-ch'ao t'ien-mou chib-tu*, in Hsiang TPTK, 1.321-6.

private accumulation and luxury that high functionaries enjoyed unofficially during the later years of the rebellion.

Hierarchy and privilege were reinforced by an inclination towards oligarchic rule that was built into the Taiping system from its earliest days, as an elect undertook to guide the fortunes of the less enlightened. The closely guarded supremacy of the 'old brethren' – which developed into a general pattern of preferment for Kwangsi men – persisted as the movement expanded. These oligarchic and hierarchic trends cast serious doubt upon the ultimate capacity of the Taipings to carry out a thoroughgoing and lasting social revolution in China. Taiping egalitarianism was not founded in any coherent corpus of social theory that might have preserved it over the long term. At bottom lay a thoroughly elitist mentality, in which all legitimate authority flowed downward from an all-powerful Jehovah to the chosen stewards of His kingdom on earth.

Occurring as it did while Western power was intruding forcefully upon China, the Taiping Rebellion inevitably provokes questions about the relative importance of internal traditions and external inspiration. One can concede immediately that native traditions of protest were well represented in Taiping thought and institutions. The outward structures of the monarchy, the bureaucracy and the land system embodied much utopian material from the native culture. Residues of popular Buddhism and Taoism can be found in Taiping religious texts, and the language of Taiping ethnism owed much to ethnic-nationalist movements of the past. Yet if viewed against the background of contemporary protest against the Ch'ing, the uniqueness of the Taipings becomes immediately apparent. Secret societies in the Triad tradition seemed incapable of offering a compelling challenge either to the Ch'ing state or to traditional social norms. White Lotus eschatology lent no support to the rational organization of secular power. The tax resistance movement lacked a well-defined rationale of protest, either political or cultural. Uprisings by ethnic minority groups lacked ideological appeal that might have bridged the gap between them and the Han peasantry. Ultimately, however, there emerged the potent combination of minority-group alienation and intense ideological consciousness that was embodied in the Hakka-organized God-Worshipping Society. And it is hard to imagine the mobilization of the Hakkas without the injection of the new faith that Hung had brought from Kwangtung. This faith elevated the Hakka struggles to a new plane of significance: a battle of the saved against the damned. Filled with a sense of their own unique righteousness, they could challenge Ch'ing culture on the basis of an all-embracing cosmology. Further, the way in which the divine order was revealed made possible a concentration of leader-

ship, which, though still imperfect, was more effective than either the White Lotus or the Triads had been able to achieve. Hung's borrowed doctrine crystallized discontents within Chinese society and energized the powerful utopianism that lay beneath the conservative surface of China's rural culture.

The seizure of Nanking and the establishment of the Heavenly Capital marked a change in the character and fortunes of the rebellion. From an on-rushing host the Taipings now became a regional regime seeking to control territory and communication lines from a static base. The decision to encamp at Nanking rather than forge ahead to Peking with the entire army was taken only after some internal debate. It probably reflected the premise (urged upon Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, it is said, by an old sailor) that Nanking lay at the economic heart of the empire and was well served by water transport. As the original Ming capital, its tradition as a seat of government was unquestioned. But as a political decision, the settlement at Nanking may have been a major mistake. The thrust to Peking, now entrusted to a northern expedition that was undermanned and poorly supported, faltered at the Tientsin suburbs; the remnants were wiped out by the spring of 1855. The Ch'ing regime survived: its armies in disarray, its funds depleted, and much of its tax base in rebel hands. Yet it retained an asset that the rebels would now have to reckon with: the stubborn hostility of significant segments of the orthodox elite towards the alien creed and the new order, a hostility that could now be put to the service of the Manchu monarchy.

DEFENDERS OF THE OLD ORDER

The restructuring of the orthodox opposition

Our view of the late Ch'ing elite has in some measure been darkened by the incapacity and corruption that so bemused treaty-port observers in the nineteenth century, as well as by the fact that the class as a whole, along with the state it served, slid to ruin in the early years of the twentieth century. Nevertheless the record suggests that the early nineteenth century saw something of a revival of elite morale and vitality, a revival that made possible the cruelly effective repression of the mid-century rebellions. Some signs of this late invigoration were already apparent at the time of the White Lotus Rebellion: an internal catastrophe that jolted some of the literati into a renewed concern for problems of domestic administration. In rebel-suppression experts like Kung Ching-han and Yen Ju-i can be seen early exemplars of the statecraft (*ching-shih*) school of practical scholarship, a school that generated a widening stream of

interest in administrative technique during the Tao-kuang reign and thereafter (see chapter 3).

The revived interest in practical affairs may in part be credited to the Chia-ch'ing Emperor, whose treatment of the literati was less repressive than his father's had been. But there were already current a number of intellectual trends conducive to greater initiative by the elite in governmental affairs. The interest in practical studies was related to the revival of Sung ethical philosophy in the late eighteenth century, led by the literary movement known as the T'ung-ch'eng school, which sought the cultivation of character through an unadorned 'ancient' prose style. Concern with questions of self-cultivation, family and public ethics, and the ultimate principles behind human nature, which had become unfashionable in the heyday of eighteenth-century scholasticism, re-emerged to counter in some measure the demoralization of the bureaucracy. Also emerging in the early nineteenth century was the implicitly iconoclastic branch of classical learning known as the 'New Text' (*chin-wen*) school, led by men whose unorthodox interpretations of the classics predisposed them to institutional reform. All these trends were leading towards a practical, eclectic and activist outlook that, by mid-century, contributed powerfully towards the consolidation of the existing social order and the defeat of rebellion.

It was in Hunan that the new spirit was most in evidence. Hunanese 'statecraft' activists were influenced by the practical concerns of the previous generation of Hunan scholar-officials: particularly the ethnographer and military administrator Yen Ju-i and the Neo-Confucian revivalist T'ang Chien (see chapter 3). It was T'ang's friend, the influential Hunanese official Ho Ch'ang-ling, who commissioned Wei Yüan to edit the compendium of practical wisdom on government, *Collected writings on statecraft of the reigning dynasty* (*Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien*), which was published in 1827. Ho and T'ao Chu, another Hunanese, were the most eminent of the provincial officers who sought to introduce practical reforms in administration during the ominous 1820s and 1830s. Officials such as these stood out as bright spots in the otherwise dark picture of the early nineteenth-century bureaucracy. But it was the second generation of Hunanese scholar-activists, the students, protégés and kinsmen of the great officials of the Tao-kuang reign, who were to prove the nemesis of the nineteenth-century rebellions. Men like Tso Tsung-t'ang, Hu Lin-i and Tseng Kuo-fan were closely bound by links of friendship, kinship and academic influence to T'ao Chu and Ho Ch'ang-ling.

The man who emerged as the leader of the elite's resistance to rebellion, Tseng Kuo-fan (1811–72), was born to a landed family that was

educationally and socially ambitious, yet not of gentry rank. Tseng was educated in family schools and at the eminent Yüeh-lu academy in Changsha, a centre of statecraft influence. After attaining the *chin-shih* degree in 1838, Tseng rose through the Hanlin Academy to administrative posts in various boards and ultimately to the acting senior vice-presidency of the Board of Civil Office. By mid-century he was thus firmly placed in the upper stratum of metropolitan officialdom.

The principal influences upon Tseng as a young official were the Ch'eng-Chu revivalism of T'ang Chien, the practical dedication of the statecraft group, and the austere literary canons of the T'ung-ch'eng school. Amid the intellectual controversies of his day, Tseng inclined towards an eclecticism whereby textual research might be reconciled with a concern for moral regeneration. On the whole, however, Tseng's character and outlook were most strongly coloured by the sombre puritanism of T'ang Chien and of Wo-jen (d. 1871), the Mongol scholar who was later to lead the conservative resistance against early modernization efforts. Activist, yet deeply conservative, this cast of mind was fortuitously placed at a moment in history when radical challenges assailed traditional China from both within and without. It was well-suited to holding the line against rebellion and moral drift, for steeling Tseng and his followers for their monumental task. It was understandably ill-suited, however, to the intellectual task of coming to terms with the new stage of history in which China found herself. Though foes of corruption, bungling careerism and arid scholasticism, the political outlook of the Ch'eng-Chu moralists was shaped by the narrow puritanism in which they sought to mould their own personalities. In Tseng, the new moralism bred a paternalistic but none the less stringent authoritarianism. In Wo-jen, it bred a bigoted rejection of innovation, particularly any that smacked of Western influence.

Yet the influence of the Hunanese revival was not unambiguously conservative. In others of the Hunan group, such as Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812–85), the activist component of the movement led ultimately to an interest in the application of modern technology, once it became clear that such technology was essential to China's survival. Furthermore, the new moralism had links with the potentially radical New Text school. Ho Ch'ang-ling had entrusted the editing of the *Collected writings* to Wei Yüan (1794–1856), one of the most vigorous minds of the age; Wei's willingness to recognize the unprecedented problems of the late Ch'ing and to propose new solutions for them could not have been unrelated to his New Text sympathies or to his personal friendship with Kung Tzu-chen, the most creative of the New Text writers. Thus the very movement that was

to champion the traditional order during the mid-century rebellions was also to contribute in some measure to the early phases of China's modern transformation.

By the closing years of the Tao-kuang reign, Tseng Kuo-fan had become an influential teacher in Peking. His role as mentor and patron of young talent was to prove indispensable to his later career as military leader. Indeed it was one of his growing circle of protégés, the Hunanese *chü-jen* Chiang Chung-yüan, who became the pioneer in the militarization of the orthodox elite. Chiang was from the embattled border district of Hsin-ning where, as mentioned earlier, a confluence of White Lotus and Triad activism was threatening the established local order. In 1844 Chiang returned to Hsin-ning from Peking and confronted the challenge immediately by organizing a local defence association led by members of his own lineage. The elite of other local lineages were doing likewise.

Developments in Hsin-ning were but part of a general process under way in the south, in which the elite sought to preserve their lives and property by forming local defence associations. Such an association (*t'uan*) consisted typically of a group of villages bound together by the interpersonal connections of community leaders. The headman of a *t'uan* commonly assumed broad irregular taxing and police authority. 'Contributions' (*chüan* – a kind of irregular tax) financed defence works and a force of militiamen. These associations were sanctioned by a body of officially approved theory, as long as the militia remained non-professional and the leadership responsive to official control. Indeed, in its officially approved form, such 'grouping and drilling' (*t'uan-lien*) was no different from the *pao-chia*-based local control system promoted by the anti-White Lotus administrators two generations earlier. But the exigencies of the times often led to greater professionalism on the part of the militia corps and greater independence on the part of their leaders. Anarchy was averted only by the underlying community of interest between the local elite and the bureaucracy. The social eminence and official connections of the higher elite, such as Chiang Chung-yüan, could regularize the relations of such groups to local officialdom, and generally the powers of *t'uan* headmen were duly legitimized by district magistrates.

In the case of Chiang Chung-yüan, official connections and local leadership combined to form a distinctive type of career: that of the gentry-militarist of the mid-nineteenth century and after. Militia raised from Chiang's *t'uan-lien* association played a major role in defeating the rebellions of Lei Tsai-hao and Li Yüan-fa. In 1851, Chiang himself was recruited to the staff of Sai-shang-a, the new imperial commissioner deputed to suppress the Taipings. It was not long before he realized the hope-

lessness of defeating the rebellion with existing Ch'ing forces, whereupon he summoned a picked force of Hsin-ning men to Kwangsi. These troops, which soon grew to about 1,000, proved staunch fighters, animated as much by kinship solidarity and loyalty to their gentry patrons as by the promise of pay and loot. Chiang campaigned northward as the rebellion progressed and was responsible for one of the Taipings' early defeats, the near-disaster at Shuai-i-tu. Having begun his military career in response to purely local threats, he was now firmly committed to the larger anti-Taiping campaign.

As Chiang Chung-yüan was becoming involved in military affairs through his position in local society, another Hunanese, Hu Lin-i (1812–61), was doing so through another role: that of prefect in the neighbouring province of Kweichow. There Hu had recruited a small, highly selected body of mercenaries to combat local rebels. Even while hard pressed by local uprisings, his thoughts turned constantly towards events in his native Hunan. Once the Taipings crossed the border from Kwangsi, Hu was determined to join the fight against them. Having had ample opportunity to observe the incapacity of imperial troops, he had long been convinced of the need to mobilize a new type of military force that would sacrifice numbers for quality and discipline. Once armed with such a force, he eagerly responded to the summons of his old patron, Wu Wen-jung, governor-general of Hunan and Hupei, and began moving eastward to the front in early 1854. Another of Wu Wen-jung's protégés was Tseng Kuo-fan, who was by now also deeply involved in military enterprise of a new type.¹³

The development of the Hunan Army

In July 1852, Tseng asked permission to visit his native district, Hsiang-hsiang, on his way home from supervising the Kiangsi provincial examination. This was a visit long planned and now more urgent because of the Taiping invasion of Hunan. At this point Tseng apparently had nothing more in mind than supervising local defence in his home area; but events were soon to draw him into enterprises of provincial, and then of national scope. His leave came sooner than anticipated: on the way south he received news of his mother's death and hastened straight home in mourning. In Hsiang-hsiang he found vigorous local defence measures

¹³ On the restructuring of the orthodox opposition see Ch'ien Mu, *Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien hsieh-shu shih* (A history of Chinese scholarship over the past three hundred years), 569–92 (on T'ang Chien). Han-yin Chen Shen, 'Tseng Kuo-fan in Peking, 1840–1852: his ideas on statecraft and reform', *JAS* 27.1 (Nov. 1967) 61–80. Ho I-k'un, *Tseng Kuo-fan p'ing-chuan* (Tseng Kuo-fan: an appraisal and a biography), 25–30. Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and its enemies in late imperial China*, 135–48.

already in train; members of the local elite, headed by the *sheng-yüan* Wang Chen and his teacher, Lo Tse-nan (1808–56), had mobilized several bands of mercenaries (*yung*) during the Taipings' march northward and were now seeking opportunities to campaign farther afield. Tseng himself now acquired military responsibilities of a sort, for in December 1852 the court appointed him 'Commissioner of Local Defence' (*t'uan-lien ta ch'en*), to work in concert with the provincial governor. Of course the court had no intention of authorizing a new type of military enterprise, but was merely attempting to control, through a trusted metropolitan official, local militarization already under way. Commissioners of similar backgrounds were soon appointed in other provinces.

Tseng, however, knew *t'uan-lien* to be wholly unequal to the Taiping challenge and after some hesitation resolved to use existing resources in a new way. He summoned the Hsiang-hsiang mercenaries to Changsha, with Lo Tse-nan at their head, as the nucleus of a professional provincial force. To the Hsiang-hsiang battalions were soon added contingents from elsewhere in Hunan, including Chiang Chung-yüan's Hsin-ning force. Tseng had resolved that Chiang should serve as field commander of the entire army, but defects in the organization of Chiang's own detachment soon convinced Tseng that he himself would have to take direct control. Tseng proceeded slowly, first clearing Hunan itself of local rebels, establishing a network of local control and recruitment in the local *t'uan-lien* associations, and only then committing his force to the larger struggle. Not until the summer of 1853 did major elements of the Hunan Army – as it came to be called – emerge from Hunan to do battle with the Taipings.

The rise of the Hunan Army represented irregular forms of organization – by implication highly subversive of imperial authority – which were nevertheless so cloaked in orthodoxy that they were able to coexist with the established Ch'ing order. The organizational principles of the Hunan Army were drawn from the military writings of Ch'i Chi-kuang (1528–87), a general who had formed a personal 'family army' outside the regular Ming military system to fight the Japanese pirates and their native accomplices in the coastal provinces. Both Lo Tse-nan and Wang Chen, while training *yung* mercenaries in their native Hsiang-hsiang, had adopted some of Ch'i's ideas. His writings had been widely distributed by the statecraft writers of the early nineteenth century. Although the Hunan Army was to be larger than Ch'i's force (which started with only 3,000 men), Tseng adopted Ch'i's model in organization and training. There was, first of all, to be a clearly defined chain of command (what Ch'i referred to as *shu-wu*, or tying together the ranks). Within the chain of command, the

key position was occupied by the battalion officer (*ying-kuan*), who headed 650 men (500 troops and 150 labourers), while above the battalion officer was the commander (*t'ung-ling*), who could control from two to more than a dozen battalions. But the battalion officer was to have complete responsibility for his 5 company officers (*shao-chang*), each overseeing 100 men. All ranks were in fact fastened together by personal relationships. The battalion officer chose his company officers and the company officer his platoon officers (*shih-chang*), while as a rule the platoon officer personally recruited the 10 men who were to serve under him. The battalion officer, too, was normally attached to a particular commander. Tseng stipulated that each time a new battalion officer was appointed, all the lower officers as well as men of the battalion were to be chosen anew. The personal links thus formed supplied the cohesiveness which the Green Standard army and its mercenary adjuncts so conspicuously lacked. Tseng's new army was not entirely outside the old system, since from the beginning he would recommend to the throne that officers of the Hunan Army be given honorary Green Standard ranks. However, in fostering the inter-personal obligations between the men and officers of his army, he was capitalizing upon the pre-existing lineage or native-place relationships which the Green Standard army would not encourage between the higher and lower officers.

This system was alien to the bureaucratic principles of the Ch'ing military system, in which personal linkages of this sort were considered a menace. Yet they were well-suited to link a congeries of irregular elite-led contingents into a centrally directed force. Tseng was well aware of the conflict latent in this new military enterprise and took pains to allay imperial suspicions. Initially the Hunan mercenaries were mobilized under Tseng's vague powers as *t'uan-lien* commissioner. The raising of a professional fighting force had of course little to do with the officially prescribed format for *t'uan-lien*, which stressed a low level of militarization, and the scheme was shortly abandoned. Tseng was careful to soothe Manchu feelings by placing a local banner officer, T'a-ch'i-pu, in a major command position. In the last analysis, however, it was Tseng's own position as a trusted metropolitan official and his ramified connections at the capital that made his new military organization acceptable to the throne. Throughout the ensuing decade, Tseng was able to count on the support of high Manchu courtiers such as Wen-ch'ing and Su-shun, who understood the necessity of entrusting irregular powers to Chinese provincial military figures if the dynasty were to survive. The support of these Manchu grandees counterbalanced the hostility of regular Han metropolitan officials such as Ch'i Chün-tsao (1793–1866), successor of Mu-

chang-a as chief Grand Councillor, who considered such provincial military power dangerous and unacceptable.

During the next few years this army structure was elaborated into regiments, divisions and army groups under Tseng's trusted associates, most of whom were holders of lower civil degrees. Quite apart from its military importance, Tseng's new organization proved to have great political significance for the future of the empire. Tseng's personal staff and general officer corps became seedbeds of executive talent. From them emerged many of the top provincial officials who were to dominate China's civil and military administration for the remainder of the nineteenth century. During the early years, Tseng's officer corps was drawn largely from among the civil literati, a practice consistent with the heavy Neo-Confucian tone of the army's indoctrination. But by the mid-fifties, illiterate men of humble origin had made their way into high command. The brilliance and ruthlessness of these men weighed heavily in the balance, so that the Hunan Army's power grew more fearsome while its ideological commitment waned.

The Hunan Army ultimately swelled to a strength of some 132,000 men, including its cavalry and naval auxiliaries. This figure, not large by the standards of the day, exemplifies Tseng's emphasis of quality over numbers. Hunan Army units were distinguished for strict attention to details of recruitment, training, discipline and indoctrination in Confucian principles. They were distinguished no less for their high pay. For the common soldier, pay was about twice that of the highest category of Green Standard troops. High-ranking officers were paid munificently in the hope of diminishing corruption and bolstering morale.

Tseng's commitment to such salaries required that he secure ample and regular financial support. The methods whereby he and his lieutenants financed their military operations had an influence upon the evolution of Ch'ing fiscal procedures that was to persist into the twentieth century. Tseng's basic problem was to sequester more resources than the centralized accounting and disbursal system could afford him. This meant, first, establishing new categories of local revenue that were not under the Board of Revenue's direct control; and second, once Tseng's group had achieved high provincial offices, gathering fiscal power into the hands of the governors and governors-general and bypassing the Board of Revenue.¹⁴

An early financial expedient was the sale of ranks and titles. Certificates

¹⁴ On the Hunan Army see Lo Erh-kang, *Hsiang-ch'ün hsin-chib* (A new history of the Hunan Army), 63, 97–112. Hsiao I-shan, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shib* (A general history of the Ch'ing period), 3, 411–15. Chien, *Ch'üan-shib*, 1039–80. Kuhn, *Rebellion and its enemies*, 105–35.

for the *chien-sheng* degree and various brevet titles were sent from Peking to the provincial governments. The Hunan governor, Lo Ping-chang, transferred a batch of these certificates directly to the headquarters of the Hunan Army in the winter of 1853. Proceeds from rank sale were Tseng's principal support at this early period. But as the army expanded, they were shortly overshadowed by the mercantile tax known as *likin* (literally, tax of a thousandth, but designating simply a small amount), which was levied *ad valorem* on goods in stock or in transit, or upon products such as tea at their places of manufacture. *Likin* was first instituted around Yangchow in late 1853 by the censor Lei I-hsien for support of Ch'ing forces north of the Yangtze; and proved so successful that it was soon adopted in provinces throughout the empire. Rates varied greatly from place to place, ranging from 2 to 10 per cent in most provinces. By the late 1850s it was already apparent that the collection and disbursement of this rich tax resource was to remain largely in the hands of provincial authorities. Although all collections were supposed to be reported to Peking, and although certain fixed categories of central government expenses were actually met with *likin* revenues, yet the overwhelming needs of provincial militarization kept the bulk of reported revenues – to say nothing of amounts unreported – out of Peking's control.¹⁵

Tseng Kuo-fan was quick to seize the opportunity offered by the new tax. In 1856 he came to an agreement with the Hunan governor, Lo Ping-chang, whereby the bulk of Hunan *likin* was earmarked for support of the Hunan Army. In 1860, after Tseng obtained the governor-generalship of Kiangsi and Kiangnan, he channelled the whole of the Kiangsi *likin* through a special bureau that was not controlled by the provincial financial commissioner, thus circumventing the regular fiscal machinery. From this time onward even subordinate commanders of the Hunan Army were authorized to set up their own *likin* collection bureaux, upon whose revenues they came to depend. During the 1850s and early 1860s *likin* bureaux were instituted in a somewhat unsystematic manner, a situation that favoured the interests not only of the Hunan Army but also of local irregular forces under gentry control.

The administrative decentralization exemplified by *likin* was visible also in Tseng's other financial measures. From the beginning Tseng had sought to divert regular provincial revenues for the use of his army. But the court was unable to compel provincial governors to divert funds to Tseng. Only by making private arrangements with sympathetic provincial authorities such as Lo Ping-chang and Hu Lin-i was Tseng able to tap regular tax revenues. Such private deals became a regular feature of the

¹⁵ Lo Yü-tung, *Chung-kuo li-chin shih*, 61–2, 222–9.

national financial machinery; only after informal arrangements were made was Peking asked for authority to transfer funds. Once Tseng became a high provincial official himself, he furthered the trend towards provincial control of regular categories of revenue. This was done, first, by concentrating fiscal authority in the office of the provincial governor; and second, by deceptive accounting to Peking. Tseng encouraged his disciples to conceal substantial portions of regular provincial revenues as the only way the civil war could successfully be prosecuted.

Thus the needs of local militarization set in train serious and lasting changes in the structure of Chinese financial administration, involving a partial shift from agricultural to mercantile taxation, and a dispersal of some of Peking's fiscal authority into the hands of provincial leaders. Further damage to the Ch'ing fiscal system resulted from the central government's effort to meet military expenses by inflationary monetary policies. Beginning in 1853, Peking undertook a series of desperate measures such as issuing debased copper coinage, iron coins and paper notes. Though these expedients alleviated government shortages for the time being, they wrought havoc among the people, further weakened the national economy, and heightened popular distrust of the Ch'ing state.¹⁶

It should be understood that the emergence of new military forces led by Han civil elite did not yet mean that the regular Ch'ing military system had been supplanted. Until 1860, Tseng's Hunan Army existed alongside large contingents of Banner and Green Standard troops. Though most were ill-led, they were able to tie down portions of the Taiping army and continued to be a significant factor until 1860. The 'Great Camp of Kiangnan', situated just outside Nanking, was composed of Ch'ing regulars and mercenaries and remained paramount in the eyes of the court. Its commanders had superior authority in the overall campaign until 1860, when it was finally and ignominiously destroyed. Until that time, Tseng himself remained in a relatively minor official status and was hardly in a position to dominate the Ch'ing military effort. Before 1860, the Hunan Army should be appreciated as a substantial addition to Ch'ing military strength and, more important, as a foundation for future institutional change.

DISSENSION AND DECLINE

The character of Taiping rule

In early 1854 Tseng's army clashed head-on with Taiping forces in the middle Yangtze valley. The Taipings had launched a massive westward expedition, which had succeeded in taking and holding most of the im-

¹⁶ Jerome Ch'en, 'The Hsien-feng inflation', *BSOAS*, 21 (1958) 578-86.

portant river cities upstream from the Heavenly Capital of Nanking. Now, with the northern expedition foundering, the provinces of Hupei, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Kiangsu became a vast theatre of Taiping military operations. The rebels' strategic design was to secure the river communications of Nanking and occupy the agricultural regions around them. Elements of the Hunan Army turned back the Taiping invasion of Hunan in a crucial battle at Hsiang-t'an (1 May 1854), and Tseng's naval forces sailed forth to challenge Taiping control of the rivers and lakes. But the talented Taiping Assistant King, Shih Ta-k'ai, dealt Tseng serious defeats on both land and water, and mid-1856 found rebel military fortunes at their height. The Taipings held strategic cities along a nearly 300-mile stretch of the Yangtze valley, from Wuchang in the west to Chinkiang in the east, their control over the waterway the more secure because most of Tseng's fleet was bottled up in Poyang Lake. Shih Ta-k'ai's legions had subdued most of the rich prefectures of Kiangsi. A final touch to the Taiping military triumph was a major victory over the Ch'ing forces outside Nanking in June 1856, leading to the death of the Ch'ing commander, Hsiang Jung, shortly afterwards.

As a new imperial regime, the Taipings faced difficult problems in consolidating their rule. Having thrown a deadly challenge at the Confucian establishment, they had to develop their own establishment at all levels of society. Having propagated a radically utopian social programme, they had now to accommodate theory to reality. By 1856, a year of triumph and crisis for the Taipings, a number of their characteristic institutions had emerged.

The character of the Taiping bureaucracy was shaped by two disharmonious principles: the domination of all posts of substance by the Kwangsi elect, and the broad search for new, literate support by means of a traditional mechanism, the examination system. Taiping civil service examinations began immediately after the establishment of the Heavenly Capital at Nanking and continued throughout the years of the regime. Their format was in most respects the same as that of the Ch'ing system, with periodic examinations at local and metropolitan levels. Their content, however, consisted of Christian themes and panegyrics on Taiping leaders; and their social basis was broader. Investigations of the backgrounds of candidates were wholly dispensed with, suggesting both the Taipings' desperation for literate talent and their commitment to broadened participation in political life. The examinations seem to have been rather easy to pass. In the Hupei provincial examination held in 1854, fewer than a thousand candidates produced more than 800 *chü-jen*; in the Anhwei examination of the same year, 30 *chü-jen* were chosen from a single district.¹⁷

¹⁷ Li Ch'un, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo chib-tu ch'u-t'an*, 472.

Despite the obvious Taiping effort to win over the orthodox elite, rather few such literati participated in their examinations. The social origins of candidates seem to have been quite miscellaneous, including former monks, soothsayers and other literates whose 'superstitious' vocations had been proscribed by the new regime. The morale of the literati in Taiping-occupied areas cannot have been uplifted by the frequent injunctions to attend examinations on pain of decapitation. Occasionally a trapped scholar chose a martyr's death by turning in an examination paper filled with witty abuse. A problem still unsolved is the actual contribution of the examination system to the building of the Taiping bureaucracy. But the evidence suggests that the dominance of military functions over civil, the fluid strategic situation, and the undiminished importance of regional and religious qualifications among the Taipings meant that civil service examinations did not play a large role. As a propaganda device and symbol of legitimacy, however, the Taiping examination system should not be underestimated.

The Taiping official system itself consisted of two ranks of heritable nobility (king and marquis) plus eleven grades of officials. Of these eleven grades, the first six bore the names of bureaucratic posts gleaned from the histories of various dynasties, though they generally designated ranks rather than specific functions. The last five grades were associated with more specific roles in military command or local government. As in the Taipings' utopian model, the *Rites of Chou*, the distinction between military and civil roles was non-existent, and an official in any grade might find himself assigned either to civil administration or troop command. Within this graded hierarchy the real power centres were the administrative staffs of the various kings. Each king had within his entourage a secretariat divided into the traditional six functional divisions of government (analogous to the 'Six Boards'). This did not result in complete administrative chaos, however, because the Eastern King, Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, had arrogated to himself the powers of a prime minister in both civil and military affairs, and his secretariat had achieved by 1856 a central co-ordinating role within the Taiping bureaucracy as a whole.

Taiping local government was based upon the old Ch'ing divisions of prefecture and hsien (district), and below the hsien upon the *Land regulations*, which prescribed hierarchically-graded units ranging from the twenty-five family group up to the 'army' of 13,156 families. To the prefectural and hsien posts were appointed officials with functions similar to those of the Ch'ing officials they replaced. Below hsien level, evidence on the actual implementation of the Taiping format is scattered and often contradictory. Two considerations, however, point to the

fragility of Taiping local control. The first is that the Taiping system shared a weakness with that of the Ch'ing, namely that the regular local bureaucracy was thinly spread. Court-appointed officialdom stopped at the level of the hsien, as in the Ch'ing system, and all posts below that level were to be staffed by local people locally nominated. Therefore the whole infrastructure of local government, so crucial to the Taiping re-ordering of society, was staffed by persons whose commitment to the regime's programme was often marginal at best. A second element of weakness, related to the first, was that the Taipings found it difficult to impose their artificial numerical subdivisions upon the indigenous units of local organization and often found themselves simply applying new terminology to existing institutions (such as the traditional *hsiang* district subdivisions, or the existing *pao-chia* or *li-chia* population units). This meant that the headmen of such units in Taiping-occupied areas were sometimes the same men who had dominated community affairs under the old regime, hardly a situation conducive either to firm local control or to genuine reshaping of local society.

The Taipings' land policy in conquered areas generally suggests a tenuous hold over the countryside. It must be seen as an outgrowth of an acute need for revenue, a shortage of reliable cadres, and the resulting need to leave rural social relationships largely undisturbed. To implement a radical land policy would have required time and security, which the Taipings never had, and would inevitably have brought about a temporary drop in production and revenue. We have mentioned that the Taiping *Land regulations*, by simply omitting provisions for periodic reallocation, hinted that redistributed land might become the property of the tillers. In practice the Taiping land programme was neither one of state ownership nor one of land-to-the-tiller. Though there is still considerable dispute among Chinese historians on this point, the burden of evidence indicates that in most areas under Taiping occupation the landlord-tenant relationship remained in existence. Though the tendency towards accommodation with landlords seems to have been more pronounced during the later years of the movement, there are signs that it existed earlier as well. In cases where the Taipings sought to settle some form of proprietary status upon tenants, the primary consideration seems to have been the need to collect taxes from them after their landlords had fled. Taiping tax procedures quickly outgrew the crude confiscation and extortion that generally marked their entry into an area and became regularized into a system of land tax that differed little from that of the Ch'ing, save that quotas were lighter.

Generally speaking, the condition of the peasantry was somewhat im-

proved in those Taiping areas not devastated by war. The presence of the rebels seems to have hardened tenants' determination to resist extortionate rents, and in some cases landlords had to content themselves with partial payments. In some regions of the lower Yangtze after 1860, the imposition of miscellaneous direct taxes upon tenant farmers went hand-in-hand with an official programme of rent reduction. It was just another way of sharing with landlords the surplus production of the countryside.¹⁸ The economy of Taiping areas was in general less tax-ridden than that of the old regime, in the mercantile sector as well as the agricultural. Taiping trade taxes were less ruinous than the ubiquitous likin, being apparently better regulated and more honestly administered.

Disintegration at the centre and revival of leadership

The catastrophe that struck the Taipings in 1856 sprang neither from the deficiencies of their local administration nor from the strength of their opponents, but from the instability of their own central leadership. This instability, as we have suggested, was built into the Taiping system during the movement's earliest days. The continued survival of the regime required that rivalries among the kings be balanced by the spirit of brotherhood in a common cause. But brotherhood soon fell victim to the ruthless ambition of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, the Eastern King. By the time the Heavenly Capital had been established in 1853, his already great power had been enhanced by the deaths of Feng Yün-shan and Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, both killed in battle. The consolidation of his executive position was achieved at the expense of Wei Ch'ang-hui and Shih Ta-k'ai, the Northern and Assistant Kings, of Ch'in Jih-kang (appointed a king in 1854), and even of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan himself, whom Yang humiliated and bullied along with the rest. Hung's progressive mental deterioration had in any case led to his virtual withdrawal from active participation in executive decisions. Yang quickly assumed new spiritual authority, asserting that he was the incarnation of the Holy Ghost, exalted even above the second son of God. Most historians have despised Yang as a faithless schemer, assuming that his own religious pretensions (in contrast to Hung's sincere beliefs) were mere contrivances. Evil machinator or not, it is clear that without Yang's administrative brilliance and instinct for power centralization, the Taiping movement would never have achieved as much as it did.

Yang's downfall was precipitated by what appears to have been his

¹⁸ Li Ch'un, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-tu ch'u-t'an*, 65, 94-8, 338-83; Chien Yu-wen, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo tien-chih t'ung'-k'ao*, 655-69; Lo Erh-kang, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-kuo*, 119-21.

effort to usurp supreme power by displacing Hung Hsiu-ch'üan himself. Hung became aware of his danger when Yang forced him, in August of 1856, to grant him the designation '10,000 years', an imperial prerogative hitherto reserved for Hung himself. The Heavenly King then secretly summoned Wei Ch'ang-hui and Shih Ta-k'ai back to the capital with instructions to kill Yang, a move perhaps already plotted by Wei, Shih and Ch'in Jih-kang. Wei, then campaigning in Kiangsi, was nearest; with a body of several thousand picked troops he hastened back to Nanking. From a rich landlord background, Wei may have doubly resented his long victimization by Yang, who was by origin a poor labourer. On the night of 1 September he struck swiftly, killing Yang and ordering a slaughter of his entourage in which some 20,000 are said to have died. The scale of the massacre, which raged in Nanking for nearly a fortnight, apparently went far beyond anything Hung had envisioned. When Shih Ta-k'ai reached Nanking some ten days later, he too was appalled and urged Wei to stop. Wei, perhaps by now somewhat demented by the hideous scene, suspected Shih of sympathies for the Eastern King's clique. Shih prudently fled the capital and rejoined his troops at the front, whereupon Wei exterminated his entire family. Shih marched on Nanking with a huge army to take revenge. Now Hung himself felt Wei's power oppressive and potentially as dangerous as Yang's had been. Learning that Shih had overwhelming support among the Taiping armies, Hung rallied his forces in mid-November and killed Wei along with some 200 of his followers. In this arena of carnage, greed and paranoia perished whatever remnants of its original vision the Taiping movement might have retained.

An equally grievous loss was that of centralized authority. None of the surviving leaders was able to exercise the power of the now apotheosized Eastern King. Shih Ta-k'ai, called back by Hung to Nanking as chief executive, found himself balked by a palace clique consisting of Hung's brothers and the sycophantic courtier Meng Te-en. After six months Shih departed, taking his own army with him on a long independent campaign southward and westward, never again to rejoin the movement. The Ch'ing loyalists were quick to take advantage of Taiping disorganization. In December 1856, Hu Lin-i's forces dislodged the Taipings from Wuchang, and by late 1857 Tseng had wrested from them most of their Kiangsi conquests. Their key river base, Anking, was now threatened. This period of Taiping military decline, from late 1856 to mid-1858, culminated in the loss of strategic Kiukiang and the re-establishment of a Ch'ing siege force outside Nanking.

For all the chaos at its centre, the Taiping movement evidently retained

an irrepressible vitality among its rank and file. The revival of its military fortunes in late 1858 was largely accomplished by two men from the poorest stratum of Kwangsi peasants, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and Li Hsiu-ch'eng, who had risen slowly through the rebel army ranks. Emerging as top field commanders in 1857, these brilliant tacticians gradually regained the offensive and succeeded in throwing Ch'ing forces north of the Yangtze badly off balance. In September 1858, they dealt a Hunan Army force a stunning defeat at San-ho-chen in northern Anhwei; and in November smashed the Ch'ing regulars at P'u-k'ou opposite Nanking. With these two strokes the Taipings relieved the pressure on Anking and reopened the northward communications of the Heavenly Capital.

A second component of the Taiping revival was a limited and temporary revival of central authority in the person of the Heavenly King's cousin, Hung Jen-kan (1822-64). One of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's first converts (and, like Hsiu-ch'üan, a disappointed examination candidate turned schoolteacher), Jen-kan had been separated from the movement since 1852. In the interim he had worked with Protestant missionaries in Hong Kong: first the Swede, Theodore Hamberg, and later various members of the London Missionary Society, including the Scottish sinologue James Legge. His studies, which ranged beyond theology to Western sciences and political economy, not only made him the most broadly educated among the Taipings, but also equipped him to be one of China's first interpreters of Western culture. When finally he succeeded in reaching Nanking in April 1859, he was greeted joyously by the Heavenly King and elevated to supreme executive power, with the title 'Shield King' (Kan Wang).

Hung Jen-kan's *New treatise on administration* (*Tzu-cheng hsin-p'ien*), issued in 1859, outlined a policy of strengthening central control, modernizing China's economy and communications by the adoption of Western techniques, and cultivating friendship with the Western powers. Hung's proposals to open modern banks, issue patents, build railways and steamships and promote mining represent a whole-hearted if poorly integrated appreciation of the underlying elements of Western power. They were also a significant departure from Taiping economic theory. In another work Hung prescribed substantial changes in the Taiping examination system that would lead to a more practical literary style and a more effective blending of civil and military roles. In the new Taiping elite, the scholar was to be able to 'write of military strategy in poems and books', and the soldier to 'put aside his shield and spear for gentlemanly behaviour'.¹⁹ At the same time, Hung did not despair of gaining the allegiance of China's

¹⁹ *Cb'in-ting shih-chieh t'iao-li*, in Hsiao I-shan, ed. *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ts'ung-shu*, 937-8.

orthodox elite, to whom he addressed a renewed propaganda appeal on traditional ethno-nationalistic grounds.

By mid-1860 Taiping military victories north of the Yangtze had relieved pressure on strategic points but had failed to establish a secure economic base. More serious, they had failed to reduce the bastions of the Hunan Army in the central Yangtze area. Manpower accretions in Anhwei, which consisted largely of politically-unreliable Nien rebels (who shortly deserted to the Ch'ing), discouraged long-term reliance on that area as a base of operations. But following the second destruction of the Great Camp of Kiangnan in May 1860, which greatly heightened Taiping morale, Hung Jen-kan proposed a major campaign to subdue the region of the Yangtze delta. With that area as an economic base, there was to be a renewed effort to conquer the mid-Yangtze valley as far as Wuchang and Hankow. Among other benefits, possession of the lower Yangtze cities would, Hung thought, give the Taipings access to Western steamships, which could then be sent to fight upriver.

The new eastward campaign had rapid initial success. Ch'ing regulars defending Chü-jung, Tan-yang and Ch'ang-chou were sent reeling in disorderly retreat. By 2 June, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's forces marched into Soochow, the economic and political centre of eastern Kiangsu and gateway to the coastal cities. Intending a long occupation, Taiping commanders throughout the region worked assiduously to stabilize the local economy and control the countryside. The policy was to disturb local social structure as little as possible in order to insure a continuous flow of resources into the Taiping treasury. There now lay ahead only the displacement of Ch'ing forces from the coastal cities. Aside from the plan to acquire steamships for the upper Yangtze campaign, there is little evidence that Hung Jen-kan or other Taiping leaders appreciated the long-term importance of Shanghai as a source of revenue from foreign trade. Yet it had to be taken as part of the larger campaign in the Yangtze delta, and Hung Jen-kan set about smoothing the way with the foreign powers. But Hung's initiatives to gain foreign support or neutrality, which were based on a naïve optimism about Western sympathy for the Taipings as progressive fellow-Christians, were doomed; for the Powers were in no frame of mind to cooperate with the rebels and were more impressed with the revival of imperial power in the lower Yangtze provinces.

Tseng Kuo-fan's rise to command

The decisive events of the early 1860s, ultimately the determinants of the Ch'ing victory, took place within the loyalist command structure. The second collapse of the Great Camp of Kiangnan (May 1860) had brought about the deaths of Chang Kuo-liang and Ho-ch'un, the top Ch'ing commanders; the disgrace of Ho Kuei-ch'ing, the Liangkiang governor-general; and the destruction of regular Ch'ing armies in the region east of Nanking. There followed a momentous reorientation of imperial policy: there was now no choice but to entrust Tseng Kuo-fan with the leadership of the entire campaign. Accordingly on 8 June 1860, Tseng was appointed acting Liangkiang governor-general and imperial commissioner with supreme military authority in the lower Yangtze region. In this, his first regular provincial post, Tseng was at last able to link his military forces to the more ample funds and more potent authority of a major governor-generalship.


For the Ch'ing government, this linkage of personal military power and regular provincial authority was a portentous move. There had been precursors during the 1850s, in which several of Tseng's subordinates had been made governors or acting governors: Chiang Chung-yüan and later Li Meng-ch'ün in Anhwei; Liu Ch'ang-yu in Kwangsi; and Hu Lin-i in Hupei. Tseng's new appointment to the powerful Liangkiang governor-generalship, however, was clearly a more potent amalgam of civil and military powers. It was a turning point in the civil war and in many ways a turning point in China's modern history. The powerful conservative coalition thus forged between the Manchu monarchy and the leading elements of the Han elite was to prolong the dynasty's life into the twentieth century and profoundly influence the mechanisms of China's politics through the Republican period.

Besides strengthening the Hunan Army's financial and political base, Tseng's promotion in 1860 at last provided the loyalists with sound strategic leadership. Tseng shared the Taipings' perception that the upper Yangtze, from Nanking to Hankow, was the key to the security of the Heavenly Capital; and key to the control of the upper Yangtze was Anking, the strategic river port of northern Anhwei, which had been under Taiping control since 1853. In late 1859 the court had recognized, upon Tseng's insistence, how vital it was that Anking be recaptured, and Tseng now proceeded methodically to do so, entrusting the campaign to his brother, Tseng Kuo-ch'üan. On 5 September 1861, Anking fell after bitter fighting and with great slaughter of the civilian populace. Thus was laid the strategic foundation for the rebellion's defeat.

A contemporaneous event of equal importance was Tseng's sponsorship of new armies, built on the model of his own Hunan force and led by his own former staff men. In this way the mechanism of his own power was passed on to the succeeding generation of gentry-militarists. Tseng turned first to his disciple Li Hung-chang (1823–1901), a capable, versatile and ambitious *chin-shih* whose father had been Tseng's classmate. Li, from a prominent official family of Ho-fei, Anhwei, had begun his military career leading a force of mercenaries in defence of his home area from 1853 to 1857. The militarization of the Anhwei elite had begun in response to the Nien Rebellion in the Anhwei–Honan border region and was accelerated by the onslaught of the Taipings. Li's own role seems to have been comparable to that of Wang Chen and Lo Tse-nan in Hunan: he recruited men from the rolls of the *t'uan-lien* (local defence militia) and organized them into professional fighting units. Li soon moved from direct troop command to a staff position under Fu-chi, Chiang Chung-yüan's successor as Anhwei governor. After six years in Anhwei, Li resolved to join his elder brother, Han-chang, in the service of his old patron Tseng Kuo-fan. He arrived at Tseng's Kiangsi headquarters in January 1859.

Tseng considered Li too talented for a staff position and sought to entrust him with substantial independent troop command. Tseng and Hu Lin-i had long had their eyes on the Huai-yang circuit of Anhwei as a source of troops, and Tseng had repeatedly tried to arrange for Li to recruit and train a force from that area. The occasion finally arrived in 1861, when a representative of the refugee gentry in beleaguered Shanghai came to Tseng's camp at newly-recovered Anking and begged for military relief. Li set out immediately to raise an army. His new troops were drawn from among *t'uan-lien* militiamen, augmented by certain mercenary units already in being and stiffened by eight battalions of seasoned Hunanese. In April 1862, the resourceful Shanghai gentry sent to Anking a fleet of steamships rented from foreign merchants. Li's troops were then swiftly transported downriver to occupy Shanghai.

Tseng's determination to sponsor new armies stemmed partly from his realization that the Hunan Army was past its peak of effectiveness. Shaken by the deaths of its most able commanders (Lo Tse-nan, Chiang Chung-yüan, Li Hsu-pin and in September 1861, Hu Lin-i); beset with morale problems since the catastrophe of the San-ho-chen defeat; and finding new recruitment in Hunan increasingly difficult, the Hunan Army faced an uncertain future. Tseng was also anxious to take advantage of his newly acquired political power by extending the new pattern of joint military–civil authority. Shortly after Li began mustering troops in late



MAP. 11 The Taiping-imperialist struggle


1861, Tseng decided to recommend him for the governorship of Kiangsu, a post Li was granted upon his arrival in Shanghai. Earlier, Hu Lin-i's close friend, Tso Tsung-t'ang, a talented Hunanese scholar who had served Tseng and other officials as an executive officer, had been given command of the southern front and ordered to recover Chekiang with a force of Hunan mercenaries. Tso was appointed governor of Chekiang in January 1862.

An underlying factor in Tseng's decision to extend his power into the Shanghai area was his concern lest foreign troops, whose intervention had so long and so insistently been sought by the refugee elite in Shanghai, achieve a military foothold in the interior of Kiangsu. Deeply suspicious of foreign involvement, Tseng was convinced that the way to make use of the West was not to engage foreign troops but to establish Chinese arsenals to make Western-style munitions.

Foreign involvement

The detached and even at times mildly hopeful Western view of the Taipings in the early 1850s had by now dissipated. By 1860, the rebels were seen primarily as a threat to foreign trade. Great Britain, whose stake in the China market was largest, maintained officially a policy of neutrality in the civil war, insisting only that the treaty ports be not molested. But dispatches of British consular and military officials presented an increasingly hostile view of the Taipings, stressing the 'destructive nature of the insurrection and . . . the blasphemous and immoral character of the superstition on which it is based'.²⁰ The British fear was not that the Taipings would take a hostile stance towards foreign trade or even towards foreign treaty rights, but rather that their supposed inability to establish effective government would throw the country and its commerce into chaos. Though the idea of intervention against the rebels had been toyed with at various levels of administration, official British policy remained limited to the protection of British interests at the trading ports, and in effect to a determination to defend Shanghai. The French (whose intervention had helped Ch'ing forces recover Shanghai from the Small Sword Society in 1855) had arrived at the same conclusion. Accordingly Li Hsiu-ch'eng's thrust at Shanghai on 19 and 20 August 1860 (a tentative movement involving only 3,000 men) was repulsed by British and French troops. Ironically, this intervention was undertaken while other British and French forces were storming the Taku forts in the north (see chapter 5).

²⁰ Frederick Bruce, quoted in J. S. Gregory, *Great Britain and the Taipings*, 99.



MAP 12. The Yangtze Delta

Following the treaty settlement of 1860 between the Ch'ing government and the Powers, Britain remained for a time determined to stay uninvolved in China's civil conflict. The Taipings were treated as the *de facto* authority in the middle Yangtze, and an expedition to Nanking led by Rear-Admiral Sir James Hope in February 1861 sought a stable understanding by which British trade might proceed safely in return for a guarantee of neutrality. Li Hsiu-ch'eng, who received the British at Nanking (Hung Jen-kan had by this time been relieved of his responsibilities in foreign relations), even promised to launch no assault on Shanghai for the remainder of the year. The Taiping forces would not come within a thirty-mile radius of Shanghai. Britain continued to observe a technical neutrality in the civil war, but by the summer of 1861 the sympathies of Bruce, the minister at Peking, were plainly leaning to the Ch'ing side. The growing aversion of the Western community to the 'blasphemous' Taiping Christianity, as well as the blunt fact that the Taipings were against the opium traffic, must have affected the British attitude. In June 1861 Bruce approved Hart's proposal that a naval fleet be procured by H. N. Lay on behalf of the Ch'ing government. In October, more than a month after Tseng's recovery of Anking, Bruce acceded to Prince Kung's request that foreign ships on the Yangtze be prohibited from anchoring anywhere except near the treaty ports, thus making it difficult for the Taipings to obtain arms and supplies from foreign vessels. Nonetheless, it was not Bruce's intention and still less that of London that Britain should intervene in the war itself. In December, there were only one French and two British gunboats in the harbour at Ningpo. In Shanghai the British had only seven hundred troops and the French, five hundred.²¹

By the end of 1861, however, restraint was dissolving on both sides. The Taipings were forced by the increasingly perilous military situation on their western front to consolidate their position on the coast; they occupied Ningpo on 9 December 1861, and Hangchow on the 29th. In January 1862, Li Hsiu-ch'eng launched a general attack on the Shanghai area and occupied the riverine approaches to the city.

The British, meantime, were beginning to see their future interests in terms of a revitalized and secure Ch'ing regime. Their hopes were raised by the results of the palace coup of November 1861, in which the deceased Hsien-feng Emperor's younger brother, Prince Kung, had emerged as the arbiter of imperial policy (see chapter 8). Prince Kung was prepared to live with the new treaties, and the British minister, Frederick Bruce, was prepared to afford him every chance to do so. Britain's ensuing intervention against the Taipings must be seen as part of Bruce's general effort to

²¹ Gregory, *Great Britain and the Taipings*, 118.

stabilize Sino-British relations. There is no evidence that the British feared the Taipings as a potentially stronger and more anti-foreign government. On the contrary, it was their supposed weakness and indiscipline that drove the British to oppose them and support the Ch'ing.

Foreign involvement in the anti-Taiping campaigns took several distinct forms: the direct intervention of British and French troops; the provision of modern arms and training to Ch'ing forces; and the supply of foreign officers to irregular mercenary contingents. Of these, the direct role of foreign forces was certainly least important. The mercenary contingents – most prominently the 'Ever Victorious Army' – were of considerable importance to the Ch'ing in Kiangsu. But the provision of modern arms was ultimately of greatest historical significance; for, along with the munitions manufacturing enterprises that accompanied it, this technical advance served as the spark for the modernization of China's armies and military industry.²²

Western intervention against the rebels had long been sought by officials and gentry in the lower Yangtze area. Wu Hsü, a Shanghai taotai who had purchased his degree, had perceived the potential value of foreign support as early as 1853 and since that time had pressed for it energetically. By 1860, concurrently Kiangsu finance commissioner, Wu was himself deep in personal business investments in partnership with comprador-merchants, and was also adept at collecting the *likin* through the merchant guilds. The governor, Hsüeh Huan, had under his command some 40,000 motley Green Standard and *yung* forces, which were untrained and poorly disciplined. As early as May 1860 Wu Hsü had begun to recruit a small corps of 'barbarian mercenaries' (*i-yung*). Advised by his wealthy *landsmann* and business partner, Yang Fang (Takee), a Chekiang banker who had been comprador of Jardine, Matheson and Company, Wu had enlisted the services of Frederick Townsend Ward (1831–62), a one-time steamship officer in China, who, since his boyhood in Salem, Massachusetts, had been either at sea or adventuring on land. Brave, quick-tempered, yet naïve enough to be manipulated by Yang Fang (whose daughter he eventually married), Ward and a few Caucasian colleagues, leading 200 Filipino troops, captured Sung-chiang, an important town north-west of Shanghai in July 1860, but lost it again within a month. During 1861, he and his officers (chiefly Americans), began training a few hundred Chinese troops in addition to the 'Manilamen' they had begun with. Heavily financed by Wu and Yang, Ward drilled his troops 'in the English manner' and equipped them with Sharp's repeating rifles. His

²² I am indebted to Prof. Kwang-Ching Liu for much of the following discussion of foreign involvement.

force had grown to 3,000 by 1862. After seeing combat in the Shanghai vicinity it was officially dubbed the 'Ever Victorious Army' (Ch'ang-sheng-chün), an auspicious epithet of the sort commonly used by the Chinese for irregular *yung* contingents. Such was the origin of the mixed unit – essentially a foreign-led corps of Chinese mercenaries – that was to gain such general acclaim in the Kiangsu campaigns of the succeeding two years.

In the eyes of Wu Hsü and the Kiangsu governor, Hsüeh Huan, however, the Ever Victorious Army was only a first step in the larger effort to enlist the direct aid of foreigners. Hsüeh and Wu cautiously deferred to the Shanghai refugee gentry and eminent former officials, who now took the lead in petitioning the throne to 'borrow' foreign troops to help suppress the rebellion. The petition even suggested bringing foreign troops into the campaigns against Soochow and Nanking. The gentry leaders claimed that Harry Parkes had intimated in early January 1862 that if approval could be obtained from the throne, as well as from Bruce, British troops would not only help defend Shanghai but also recover Ningpo, Soochow and even Nanking – 'to go all the way along the line'.²³ Hsüeh Huan, feigning reluctance, waited only for the petition to be signed by enough former high officials before memorializing the throne, endorsing the petition for 'borrowing [alien] troops to suppress rebellion' (*chieh-ping chu-chiao*). A proposal for an offensive against Soochow and Nanking was included. Meanwhile, with Hsüeh's approval, Wu Yün, the former prefect of Soochow, and Ying Pao-shih, a deputy of Wu Hsü's, established on 13 January an office to raise funds for the contemplated allied operations, called the United Defence Bureau (*Chung-wai hui-fang chü*). Two edicts in early February approved Hsüeh's recommendations as far as they applied to Shanghai: 'Shanghai is an important place for foreign trade; it is appropriate for the Chinese and foreigners to defend it jointly.'²⁴ The idea of extending foreign help to Soochow and Nanking was referred to Tseng Kuo-fan for his views.

When on 13 January 1862, the Taipings were observed marching on the banks of the Wusung River, the British and the French merely fired at them from ships. But on 21 February, Vice-Admiral Hope personally led an expedition to attack Taiping-occupied Kao-ch'iao, ten miles north-east of Shanghai. Hope's artillery corps was supported by 350 British and 60 French troops, with 600 of Ward's men serving as skirmishers and stormers. There followed through April similar operations against several towns in the vicinity of Shanghai – not altogether successful since the

²³ Cited in Wang Erh-min, *Huai-chün chih* (Treatise on the Anhwei Army), 55.

²⁴ *IWSM*, T'ung-chih, 4.3.

captured towns were not properly garrisoned and were quickly retaken by the Taipings. Only on 22 February did Hope write to Bruce for authorization of such operations – namely, to clear the rebels from a radius of thirty miles around Shanghai. The approval from Bruce was not given until 12 April, about the same time that General Staveley arrived from Tientsin with some 1,800 British troops. Peking's blessing on Ward's Sino-Western *jung* army had been accorded on 25 February, when a rescript approved Hsüeh Huan's recommendation that Ward be given the fourth military rank as well as a peacock feather. Moving on small British gunboats up and down the broad internal waterways, the combined forces of the British, the French and Ward reduced, between 1 and 18 May, the principal towns within the thirty-mile radius. The looting after the capture of each town was systematic, under a prior agreement on 'fair distribution'. Garrisoning was now effectively performed chiefly by Ward's men and in two cases by the British and French troops themselves.

That Shanghai remained safe from the Taipings must be credited to active European intervention through late May 1862. But after that it was the newly-arrived forces of Li Hung-chang that shouldered the main burden of defence. Li and his 6,500 men had arrived in April, coming down the Yangtze from Anking on the seven steamships hired from a British firm by the gentry in Shanghai. Making his headquarters in the Chinese city of Shanghai, Li decided from the beginning that his forces would not fight as adjuncts to the British and the French – but would 'strive for self-strengthening' and not mix with foreigners.²⁵

The Taipings now mounted a major offensive against Shanghai with some 50,000 troops. In view of their own small numbers, the British and the French withdrew their men from Chia-ting, a city about thirty miles inland which they had garrisoned. Sung-chiang, guarded by Ward, was also in peril. General Staveley urgently requested that London send large reinforcements from India – an idea which, if realized, would very likely have resulted in the expansion of the European role in the war. But such reinforcement was found unnecessary, for Li Hung-chang and his forces proved almost immediately that they were capable of coping with the situation. As the Loyal King's large forces attacked Shanghai from the west in early June, the Anhwei Army defeated them in a series of battles that culminated at Hung-ch'iao on 17 June. The Loyal King, seeing that Shanghai could not be taken quickly, decided to return to his base at Soochow, where he began planning an expedition to relieve Nanking,

²⁵ Li Hung-chang, *Li Wen-chung kung ch'üan-chi* (Complete papers of Li Hung-chang, *P'eng-liao ban-kao* (Letters to friends and colleagues), 1.15, 26.

now threatened by forces under Tseng Kuo-ch'üan. Large Taiping armies under other commanders continued to press on Shanghai, but these forces were also defeated by the Anhwei Army, aided by Ward's contingent. Li Hung-chang's forces recaptured by the end of August 1862 all the towns in Shanghai's thirty-mile radius except Chia-ting (which was recovered in October by joint Sino-Western forces – the last instance of the British and French troops taking the offensive in the Taiping war).

Li was convinced that only through independent action could the Anhwei Army achieve the strength and experience necessary for real military hegemony in the area. Li remained equally suspicious of Western influence in the realm of military training. In July of 1862, when pilot programmes for the training of Chinese troops by Western officers had already been established by the central government, Li pleaded with the Tsungli Yamen not to support such expedients, for fear that the Europeans would 'gradually encroach upon the authority [over Ch'ing armies]'.²⁶ The resistance of both provincial and central government officials against direct foreign involvement in China's civil war is nowhere revealed more clearly than in the story of the ill-starred 'Lay-Osborn Flotilla', which is discussed in chapter 9.

The fall of the Taiping kingdom

The loyalist capture of Anking in September 1861 had marked with a bloody flourish the failure of the Taiping western campaign, which had been part of Hung Jen-kan's grand strategy of 1860. This campaign, in some ways more vital to the Taiping position than the thrust eastward, had foundered partly because of poor coordination among the rebel generals. Li Hsiu-ch'eng, whose generalship had earned him the title 'Loyal King' (Chung Wang) in 1859, was more attentive to his own power base in the lower Yangtze than to the larger strategic design. This fragmentation of command was but one aspect of the Taipings' failure to re-establish centralized leadership after the death of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing. The position of Hung Jen-kan, never firm, was undermined by the withdrawal of the Heavenly King from temporal concerns and perhaps from sanity. The jealousy of field commanders and the machinations of courtiers had succeeded, by early 1861, in stripping away his prime-ministerial powers. Jealousy and ambition also changed the character of the Taiping elite, as scores of 'kings' were appointed to satisfy the demands of military leaders, some of whom were only marginally committed to the move-

²⁶ See Britten Dean, 'Sino-British diplomacy in the 1860s: the establishment of the British concession at Hankow' *HJAS*, 32 (1972) 95–6.

ment. Though individual rebel armies still retained fearsome strength, the loss of Anking and the dissolution of central control had set the stage for the kingdom's extinction.

That extinction was ultimately accomplished by the encirclement of Nanking by Tseng Kuo-ch'üan; and by the clearing of the coastal region by Li Hung-chang and of Chekiang province by Tso Tsung-t'ang. Li's drive from the east through Kiangsu is of particular historical significance; for it reflected the mastery, by this astute and adaptable leader, of new sources of wealth and power in the form of the commercial riches of Shanghai and its hinterland. Shanghai, as the new centre of Sino-foreign trade, with its phenomenal growth in population, its wealthy community of refugee gentry, and its manifold ties to inland commerce, was unmatched as a military base. Once appointed governor of Kiangsu, Li had immediately set about gaining control of the maritime customs revenues and the Kiangsu likin. Both these trade taxes, but particularly the latter, were to prove mainstays of his military operations in years to come. Having won control of these resources by relentless bureaucratic in-fighting, Li was in a position by late 1862 not only to maintain his rapidly expanding Anhwei Army, but also to supply substantial funds to Tseng Kuo-fan, whose troops were growing mutinous over arrears of pay.

As Li's army in 1863 methodically broke the Taiping hold on the cities of eastern Kiangsu and northern Chekiang, the army expanded to over 50,000, and the stage was set for the first significant modernization of China's armed forces. Unlike his conservative mentor, Tseng Kuo-fan, who resisted the adoption of foreign-style arms by his own Hunan troops, Li was quick to appreciate the technological windfall represented by his control of Shanghai. From Westerners he bought large quantities of rifled small-arms and foreign-style field artillery and hired British and French officers to train his troops in their use. By the spring of 1864, Li's battalions were equipped with some 15,000 rifles. To supply this force with ammunition required another innovation: the rapid development, from 1863, of arsenals in Shanghai, Soochow and eventually Nanking, to produce modern munitions. These early ventures in military modernization for the suppression of internal rebellion foreshadowed conditions in the last decades of Ch'ing rule. The availability of modern arms to the forces of orthodoxy meant that, for the ensuing fifty years, domestic order could be maintained with considerable success, notwithstanding China's inability, during the same period, to build an armed counterweight to foreign aggression.

The Ever Victorious Army, since its founding in 1860, had survived successive crises in leadership. Frederick Townsend Ward, its first com-

mander, functioned smoothly with both his Chinese merchant backers and the Ch'ing authorities. To symbolize and perhaps to solidify his role as an adjunct of the Chinese military system, he was granted the rank of colonel in the Chinese Green Standard Army. Ward died of wounds in September 1862, and was succeeded by another American, Henry Andrea Burgevine, who proved less amenable to Chinese direction. After the unruly Burgevine was dismissed, in early 1863, the command of the force passed to Major Charles George Gordon of the Royal Engineers, a close friend and relative of the British commander at Shanghai, General Staveley. Gordon received specific authorization from London to serve under Chinese command. After some initial reluctance, the British authorities in Shanghai were reconciled to an expansion of the unit's sphere of operations: from a force initially intended for the defence of the Shanghai area, it now accompanied Li Hung-chang's forces in their campaigns westward against the Taiping strongholds. In these campaigns, Gordon's force of mobile artillery and shock-troops proved a potent weapon in the hands of the Ch'ing. Throughout 1863, the Ever Victorious Army spearheaded Li's campaign to reduce rebel-held cities in eastern Kiangsu and northern Chekiang. Major victories at Ch'ang-shu, T'ai-ts'ang and K'un-shan brought the Ch'ing forces ever closer to Soochow, the key economic and administrative centre of the region. The fall of Soochow on 5 December 1863, aided in part by treachery among its defenders, was a major defeat for the rebellion. Two features of the Gordon campaigns deserve particular notice: the use of modern artillery, supplied on favourable terms by the British, fundamentally altered the old pattern of siege warfare that had characterized the civil war up to that time. The walled cities that had sheltered the Taiping civil regime and formed the anchors of its military defence were no longer secure. Second, the success of Li's campaigns in eastern Kiangsu diverted significant Taiping forces from the defence of the Heavenly Capital itself, now under siege by Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, and thereby hastened the final downfall of the movement.

Their capital besieged, their downriver economic base wrested from them, the Taipings fought out their last battles with fanatic abandon. On 19 July 1864, Tseng Kuo-ch'üan breached the walls of Nanking, slaughtered its inhabitants, and burned the city. In this final cataclysm, some 100,000 are said to have perished. Hung Hsiu-ch'üan had died of illness before Nanking's fall. Now the movement's remaining leaders were hunted down and put to death. The few units that escaped were pursued to Kwangtung, where they were wiped out the following year. The only significant body of survivors was the army of Lai Wen-kuang, a Taiping king who now recruited thousands of Anhwei refugees made

homeless by ruthless Ch'ing anti-Nien campaigns, organized and indoctrinated them in the Taiping manner, and vowed to continue the struggle. Lai Wen-kuang's alliance with the Nien prolonged the life of this remnant of the Taiping Kingdom until 1868. But as a political entity and as a community of faith, the movement was effectively destroyed in 1864. To the single-minded ferocity of the victors must be credited not only the destruction of the Taiping political and military organization, but the virtual obliteration by fire and sword of the Taiping tradition itself.

Assessing the reasons for the Taipings' defeat, one is quickly faced with the inadequacy of a purely military explanation. Discrepancy in firepower, a factor in the last three years of the rebellion, is not a satisfactory answer. The Taipings themselves were not without modern arms. By 1862, Li Hsiu-ch'eng was known to have secured several thousand rifles through Western merchants and adventurers. But the strategic fate of the Taipings appears to have been sealed as early as 1861, with the failure of their final western campaign, even before Li's Anhwei Army was founded. Nor, for the same reason, can foreign military involvement be considered a decisive factor. Flaws in the Taiping leadership group were more important: Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's political incapacity meant that a single centralized authority could emerge only through rivalry among his immediate followers. Yet even this element of inner weakness cannot adequately explain why, in the face of this formidable challenge, the dynasty's conservative champions were able to re-establish internal control. The answer must be sought by reassessing the inner character of the Taiping movement and its relationship to its social environment. For this purpose it may be useful to compare the Taipings with the Nien, the roughly contemporaneous rebel group in the north-central provinces.

THE CHARACTER OF THE NIEN ORGANIZATION: A COMPARISON

The history of the Nien movement before 1853 is imperfectly known. It is clear, at least, that the Niens arose from the human debris of the White Lotus Rebellion, yet were not strictly speaking descendants of the White Lotus sect. The epicentre of the Nien movement lay in the Huai-pei area, that is, the Anhwei-Honan-Kiangsu border region north of the Huai River. This was a dry-farming area much ravaged by flood and drought, in which famine had driven flocks of the poor into the hastily organized Ch'ing mercenary battalions during the White Lotus uprising. When finally demobilized, these men returned to their native villages, without hope of finding livelihood in the rural economy, yet ill-disposed to accept

their fate passively. Along with survivors of the rebel armies themselves, they entered upon a life of local banditry.²⁷

The social processes underlying the early Nien movement remain one of the most underdeveloped research areas in nineteenth-century history. Available evidence suggests that at least two such processes must be taken into account: (1) the change in the meaning of the term *nien*, from a generic term signifying a common type of bandit group, to a proper noun signifying a specific organization with consciousness of its corporate identity; and (2) the steps by which mobile outlaw groups in the border areas gradually extended their influence and their organization to settled communities in the Huai-pei plain.

An important memorial by T'ao Chu, then serving as a provincial censor, reveals the forms the movement had assumed by 1814, a decade after the suppression of the White Lotus Rebellion. The scattered remnants of the White Lotus wars had grouped themselves into organized bands in the ill-governed regions lying between Honan and Anhwei. Relying upon the laziness of responsibility-shirking local officials, they moved freely back and forth across administrative boundaries to escape capture. Living by plunder, extortion and the conveying of contraband salt, these were fully militarized banditti largely outside the pale of settled society. Members of such bands were known variously as 'sword-wielders' or 'red-beards' (perhaps from colouring applied as facial disguise, perhaps from the conventional make-up of tough characters in operas). An individual band of a few dozen or a hundred men was commonly called a '*nien-tzu*' or '*nien*'.²⁸

But the character of outlawry in this region was evolving rapidly. By 1814 the process had already begun whereby the *nien* bands ceased to be mere gatherings of the desperate and deprived and became instruments of the wealthy and powerful in settled society. There were many ways in which the *nien* groups were able to forge links with local communities. Bandit chieftains set up gambling tables in the market towns and gathered client followings of the unemployed and adventurous. The terror unleashed by *nien* outlaws upon village society induced many a family to seek protection by professing allegiance to their chieftains. 'Secure was the village, and fortunate the lineage, that contained *nien* members' wrote one observer.²⁹ By the 1820s the *nien* underworld was becoming en-

²⁷ Fang Yü-lan, *Hsing-lieh jib-chi hui-yao*, in Fan Wen-lan et al. eds. *Nien-chün*, 1.309-14; Chian Ti, *Ch'u-ch'i Nien-chün shih lun-ts'ung*, 1-38; Ssu-yü Teng, *The Nien Army and their guerrilla warfare, 1811-1868*, 46-76.

²⁸ T'ao Chu, *T'iao-ch'en chi-pu Wan-Yü teng sheng hung-bu fei-t'u che-tzu*, in Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i, *Nien-chün tzu-liao pieh-chi*, 5-9.

²⁹ Fang, *Hsing-lieh jib-chi hui-yao*, 310.

trenched in the local kinship system, in which it was perpetuated and transmitted by wealthy and powerful lineage leaders.³⁰ There was a tendency also for the salt smugglers to seek secure community bases. The kings of that profession, beset constantly with mortal danger from government pursuers or rivals, settled themselves in village groups, earthen walls bristling with armament, prepared against all comers.³¹

By mid-century it was clear that the scattered *nien* groups had become closely enmeshed with the economic life of many communities in the Huai-pei area. Whole settlements might come to depend upon plunder for survival. Setting forth under the command of a *nien* chief, villagers would return home laden with pillage, of which half was kept by the leader and half divided equally among his followers. Thus the meaning of *nien* came to embrace both fully militarized banditti and semi-militarized community-based groups. Consequently it would seem analogous to both the *t'ang* (local lodges) and *ku* (mobile bandits) of the southern underworld. The leaders of local *nien* bear striking similarities to the 'rice hosts' (*mi-fan-chu*) of the Kwangsi Triads: these were wealthy and influential local figures who collected about them men unable to support themselves in legal occupations, by providing them with an alternative economic niche and a new form of group cohesion.

A puzzling and important problem remains as to whether the *nien* bands in aggregate can be considered a branch of the White Lotus Society. Identification of the *nien* as White Lotus affiliates has commonly been justified by citing accounts of officials such as T'ao Chu, who saw the 'red beards' as former White Lotus rebels who had 'slipped through the net'.³² What remains unclear, however, is what proportion of the rank-and-file of the White Lotus armies themselves had actually been White Lotus members. The White Lotus had recruited broadly among settler groups and indigenous outlaws in the three-province border area, and it is fairly certain that many of those recruited had developed only a tenuous relationship to the doctrine and the congregational structure of the sect itself. If this is the case, then the remnants of the White Lotus armies must have been very heterogeneous. When we add to this the information that the *nien* bands were also composed of former anti-White Lotus mercenaries, it becomes apparent that the sect itself must have contributed only marginally to the *nien* in their early years. This supposition is strengthened by an account of 1822, in which officials were able to distinguish clearly between White Lotus sectarians and *nien* bandits during

³⁰ *Ch'ing shih-lu*, Tao-kuang, 41.7b.

³¹ Pao Shih-ch'en, *Huai-yen san-ts'e*, in *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien*, 49.4b.

³² T'ao, *T'iao-ch'en chi-pu*, in Nieh, *Nien-chün tzu-liao pieh-chi*, 6; Huang Chün-tsai, *Chin-bu ch'i-mo*, 337.

Chu Feng-ko's local rebellion in the Honan-Anhwei region.³³ What the *nien* seem almost entirely to have lacked, in the period before 1853, is the White Lotus' distinctive syncretic religion and its apocalyptic political line. In view of the movement's diverse social origins, we are certainly justified in assuming a certain overlap in membership between *nien* and White Lotus; but to designate the *nien* bands as White Lotus sectarians in the strict sense would be erroneous. What existed before the 1850s was actually a widely dispersed congeries of individual bands, known by the common generic designation of *nien*, headed by chieftains who were this-worldly in outlook and only dimly conscious, if at all, of shared origins or shared destinies.

It was during the desperate years of the early 1850s that there emerged among the *nien* the first manifestation of unity and the first stirrings of shared political consciousness. And it is at this point, or just shortly before, that they merit the proper noun 'Nien' by which they are generally known. The tragic process whereby the Yellow River shifted its course from the southern to the northern side of the Shantung peninsula began in 1851 with a series of damaging floods that inundated broad reaches of Huai-pei. Though it was not until August 1855 that there occurred the massive break in the dikes that released the river north-eastward, the years from 1851 brought ruin and famine. These years of economic desperation exacerbated the endemic malaise of inter-community feuding, a circumstance of some significance for our understanding of the character of the Nien movement. Like the Triads of the south, *nien* bands were able to fit themselves into the prevailing social ecology by taking the lead in village defence against neighbouring settlements. Their role as leaders of local defence became more crucial in early 1853, when the arrival of the Taiping armies in the Yangtze valley precipitated a general militarization of the Anhwei countryside. This process was facilitated by the large number of illegally-owned firearms among Huai-pei villages, which had long been a source of concern to local officials.³⁴ Now encouraged by the government for defence against the Taipings, this militarization served only to broaden the Nien community base as Nien leaders took charge of local defence in scores of villages. Nien village organizations were indistinguishable from orthodox *t'uan* (local defence associations), and indeed must be considered generically the same sort of group: clusters of villages, each with a stout wall, bound to one another within common defence perimeters and defended by armed militia. Many such organizations that called themselves *t'uan* were in fact led by Nien or later sub-

³³ *Ch'ing shih-lu*, Tao-kuang, 41.7a-b.

³⁴ T'ao Chu, *Cb'ou-k'uan ch'ib-chiao hsiung-ch'i che-tzu*, in Nieh, *Nien-chün tzu-liao pieh-chi*, 18.

orned by them. Fewer and fewer remained in the control of orthodox gentry, and government troops operating in the Huai-pei area were generally surrounded by a hostile and well-organized populace.

Despite the increasing solidity of their community base, the process whereby the Niens amalgamated their military bands was slow and hesitant. After a number of scattered attempts by various local leaders, finally in 1852 a group of eighteen chieftains brought their fighters together under Chang Lo-hsing, a powerful but illiterate landlord and salt smuggler of Chih-ho-chi (present Wo-yang, Anhwei). This grouping soon broke up after an attack by government forces, and Chang himself was coopted as a 'militia leader' by the local prefect. His nominal loyalism was brief, however, and in late 1855 and early 1856 he and his associates began to group the scattered bands into a new form of organization. With the counsel of two lower gentrymen, Chang was named head of all the Niens, with the title 'Lord of the Alliance' (*meng-chu*). Nien fighters were now loosely grouped into five 'banners', of which each contained some 20,000 men in a confederation of smaller bands. In later years these banners proliferated into twelve or more, as new rebel groups were formed or absorbed. Individual leaders retained much of their former autonomy, and Chang's leadership was hardly that of a centralized military force. Yet this primitive organizational structure permitted Nien bands to cooperate in more far-reaching endeavours and brought widespread warfare to eight provinces in the years that followed.

The pattern of Nien activity might be described as seasonal militarization. Relying on fortified local bases such as Chang Lo-hsing's at Chih-ho-chi, Nien banners set forth in spring and autumn to plunder surrounding areas and returned regularly to their homes. Great efforts were spent on protecting their native villages and on establishing new centres of Nien affiliation in neighbouring areas. This means that many Niens led dual lives, retaining ties to village society as well as to their military units. Others, however, such as homeless famine victims and roving salt smugglers who were brought into Nien ranks, must have remained fully and permanently militarized.

The Nien movement now embodied not only a more coherent organization but also a more explicit symbolic content. The leadership borrowed eclectically from White Lotus lore and from Taiping symbols to construct an image that could attract widespread support. Chang Lo-hsing assumed the title 'Great Han King with the Heavenly Mandate' (Ta-Han ming-ming wang), a title that not only challenged the Manchu dynasty but also suggested obliquely an affiliation to White Lotus Manichaeist beliefs. This may have been a device to solidify relations with local White Lotus

adherents, many of whom were by now members of Nien banners. Though it has been suggested that the banners themselves may have been a form borrowed from the practices of the Eight Diagrams Society, a White Lotus sect, their actual origin remains uncertain. Nevertheless, it is plain that the years after 1856 saw an absorption by the Niens of much overt symbolism from heterodox traditions, including those of the White Lotus Society. Whether this demonstrates that the Nien were now coming out in the open, as it were, as a White Lotus affiliate is extremely questionable. Even at this stage, the Niens are probably best understood as an outgrowth of a Mafia-like local underworld which, in the process of re-organization and expansion, found it expedient to flourish a miscellaneous array of symbolic paraphernalia from the well-stocked storehouse of traditional heterodoxy.

Government campaigns against the Niens during the 1850s and early 1860s were foiled by their own divided and inept leadership. Dogged, cautious and corrupt officials such as Yüan Chia-san made little headway either in destroying the Nien armies or in re-establishing control over Nien base areas. The rebel cavalry, which had grown by 1858 to more than 20,000 horse, proved more than a match even for Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, the dashing Mongol prince whose northern riders descended upon the region in 1860. As a commander, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in (more correctly called by his Mongolian name, Senggerinchin) proved a failure, largely because of his inability to work with his Chinese counterparts. Though his fierce attack upon Nien strongholds in 1863 regained Chih-ho-chi and resulted in the capture and execution of Chang Lo-hsing, the vigour of the Niens was maintained by the slain rebel's nephew, Chang Tsung-yü, under whose leadership the Niens surrounded and killed Seng-ko-lin-ch'in in 1865. To Peking, the loss of this commander was a trauma comparable to the destruction of the Great Camp of Kiangnan in 1860. In the same way as in 1860, the court turned to the new armies. The campaigns that finally defeated the Niens relied not upon cavalry charges but upon methodical encirclement, a strategy introduced by the conqueror of the Taipings, Tseng Kuo-fan, who assumed the anti-Nien command in 1865 (see chapter 8).

As a rebellion the Niens offered a less imposing political threat to the Ch'ing than did the Taipings; yet they were in certain respects more persistent and more difficult to suppress. Their persistence must be attributed largely to their intimate ties to the institutions of local society. Based upon kinship bonds and upon customary modes of inter-community cooperation, the Niens may in a sense be considered a regional rejection of imperial authority rather than a determined assault upon imperial

legitimacy. They were certainly no threat to the orthodox value system. Indeed the traditionalism of their social base was paralleled by the indeterminacy of their political orientation. Thus the Niens were able to cooperate with other rebel groups easily, but made commitments to none. Unlike the Taipings, the Niens were entirely at home in the welter of local outlaw and rebel groups that inhabited surrounding society. With the Turban Bandits (*fu-fei*), the Black Flags under Sung Ching-shih, the White Lotus and dissident *t'uan* associations, the Niens were able to interact profitably on an *ad hoc* basis. With the Taipings themselves the Niens forged a series of ententes, which the Taipings had occasion to regret. The Nien leader Li Chao-shou brought his legions to the aid of the Taipings in Anhwei during 1858, but the Taipings were able to instil in them neither discipline nor faith. Li himself soon defected to the Ch'ing. The diffuseness of the Nien protest could indeed be demonstrated by the frequent defections of their leaders, often back and forth several times by the same man. Miao P'ei-lin, holder of a *sheng-yüan* degree, was a local strongman whose long record of treachery to both sides is only comprehensible in the twilight of values that overspread the civil warfare of the Liang Huai region. (For a more detailed account of the Nien movement and its denouement, see chapter 9.)

THE TAIPIING REBELLION IN PERSPECTIVE

The Niens were rooted firmly in rural society and restricted by traditional outlooks. Not so the Taipings. It is significant, to begin with, that the Taiping religion never became an integral part of a folk culture. Only some half-dozen years intervened between the Hakkas' conversion and their violent departure from home. This signal contrast with the White Lotus and Triad traditions explains in part why the movement was effectively exterminated, not only as a secular institution, but even as a structure of belief. In determining the true character of the Taiping movement, ideological and social factors played essential and complementary roles. Their nearness to the site of Western penetration gave the Hakka communities access, through Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, to a creed fundamentally subversive of traditional Chinese values. It was a creed, furthermore, that embodied an uncompromising dualism and an apocalyptic promise of redemption to a chosen people. The social analogue was the ethnic polarization of the environment into which the creed was injected. The sense of distinctiveness and alienation among the embattled Hakkas was perfectly mirrored in the faith that now seized them.

Yet the Hakkas, who were nonetheless of Han stock themselves, could

plausibly issue a summons to the Han nation to expel its alien oppressors. The universalistic claims of the Taiping theocracy represented the final redemption of an oppressed minority. But messianism and doctrinal exclusiveness had concrete disadvantages in the traditional Chinese setting. First, they hindered cooperation with other rebel groups. Purism and esoteric ideology were hardly advantages in forging alliances with groups whose outlooks, however anti-Manchu, were based on traditional assumptions and traditional modes of organization. Taiping relations with the Triads and the Nien reflected this difficulty. Though Taiping armies cooperated sporadically with both groups, no long-term alliance resulted. During the mid-nineteenth century rural China was seething with rebellions of every description. The fact that they were capable of only *ad hoc* tactical cooperation made them the easier to suppress. Second, the fact that the Taipings had rejected the values and institutions of traditional society made it harder for them to spread their control into the rural hinterland beyond the walls of their captured cities. Cities were, for the Taipings, symbols of imperial legitimacy as well as enclaves within which their distinctive institutions could be nurtured. The indigenous forms of rural organization were more readily mobilized by the orthodox elite, who, through their local defence associations, succeeded in retaining control of the countryside in many hsien whose urban centres had been captured by the Taipings. Thus the cultural gap between the Taipings and the rural society they sought to govern tended often to coincide with the gap between city and countryside, a curious portent of the kind of cultural fragmentation China was to suffer generations later as Western influences invaded the treaty ports.

But the Taipings' very weaknesses suggest their great historical significance. More than any other rebellion of their day, they addressed themselves directly to the crisis of the times and offered concrete measures for resolving it. Their vision of a new system of property relations, a new mechanism of local control, and a new relationship between the individual and the state was an authentic response to the distinctive problems of the late imperial age. To reduce nineteenth-century social history to familiar patterns of dynastic decline is made considerably more difficult by the phenomenon of the Taipings and the background from which they emerged.

CHAPTER 7

SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1800-62

FAILED EFFORTS TO EXPAND COMMERCE

As the only European power active in Inner Asia, Russia held a special status in the Manchus' firmament. The Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 had loosely defined a border and had established the principle of equality between the Ch'ing and Muscovite empires. Three preliminary agreements and the Treaty of Kiakhta in 1727 had extended the boundary line farther west and appointed two places for Russian trade: Kiakhta on the northern frontier of Mongolia, and Tsurukhaitu (Curhaitu)¹ on the Manchurian frontier near Nerchinsk. At both these places Ch'ing and Russian merchants could carry on duty-free trade, but Tsurukhaitu failed to develop as a commercial centre, so that virtually all the legal private commerce came to take place at Kiakhta. In short from the 1720s Russia possessed a market for Sino-Russian private trade in which both sides communicated on terms of equality. It would take Britain and the other Western powers until the 1840s to obtain such conditions on the China coast.

In addition to the Kiakhta trade, Russia could send a caravan to Peking every three years, on the understanding that the caravan leader would perform the Chinese tributary ceremonies, and Russia was allowed to maintain an ecclesiastical mission in Peking. Apart from these concessions, the Ch'ing excluded all Russians from the Middle Kingdom.

Russia's official caravans were not profitable enough. Smuggled furs glutted the market in Peking. Russian exports secretly bypassed Kiakhta and found their way to Urga in Mongolia and to Naun in Manchuria, while Chinese goods bypassed Kiakhta on their way to Irkutsk. After 1755 the Russian government ceased to send its state caravans to Peking. In 1768 a supplementary article to the Kiakhta treaty reaffirmed duty-free trade at Kiakhta and Tsurukhaitu and tried to improve the regulation of border affairs. Difficulties persisted, however, and the Ch'ing government intermittently suspended the trade, the longest suspension being that of 1785-92. But even with Kiakhta closed, Sino-Russian trade con-

¹ *Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s Kitaem, 1689-1881 gg.*, 87.

tinued through periodic fairs. Throughout most of the 1700s the fair of greatest importance was at Irbit, rivalled in the last quarter-century by the Makar'ev fair, which was moved to Nizhni-Novgorod after a fire in 1816. Furs from Arkhangel'sk and Vologda were brought to these places, as was cloth from Moscow and Iaroslavl' and leather from the Volga cities. Russian merchants sold them to Siberian and central Asian traders in return for Chinese and other Asian goods.

In 1792 Ch'ing and Russian negotiators re-opened the trade at Kiakhta and ironed out a number of troublesome details, agreeing to punish border violators each by the laws of his own country. But in return for this re-opening, the Russian government had to put up with a condescending tone from the Ch'ing empire, a condescension reflected, albeit subtly, in the instrument of the 1792 accord itself. Complications still lingered too – souring relations with Russia – from the Ch'ing conquests of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which the Manchus had carried out, to some extent, at Russia's expense, curtailing Russian trade and insisting upon Ch'ing primacy in the eyes of the nomads. By the 1790s the Russians had the further worry that British commercial successes in China might prejudice the Kiakhta trade.

About the beginning of the nineteenth century the Kiakhta exchange of Russian furs for Chinese cotton and silk was enlivened by the growth of European Russia's demand for tea, parallel to the British demand for the same commodity at Canton. Soon tea approached 40 per cent of China's exports to Russia. Other Chinese exports included tobacco in ball form, which was particularly popular in Siberia, herbs, spices, rhubarb and a wide variety of luxuries and manufactured items, such as chinaware, metal goods and glass items. The trade was supposed to be nothing but barter, but despite Ch'ing restrictions, some silver also flowed out of China through Kiakhta.

In 1800 the Russian government tried to increase its profits from the Kiakhta border trade by tightening official control and publishing a set of *Instructions for the Kiakhta customs house and trading partners*. This attempted to standardize prices, adjusted the customs tariff, and cut out foreign competition. European and American merchants were prohibited from trading on the Russian side at Kiakhta, but foreign manufacturers continued to hold a large share of the market – except in 1812, when Napoleon invaded Russia. From 1800 to 1824, the Kiakhta trade's peak year, the total volume of business increased some 90 per cent – from a total turnover of 8,383,846 to 15,960,000 roubles.²

² M. I. Sladkovskii, *Istoriia torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii narodov Rossii s Kitaem (do 1917 g.)*, 197–8.

On Sinkiang's north-western border there was also, by 1800, an illicit Sino-Russian trade at Kulja and Tarbagatai. Since Russian merchants had been doing an increasing volume of trade with the Kazakhs, who alone enjoyed trading rights in Ili and Tarbagatai, the Ch'ing had, in 1768, forbidden the Kazakhs to import anything other than livestock so as to prevent them from carrying Russian goods. As time went on, however, the articles of the Kazakhs' trade became more varied again, and the authorities looked the other way as violations of the commercial rules increased. Merchants from the Russian empire themselves began to trade. At first only Tatars and Siberian Muslims came. Tashkentis living in Semipalatinsk entered the trade, smuggling small loads into Ili and Tarbagatai on two or three horses at a time and acting as agents of the Kazakh sultans. The Sinkiang authorities at first pretended not to notice, but after a time they began to tax this commerce. Despite outward appearances, the Ch'ing government was keeping sharp watch over Russian activities. It did not fail, for example, to notice Russia's placement of border pickets in the region of the Naryn River. The Ch'ing protested against these, and after several meetings between Ch'ing and Russian officials in 1794, the Russians pulled down the most objectionable of the pickets.

In 1797 the Russian government ordered its officers to expedite trade with Sinkiang along the Irtysh, even though this was a violation of the Kiakhta treaty, and the Kulja and Tarbagatai trade continued to grow. Han Chinese merchants and Ch'ing officials avidly bought up Russian wares – cloth, watches, knives and other miscellaneous manufactures, including barrel-organs, which were popular as a curiosity. Ch'ing subjects were willing to pay what Russians regarded as ridiculously high prices in brick tea, textiles (especially the much-prized Khotan coloured cottons), and silver, which it was illegal to export. Ch'ing merchants readily accepted credit, and the Russian Tatars made fortunes, while Sinkiang became 'an absolute California for adventurers'. Although traders of European Russian origin did occasionally visit the Sinkiang frontier, the only one known to have done much business then in Kulja and Tarbagatai was a merchant of Semipalatinsk named Sannikov.

About the turn of the century there were also some other Christian traders and travellers who made their way into Sinkiang. Of these the most numerous were Armenians. Two Athanasius brothers from Istanbul traded freely for some years in Yarkand, Khotan and Aksu, and the Armenian community in Kashgar had its own church. A Georgian nobleman from Tbilisi named Rafail Danibegashvili visited Ladakh, Yarkand, Aksu, Turfan and Zungharia, and at approximately the same time a German officer and agent of the British East India Company,

known only as Georg Ludwig von . . ., visited the Pamir countries, Kokand, the Kazakh steppe, Kashgar and Yarkand. Hindu traders evidently did business in Sinkiang without difficulty.

From the 1770s or before, Russian goods had been entering Tibet, carried mainly by Oirat Mongols. Gifts from the Panchen Lama to the British East India Company had included 'gilded Russian leather, stamped with the Czar's double-headed eagle', and in the early nineteenth century Asiatic Russian merchants were reported to be selling French cloth in Tibet and central Asia. Indeed one of the most important goals of Russian policy in Asia was to develop trade through Sinkiang and Tibet to India and China. To this end, the Russian government founded the Bukhtarma customs house in 1803, and in 1804 the Siberian authorities sent a caravan to Kulja and Aksu under the command of an interpreter named Beznosikov, who gathered information, posing as the agent of a Kazakh sultan. In 1805 Gabaidulla ('Ubayd Allāh) Amirov, a Tatar who had been taken captive during the Pugachev Rebellion, returned to Russia from travels in Bukhara and India, adding knowledge and enthusiasm to Russian interest in distant Asian trade.³ It is all the more understandable, therefore, that British penetration into India 'caused a flurry of activity in St. Petersburg', leading to the establishment of a Special Department of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs to handle matters relating to Asian peoples.

Largely as a result of the trappers' pursuit of the receding fur supply, Russian commercial interests had considerably expanded in the northern Pacific during the last three decades of the eighteenth century. In 1799 the Russian government had created the Russian-American Company, 'the first joint-stock, limited liability, imperially-sanctioned company in Russian history'.⁴ But if the Company were to be profitable, it had to supply its outposts, expand the market for its furs, and check foreign competition. So St Petersburg began to take a new interest in the Amur as a possible route for carrying supplies from central Siberia to the Pacific Ocean.

For sale of the Company's furs, China seemed the best market, but here West European and especially American merchants held a competitive advantage, inasmuch as they could transport furs in about five months from north-west America to Canton. Not only was transport of the

³ Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 2.145–7, 381; Rafail Danibegashvili, *Puteshestvie Rafaila Danibegashvili*, ed. L. I. Maruashvili, 26–7; Clifford M. Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin: Russia's trade with China and its setting, 1727–1805*, 325–6, n. 115; Schuyler Cammann, *Trade through the Himalayas; the early British attempts to open Tibet*, 30; Alastair Lamb, *Britain and Chinese central Asia: the road to Lhasa 1767 to 1905*, 51, n.2; P. I. Nebol'sin, 'Ocherki torgovli Rossii s Srednei Aziei', *Zapiski Imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva*, 10 (1855) 354–73.

⁴ Foust, *Muscovite*, 318.

Russian-American Company's furs to Kiakhta outrageously expensive and time-consuming (it often took over two years to bring them there from Alaska), the need for supplies at the Russian outposts in Alaska and Kamchatka was so severe that the Company's foreign competitors could strike at the very heart of its function by selling supplies to the Company's outposts in return for furs and by then marketing the furs at Canton. The success and perhaps even the survival of the Russian-American Company therefore depended upon winning permission from the Ch'ing for Russians, like Europeans and Americans, to trade with China by sea.

Following this logic, St Petersburg informed Peking in 1803 of the tsar's desire to send an embassy to China, and in the same year sent two ships, the *Nadezhda* and the *Neva*, out of Kronstadt under the command of A. J. von Krusenstern to circumnavigate the globe. With von Krusenstern on the *Nadezhda* went N. P. Rezanov, who was a court chamberlain and a director of the Russian-American Company, for the purpose of talking the Japanese into authorizing Russian trade. Rezanov's embassy to Japan failed completely. The Japanese refused to receive him in Edo, turned down his gifts, and sent the *Nadezhda* away with orders that Russian ships were not to visit Japan again; so Rezanov returned to Russia independently, while von Krusenstern headed the *Nadezhda* towards Canton with a cargo of furs from Kamchatka to rendezvous with the *Neva* late in 1805.

In the meantime the Li-fan Yüan had replied that the emperor was willing to receive a Russian embassy; so St Petersburg sent Count Iu. A. Golovkin to sound out the Ch'ing about a long list of Russian desiderata. Golovkin was to persuade Peking to open the entire Russo-Ch'ing frontier to Russian commerce, legalize Russian trade at Kulja and Tarbagatai, and permit trade to expand at the confluence of the Irtysh and the Bukh-tarma. Moreover, he was to try to obtain for Russia unrestricted caravan trade in the Chinese interior and exclusive trading privileges at Nanking, along with many other things, including trade with India through Tibet, the right for Russian supervisors to accompany Volga Kalmuks on their pilgrimages to Lhasa, navigation of the Amur, the establishment of a Russian depot at the Amur's mouth, and the opening of Canton to Russian shipping, beginning with the *Nadezhda* and *Neva*. According to an explanation that the Russian Senate later gave to the Li-fan Yüan, Golovkin was supposed to reach Peking before the arrival of the *Nadezhda* and the *Neva* and announce them, explaining why they needed to trade at Canton.

But the ticklish question of Ch'ing tributary ceremonial and, in particular, the kotow wrecked the Golovkin embassy before Golovkin could reach the Ch'ing capital. Russian envoys to Peking had always performed

the three kneelings and the nine prostrations that the Ch'ing court required of tributaries. In 1793, however, Lord Macartney, as ambassador from Russia's chief commercial rival, had refused to kotow, and yet the Ch'ing emperor had granted him an audience nonetheless. When the British had asked for trading rights at Peking similar to those that the Russians enjoyed (a tributary caravan every three years), the Ch'ing emperor had replied that Russian trade was confined to Kiakhta just as British trade was confined to Canton.

By the time of the Golovkin embassy the Ch'ing government was certainly apprehensive that concessions to one European power would lead to increased demands from the others. After Macartney, the Ch'ing were more anxious than ever to uphold the proper tributary forms, and in particular the kotow. Golovkin, on the other hand, aware of Macartney's refusal to kotow, was probably determined to abase himself as little as possible. Before the Russian ambassador reached Peking, the Ch'ing authorities put him to the test by requiring him to kotow at Kalgan in front of a symbol of the emperor draped in yellow silk. This Golovkin refused to do. The Ch'ing authorities remained adamant. Golovkin was similarly unyielding; so there was nothing left for him to do but return to Russia. The affair was followed by an unhappy exchange of notes between the Li-fan Yüan and the Russian Senate.

Meanwhile, at the end of 1805 von Krusenstern's two ships had arrived unannounced at Canton, where they succeeded in trading, but after their departure the Ch'ing government emphatically reaffirmed its limitation of non-tributary Sino-Russian commerce to the barter trade at Kiakhta.⁵ Von Krusenstern, on returning to Russia, repeated the fallacious assertions of earlier explorers in 1787 and 1797 that Sakhalin was a peninsula and that the mouth of the Amur lost itself in the sands so that it was useless as a passageway for ships. Backed by the authority of a man of von Krusenstern's stature, this false idea delayed Russia's movement into the Amur region for almost half a century.⁶

The failure of Golovkin's mission left Russia with only the two non-tributary doors to China that she had won in the eighteenth century: her ecclesiastical mission in Peking and the market-place at Kiakhta. Illegal trade along the border increased, but the Kiakhta trade continued as before, in accordance with the *Instructions* of 1800, which prohibited transactions in cash or on credit. There were, of course, some abuses in this respect, but the Russian government dealt severely with violators, and in

⁵ Material in Lo-shu Fu, *A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations (1644-1820)*, 1.361-7 and 2.599-602, provides an interesting perspective.

⁶ Sladkovskii, *Istoriia*, 182.

general Sino-Russian commerce remained restricted to barter until 1854, when the Kiakhtha administration authorized Russian merchants to pay for Chinese goods in gold and silver. In 1855 the Russian government – still hoping to enlarge Russia's legal China trade – further loosened the Kiakhtha rules. As an immediate result, business at Kiakhtha somewhat increased, but Russia's balance of payments suffered, and Russian exports at Kiakhtha continued to decline.

No account of nineteenth-century Sino-Russian relations would be complete without mention of Russia's other non-tributary door to China, the ecclesiastical mission of the Russian Orthodox Church. After organizing all fugitive Muscovites and Cossacks in the Ch'ing empire, and some captives, into a separate company of the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner in 1683-5, the Ch'ing government had allowed Russia to send successive ten-year missions of Orthodox clergy and students to Peking, where they established themselves in 1716 and later built their own church. The eighteenth-century missions are best known for their idleness, drunkenness and debauchery, but the historical literature has probably stressed these negative aspects too much, for with the mission students lay the beginnings of Russian sinology and much of the Russian government's knowledge of China.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the ecclesiastical mission consisted of a hostel (which housed the mission proper), the Nikolskii church, a school of Chinese and Manchu studies and a Manchu school of Russian studies.⁷ Eight missions had resided in the Ch'ing capital. Of the eighth, all but two members had died; so Alexander I sent out the ninth mission in 1806 under the direction of Father Hyacinth, N. Ia. Bichurin.⁸ Like his predecessors, Bichurin sowed some wild oats in China. At one point the Li-fan Yüan summoned the entire mission and rebuked them for their immoral behaviour. But Bichurin acquired a sound knowledge of Chinese and a Chinese library. Under his leadership, the ninth mission laid Russia's sinological cornerstone and stepped up the gathering of information on China proper, Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet. The tenth mission produced Daniil Sivillov, under whom the first chair of Chinese was founded at the University of Kazan in 1837, as well as O. P. Voitsekhovskii, the tenth mission's physician, who succeeded Sivillov in that chair. In 1830 J. E. Kowalewski (O. M. Kovalevskii), whose three-volume dictionary of Mongolian is still a pre-eminent work of Mongolian lexicography, escorted the eleventh mission to Peking,

⁷ See Eric Widmer, *The Russian ecclesiastical mission in Peking during the eighteenth century*, 19-20, 88.

⁸ R. K. I. Quesed, *The expansion of Russia in East Asia 1857-1860*, 10, n. 3, says that before doing so, Alexander used three Jesuit missionaries to gather information for him in Peking.

returning the following year with a library of Chinese, Manchu and Tibetan books for the University of Kazan. The hieromonk Avvakum Chesnoi – later interim head of the mission and archimandrite – became, after his return to Russia in 1841, an adviser to the Asiatic Department (established 1819) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The twelfth mission produced Russia's first real sinologist in the present-day sense of the term, V. P. Vasiliev (Vasil'ev), who had been Sivillov's student and who, on returning from China, became Professor of Chinese and Manchu at Kazan (replacing Voitsekhovskii), and then in 1855 became the first Professor of Chinese at the University of St Petersburg.⁹ Another member of the twelfth mission, the archimandrite Palladius (Palladii), N. N. Kafarov, also became an accomplished sinologist. He invented the Russian transcription system for Chinese and published a number of important articles on Chinese subjects, while in the political sphere he gathered intelligence for the Russian government. His continued presence in Peking became of particular significance in the late 1850s, when Russia was negotiating her treaties with China and detaching the Amur and maritime territories. From 1850, the terms of the ecclesiastical missions were shortened from ten to five years, making it possible for a larger number of Russian students to have first-hand experience in the Ch'ing capital.

CENTRAL ASIAN TRADE AND THE TREATY OF KULJA (1851)

In spite of Golovkin's failure, Siberian officials still sought to expand Russia's China trade beyond Kiakhta. At first they cautiously restricted themselves to encouraging illicit exchanges along the Irtysh and collecting reports from Russian Tatars, like Murtaḍā Fayḍ ad-Dīn, who traded in Sinkiang in 1807. By 1810, however, Sino-Russian business had greatly increased at Bukharma, and even Han Chinese merchants were sneaking out to trade there; so the Siberian authorities induced a merchant named Nerpin to send a reconnaissance caravan to Tarbagatai and Kulja headed by the interpreter Putimtsev (Putintsev), acting as usual as a Kazakh sultan's agent. This expedition revealed that among the Ch'ing officials there were those who desired legalization of the Russo-Sinkiang trade.

Between 1810 and 1825 numerous caravans from Russia visited Alti-shahr, including among their members such shadowy figures as the Georgian nobleman Madatov who posed as an Armenian, the Semipala-

⁹ Biography in *Ocherki po istorii russkogo vostokovedeniia*, Sbornik 2 (Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Vostokovedeniia), 232–340.

tinsk trader Pelenkov (Pilenkov) who posed as an Andijani, and one Isaev who posed as a Bulghar. The Siberian authorities talked two distinguished Muslim traders from Tashkent and Kazan into outfitting a caravan to investigate the trading possibilities at Aksu, and in 1813 another caravan was dispatched with the interpreter P. A. Bubennov. It left Semipalatinsk with merchandise valued at 321,000 roubles and proceeded, with Kirghiz cooperation, along a new route through Kirghiz territory to Aksu and Kashgar, returning the following year with rhubarb, tea, textiles and brocades – 1,000,000 roubles' worth of goods. This established the profitability of the Sinkiang trade in Russian official minds.

Pelenkov and another merchant of Semipalatinsk named Popov carried on considerable trade with Sinkiang in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and it was as Popov's agent that Murtaḍā Fayḍ ad-Dīn went with a caravan in 1821-4 to Kashgar, where he reconnoitred for the West Siberian military command. On the advice of such Tatar merchants, some Kirghiz chiefs sent representatives to the Siberian authorities to discuss submission to Russia. They were warmly received.¹⁰

International politics became increasingly mixed with Russian efforts in central Asian trade. By far the most interesting of the 'native' political agents was a Jewish merchant of Kabul called Āghā Mahdī (Megdi Rafailov), who had been orphaned at an early age in Kashmir, had been reared as a Shi'ite Muslim, and had then converted to Greek Orthodox Christianity in Russia. In 1813 the Siberian authorities sent Āghā Mahdī with a caravan from Semipalatinsk to Altishahr and Ladakh. In Leh, Āghā Mahdī presented the Siberian authorities' letter, calling for friendly relations, to the wazir, Akbar Maḥmūd Khan, who promised his protection to Russian trade and sent a letter in reply, expressing a desire to enter into ties with Russia.

In 1821 the Russians sent Āghā Mahdī back with a letter for Ranjit Singh, maharaja of the Punjab, written by order of Tsar Alexander and signed by Count K. R. Nesselrode, for the opening of friendly relations. While in Yarkand on his way to Kashmir, Āghā Mahdī changed his religion once again, becoming a Sunni Muslim, and was reported to have 'assured the Mohammedans of Kashgar of support from Russia, in any attempt to shake off the yoke of the Chinese, and . . . even invited the heir of the principality to St. Petersburg, with a promise that he should be sent back with an army to recover the dominions of his ancestors'. But while crossing the Karakoram, Āghā Mahdī's whole body became horribly swollen, and he died. Kirghiz tribesmen plundered his caravan,

¹⁰ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 1.602, 673; 3.294-8, 425, 513, 585.

and the Russian government learned of his fate only in 1823. News of Āghā Mahdī's mission also alerted the British to Russia's ambitions on the Indian frontier, and the British heard at the same time of an agreement between the Russians and the Kokand ruler, whereby the latter would supply 'a safe convoy to the Russian-Chinese caravan through his dominions, from the Russian frontier to Kashgar'.¹¹

In the 1820s Britain and Russia began to view each other's movements toward Sinkiang and Tibet with increasing concern. At first Russian officials were confident of their trading position in Inner Asia. Russian sealskins, furs, green velvet, gold and silver embroidery thread, Bulghar leather, spades, hoes, logwood, loaf sugar, castor and Astrakhan broadcloth were reaching points as far away as the markets of Khotan. But as foreign competition seemed to threaten the structure of Russia's Kiakhta trade, members of the St Petersburg government began loudly voicing their fears that the British might 'steal' Russia's Asian commerce. Bukharan merchants reported in Petropavlovsk that British secret agents had gone to Kabul and 'Bukharia', had sold goods on credit, had given presents to the rulers there, and had left weapons, including firearms. Russian wariness increased. So too did the wariness of the Ch'ing government.¹²

With the outbreak of Jahāngir's jihad in 1825, Peking took steps to exclude British and Russians from the empire's Inner Asian frontiers. But the local Sinkiang authorities did not prevent Muslim traders from importing Russian goods, and even Russians who dressed as Muslims were allowed to pass. European Russians like the Omsk regimental physician Zibbershtein (1825) and the experienced Bubennov (1829) managed to enter Sinkiang. Tatar agents like Muḥammad Ya'qūb Dzhankulov and the Troitsk merchant 'Abd al-Walī Abdul-Vagapov ('Abd al-Wahhāb) Abu-Bakirov, who went to Zungharia in the 1840s, continued to supply the Siberian command with up-to-date reports, as did other Muslims, directly and indirectly, such as 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Iṣhān, who gave a report (1833) on his journey from Amritsar to Kashmir, Kabul, western central Asia and Altishahr.

Sino-Russian trade across the Sinkiang border began to grow. Chinese tea exports were the first to rise. In 1825, 60 *pud* 22 *funt* of tea passed through the Semipalatinsk customs house (one *pud* = 16.38 kg.; one

¹¹ *Ibid.* 1.553; 2.419–20. William Moorcroft and George Trebeck, *Travels in the Himalayan provinces of Hindustan and the Panjab; in Ladakh and Kashmir; in Peshawar, Kabul, Kunduz, and Bokhara; by Mr. William Moorcroft and Mr. George Trebeck, from 1819 to 1824*, 1.383–92.

¹² Nesselrode to P. M. Kaptsevich, in Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 3.428; Ministry of Finance to governor-general of western Siberia, in Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 3.295; and Moorcroft, *Travels*, 1.372.

funt = 409.5 g.) By 1835 the volume had risen to 909 *pud* 51 *funt*. Rhubarb and sal-ammoniac were also important. In imports from Russia, there was a growth in the volume of metalwares. Russian broadcloth, sables and imitation brocades went as far as Changthang and Lhasa in Tibet, and caravans commonly came from the Russian frontier to points as far south as Kucha and Aksu, bringing broadcloth, brocades, copper, steel, furs, silver and gold ducats, and making Aksu in the 1830s 'a great commercial mart for the products of China and Russian Tartary'. Kokandis and other central Asians participated increasingly in the Russo-Sinkiang trade, so that a large proportion of the exports to Russia from Bukhara and Kokand came to consist of Chinese products, and Russian fabrics reached Yarkand by way of Andijan. Even some Chinese merchants, not to be outdone, apparently eluded the Ch'ing border guards and attended the Nizhni-Novgorod fairs.¹³

In general, down to about 1830 it had not been uncommon for Ch'ing merchants to buy Russian goods with silver, but thereafter the trade turned into barter, and by the 1840s Russian merchants began to buy Chinese goods with silver and gold and to make use of Chinese credit. In 1835-40, only 586 *pud* 25 *funt* of silver from Zungharia passed through the Semipalatinsk customs house. For opium, silver seems to have been the means of payment, but much of this silver immediately made its way back into Sinkiang. By the 1830s small amounts of opium had been penetrating Zungharia from Semipalatinsk, but with the outbreak of the Opium War, St Petersburg outlawed the export of opium to China, in order to undermine Britain's position, informing Peking in 1841. Russia's opium trade had been small and thus easy to renounce, but it is uncertain to what extent the Russian prohibition was effective. The trade may even have grown in the 1840s, for an eyewitness (c. 1850) reported that Tatar merchants from Russia were selling the drug in Sinkiang for its weight in silver. 'Before the caravans reach the towns of Kulja and Tchoubachack [Chuguchak] they are met by Chinese, who purchase their whole stock, paying for it in silver, and these men smuggle the opium into the towns; then the merchant enters with his caravan of wares and silver ambas

¹³ V. S. Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaia politika Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'sizjane v pervoi polovine XIX veka*, 112 (I have been unable to consult Zemlianitsyn's article at first hand); R. H. Davies, comp. *Report on the trade and resources of the countries of the north-western boundary of British India*, 65-6, 68; W. H. Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary and Khoten', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 4.48 (Dec. 1835) 656, 658; W. H. Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek State of Kokan, properly called Khokend (the ancient Ferghana) in central Asia', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 3.32 (Aug. 1834) 377; J. R. McCulloch, comp. *A dictionary, practical, theoretical, and historical, of commerce and commercial navigation*, 597. Chinese also supplied information - e.g., 'Marshrut ot goroda Turfana do Kashkara po slovam kitaiskogo poddanogo Ma-Tiang-Shi, zhitelia pervogo iz sikh gorodov', *Russkii arkhiv*, 10 (1914) 207-12.

[*yambu*] unmolested'.¹⁴ By mid-century, opium was also making its way into Zungharia through central Asia.

The entire Russo-Sinkiang trade was, of course, officially in violation of Ch'ing law and the Kiakhta treaty. But Russia's control of the Kazakhs had become so strong by the 1830s that the façade of a Ch'ing-Kazakh trade monopoly could no longer conceal the fact of Han Chinese-Russian commerce. So the Peking government relinquished the official character of the monopoly by legalizing Han Chinese trade with the 'Kazakhs' (including Russian Tatars, various central Asians, and European Russians clothed in Muslim garb) at Tarbagatai and then, in 1845, in Ili. The authorities did, however, retain the right to make their purchases of Kazakh livestock before the private merchants, and the Ch'ing imposed a steep tariff: an 8 per cent sales tax on Russian goods, and a 5 per cent import duty on merchandise coming from abroad to Ili and Tarbagatai.

The volume and value of trade in Ili and Tarbagatai increased, especially in the 1840s, from a total turnover of 367,300 roubles' worth in 1840 to 834,500 roubles' worth in 1851. From the Russian side, the two main merchants at that time were Popov's partner Samsonov and a trader originally from Tashkent named Ibragim Amirov, both of whom lived in Semipalatinsk. Samsonov's annual exports to Ili were valued at about 20,000 roubles, while Amirov sent about 15,000 roubles' worth of goods to Tarbagatai each year. Many others did profitable business too, but even by the end of the 1840s the total volume of the Sino-Russian commerce in Ili and Tarbagatai was still only about 6 per cent of the size of the Sino-Russian trade at Kiakhta. Like the Kiakhta trade, in the 1840s the illegal trade in Ili and Tarbagatai was mainly an exchange of Russian textiles for Chinese tea, much of which went to Russian Inner Asia and the Volga region. The value of the tea exports to Russia through Sinkiang rose almost ten times between 1842 and 1851.

In 1845 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself decided to investigate directly the long-term prospects for Sino-Russian trade across the Sinkiang frontier and sent a vice-director of its Asiatic Department, N. I. Liubimov, to Tarbagatai and Ili disguised as a merchant under the name of Khoroshev. Liubimov, whom the Ch'ing authorities must have admitted to Sinkiang under the additional legal fiction that he was a Muslim agent of the Kazakhs, noted the preponderance of British goods, which came not from India but from the China coast. But he saw great possibilities for Russia's trade in Sinkiang, provided that the trade could

¹⁴ Sladkovskii, *Istoriia*, 212-15; T. W. Atkinson, *Travels in the regions of the upper and lower Amoor and the Russian acquisitions on the confines of India and China*, 159 (cited passage); Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaiia*, 159 (from Zemliantsyn); A. L. Narochnitskii, *Kolonial'naia politika kapitalisticheskikh derzhav na Dal'nem Vostoke 1860-1895*, 113-14.

be legalized by treaty. Russia would have to hurry, he advised, because of the increasing volume of imports of British cloth; so in 1847, on instructions from the Russian government, the archimandrite Polikarp of the ecclesiastical mission in Peking asked the Ch'ing government to legalize Russian trade in Ili, Tarbagatai and Kashgar. The Chinese Kiakhta tea traders, who feared that legal Sino-Russian commerce in Sinkiang might damage their business at Kiakhta, convinced the Ch'ing government to refuse.¹⁵ The Russians, however, were not to be put off, and, having begun construction of a road running from Orenburg toward Ili, they repeated their request for the legalization of their Sinkiang trade in 1848 and 1850.

If the Ch'ing had refused to legalize Russia's Ili and Tarbagatai trade, the trade would have continued anyway. Open defiance of Ch'ing law would have contributed to the breakdown of imperial control in northern Sinkiang and would have called attention to the empire's weakness along its Inner Asian frontier. If, on the other hand, the Ch'ing legalized the trade, the authorities could regulate it and reaffirm the dynasty's authority. So the Ch'ing acceded to the Russian request.

On 6 August (25 July, old style) 1851, E. P. Kovalevskii for Russia and I-shan for China signed the Treaty of Kulja, which opened Ili and Tarbagatai to duty-free Sino-Russian trade, allowed the Russians to build warehouses, homes and one cemetery in each of the two cities, and permitted Russian merchants to remain for eight-and-a-half months (spring, summer and autumn) each year to sell their merchandise under the jurisdiction of a Russian consul. If a merchant was unable to dispose of his goods in the allotted time, he could remain until he had done so, after which the consul was to send him back to Russia, but the Ch'ing army would not supply an escort to such a merchant unless he had at least ten camel-loads of goods. The treaty increased the Russian government's control over Russia's own traders by stipulating that they must produce a certificate (*bilet*) from the Russian authorities in order to enter Ch'ing territory. Russian merchants in Ili and Tarbagatai could leave the marketplace – and the consul's supervision – only by obtaining a certificate from the consul. The treaty forbade the traders of either empire to extend credit.

The Kulja treaty slightly modernized the tradition of Chinese frontier markets where outsiders might come for the trading season but not reside permanently. Residence of a Russian consul was a new feature, his control over Russian subjects was not; nor was the prohibition of credit, which had been constantly forbidden, to no avail, at Canton before the coastal treaties. In short, the Kulja treaty was no doubt facilitated by the example

¹⁵ Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaja*, 114-16.

of the Treaty of Nanking, but its provisions were in the old tradition of frontier control.

Zungharia was far from the manufacturing centres of China proper, but relatively close to Russia; so the Russians rapidly developed their trade in Ili and Tarbagatai, building warehouses there in 1852, and in 1854 they founded Verny (now Alma-Ata), an important link in the Russo-Sinkiang trade. Since St Petersburg prohibited the export of opium, gold, silver, banknotes (*kreditnye bilety*), firearms, gunpowder and vodka to China, the exchange came to consist mainly of Russian livestock, textiles, hardware, jewellery, leather and furs, in return for handmade Chinese cloth and tea. Over 90 per cent of the exports from Ili and Tarbagatai to Russia in the first half of the 1850s consisted of tea, mainly cheap brick tea consumed by Russia's Asian population. Other Chinese exports to Russia across the Sinkiang border were silks, coarse woollens and – interestingly – furs from the Altai.

Russia's growing presence cannot have been acceptable to everyone in Zungharia, because in 1855, for inadequately explained reasons, several hundred 'vagrants' looted and burned the Russian warehouse in Tarbagatai. The Sinkiang authorities were thought to have connived in the warehouse's destruction. Russian trade at Tarbagatai was suspended, and the trade in Ili was reduced as well. Russia demanded compensation, and sent a Christian Kazakh officer, Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, to Ili in 1856 to negotiate the re-opening of Russian trade. The trade was then resumed, but the question of Ch'ing compensation remained outstanding and for a while figured in the Sino-Russian treaty negotiations under way on the China coast. Eventually, however, the Ch'ing were forced to acknowledge their responsibility. By the conditions of a Sino-Russian agreement that was concluded in Tarbagatai (Chuguchak) on 9 September (28 August) 1858, the Ch'ing undertook to rebuild the Russian warehouse and compensate Russian losses with 550 chests of tea, valued at 305,000 roubles.¹⁶

The Russian government's only real disappointment in the Treaty of Kulja had been the Ch'ing government's unwillingness to open Kashgar to Russian trade. The Russian government, it was said, had 'paid constant attention to the establishment of political and commercial relations with Kashgar' ever since the reign of Catherine II (1762–96),¹⁷ but Altishahr had been troubled by rebellion, and the Ch'ing did not want Russian influence extended there. The outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, how-

¹⁶ Narochitskii, *Kolonial'naia*, 131; Sladkovskii, *Istoriia*, 230–3, 270–4; Quested, *Expansion*, 111.

¹⁷ Sukhozanet to governor-general of western Siberia, in A. Kh. Margulan, 'Ocherk zhizni deiatel'nosti Ch. Ch. Valikhanova', in Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 1.63.

ever, added another dimension to Russia's aspirations for trade contacts with Kashgar, because the war increased Anglo-Russian rivalry. In view of Britain's growing maritime trade, especially in tea, Russia was all the more desirous of holding a competitive advantage in commerce overland. In particular, St Petersburg feared that British trade might penetrate into the heart of China proper by land, from India through Sinkiang. In 1854 the Russians strengthened their control over the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz of the Russo-Ch'ing borderlands, exploring the Ch'ing frontier and noting the caravan route that led towards Kashgar. In 1855 the same Dzhankulov who had examined conditions in Zungharia for the Siberian authorities in the 1840s made his way into Altishahr and Kokand.

In 1858 the Russians sent Valikhanov back to Sinkiang, this time to Kashgar, disguised as a merchant. He succeeded in remaining there for almost half a year (October 1858 to mid-March 1859) and also in visiting Yarkand. On his return, Valikhanov published an extensive and circumstantial account, 'On Conditions in Altishahr' (1861),¹⁸ laying the foundations of Russian scholarship on Eastern Turkestan. The Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the present Kazakh Academy of Sciences is named in Valikhanov's honour.

By the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking in 1860, Kashgar was finally opened to Russian trade. The Crimean War had ended, but Anglo-Russian rivalry continued to grow.

THE LOSS OF NORTH-EAST MANCHURIA

The Ch'ing dynasty continued in its half-hearted resolve to preserve the Manchu character of the Manchurian frontier, but Han Chinese immigrants continued to pour in (the population of Kirin doubled between 1800 and 1850); so the government, reflecting on Manchuria's resources, instituted a policy of Manchu immigration. In 1812 it had been decided to resettle impoverished Manchu bannermen from Peking onto military farms in Kirin and southern Heilungkiang. In 1824 the government began to implement this decision, setting aside farmlands for the Manchu immigrants and offering them five tax-free years. This measure had no effect whatsoever in reinforcing the Manchu character of the frontier. Han Chinese settlers opened farms. Han Chinese merchants traded everywhere, with and without the required permits. Entrepreneurs opened businesses, such as the opium trade and the fortress-like kaoliang distilleries, which contributed to nineteenth-century Manchuria's jolly times. As the second

¹⁸ 'O sostoianii Altishara ili shesti vostochnykh gorodov kitaiskoi provintsii Nan-lu (Maloi Bukharii) v 1858-1859 godakh', in Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.265-412.

half of the century approached, a Han Chinese gentry class began to develop in Manchurian frontier society.¹⁹

The influx of Han Chinese into Kirin and Heilungkiang, their settlement of unguarded territory, their buying up of arable lands owned by the bannermen and unincorporated tribesmen, their competition with the natives in hunting and fishing, and their trading efforts led, in the second quarter of the century, to indebtedness and impoverishment among the indigenous Manchurian population. Even so, the sinicization of the frontier did not move fast or far enough to save the northernmost tribal areas and the maritime territories from Russia. At mid-century there still were only scattered Ch'ing subjects inhabiting the right bank of the Amur, and on the left bank there were fewer still.²⁰

Russia had steadily strengthened her presence in eastern Siberia throughout the eighteenth century. Russian explorers had undertaken two Amur expeditions in 1737 and 1738, and G. F. Müller, the historian of Siberia, had suggested in 1741 the desirability of navigation on the Amur as a means of provisioning Kamchatka. Five years later, Bering's helper, A. I. Chirikov, had urged the establishment of a port at the river's mouth, and in 1753 the Irkutsk governor Miatlev had reiterated the substance of both these proposals. Catherine II had found the idea of acquiring the Amur attractive, but sea voyages in 1787 and 1797 had led to the faulty belief that the Amur's mouth was impassable. In the early nineteenth century two other Russians had investigated the river region up to Albazin, and the Russian-American Company had made known its interest in the Amur's potential,²¹ but the Golovkin mission had failed to gain navigation rights, and von Krusenstern's voyage had confirmed the erroneous notion of the Amur's impassability.

Another attempt to open the question of the Amur may have been made in 1819, when the Russian government sent its tenth ecclesiastical mission to Peking under the escort of E. F. Timkovskii, who was to buy maps and geographical descriptions 'the better to execute the intentions of our government'. Timkovskii's published account refers only to minor negotiations with the Li-fan Yüan, but one of his responsibilities may have been to look into the possibility of Amur navigation rights.²² In

¹⁹ See Robert H. G. Lee, *The Manchurian frontier in Ch'ing history*, 39, 83, 97.

²⁰ Ernst G. Ravenstein, *The Russians on the Amur; its discovery, conquest, and colonisation, with a description of the country, its inhabitants, productions, and commercial capabilities; and personal accounts of Russian travellers*, 100–1, 202 ff.; Vladimir (Zenone Volpicelli), *Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian railway*, 196; and P. M. Collins, *Siberian journey down the Amur to the Pacific, 1856–1857*, ed. Charles Vevier, 204 ff.

²¹ Ravenstein, *Russians*, 68–9, 113–14, and Vladimir, *Russia*, 168.

²² George Timkowski, *Travels of the Russian mission through Mongolia to China, and residence in Peking, in the years 1820–1821*, ed. Julius von Klaproth, 1.324; J. J. Gapanovich, 'Russian expansion on the Amur', *The China Journal*, 15.4 (Oct. 1931) 179.

consequence of Russia's treaties of 1824 and 1825 with Britain and the United States, the Russians had to forswear further southward expansion in North America. St Petersburg began therefore to look with greater interest at the Ch'ing territories north of the Amur, and in 1832 Colonel M. V. Ladyzhenskii was sent to ascertain the exact location of the frontier marker on the lower Gorbitsa. In 1840 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to discuss the Amur question with the Ch'ing through the ecclesiastical mission in Peking, but Peking took the position that the Nerchinsk treaty had closed the matter.

The military governors of Kirin and Heilungkiang paid little heed to developments on the fringes of Manchuria, and Ch'ing policy, still resisting Han Chinese colonization, left northern Manchuria essentially unwatched and unprotected. Only Japan appears to have seen the logic of Russia's movements in eastern Siberia, for as early as 1809 the Japanese government had sent an agent named Mamiya Rinzō to determine the extent of Russian influence and penetration not just in Sakhalin but even in the region of the Amur.²³

The costs and time involved in overland transport across Siberia put Russia's Kiakhta trade at a competitive disadvantage against West European and American sea transport to Canton, but the Russian government, believing the Amur unsuitable for sea passage, paid little attention to improving commercial relations with China. The Nanking treaty, however, changed the Russian government's attitude, for European and American competitors could now ship their cargoes more quickly and cheaply than ever and do business far more easily. By contrast, the Kiakhta trade was slow and costly. Kiakhta's total trade turnover in the second quarter of the nineteenth century remained roughly stable – about thirteen or fourteen million roubles annually – but Russian profits were choked by the overland transport expense. Freight costs for tea carried by land from Kiakhta to Moscow in the 1840s, for example, amounted to six roubles or more per *pud*, whereas a *pud* of tea carried from Canton to London by sea cost the equivalent of only thirty to forty kopecks. As a result, European and American goods gradually disappeared from the Kiakhta market. Overland trade between China and European Russia also suffered. By far the most important Chinese export at Kiakhta was tea. China imported increasing amounts of Russian woollen and cotton fabrics, since these readily found a market even in south China. Chinese imports of furs, on the other hand, declined. But because of the freight costs, the Kiakhta trade became increasingly narrowed to exchanges between China and Russian Siberia.²⁴

²³ Mamiya Rinzō, *Mamiya Rinzō no Kokuryūkō tanken – Tōdatsu kikō*, esp. 108–9. See also Naroch-nitskii, *Kolonial'naia*, 110–11.

²⁴ Sladkovskii, *Istoriia*, 205–10.

For Siberia, the potential of the China trade seemed especially important. Siberia's growing population and economy needed a correspondingly expanding foreign trade to further its development, and the key to Siberia's trade and industrial potential was the Amur. T. A. von Midden-dorff of the Imperial Academy of Sciences explored the Amur region in 1844. In 1846 the Russians secretly and inconclusively reconnoitred the river's mouth, and in 1847 the Russian government made another direct approach to the Ch'ing, requesting three additional trading places. The Ch'ing refused, and in that same year Peking blindly reiterated its old policy that Han Chinese immigration into northern Manchuria should be resisted.

Since by 1847–51 almost half of Russia's exports of manufactures were going to China, St Petersburg had to take the China trade seriously. In 1848 the Russians tried their luck again on the China coast with a Russian-American Company ship, the *Kniaz' Menshikov*, which sailed into Shanghai carrying a cargo of furs and asked permission to trade. The Ch'ing authorities refused and sent her away. She reappeared at Shanghai with the same request two years later, only to meet with the same response. In 1853, however, another Russian ship visited Shanghai and succeeded in trading Alaskan furs for provisions and tea.²⁵

Meanwhile N. N. Muraviev (Murav'ev), the energetic governor-general of eastern Siberia, pushed forward the exploration of the Amur both for the sake of Siberia's economic development and for reasons of military security, inasmuch as he and others like him were concerned about the vulnerability of the Russian Far East in the face of British naval power in the Pacific. Muraviev's fears were strengthened by the appearance of two Englishmen, Hill and Austen, in 1846 and 1848, ostensibly doing geological research and looking for a Captain Franklin whose expedition had disappeared. When it was learned that Austen intended to sail down the Amur on a raft, Muraviev had him arrested and brought back to Irkutsk. In 1849 Muraviev sent G. I. Nevel'skoi to explore the northern part of Sakhalin and to examine the strait and the Amur's estuary and mouth. Nevel'skoi established the navigability of the Amur and proved that Sakhalin was not a peninsula but an island. He saw no Ch'ing forces along the Amur and concluded that Ch'ing authority in this region did not exist. The inhabitants of the lower Amur, he surmised, did not even consider themselves Ch'ing tributaries, and it was his opinion that in fact their attitude toward the Ch'ing was one of hostility.²⁶ Sightings of the British, French and American ships off Kamchatka and in the Sea of Okhotsk further stimulated Russian interest in access to the Amur.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 266, 282, n. 26.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 202.

'Whoever possess the mouths of the Amur', Muraviev argued, 'will also possess Siberia, at least as far as (Lake) Baikal', and he warned that if the British were to seize the Amur mouth and Sakhalin, Russia would lose all of eastern Siberia as well.²⁷ Other voices, notably those of Nesselrode and the finance minister Vronchenko, resisted Muraviev's counsel for fear that efforts in the Far East would divert Russian energies from Europe, but in the end Muraviev's reasoning prevailed. In 1850 a second expedition under Nevel'skoi – under orders to act with great circumspection insofar as the Ch'ing were concerned – founded two winter posts, Petrovsk, north of the Amur River's mouth, and Nikolaevsk, in clear violation of the Nerchinsk treaty, a short distance upstream. A Russian military flag was raised.

Nevel'skoi's action brought forth strong protests from the members of the government in St Petersburg, but the tsar, for whom Nikolaevsk had been wisely named, finally resolved the matter by stating that 'Where the Russian flag has once been hoisted it must not be lowered'.²⁸ The government declared the Nikolaevsk post a trading factory for the Russian-American Company, settled a small Russian colony there, and erected fortifications. Hoping to legalize Russia's naval position, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Li-fan Yüan to say that foreign ships menaced the Amur River's mouth and to suggest joint plans for its defence. The Li-fan Yüan, however, ignored the Russian note.²⁹

By 1853 American whalers off the Okhotsk seacoast had added to Russian anxieties, and when Perry's 'opening' of Japan became known, the strategic importance of the Far East began to be taken even more seriously. Russian agents had explored widely the territories north of the Amur; so the Russian government decided to try to persuade the Ch'ing empire to cede the area from the Bureya River to the mouth of the Amur. A note was accordingly sent to Peking asking for a new delimitation of the border but recognizing that the Treaty of Nerchinsk was still in force. The Ch'ing agreed and appointed a delegation to confer with the Russians the following spring. Russia then strengthened her position by establishing the posts of Aleksandrovsk and Konstantinovsk on the Manchurian coast across the Tartar Strait from Sakhalin and the Mariinsk post about 150 miles upstream from Nikolaevsk, while at the same time pressuring the Ch'ing government to open the Nanking treaty ports to Russian trade. Vice-Admiral Count E. V. Putiatin sailed into Shanghai on his way to Japan,

²⁷ Narochnitskii, *Kolonial'naia*, 117.

²⁸ A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Asia*, 138.

²⁹ Quesed, *Expansion*, 31-4, 37; also Chao Chung-fu, *Ch'ing-chi Chung-O tung-san-sheng chieh-wu chiao-she*, 26.

and the following year he put in another brief appearance at Shanghai, which worried the Ch'ing authorities about Russian aims.


When Muraviev, who had been abroad in Europe, returned to Russia in 1854, Russia was fighting the Crimean War against Britain and France, and a genuine Anglo-French threat to the Russian Far East existed. The governor-general was much annoyed to learn of the plans to delimit the Sino-Russian Manchurian border and quickly scotched them, thereby adding to the confusion in Peking with regard to Russia's intentions. Pointing to Britain's overwhelming naval power, which threatened Russia's Far Eastern coasts, Muraviev won over the tsar, Nicholas I, to an active policy. If Russia did not act, Muraviev argued, Britain might seize Sakhalin or the lower Amur. Muraviev also had the support of the archimandrite Palladius (N. N. Kafarov) of the Russian ecclesiastical mission in Peking, who informed him that the possibility of ceding the Amur's northern bank to Russia had in fact been discussed in Peking on the ground that 'the Amur countries . . . by ancient right belong more to Russia than to the Manchus'.³⁰ The Russian government was therefore encouraged to believe that the Ch'ing might not be ill-disposed to Russia's use of the Amur, inasmuch as this would protect the river from British and other foreign incursions. That same year, 1854, Muraviev sent a military expedition down the Amur for the defence of Sakhalin and the Amur's estuary, and notified the Li-fan Yüan that because Russia was at war with Britain and France, he was sending an expedition to protect the river and the coastal region from enemy attack.

Earlier, the Ch'ing garrisons in Heilungkiang and Kirin had numbered well over 10,000 men each, but with the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion, the government had sent most of this force to fight the rebels and was, as a result, militarily too weak on the lower Amur and elsewhere in Manchuria to prevent Muraviev from doing as he chose. The garrison forces at Aigun numbered only about 1,000 men, miserably armed. 'Most of them carried a pole blackened at the top to represent a lance; a few only had matchlocks, and by far the greater number bows and quivers slung across the back.' There were also 'some guns mounted on clumsy red carriages of very rough workmanship'.³¹

The Li-fan Yüan made no reply to Muraviev's note, and the Russian expedition went on down the Amur unimpeded. But as a consequence, the Ch'ing authorities learned for the first time of Russia's settlements along the lower course of the river. Even so, Peking remained indecisive

³⁰ V. Kryzhanovskii, ed. 'Perepiska Nachal'nika Pekinskoi Dukhovnoi Missii Arkhimandrita Palladiia s General-Gubernatorom Vostochnoi Sibiri Gr. N. N. Murav'evym-Amurskim' *Russkii arkhiv*, 10 (1914) 177.

³¹ Ravenstein, *Russians*, 119.



MAP 13. Manchuria in the nineteenth century

about what line of action to take, and the Tartar-general of Heilungkiang memorialized in vain that the only way to prevent Russian absorption was to bring in Han Chinese settlers to fill up the unpopulated Amur areas.

Britain and France confirmed Muraviev's warning by making a diversionary attack in 1854 on Petropavlovsk, situated on the lower east coast of Kamchatka, and in 1855 an Anglo-French squadron twice tried to make a landing at Aian bay. In deCastries Bay Russian defenders held off a similar attempt, but the Anglo-French squadron did a certain amount of damage to Russian settlements in Alaska, and allied warships attacked the Russian-American Company's brig *Okhotsk*, forcing her crew to scuttle her. The Russians were able to save their own little squadron only by hiding it in the estuary of the Amur. Meanwhile Muraviev, who was strengthening the new Russian forts in the region of the Amur, informed the Ch'ing that Russia had repulsed an Anglo-French bombardment and was planning to send a second military expedition farther down the Amur to ward off a second Anglo-French offensive. He fortified his argument by saying that the British were supplying arms and ammunition to the Taipings at Canton and other places. This, to the Peking government's alarm, coincided with other reports that the European allies were actively supporting the rebels.

Peking nevertheless protested against Muraviev's expedition and, with the Treaty of Nerchinsk in mind, stressed the need for border delimitation. But rebellion was in full swing, and the depleted Manchurian banner forces were powerless to resist Muraviev's expedition. So with Muraviev in command, the Russian expedition proceeded down the Amur. At Sahaliyan Ula Hoton (Aigun) the Ch'ing authorities even aided the Russian troop movement by supplying provisions, horses and guides, and refused to accept any remuneration inasmuch as trade on the Amur with foreigners was forbidden. But they did accept gifts, and the Ch'ing commander, Fulhungge, informed Muraviev on meeting him face-to-face that future Russian expeditions could not be allowed to pass without the Ch'ing emperor's express permission. In reporting to his superiors, Fulhungge pretended that he had steadfastly refused his cooperation to the Russians.³² At Mariinsk the Ch'ing delegation for the frontier delimitation met Muraviev and was taken aback by his demands: cession of the left bank of the Amur to Russia, Russian retention of all the new settlements, navigation of the Amur, and resettlement of the affected north Manchurian Ch'ing subjects to other areas within Ch'ing territory. The

³² Sladkovskii, *Istoriia*, 221; and Ivan Barsukov, *Graf Nikolai Nikolaevich Murav'ev-Amurskii po ego pis'mam, ofitsial'nym dokumentam, razskazam sovremennikov i pechatnym istochnikam (Materialy dlia biografii)*, 2.131; cf. Quedstedt, *Expansion*, 55-6.

Ch'ing negotiators reminded Muraviev that the Russian government's note of 1853 had recognized both banks of the Amur as Ch'ing territory, but of course they had to refer the whole question to Peking.

Muraviev, who had begun to populate the Amur's northern bank in the spring and summer of 1855 – founding Irkutskoe village, Bogorodsk, Mikhailovsk, Novo-Mikhailovsk, Voskresensk and a Cossack village on the island opposite Mariinsk – then returned up the river and went on to St Petersburg, where the new tsar, Alexander II, gave him full authority to negotiate with the Ch'ing and to conduct yet another military expedition down the Amur.³³

Not only did the rebellions weaken the Ch'ing empire's bargaining position vis-à-vis the Russians by draining the Manchurian frontier of its banner forces. The rebellions also emptied the provincial treasuries, led to a relaxation of various governmental restrictions on Chinese activities in Kirin and Heilungkiang, and opened the door to banditry and the breakdown of public order in the frontier. The government, for lack of troops, had to suspend the annual hunts of the banner forces. It could not meet its expenses, could not support its Manchurian bannermen, and soon found itself in arrears with the soldiers' pay.

In Manchuria specifically, the Ch'ing had set aside the rule that only Manchus or Mongols could serve as military governors in the Manchurian frontier and had named a Han Chinese bannerman to the military governorship of Kirin in 1853. The government had also reorganized the Kirin and Heilungkiang provincial finances. Prior to this time the central government had covered nearly four-fifths of Kirin's administrative expenses and nearly all of Heilungkiang's. This had become impossible for the central government to continue; so the Peking Board of Revenue had shared out the responsibility for the Kirin and Heilungkiang subsidies to various other provinces. The system proved to be only moderately successful, since the provinces responsible often failed to meet their obligations, and, as a result, the Manchurian frontier provinces began to develop their own sources of income, instituting new taxes, opening governmental and military farms to defray expenses, and creating special 'emolument lands' (*sui-ch'üeh ti*) to supplement the annual incomes of the banner forces.

The government had stopped licensing Han Chinese ginseng-diggers in 1853 so that the ginseng proceeds could go for soldiers' pay, but the Ch'ing then opened the gold and silver mining monopolies to Han Chinese private enterprise under a government tax. The government had similarly opened coalmining as early as 1815, and had had no trouble, but

³³ Quesed, *Expansion*, 39-54, 57.

the conditions surrounding the extraction of precious metals, especially gold, were different. So much lawlessness developed among the gold-miners that the government was eventually obliged to outlaw it once again.³⁴

These measures were far from enough to create a secure Manchurian frontier or even to make a strong enough military showing to cause Muraviev to hesitate and allow the Ch'ing to gain time. The Ch'ing government clearly placed far greater importance on pacification of the Han Chinese interior than on defence of the Manchu frontier. The Taiping Rebellion, with its rival dynastic claims, undoubtedly embodied the Manchus' old fears that the Han Chinese might some day overwhelm them and drive them out of China, but the Manchus were in the same position that any dynasty would have been in time of rebellion, and they made the same choice that any Han Chinese dynasty would have made. China was now the Manchu heartland, and it was better, if necessary, to sacrifice the periphery.

When Muraviev's third military expedition proceeded down the Amur in 1856, there was nothing that the Manchurian authorities could do other than try to gloss over the situation. From then on, the Russians came and went at will under the pretext of safeguarding the area from Anglo-French attack – although the Congress of Paris in 1856 had ended the Crimean War even before Muraviev's expedition had set out. Russian settlers founded numerous new towns and cleared large areas of forest for cultivation. The St Petersburg government, also in 1856, without reference to China, unilaterally created the Russian maritime province of eastern Siberia for the administration of Russia's holdings in Kamchatka, on Sakhalin (which, by the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Shimoda of 1855, still remained 'undivided' between Russia and Japan), and at the Amur's mouth. The capital of the new province was Nikolaevsk.

While the Ch'ing government continued to pursue its short-sighted goal of keeping Han Chinese settlers out of northern Manchuria, the Russian government populated the region with Russian settlers, so that by the end of the 1850s the north Amur basin and the maritime territories were already largely Russian. According to a Russian official source, the combined population of these areas was then about 24,000 persons – 8,370 in the Amur region and 15,594 in the maritime region. Of these, 6,349 were Russians – 2,950 in the Amur region and 3,399 in the maritime territories. The Chinese numbered only about 2,400 – roughly 1,500 in the Amur area (mainly in the Amur-Zeya valley) and about 900 in the maritime district. By 1858 four Russian steamers were plying the waters

³⁴ Lee, *Manchurian frontier*, 37–8, 76, 89, 91, 133.

of the Amur, and in that same year the Russian navy sent out seven more from Kronstadt. On Russia's borders with Mongolia and Manchuria stood about 16,000 Russian troops with forty cannon.³⁵ The Heilungkiang banner forces, on the other hand, cannot have been more than a few thousand strong. At Aigun, for example, there were 'well-built barracks, capable of housing several thousand troops, but not a single soldier was to be seen – even the sentry boxes were vacant'.³⁶

The end of the Crimean War freed Russian, British and French energies for renewed activity in China. Immediately, the British and French governments began to plan for demands on the Ch'ing empire that would secure treaty revision and permit European merchants to do business on the China coast in accordance with European procedure. The British and French also proposed to the Russian government that Russia should associate herself with their demands, but St Petersburg declined, declaring that Russia would use neither force nor threats against the Ch'ing empire. It was nonetheless clear in St Petersburg that Russia could use the fact of Anglo-French aggression to secure for herself whatever trading rights the British and French might obtain and at the same time redraw the Sino-Russian boundary in Manchuria. Intending to accomplish these ends by diplomacy, the Russian government sent Putiatin overland to attempt negotiations in Peking, but the Ch'ing authorities refused him entrance, first at Kiakhta and then at Tientsin. Undaunted, Putiatin visited Japan, concluding an agreement for Russian trade at Nagasaki and Hakodate, then sailed to Hong Kong and joined the Western allies. Like the American envoy, he remained unwarlike, a neutral observer of the hostilities, yet presented demands for a treaty like the belligerents. But unknown to the allies, Putiatin added a supplementary note, claiming the left bank of the Amur River and the right bank of the Ussuri as boundaries, and implying the backing of the European powers for his demand.³⁷ This note reached the Ch'ing authorities in the same envelope as the American one.

During the Tientsin negotiations in 1858, the artful Putiatin managed to keep his demands for the Amur and maritime territories entirely secret from the other three envoys. The Ch'ing unwittingly facilitated this by dealing separately with the Westerners in the hope of pitting them against each other. In so doing they gave Putiatin an opportunity to assume the role of mediator.

³⁵ Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv SSR, f. 1265, op. II, d. 178, l. 40 (cited in Sladkovskii, *Istoriia*, 222). Cf. the higher figures in Ravenstein, *Russians*, 141, 145; and Vladimir, *Russia*, 253–4. Also Narochinskii, *Kolonial'naia*, 112; Barsukov, *Graf*, 2.154–5. The population of Manchuria as a whole has been figured at 1,665,542 persons in 1842, rising to 2,187,286 persons in 1864. See Chao, *Ch'ing-chi*, 6.

³⁶ Collins, *Siberian journey*, 230.

³⁷ Quested, *Expansion*, 96–9; Chao, *Ch'ing-chi*, 58–62.

In the meantime, through the archimandrite Palladius, Muraviev had informed the Ch'ing emperor that he was now in sole charge of the Amur question and that Putiatin's new orders were simply to help settle the quarrel between China and the Western allies. The emperor, therefore, being unaware that the allies were ignorant of Russia's territorial demands, and being anxious to separate the negotiations over these demands from what he took to be the backing of British and French gunboats, deputed the same I-shan who had negotiated the Treaty of Kulja in 1851 and was now military governor of Heilungkiang to meet Muraviev and settle the issue of the frontier.

As soon as negotiations between I-shan and Muraviev got under way at Aigun on 23 (11) May 1858, Muraviev put forward demands for the lands north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri, the resettlement of Ch'ing subjects inhabiting these lands, and unrestricted Russian (but not other European) navigation and trade on the frontier rivers. I-shan demurred, insisting on the right of the Ch'ing subjects inhabiting the north bank to reside there in perpetuity and to continue under Ch'ing administration. On this point Muraviev gave in, but he was willing to tolerate no delay and threatened military action.

For I-shan the situation was impossible. The Russians were already in full possession of the north bank of the Amur. He dared not take responsibility for the outbreak of yet another war at a time when half of China was in rebellion and when Canton and the Taku forts were held by the Anglo-French allies, who were reported to be helping the Taipings and now posed a direct threat to Peking. Moreover, neither I-shan nor the officials in Peking knew how vast the territory was that the Russians were demanding, how far the Khingan Mountains were from the Ussuri, or what the Nerchinsk treaty had left undetermined. The emperor had asked for answers to these questions, but the report did not come in until later, and when it did, it was in very vague language. In 1858, as far as the Ch'ing could see, north-eastern Manchuria had value only as a hunting preserve to supply the court with furs.

I-shan signed the Treaty of Aigun on 28 (16) May 1858, in Manchu, Mongolian and Russian versions, acceding to Muraviev's demands. The maritime territories east of the Ussuri would remain under joint Russo-Ch'ing possession until the two empires could delineate a boundary. Ch'ing inhabitants of the Amur's left bank would remain where they were (mainly south of the Zeya) 'under the jurisdiction of the Manchu government'. I-shan in his report to the emperor regarded the treaty as only a temporary expedient authorizing Russian settlement and trade, not an alienation of Ch'ing territory. Peking's understanding was clearly the

same. So without delay, still under the impression that the Anglo-French allies were backing Russia's demand, the emperor agreed to the treaty on 14 (2) June, and requested the Russian government to try to persuade the British and French to soften their demands. On 20 (8) July, just to be sure, I-shan got Muraviev to sign an additional formal agreement reiterating that Ch'ing subjects on the north bank would not be moved.

Meanwhile Putiatin, with advice from Palladius, had been negotiating at Tientsin, pressing the Ch'ing for the cession of the Amur territories and offering Russian rifles, cannon and military instructors in return. His success in concealing his territorial demands from his British, French and American colleagues was nothing short of remarkable. At one point, the Ch'ing negotiators explicitly mentioned them to the Americans and asked Reed, the American representative, to intercede with Putiatin, but Reed, who, if anything, was sympathetic to Russian expansion in east Asia, had not taken in the full significance of what had been told him. Reed never guessed that Putiatin was pressing for the Amur territories under his very nose and never mentioned the Ch'ing negotiators' request to the British and French. Later, the Ch'ing representatives told the British interpreter, H. N. Lay, of Putiatin's desire for a determination of the Russian boundary, saying that Putiatin wanted it to take place at the Amur and that he did not want the subject even to be mentioned at Tientsin, but Lay seems not to have grasped the point of what Putiatin was doing.

Had the British and French realized at Tientsin that Russia was demanding territory and navigation on the Amur, they might have strengthened the Ch'ing position by claiming equal most-favoured nation treatment. So Putiatin, who knew this and understood Chinese ways better than his Western associates, now completely changed his tune, dropped his Amur demands, and helped the Ch'ing resist the British. His Sino-Russian Treaty of Tientsin on 13 (1) June 1858, facilitated mutual communication, opened the treaty ports to Russian trade, and stipulated that 'undetermined parts of the borders between China and Russia shall without delay be examined on the spot by authorized persons from both governments, and the agreement concluded by them concerning the boundary line shall comprise a supplementary article to the present treaty'. No mention was made of the Amur. Putiatin did not know that two weeks earlier the Aigun treaty had decided much of the Sino-Russian eastern boundary.³⁸ By this treaty, Putiatin realized most of the aims that had prompted the Golovkin mission of 1805. Russia now had commercial privileges in coastal China to offset the competitive advantages of West European and American shipping over Russia's Siberian trade.

³⁸ Sladkovskii, *Istoriia*, 238.

On 15 (3) June the Ch'ing asked Putiatin to intercede on the dynasty's behalf against the demands of the other powers. To some extent this was a natural choice, for the Manchus felt that they knew the Russians at first hand, whereas most of the Ch'ing superstructure's information about the West Europeans had been strained through the Han Chinese bureaucracy in south China, of which the Peking government tended to be suspicious. Putiatin did intercede with the other powers – in support of Russia's position in China – but without telling the Ch'ing that he was doing so. In urging the allies to reduce their demands, his main argument was that, with rebellions in progress, European pressure might destroy the dynasty. Of course Russia did not want Britain to win her demand for access to all the main rivers of China, since this would include the Amur, and foreign diplomatic residence in Peking would add to Britain's influence over the Ch'ing government at Russia's expense. Elgin nevertheless held out for diplomatic residence in Peking and for trade in the interior, and by threatening to attack, got his Treaty of Tientsin on 26 June. Putiatin continued his efforts. Hearing that a new government in Britain had instructed Elgin not to attack Peking or bring down the dynasty, he advised the Ch'ing to renounce the two disputed articles in the British treaty, and he renewed offers he had made earlier to send arms and instructors to China. The court accepted the weapons and agreed also to receive a few instructors to teach their use and to redesign the coastal forts.

To ratify the Aigun and Tientsin treaties, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to Peking a state councillor, Petr Perovskii, who had been Muraviev's Manchu interpreter at Aigun, but named him head of the ecclesiastical mission, over Palladius, instead of ambassador, with the result that Perovskii found it extremely difficult to negotiate. Feeling it urgent to delimit the easternmost Russo-Ch'ing boundary before the British, French and Americans arrived in Peking to ratify their treaties, the Russian government appointed the young Count N. P. Ignatiev (Ignat'ev) 'political agent' in Peking to succeed Perovskii. In March Ignatiev set out for China overland.

Muraviev meanwhile had been exploring and settling the Ussuri. Reports of this alarmed the Peking government, which began to consider the Russian question in more depth. Soon the Li-fan Yüan wrote a letter to Russia, saying that the Ch'ing emperor would be happy to receive the shipment of guns but asking for delivery at Urga. The Ch'ing would repair their own coastal defences. In negotiations with Muraviev and Perovskii, the Ch'ing ratified the Tientsin treaty but protested Muraviev's violation of Ch'ing territory on the Ussuri. When at last it became clear that the Russians were not only continuing to navigate the Amur but were

forcing their way up the Sungari and penetrating the Ussuri region exactly as they pleased, Peking decided not to ratify the Aigun treaty. Another decision, not to allow foreign diplomatic residence at Peking on terms of equality, precipitated the Taku hostilities on 25 June 1859, when Senggerinchin's forces sank four British gunboats. This gave the policy-makers in Peking, who mistakenly believed that the Russians had participated in the Taku attack, renewed courage to resist Russia's demands. Two days later Ignatiev arrived in the Ch'ing capital to take over from Perovskii, but was unable to make any headway, even though higher in status.

In the glow of confidence from Taku, the emperor took a firmer line in Manchuria, dismissed I-shan, and sought new ways to strengthen the dynasty's position. But old ways of thinking still forbade Han Chinese colonization, the one action that might have saved the lands east of the Ussuri. When the Heilungkiang and Kirin authorities suggested settling Han Chinese farmers around Ninguta, San-hsing, the Sui-fen River and the Ussuri to block further Russian penetration, the government flatly refused. It decided instead to mobilize the ginseng-diggers and local tribesmen for defence of the maritime region, and informed Muraviev that it would insist on the boundaries defined in the Treaty of Nerchinsk. Muraviev was unimpressed, and St Petersburg ordered him to occupy – with troops if necessary – the whole Ussuri and maritime area.³⁹

When Ignatiev broke off his negotiations in Peking and on orders from St Petersburg, joined the British, French and American envoys at Shanghai, he hoped to follow Putiatin's example. By now, however, the British knew of the Aigun treaty and suspected a Russian role in Senggerinchin's victory at Taku. Ignatiev's strategy was to convince the allies that only a sound military defeat could bring the Ch'ing government to terms. Once this was done, he would offer the Ch'ing his services as a mediator and then exact the concessions that Russia desired by threatening China with the gunboats of Britain and France. Towards this end he communicated with the Russian ecclesiastical mission, got news from it, and allayed the suspicions of Elgin and Gros by sharing with them his superior knowledge of conditions in Peking. Through his inside sources Ignatiev was the first to learn that the emperor and most of his court had fled to Jehol. Informing Elgin and Gros, he won their trust to such an extent that they even released the diplomatic papers relating to Russia that they had seized in the Summer Palace – a bonanza for Ignatiev, for four trunks of these documents set forth all Perovskii's demands for additional terms to the Aigun and Tientsin treaties. The British gave them up without any idea what they concerned.

³⁹ Quedstedt, *Expansion*, 217.

When the Anglo-French forces were still outside the walls of Peking, Ignatiev went into the city and took up residence at the ecclesiastical mission. Here, the worried Ch'ing authorities at once asked him to mediate on China's behalf. He agreed on condition that Prince Kung should send him a formal written request for mediation, conceal nothing from him, and accede to all his demands of the previous year. Prince Kung could only comply. On 18 (6) October he sent Ignatiev a written request for mediation.

The Russian diplomat in fact did little either to help the allies get their treaties or to help the Ch'ing reduce the allies' demands. But under the very noses of Elgin and Gros, Ignatiev extracted his concessions from Prince Kung, who believed his assertions that Elgin and Gros were backing the Russian demands. When the allied armies withdrew on 6 November, Ignatiev even threatened to recall them. In short, Ignatiev did essentially as Putiatin had done. He entered the negotiations with the apparent support of an Anglo-French military attack at a time of Chinese internal rebellion, made himself mediator, pressed for the cession of territory in Manchuria which Russian forces, in large degree, already held, kept these demands secret from his British and French co-negotiators, and led the Ch'ing representatives to believe that the warships and soldiers of the allies stood behind his territorial demands.

Under these conditions, Prince Kung won few concessions from Ignatiev. Ignatiev did agree that Ch'ing subjects north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri could continue to live where they were and to hunt and fish as usual, but they were not to be under Ch'ing jurisdiction as stipulated in the Treaty of Aigun.

The Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking, signed on 14 (2) November 1860, gave Russia what she had sought in the Treaty of Aigun, confirmed and enlarged the Treaty of Tientsin, and opened the entire northern frontier of the Ch'ing empire, from Manchuria to Sinkiang, to Russia's political and commercial influence. It was agreed that Ch'ing and Russian boundary commissioners would begin demarcation of the new boundary in Manchuria in April of 1861, but the date of the Sinkiang boundary demarcation was left open. The treaty authorized unrestricted, duty-free barter trade along the whole length of the Manchurian Sino-Russian frontier. Russian trade was experimentally authorized at Kashgar on the same terms as in Ili and Tarbagatai. Russia could open consulates at Urga and Kashgar, which were to have full diplomatic equality and extraterritorial jurisdiction over Russian subjects. The Ch'ing empire could have similar privileges in Russia. Communications on frontier matters could pass between the Kiakhta and Urga authorities, between the military governors of the

Amur and maritime provinces and the military governors of Heilungkiang and Kirin, all on a basis of equality, and in important matters the governor general of eastern Siberia could write directly to the Ch'ing Grand Council or to the Li-fan Yüan. Finally, in these territorial, diplomatic and commercial agreements regarding a common Sino-Russian land frontier, the most-favoured-nation clauses of China's treaties with the other maritime powers were deemed not to apply. Prince Kung and Ignatiev signed a protocol on the same day, representing the Ch'ing emperor's ratification of the treaty and Ignatiev's acknowledgment of the same.

The Ch'ing empire had lost broad and valuable lands in the far north-east because the government had failed to perceive their value and had remained wedded to an outmoded policy of confining the Han Chinese within China proper. But this was a valuable lesson. An increasingly China-oriented Ch'ing government learned it and opened the gates to Han migration into the empire's other frontiers. The subsequent history of Chinese Inner Asia is one of Han Chinese settlement, sinicization, and the incorporation of formerly non-Chinese societies into a greater China.

Even in the face of this loss, the Ch'ing government's achievements should not be denied. Despite internal rebellion and European pressure, the dynasty survived and the Ch'ing order carried on with a minimum of change. It is difficult to see how – given what the government had at its disposal – the Ch'ing could fairly have been expected to have done much more.

In 1861 the Ch'ing boundary commissioners met with their Russian counterparts and, following their investigations, exchanged maps and descriptions of the boundary. These they formalized by signing a protocol on 28 (16) June 1861, which formed a supplementary article to the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking. (The Sinkiang boundary with Russia was not defined until the signing of the Chuguchak Protocol in 1864.) For a while, in some quarters of the Russian government, there continued to be those who discussed the merits of further territorial seizures in Manchuria and Mongolia, but on 11 July (29 June) the government finally rejected all such proposals on the grounds that the British and French might respond to any additional Russian expansion by seizing Korea or other areas from which they might menace the Russian empire. The Russian government informed its resident minister in China, its consul at Urga, and the governor-general of eastern Siberia that if the dynasty should fall, 'our actions will be directed towards promoting the formation of independent domains in Mongolia and Manchuria'.⁴⁰ A similar policy with respect to Mongolia, Manchuria and Sinkiang had formed a part of

⁴⁰ Narochitskii, *Kolonial'naiia*, 124-5.

Ignatiev's instructions, but the Russians, like the British, French and Americans, preferred to maintain the dynastic *status quo*.

The Russians also insisted on reframing the rules for frontier trade. The Ch'ing agreed to a thorough clarification, and on 4 March (20 Feb.) 1862, Prince Kung and the Russian minister, Captain L. Balliuzek, signed a new list of twenty-two Sino-Russian Overland Trade Regulations. These 1862 trade regulations established a system of credentials that Russian authorities would issue and Ch'ing authorities endorse for the Russian caravans from Kiakhta to Tientsin and for Russian merchants trading in outlying parts of Mongolia. Duties on goods imported overland from Russia were to be one-third less than those on European goods imported by sea.

A final question resolved in 1862 was an offer of weapons and instructors that Putiatin had made to China originally for use against the British and French and later, when the offer was renewed, for the suppression of Chinese rebels. In 1858 Putiatin had ordered Palladius to offer the Ch'ing 20,000 rifles, 20 cannon, and an unspecified number of military instructors. The Ch'ing, however, had been suspicious of the Russian offer – especially that of the instructors – and had accepted them so tentatively that although the Russian government had decided to send several instructors and 10,000 rifles to the Ch'ing across Mongolia and to ship 50 cannon secretly by sea, Muraviev, who wanted the weapons for his own soldiers, had been able to retain the entire shipment in Siberia in 1859. At the ratification ceremony of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking in 1860, Ignatiev had again put forward the Russian weapons offer and had even offered Russian naval support against the Taipings. Nothing came of the latter suggestion, but after several delays, including a negative recommendation from Tseng Kuo-fan, the arms shipment was finally approved, and in the summer of 1862, 2,000 rifles and 6 cannon were finally delivered. When, however, a few Russian instructors began to train Ch'ing soldiers in their use near Kiakhta, the British envoy put sufficient pressure on the Ch'ing government to have them sent home again that same year. The Russian government delayed the remainder of the promised weapons until it was satisfied with the new tariff for Sino-Russian overland trade, and eventually these arms were used by the British-trained Peking Field Force (Shen-chiying) to defend Peking and suppress banditry in Manchuria in 1865.

There were also plans afoot in Russia to join in the allies' intervention in support of the Ch'ing dynasty against the Taipings so as to counterbalance the growth of British and French influence in China. But the possibility of Russian conflict with Britain continued to exist, and Russia faced rebellion in Poland; so in the long run it was decided best to keep the Russian fleet intact. Russia did not intervene.

By 1860, maritime imports of tea entering Russia as contraband across her European frontier had grown to constitute one third of all tea imports into Russia. In consequence of the Peking treaty, the Russian government legalized the maritime tea trade but lowered the tariff on tea at Kiakhta, leaving a higher tariff on tea imports by sea. Thereafter, Russia's maritime trade with China grew substantially, tea being the main import. At the expense of the Kiakhta trade Russian ships carried tea and other Chinese wares from Canton and Shanghai to Odessa. This route was cheaper even insofar as internal Chinese transport costs were concerned, because the transport of tea from the plantations to the coastal ports took only about twenty days and the cost per *pud* was only one rouble thirty-two kopecks, whereas transport to Kiakhta took over three months, and the cost reached as high as ten roubles per *pud*.⁴¹

In terms of its total value, however, the Sino-Russian border trade at Kiakhta continued through the nineteenth century to occupy the leading place. In the long run, the Sinkiang route proved to be longer and more expensive, and the importance of the growing unregulated Sino-Russian trade on the Amur and the Ussuri – undocumented by statistical evidence until the 1890s – still seems to have remained comparatively limited. The balance of Sino-Russian trade as a whole leaned in China's favour. Russians bought tea and, increasingly, raw silk. They bartered what they could, mainly textiles, and paid the balance in gold and silver. In China, British woollens won out over Russian cloth.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 132; Sladkovskii, *Istoriia*, 268.

CHAPTER 8

THE HEYDAY OF THE CH'ING ORDER IN MONGOLIA, SINKIANG AND TIBET

Historians have tended to view the Ch'ing empire's nineteenth-century history as a period of decline. Europeans took concessions and territory. Rebels shattered the peace within. But in the 1800s the Ch'ing empire and China were not yet fully one. If the empire as such was in decline, China, the Han Chinese, their culture and their power, were beginning a period of unprecedented expansion. China had assimilated her Manchu conquerors. To survive the rebellions, the dynasty was forced to break the Manchu bannermen's monopoly of military might and put the command of armies into Han Chinese hands.

In Inner Asia, the first half of the nineteenth century witnessed the heyday of the Ch'ing order. Here the empire consolidated its earlier military gains, and only in Altishahr did this mean the repeated use of arms. Population pressure in China proper and Han Chinese trade initiatives eroded the dynasty's policy of segregating China from Inner Asia. The erosion was an expression of growing Han Chinese strength. The government had made the first official exceptions to its policy in the 1700s with the colonization of Tsinghai and Zungharia. Gradually it relaxed its efforts to seal off Mongolia and the Manchurian frontier. Segregation came more and more under attack. The 'statecraft' scholars Kung Tzu-chen and Wei Yüan both called for the fuller use of Sinkiang to provide land for China's landless Han population. Growing numbers of Han Chinese made their way into Ch'ing Inner Asia, even into strictly closed areas like Heilungkiang and Altishahr. Only central Tibet – remote and uninviting to Chinese settlement – remained untouched by the crescendo of sinicization and Han immigration.

Decline there was – not in Chinese vitality but in the political fortunes of the Inner Asian peoples. In Mongolia, Han Chinese penetration brought with it the pauperization of many Mongols. To the Muslims of Altishahr, Ch'ing rule in the nineteenth century meant infidel rule, war and the emigration of tens of thousands of Kashgarians out of their homeland and into the Ferghana valley and Tashkent. For the Tibetans, on the

other hand, Ch'ing influence seemed more benign. The real threats came from India. Lhasa chose to hide behind the emperor's robes.

Since chapter 7 has told the story of Manchuria to 1860, the present one will deal only with Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet.

MONGOLIA'S NOMADIC SOCIETY IN DECLINE

The growth of the Mongolian monastic establishment and the penetration of Han Chinese influence advanced more quickly in Inner than in Outer Mongolia. Ch'ing control was tighter in Inner Mongolia than it was north of the Gobi, but in both areas Ch'ing officials held more and more of the administrative power that Mongols had once exercised. In Inner Mongolia monasteries were more concentrated, and the nomads were more closely connected with the Chinese economy. But the same trends were visible among the Outer Mongols. As in most of the important developments of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Mongolian history, Inner Mongolia showed the way and Outer Mongolia followed.

Both Mongolias continued to supply the Ch'ing armies with cavalry. The Ch'ing, however, kept the Outer Mongols apart from the empire's wars in the nineteenth century, whereas the Inner Mongols saw action in China proper against the Europeans. Wangchinbala (1795-1847), for example, a prince of the Tümed, a writer and the father of two famous Mongolian literary figures, Gule'ansā (1820-51) and Injanashi (1837-92), fought in the Opium War in 1841. The Khorchin prince Senggerinchin served against the Taipings from 1853 to 1855, against the British and French in 1858-60, against bandits around Peking in 1860, and against the Nien rebels until he was killed in 1865.

In the nineteenth century the dynasty had the Mongols well under control, and the Ch'ing government feared them no more. Even the population was evidently in decline, among the main reasons being monasticism and syphilis. Tibetan physicians treated syphilis among the Mongols with mercury, but the disease was widespread and continued to take its toll.¹ Tuberculosis was also prevalent.

Increasingly, Ch'ing interests in Mongolia became Han Chinese interests. The ruling Manchus had become more Han Chinese in their outlook, and the dynasty abandoned its earlier attempts to block Han trade penetration and settlement in the steppe. It still required the licensing of Han Chinese merchants trading in Mongolia, but this was no longer designed to limit Han commercial activities among the nomads but rather to raise revenues, mainly for the support of the dynasty's Mongolian

¹ Günther Schulemann, *Geschichte der Dalai-Lamas*, 345-6.

administrative apparatus. If anything, Han Chinese economic penetration served the dynasty's interests, because it bound the Mongols more tightly to the rest of the empire. The Ch'ing administrators, increasingly in league with Han Chinese trading firms, solidly supported Chinese commerce. Even so, popular resentment against Han merchants occasionally boiled over, as in 1829, when lamas at the temple dance in Urga beat up some Han Chinese spectators.

There was little that ordinary Mongols could do to protect themselves against the growing exactions that banner princes, monasteries and Han creditors imposed upon them. Those unable to meet the demands could take flight, and throughout the nineteenth century increasing numbers of people did so, but their princes then levied the debts from the banner subjects at large. When banner authorities caught such fugitives, they meted out severe punishments. In one case, for example, sixty-nine defaulters were put in cangues and passed around the banner for two years from tent to tent. Since the cangues were too wide to fit through the tent doors, the prisoners had to spend their nights in the open, in the horrible winter cold.² Similarly, the church administered ferocious corporal punishment to shabis who failed to meet the quotas demanded of them. Fugitives from debt, monks unable to subsist in the monasteries, and herdsmen whose herds fell below the subsistence level could live only by banditry – lawlessness mounted steadily in the nineteenth century – or by making their way to the growing trade–monastery–garrison centres and eking out an existence by doing odd jobs. In these nascent urban centres, in particular the frontier cities of Inner Mongolia, but also in Urga, Erdeni Juu, Uliasutai, Khobdo and Kiakhta, impoverished Mongols became a kind of semi-criminal working class who lived by primitive skilled or unskilled labour, prostitution, begging and robbery.

In the monasteries there was great disparity between high-ranking lamas and the ordinary monks. All monks participating in the services were supposed to receive a share of monastery rations, the size of each monk's share being determined by his rank in the monastic hierarchy. The difference between high-ranking and low-ranking monks' shares widened throughout the nineteenth century, and the low-ranking monks often found that they could not survive on what they received. If they took on outside jobs, they missed services and commonly lost their monastery rations altogether. To stay alive, they begged, stole or returned home, where their families had to support them.

The majority of Mongols, who remained in the banners and continued their lives as herdsmen, found themselves at the mercy of the banner

² Charles R. Bawden, *The modern history of Mongolia*, 143.

princes. Ordinary herdsmen had little recourse against exorbitant taxation and levies, but in extreme cases they sometimes lodged complaints, known in Mongolian as *jarghu*, with the league authorities, even though the filing of such complaints was technically against the law. When, as occasionally happened, the authorities did force a banner prince to give back what he had illegally exacted, they were always careful to punish the plaintiffs as well, since subjects were not supposed to go over the heads of their banner princes. For this reason, the plaintiffs made every attempt to conceal the identities of the *jarghu* organizers and drafters, who came mainly from the lowest strata of the Mongolian nobility and were often quite poor, or else came from the ranks of the lamas. The texts of many of these complaints survive and are among the most important sources for the study of social and economic conditions in nineteenth-century Mongolia.³ Of particular interest was a dispute lasting from 1824 until 1844 in the banner of Dughar Chembel in the Sechen Khan aimak. Dughar Chembel, the *jasak*, extorted huge sums from his subjects; so his subjects protested until the league authorities finally found against him. At the same time, however, they also severely punished the organizers of the complaint.⁴

The most unusual of all the cases of subjects litigating against their princes arose in the Sechen Khan aimak against Toghtakhu Törö, a talented prince who came to be known as 'Terrible To Wang', grandson of the deposed Sechen Khan Sangjayidorji. Toghtakhu Törö, who stood far above the intellectual and cultural standards of nineteenth-century Mongolia, knew Chinese, Manchu and Tibetan, and made several trips to China and Tibet. In 1821 he commuted into a tax in silver all the tributary dues that his banner subjects owed him, and over the course of the following years began an attempt to modernize the banner. He set up farms to supply his subjects and sold the excess to other banners. He developed hunting, fishing and the gathering of wild plants and mushrooms so as to cut down on the meat consumption that reduced the herds. For the treatment of ailments, he developed the mineral springs in his territory. He imported Han Chinese artisans to run textile mills and to train Mongols. He mined gold, salt and soda. In the field of education, he opened schools to provide compulsory education for all the children of his banner, nobles and commoners alike, and he prepared the teaching material himself. He instituted special instruction for musicians and actors. For the

³ C. Nasanbalzir and Š. Nacagdorž, eds. *Arдын зэргын бйг (XVIII–XX зууны ехөн)*. See the English translation by Š. Rasidondug, in collaboration with Veronika Veit, *Petitions of grievances submitted by the people (18th–beginning of 20th century)*.

⁴ See Š. Nacagdorž, *Манжийн ерхсэлд бэлсн ийеийн Халхын хураангуй түүх (1691–1911)*, 215–23; and *Bügd Naŋramdax Mongol Ard Ulsyn түүх, Дөд бөй* [2]: 1604–1917, 256–61.

bulk of his nomad population he collected information on the techniques of animal husbandry and nomadic life, published it in a book, and distributed it.

When Toghtakhu Törö's interests came into conflict with those of the lamaist church, he ran into trouble. In 1837 he developed a scheme to consolidate eleven local monasteries, containing about a thousand monks, into a single banner monastery and set up a brick factory to make the bricks and tiles for the new monastery and also for a palace for himself. But the herdsmen, accustomed to their local temples, did not want to give them up. Low-ranking monks, many of whom were living outside their monasteries in order to make ends meet, feared that Toghtakhu Törö's consolidation scheme would displace them altogether. The higher-ranking lamas realized that moving into a central monastery would reduce their authority and privileges as local heads. But Toghtakhu Törö was adamant and proceeded with the building of the central monastery.

The lamas and many of the laymen of Toghtakhu Törö's banner petitioned the banner office that same year to reverse his consolidation decision, and a long quarrel began that lasted from 1837 until 1842. The situation deteriorated to the point where fighting broke out between Toghtakhu Törö's soldiers and the protesters. At the new monastery there was a demonstration with the monks shouting 'Let us go home!', and Toghtakhu Törö had to refer the dispute to the league authorities. The case dragged on and on. It was referred to the amban's yamen in Urga; the amban referred it back to the league. The protesters, undaunted, lodged a complaint with the league authorities which contained forty accusations against Toghtakhu Törö. The authorities responded by arresting the bearers of the complaint.

The league authorities disliked Toghtakhu Törö's consolidation scheme. Ch'ing policy had always been to prevent the combination of Mongolian secular and ecclesiastical authority, yet Toghtakhu Törö was clearly bent on concentrating all the political, economic and ecclesiastical power of his banner in his own hands. However, popular unrest was even less palatable to the authorities than Toghtakhu Törö's bid for greater power. They therefore increased their pressure on the protesters, forcing some of the plaintiffs to withdraw their names, and the league settled the case in Toghtakhu Törö's favour, then passed it on to Urga for review. The amban upheld the league and severely punished the protesters, especially the ringleaders, but the Ch'ing authorities also took the opportunity to put Toghtakhu Törö in his place: they sentenced him to a light punishment and broke up his consolidated monastery.⁵ This did not, however,

⁵ Nacagdorž, *Manžiin*, 223–36; *Bügd Natramdax*, 2.261–70; Bawden, *Modern history*, 179–83.

prevent Toghtakhu Törö from becoming captain-general of the league in 1859.

Many of Toghtakhu Törö's projects were real advances for his day, but he gave his subjects little reason to hope that they would share any of his schemes' rewards. His plans also came up against the conservatism of his people and the power of the lamaist church, which held captive the minds and imaginations of the nineteenth-century Mongols.

Among the symptoms of the decline of nomadism in nineteenth-century Mongolia – general population decline, the loss of males to the monasteries, the Mongols' growing indebtedness to Han Chinese merchants, the Ch'ing dynasty's power over the princes, the growth of urban centres, the pauperization of the ordinary nomads – perhaps the most striking was the spread of agriculture in the steppe and the increasing conversion of pastureland to agricultural use. The Ch'ing government had, as a matter of policy, regularly established Han Chinese agricultural settlements to cultivate food, fodder and grain for its garrisons and postal relay stations in Mongolian territory. Such settlements were of limited size and took up little pasture. But during the eighteenth century, growing numbers of Han settlers had illegally begun to move into the Inner Mongolian steppe and to lease land from monasteries and banner princes, slowly diminishing the grazing areas for the Mongols' livestock. Alienation of pasture in this way was by and large illegal, but the practice continued unchecked. Han Chinese merchants further stimulated this gradual movement by accepting lands in payment of the banner princes' accounts and leasing these lands to Han farmers. This was against Ch'ing law, but by 1791 there had been so many Han Chinese settlers in the Front Banner of the Ghorlos in eastern Inner Mongolia, for example, that the *jasak* had petitioned the Ch'ing government to legalize the status of the numerous Shantung and Chihli peasants who had already settled there. In 1799 the government had finally accepted what had by then become an accomplished fact by creating a sub-prefecture to administer the settlers under the civil jurisdiction of the Kirin authorities. In 1802 an assistant sub-prefect had taken charge of the Han Chinese immigrant population in Ghorlos territory, and in 1810 a sub-prefect had been appointed at Petuna (Bedune) for similar reasons.

By 1852 Han merchants had deeply penetrated Inner Mongolia, and the Mongols had run up unpayable debts. The monasteries had taken over substantial grazing lands, and monasteries, merchants and *jasaks* had leased many pasture areas to Han Chinese as farmland. Popular resentment ran high against oppressive taxation, Han settlement, shrinkage of pasture, debts and abuses of the banner princes' authority. Perhaps inspired by the Taiping rebellion, dissident Mongols of the Üüshin banner

of the Ordos responded to their unhappy situation by forming a new kind of Mongolian secret society known as the *dughuyilang* (circle). The circle idea soon spread to other banners as a kind of grass-roots resistance movement. As in the *jarghu* texts mentioned above, when the circle members drafted a complaint, they signed their names in a circle so that nobody would seem to be the leader. Here again the leadership seems to have come mainly from impoverished petty noblemen and low-ranking lamas. In the early stages of its development, the *dughuyilang* movement directed its efforts only against Han Chinese merchants and settlers and against banner princes who exploited their subjects. Anti-Ch'ing sentiment against the dynasty as such did not make its appearance in Mongolia until late in the nineteenth century.

Under pressure of events, the Ch'ing attitude towards Han colonization of Mongolian lands grew more favourable. In 1860, just as the dynasty lost to Russia its uncolonized territories in northern Manchuria, it officially opened to Han Chinese settlement the easternmost border of Mongolia, in the vicinity of Harbin.

The economic effect of converting pasture into farmland remains uncertain, but, especially in Inner Mongolia, pastureland was so much reduced that it made a real change in Mongolia's traditional nomadism. In earlier times, Mongols without enough pasture had secretly made their way into the pastures of adjacent banners; Mongols without enough livestock had survived by means of a nomadic putting-out system, by which poor people herded the animals of the rich.⁶ But now as Mongolia's nomadic economy declined, not only Han Chinese settlers but also impoverished Mongols, no longer able to thrive as herdsmen by any means, began to take up farming in the steppe, renting farmlands from their banner princes or from Han merchant landlords who had acquired them for agriculture as settlement for debts. In some places, in fact, by the middle of the nineteenth century seven or eight out of every ten tenant farmers were Mongols. Contrary to a widespread misconception, agriculture had existed in Mongolia for centuries, and in the 1800s its importance, especially in Inner Mongolia, markedly increased. Not enough is known about Mongolian agriculture, but some Mongols evidently did well at it, and it appears that farmers, in Outer Mongolia at least, may have been subject to less taxation than herdsmen, so that farm produce sometimes made fair profits.⁷ This was by no means universally true, however, for in 1861 several thousand impoverished farmers of the West Banner of the Tümed in south-eastern Inner Mongolia, including both Mongols

⁶ Sh. Natsagdorj, 'The economic basis of feudalism in Mongolia', 272-6.

⁷ Bawden, *Modern history*, 156-7.

and Han Chinese, joined in revolt against heavy taxation and the severe terms that both Mongolian *jasaks* and Han landlords demanded for the leasing of farmland. The rebellion was short-lived, but it showed the importance of the agricultural population in Inner Mongolia at the beginning of the 1860s and the level of popular resentment against tax-hungry *jasaks* and the greedy lessors of farming land.

For all their suffering, and undoubtedly in some measure because of it, the Mongols of the nineteenth century produced some beautiful literature. The great majority of the population was, of course, illiterate, and the most popular art form was the recitations by bards and storytellers. Particularly appreciated were the so-called mendicants' tales (*badarchin-u üiliger*) narrated by itinerant monks (*badarchin*), a genre that had developed in Mongolia during the Ch'ing period. In these tales one can discern the Mongols' discontent with the declining conditions of steppe life. Similar in character were the popular, somewhat picaresque stories about the legendary Mongolian folk hero Balansengge, who made fools of monks and *jasaks* and Han traders. The most interesting of the 'lessons' for life (*surghal*), a genre close to the Mongols' traditional aphoristic poetry, date from the nineteenth century, and during this period 'prayers' for good fortune (*irügel*), eulogies (*maghtaghal*) and laments (lit. 'words', *üge*) retained their popularity. These and the Mongolian sagas, the most famous of which is the 'Geser Khan', were recited or read aloud and remained part of Mongolia's oral literature.

For literate Mongols, the nineteenth century produced much historical writing in both Mongolian and Tibetan and considerable work on philology – an outgrowth of the huge translation effort of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that had rendered the Buddhist scriptures into Mongolian. As for *belles-lettres*, Mongolian readers enjoyed the stories of the monk Agwang Khayidub (1779–1838), some of whose tales openly ridiculed and criticized members of the monastic community who abused their prerogatives and led less than saintly lives. Khaulichi Sandagh (1825–60) wrote verses, especially laments, drawing his subject matter not simply from the heroic lore of Mongolia's past or from the wealth of Buddhist literary tradition, but from the everyday lives of herdsmen.

There were many others, but perhaps the most unusual writer of the first half of the nineteenth century was Danjinrabjai (1803–56), who was born in Inner Mongolia but became the Fifth Noyan Khutughtu of the Red church in Outer Mongolia. Danjinrabjai, who wrote in both Mongolian and Tibetan, won renown as a poet, and some of his songs have

remained popular into the twentieth century. His themes, which often reflect dissatisfaction with Mongolia's social and economic decline, are interesting in the opposition that they show between the Mongolian lay and clerical leaders. Most remarkable of all is his musical play, *Moon Cuckoo* (*Saran kökege-yin namtar*), begun in 1831. At least as early as the eighteenth century, semi-religious 'opera' based on Tibetan prototypes had been performed in Mongolian monasteries with themes drawn from Indo-Tibetan Buddhist literature, but the *Moon Cuckoo* represents a new development in that it is the first known Mongolian secular drama. The play grew steadily in popularity, and secular players performed it repeatedly for secular audiences, laying the groundwork for the lay theatre that developed in Mongolia in the twentieth century.⁸

Nineteenth-century Mongolian fiction is notable also for the popularity of the many translations of stories from Tibetan, such as the Pañcatantra tales, often much changed in their Mongolian form. However, by far the most important foreign ingredient in the Mongolian literature of the time is Chinese fiction, both stories and the so-called 'novels'. P'u Sung-ling's *Strange stories from a Chinese studio* (*Liao-chai chih-i*) was translated into Mongolian, and it appears that as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century the Mongols were reading almost all the important Chinese novels in Mongolian translation. *Dream of the red chamber* (*Hung-lou meng*), *Golden Lotus* (*Chin P'ing Mei*), *Record of a journey to the West* (*Hsi-yu-chi*) and *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (*San-kuo-chih yen-i*) enjoyed special popularity. Chinese literary influence is particularly noticeable, for example, in the writing of Injanashi, the son of Wangchinbala, mentioned above. Before setting out to fight for the Ch'ing dynasty in the Opium War, Wangchinbala had begun a history of the Mongols in the great period of their power, choosing as his literary form the style of the Chinese novel, but he had died in 1847, leaving the work incomplete. Injanashi, after writing two Mongolian novels, adapting both his characters and his setting from the *Dream of the red chamber*, took up his father's historical novel and, retiring to his estate like a Han Chinese scholar, completed it, remaining faithful to the Chinese novel's narrative form. This work, which bears the title *Blue chronicle* (*Köke sudur*), remained unprinted until the twentieth century.⁹

As conditions of life deteriorated, antagonism grew between the Mongolian laity and the lamaist ecclesiastical establishment. Such feelings, particularly strong in Inner Mongolia, are to be seen in the writings of

⁸ G. I. Mikhailov, *Literaturnoe nasledstvo mongolov*, 74; Walther Heissig, *Ein Volk sucht seine Geschichte: die Mongolen und die verlorenen Dokumente ihrer grossen Zeit*, 247; Walther Heissig, *Geschichte der mongolischen Literatur*, 1.63, 215–17.

⁹ Heissig, *Geschichte*, 1.278–90, 307–23.

Injanashi's brother Guleransā, a *jasak* as well as a man of letters, who satirized lamas to appeal to the anti-clerical tastes of his lay readership. Later in the century a profounder sense of dissatisfaction with the Mongolian social order found expression in the Ordos poet Keshigbatu (1849–1916), who began his career as a banner judicial officer but associated himself for a time with the *dughuyilang* movement.

Architecture, essentially irrelevant to the old nomadic environment, had been stimulated by the widespread building of temples and monasteries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At first the Mongols, drawing their models from the settled societies towards which they found themselves increasingly oriented, built their monasteries either in Tibetan or in Chinese style. In the eighteenth century, examples of mixed style began to appear, making various combinations of Tibetan and Chinese elements with ingredients of native Mongolian architecture based on the round form of the Mongols' felt tents. Among these examples of mixed architecture, the rarest were temples of the Tibeto-Mongolian type, which were erected over huge statues of the Buddha Maitreya. The first such temple was constructed in Urga at the beginning of the nineteenth century. A literature in Tibetan and Mongolian survives, in both printed books and manuscripts, giving short histories of Mongolia's monasteries and outlining the principles of Mongolian architectural engineering.¹⁰ The decorative arts achieved a certain degree of development in the nineteenth century but for the most part religious paintings, carvings and the like remained essentially imitative in their conception and execution.

Politically, socio-economically and culturally – with the exception of some native literary works – Mongolia in the first part of the nineteenth century was under foreign sway.

SINKIANG: THE MAKHDŪMZĀDAS AND KOKAND

In 1820, the statecraft scholar Kung Tzu-chen published two essays, one arguing for the conversion of Sinkiang into a province and the other pressing for the termination of the trade at Canton.¹¹ The interrelationship of these two areas, Sinkiang and Kwangtung, where Ch'ing subjects traded constantly with foreigners, became more apparent two decades later, when the government applied the lessons of Altishahr to its difficulties with Britain on the China coast.

¹⁰ N. M. Shchepetil'nikov, *Arkhitektura Mongolii*, 86; D. Maidat, *Arkhitektura i gradostroitel'stvo Mongolii: Ocherki po istorii*, 8.

¹¹ 'Hsi-yü chih hsing-sheng i', in Wang P'ei-cheng, ed. *Kung Tzu-chen ch'üan-chi*, 1.105–11, and 'Pa tung-nan fan-po i' (text lost – see Wang P'ei-cheng, 2.643).


Jahāngīr's jihad (1820–8) and Kokand's invasion (1830)

In 1817 the khan of Kokand reiterated his demand for special trade privileges in Kashgar and threatened to release the khojas. The Ch'ing, in reply, stopped his stipend of money and tea and revoked his lucrative privilege of sending embassies to Peking. Kokand then sent two ambassadors to suggest a compromise: to have two Kokand agents resident in Kashgar, named simply 'aksakal' (*aqsaqal*, lit. 'greybeard' – elder), which had no juridical implications. Again the Ch'ing refused, sent the ambassadors away, and taxed their goods in full; so the khan, taking advantage of the presence of Samsaq's sons Jahāngīr and Bahā' ad-Dīn in Kokand, released Jahāngīr, who declared a jihad (holy war), assembled an army of several hundred men, mainly Kirghiz, and returned to the Altishahr of his forefathers.

Ch'ing forces quickly routed the invaders, and Jahāngīr fled back to Kokand with only twenty or thirty survivors, but his raid showed that the Āfāqī Makhdūmzādas' cause was still alive. When Kokand contacted the Kashgar authorities again in 1821, attempting to regain the exemption from customs of 1809, the Ch'ing government restored the khanate's trading and tributary rights, but not the exemption, and it still refused the stationing of a Kokand resident on Ch'ing territory. That same year, however, the Kokand ruler died, and Jahāngīr escaped into the territory of his Kirghiz allies. The Ch'ing and Kokand governments thus lost their opportunity for a mutually advantageous accord. In 1824 the khoja began to harry the Ch'ing borders with a band of several hundred Kirghiz. Kokand, now disclaiming all responsibility for Jahāngīr, tried again unsuccessfully in 1825 to obtain an exemption for her merchants from payment of customs duties. The prize was worth having, for according to a Russian report, every day 100 to 300 camel loads of merchandise arrived from China proper.¹²

Jahāngīr's jihad might have come to nothing had it not been for the stupidity of a Ch'ing officer who led 200 cavalymen against the khoja in 1825, and failing to catch him, massacred an unprotected camp of Kirghiz women and children. When the Kirghiz chief discovered this atrocity, he called up 2,000 horsemen, trapped the Ch'ing troops in a ravine, and slaughtered them. News that Jahāngīr's allies had defeated a Ch'ing army spread swiftly through the Tarim basin cities. The khoja himself 'observing how unpopular the Chinese had become', notified the khan of Kokand, the ruler of Ura-Tūbe, the emir of Kunduz and various Kazakh and

¹² 'O polozhenii del v Kashgare', compiled by a Mr Sushin (1827), cited in Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 3.426.



MAP 14. Altishahr in the nineteenth century

Kirghiz chiefs of the opportunity to seize Altishahr. Gradually Jahāngir assembled a force of over 500 Kashgarians, Kokandis, Kirghiz and Kazakhs; there were also Ghalchas (mountain Tajiks) whose black costumes gave rise to rumours in Siberia that Europeans were fighting in the khoja's army.¹³

In 1826 Jahāngir invaded, paying his respects to the Āfāqī tombs in Yaghdu before marching on Kashgar and losing 400 of his men in an initial engagement. On fleeing back to Yaghdu, the invaders were surrounded by the imperial forces, but Jahāngir's army, armed with matchlocks, broke through, and with this triumph the populace rose, swelling the khoja's numbers to about 10,000 people.¹⁴ The Ch'ing councillor, Ch'ing-hsiang, meanwhile set up a coordinated defence, but the jihad was too strong, and the Ch'ing army had to barricade itself in the Kashgar citadel, where Ch'ing-hsiang executed Yūnus the hakim beg, and many of the city's inhabitants whose sympathies were believed to lie with the invaders.¹⁵ The position of the market quarters outside the Manchu cantonment enabled Jahāngir to seize valuable merchandise, which contributed to his success, and the insurgents took out their resentment against the Han Chinese merchants.

Previously Jahāngir had sent a messenger to Kokand to ask for reinforcements in return for a share of the spoils of conquest (it was said that 'not even a hundred East Turkestanis could equal a single soldier from Andijan'),¹⁶ or alternatively the Kokand government, who thought of Jahāngir's forces as 'hooligans' (*awbāshiyya*), had decided to enter the fray on its own initiative. In any case, Muḥammad 'Ali, the khan of Kokand, now arrived in person with a cavalry of between 8,000 and 10,000 men, and Jahāngir met him on horseback – meaning that the khoja refused to recognize the Kokand ruler as his khan. According to one source, the khan's forces 'surprized the Chinese general in his cantonment' and 'cut up the Chinese army'. Other sources suggest that Jahāngir himself already had the situation in hand by the time of the khan's arrival or that the khan was apprised of a plot laid by Jahāngir to murder him at a feast. The khan 'could not infuse confidence' into Jahāngir's mind, and the khoja, becoming jealous of Muḥammad 'Ali and 'suspicious of treachery', drew off his troops towards the north. The khan made several unsuc-

¹³ W. H. Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary and Khoten', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 4.48 (Dec. 1835) 660; Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 2.319, 647.

¹⁴ Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih*, 303. Muḥammad Amin Yārkandī says 12,000 men – R. H. Davies, comp. *Report on the trade and resources of the countries on the north-western boundary of British India*, cccxliii.

¹⁵ Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 660. Cf., however, Muḥammad Amin's 'oral information', in Davies, *Report*, cccxli, cccxlii.

¹⁶ Tseng, *Chung-kuo*, 303.

cessful assaults on the Kashgar citadel, exploding gunpowder (*dārū*) under its walls. But the defenders answered with arrows, muskets (*tufang*), stone missiles, *pūr-i jāngudhār* (cannon?) and naphtha. There was so much killing that 'from the vein of the earth a stream of blood boiled forth'.¹⁷ After twelve days and the loss of a thousand of his men, Muḥammad 'Ali Khan withdrew in disgust. Jahāngir persuaded some of the Kokand cavalry to stay and join his army.

After ten weeks the Ch'ing garrison's water and provisions ran out; its commanders committed suicide, and their soldiers fled under cover of night,¹⁸ only to be overtaken and slaughtered – except for 400 who were Tungans or other Ch'ing soldiers who had adopted Islam. Jahāngir entered the Kashgar citadel. The populations of Yangi Hisar, Yarkand and Khotan rebelled. The Makhdūmzāda forces razed to the ground the Manchu cantonments of these cities and showed off their victory by sending envoys to parade their captives in Bukhara, Kunduz, Balkh, Khiva and among the Kazakhs.

Jahāngir received no further help from Kokand, and the East Turkestanis remained deeply divided over the khoja's cause. The Ishāqiyya clung to the Ch'ing *status quo* out of opposition to their Āfāqī rivals. In some places the Āfāqiyya tried to bring about an Ishāqī change of heart,¹⁹ but elsewhere, particularly in Khotan, they used their ascendancy to settle old scores. Consequently Ishāq b. Muḥammad Hudawī, the pro-Ch'ing hakim beg of Aksu and great-great-grandson of Hudawī of Kucha (who had helped the Ch'ing conquer Altishahr in the eighteenth century) sent emissaries to Khotan to sow discord. Ishāq b. Muḥammad Hudawī himself was an adherent of the Qādiriyya with no known connection to the Ishāqī branch of the Naqshbandiyya,²⁰ but the Ishāqī begs responded to his

¹⁷ Tseng, *Chung-kuo*, 303; Wathen, 'Mémorial on Chinese Tartary', 660 (says that the khan had 'about 8,000 horse'); W. H. Wathen, 'Mémorial on the U'sbek State of Kokan, properly called Khokend, (the ancient Ferghana) in central Asia', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 3.32 (Aug. 1834), 375; and W. H. Wathen, 'Note of a pilgrimage undertaken by an Usbek and his two sons from Khokend or Kokan, in Tartary, through Russia, &c. to Mecca. Obtained in conversation with the parties', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 3.32 (Aug. 1834) 381. Mullā Niyāz Muḥammad b. Mullā 'Ashūr Muḥammad Khōqandī, *Tārīkh-i Shahrubkhi*, ed. N. N. Pantusov, 115. The author confuses Jahāngir with his son Buzurg Khan, and the dates are incorrect, but the events described are clearly recognizable. Cf. Muḥammad Amin in Davies, *Report*, cccxliii.

¹⁸ Wathen, 'Mémorial on Chinese Tartary', 660, says that Jahāngir took the citadel by storm.

¹⁹ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.363–5.

²⁰ Wathen, 'Mémorial on Chinese Tartary', 661, says that the Ishāqiyya, whom he calls the *Kura Tak* 'tribe', are 'Kadarīs' and that ИШАҚ КНОЖЕН (by which name he unmistakably refers to Ishāq b. Muḥammad Hudawī) was their 'chief'. This is impossible because Ishāq b. Muḥammad Hudawī was not a lineal descendant in the male line of Khoja Ishāq Walī b. Makhdūm-i A'zam. Multiple affiliation is of course possible, but it seems likely that Wathen has confused Ishāq b. Muḥammad Hudawī and the Qādiriyya with the Ishāqiyya because of the name 'Ishāq'.

encouragement by taking control of Khotan and declaring themselves for the Ch'ing empire. Since heavy snows prevented the Manchus from sending soldiers for their relief, the Āfāqī forces re-established Jahāngir's authority, and only one of the Ishāqī Khotan begs, a man named Amīn, escaped to Aksu, bringing 2,000 of his people. Jahāngir meanwhile made inventories of the Kashgarian households and confiscated huge amounts of public and private property, much of which he gave as pay to the Kokandis in his army. He plundered the homes of the begs, levied 'heavy black mail from the rich merchants', and 'tyrannised over the people'. He permitted so much killing that even supporters of the Āfāqiyya became disillusioned.

Early in 1827 the Ch'ing reconquest forces, 22,000 strong, set out against Jahāngir from Aksu. The barren and inhospitable terrain forced them to carry almost all their food, both for men and for animals, so that even the huge provisions of the army barely sufficed. Jahāngir fled into the mountains, and his soldiers carried away with them 'property of immense value', which they had plundered from the Altishahr inhabitants at the approach of the Ch'ing army.²¹ With them emigrated most of the rich and important Āfāqī sympathizers to settle in the territory of Kokand. After 8,000 Ch'ing troops had searched the Pamirs for the khoja in vain, the government called off the search, took reprisals against those who had collaborated with the invaders, and, setting up an 8,000-man garrison at Kashgar, withdrew 9,000 troops to China proper. A Muslim militia was also formed.

The Ch'ing now sent out notes to all the neighbouring rulers, demanding Jahāngir's extradition; and Muḥammad 'Alī had the nerve to send two successive embassies to Kashgar, denying that he had aided Jahāngir and offering to dispatch a 10,000-man army to catch him if Peking would pay the costs. The government was furious and for a time thought of cutting off all of Altishahr's foreign trade.

At the time of the imperial army's advance, the Ch'ing emperor had requested his top-ranking officers to consider the advisability of abolishing the bureaucracy of begs in western Altishahr and replacing it with a system of local chiefs (*t'u-ssu*), as in Tsinghai and eastern Kham. Ch'ang-ling, the military governor of Ili, submitted a proposal to install as ruler of Kashgaria one of the Makhdūmzādas whom the Ch'ing maintained in Peking to win the sympathies of the people and protect Altishahr against both Jahāngir and Kokand. Ulungge, another commander, proposed that Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, Yarkand and Khotan be abandoned altogether and an impregnable line of defence be set up farther east. Since these recommendations were defeatist and therefore unacceptable, the emperor appointed the governor-general of Chihli, Nayanceng, to take charge of

²¹ Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 661; Muḥammad Amīn, in Davies, *Report*, cccxlii.

Altishahr and offered ennoblement and a reward of gold to anyone who could deliver Jahāngīr captive. Control of Altishahr was important. In that troubled year the Ch'ing authorities discovered an Englishman, Alexander Gardner, disguised in native dress, passing through Yarkand from Badakhshan into Ladakh.²²

In 1828 Ishāq b. Muḥammad Hudawī sent an agent into the mountains with false stories of a Ch'ing withdrawal and bribed Jahāngīr's Kirghiz father-in-law Taylaq, so that the khoja came back into Sinkiang with 500 men. Realizing that he had been duped, the khoja fled, but this time the Kirghiz, who feared Ch'ing reprisals, betrayed him, and Yang Fang, a Chinese officer who later played an important role in the Opium War, took him prisoner. Some of Jahāngīr's followers escaped, including a large number of Dolans, who fled to Kokand. Others fled to Ladakh, but the Lhasa amban sent a mission to Leh to demand their extradition, and the Ladakhi king complied.²³ The Āfāqiyya held Ishāq b. Muḥammad Hudawī directly responsible for Jahāngīr's capture. The Ch'ing, in reward, appointed Ishāq to the post of hakim beg at Kashgar. The populace made the story of Taylaq's betrayal of Jahāngīr into a popular Turki song.

Peking did its best to present the khoja's capture as a glorious achievement and to gloss over the fact that Jahāngīr, with very few forces, had been harassing the imperial army for over seven years. The campaign against him had required the movement of 36,000 troops and had cost the government more than 10 million taels of silver.²⁴ Indeed many believed that 'the real cause of the defeat' of Jahāngīr had not been Ch'ing military might at all but the Āfāqī-Ishāqī division between the East Turkestanis.²⁵ The Ch'ing commanders presented their captive to the throne in Peking, and the government executed him by slicing. Ch'ang-ling sent orders to the Kirghiz and to Kokand to extradite all members of Jahāngīr's family, but the Kirghiz did nothing, and Kokand openly refused on the grounds of Islamic law. (Jahāngīr's family were descended from the Prophet.)

After Nayanceng reached Kashgar, he recommended a great number of administrative reforms and suggested that the lands and possessions belonging to those guilty of rebellion (both natives and Andijanis) should be confiscated. From the annual receipts of these lands, amounting to 56,000 piculs of grain, he advised that 38,000 piculs should be paid out as wages to the garrison forces and that the remaining 18,000 piculs should go to raise the pay of the officials.

²² G. J. Alder, *British India's northern frontier 1865-95: a study in imperial policy*, 31; Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 663.

²³ Luciano Petech, *Aristocracy and government in Tibet 1728-1959*, 145, 162-3.

²⁴ Wei Yüan, *Sheng-wu chi*, 4.572; Tseng, *Chung-kuo*, 307.

²⁵ Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 661.

Whatever merit these recommendations may have had in domestic terms, they were never brought to fruition because of the disastrous consequences of Nayaneng's proposals for external affairs. In brief, Nayaneng proposed a complete embargo on all trade from Kokand until the khanate handed over the Āfāqī Makhdūmzādas. All Kokandis who had resided in Altishahr less than ten years should be deported and their stores of rhubarb, tea and other property confiscated. All Kokandis who had resided in Altishahr for more than a decade should be naturalized, and a rapprochement should be made with the Kirghiz so as to alienate them from the Makhdūmzādas and Kokand. The women and children of the 'rebels' should be enslaved and exiled to Urumchi, Ili and other places.

By these measures the Ch'ing intended not only to end the troubles emanating from across the mountains but also to put the Kokand ruler in his place. Peking had seen the Kokand throne's adoption of the title khan in the eighteenth century as an encroachment on Ch'ing prerogatives – all the more because 'khan' both in Turki and in Manchu was the title of the Ch'ing emperor himself. Peking had therefore refused to recognize the Kokand ruler as 'khan' and continued to refer to him by his earlier title of 'beg'. Kokand's strategic position, however, had constrained the Ch'ing emperors to speak of the Kokand ruler at tributary audiences as 'my son' (quasi-equality in Inner Asian terms) rather than 'my subject', and in Kokand's correspondence the ruler continued to refer to himself as khan. Moreover, at audiences in Kashgar, Muḥammad 'Ali's ambassadors had failed to go through the prescribed etiquette, and, perhaps worse, in official communications his name was written in letters of gold.²⁶

The Ch'ing government agreed at once to the enactment of Nayaneng's recommendations. Nayaneng returned to Peking. His successors, Jalungga, the councillor at Kashgar, and Pi-ch'ang, the imperial agent at Yarkand, set to work in 1828 confiscating the rhubarb and tea of the Andijani merchants and expelling them from Altishahr. In Zungharia the authorities also expelled the Andijani traders who had settled in Ili. The Ch'ing rebuilt the Manchu cantonments, separating them farther from the native cities, but as before, left the Yangi Hisar, Yarkand and Khotan markets outside. Only at Kashgar did the Ch'ing place the market within the Manchu cantonment itself.

Non-Kokandis were permitted to come for business as usual, and the

²⁶ V. S. Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'siziane v pervoi polovine XIX veka*, 126–7; J. Fletcher, 'China and central Asia, 1368–1884', in John K. Fairbank, ed. *The Chinese world order*, 221–2, 366, nn. 111, 112.

government allowed Bukharans to come to Kashgar by way of Badakhshan and Karategin, but the authorities taxed the foreigners heavily in the interests of a new system of government stores. The stores, a revenue-raising device to support the Sinkiang garrison, were modelled on the government's trade monopoly with the Kazakhs in Zungharia and reserved the right to trade first with all foreigners, including the Kirghiz. But the Ch'ing retained the good will of the latter by giving the Kirghiz a share of the Andijan's confiscated rhubarb and tea. A government tea office (created in 1826) was put into successful operation at Ku-ch'eng in 1828 to tax the assorted leaf teas that the private Shansi merchants imported into Zungharia. In Altishahr, however, it was clear by the end of 1829 that the government stores were producing more resentment and difficulty than revenue; so the authorities abolished them.

Other efforts to raise revenues for the garrison took the form of extending and improving Altishahr's farmlands. Jahāngir's jihad had halted earlier efforts to reclaim unirrigated ('dead') fields for the expanding East Turkestani population, and serious food shortages in Altishahr in 1828 prompted a number of proposals to the throne. Sung-yün suggested the opening of military farms in Eastern Turkestan. Ch'ang-ling recommended that all tenants on the lands confiscated from the rebels be converted into state farmers who would raise food for the garrison. Ulungge and O-shan, the acting Shensi-Kansu governor-general, urged bringing in colonists from China proper. Although Ulungge's and O-shan's advice foreshadowed the future, it ran counter to the dynasty's long-standing policy of segregating the Han Chinese from the peoples of Inner Asia; so the Sinkiang authorities had to be content with irrigation projects and increased registration and taxation. But these measures, with Altishahr's population now reduced by the jihad, were not enough.

Nayanceng's suspension of Kokand's trade struck at the source of the khanate's riches and strength. Having gained control of the east-west caravan trade at Kashgar, and having expanded at the expense of Tashkent and the city of Turkistān, Kokand had also been seeking to control the Kirghiz and Kazakh commerce with Zungharia and the eastern route of the India-Russia trade.

'Shawls and other Indian articles', fox furs and lambskins travelled either by a circuitous westerly route through Kabul and Balkh to Bukhara and thence to Kokand²⁷ or by two easterly ones – summer and winter – through Ladakh to the markets of Yarkand, where they were bought by Kokand merchants. It is not clear whether the Ch'ing had ever allowed caravan transit privileges through imperial territory, but the government

²⁷ Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek', 376; Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 3.426.

was well aware of the khanate's efforts to monopolize Sinkiang's foreign trade and, to prevent this, had regularly refused permission for Kokand's caravans to pass through Ladakh into India. Kokand merchants had been forced, therefore, to be content with buying Indian goods at Sarikol and Yarkand and transporting these through Kokand for sale on the markets of Russia. Yarkand had thus become a focus of the India–Russia trade. Kokand merchants had enjoyed the advantage of being able to transport their purchases to Russia through their own territory, but the khanate could not prevent non-Kokandis from buying Indian goods at Yarkand or Sarikol or stop the flow of these goods to Ili or Tarbagatai and on to Russian territory.

The Ch'ing embargo, which even blocked Kokand merchandise from passing through Ili and Tarbagatai, produced a tremendous rise in prices in Kokand, followed by two years of economic hardship. Letters of supplication from Kokand's high officials left the Ch'ing government unmoved. But in the meantime Kokand recognized the embargo as an opportunity to invade Altishahr and tighten the khanate's hold on Sinkiang's trade. Āfāqī prestige in Kashgar was still so great and Kokand's trade so important that Kokand was in a position virtually to dictate events in Altishahr. With any Makhdūmzāda invasion, at least some of the people were bound to rise. 'Kokand was like the wolf, and the East Turkestanis were like sheep'. Moreover, feelings ran high among the expelled and expropriated Kokand merchants, especially when the Kirghiz appeared at Kokand markets with their confiscated rhubarb and tea, boasting that these were presents from the Ch'ing 'great emperor'.²⁸

In the autumn of 1830 the khan of Kokand set out with an army consisting mainly of Kirghiz, but with some Andijanais, fugitive Dolans and other Kashgarian exiles, to invade Altishahr. At Osh, however, before crossing the Ch'ing border, it was decided that the khan should remain in Kokand,²⁹ and Jahāngir's elder brother, Muḥammad Yūsuf, was put in nominal command. The real commanders were Ḥaqq Qulī Mingbashī, the leading official of the Kokand khanate, who was commander-in-chief (*sar āmad-i qūshūn*), and Muḥammad Sharif Atalīq, who was his second in command with the rank of *amīr-i lashkar*. After crossing the frontier, the invaders split into three forces so as to surround and attack Kashgar, Yangi Hisar and Yarkand more or less simultaneously. The reduced Ch'ing garrison at Kashgar was caught unprepared. Muḥammad Yūsuf entered the native

²⁸ Tseng, *Chung-kuo*, 308; *Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu* (hereafter *CSL*), *Hsüan-tsung shih-lu* 183.28a (2 Mar. 1831).

²⁹ Khōqandī, *Tārikh-i Shabrūkhī*, 117.

city and appointed his own governor (hakim). The Ishāqiyya of the Kashgar district fled in large numbers to Aksu (although about 1,000 of them took refuge in Kashgar's Manchu cantonment), and even many of the Āfāqiyya were unwilling to respond to the invaders' call to arms. But the non-restoration character of the invasion soon became apparent, inasmuch as Muḥammad Yūsuf himself exercised little leadership, and over 1,000 Kokand merchants appeared on their knees outside the Manchu city walls to inform the Ch'ing authorities that the invasion had been occasioned by the Ch'ing government's unfair treatment of innocent traders and to request the resumption of trade and the restoration of their confiscated property.

At Yarkand, Pi-ch'ang had with him in the city only some 500 or 600 Ch'ing troops and about 4,500 native militia, but he had more time to prepare a defence. Quickly he moved merchants and tradespeople into the Manchu cantonment and burnt the market stands and buildings to the ground, leaving nothing for the invaders. After deliberations with the Yarkand district begs, Pi-ch'ang sent his forces out to block the main strategic points of access to Yarkand. He stationed 1,000 native militiamen to guard the Muslim city and the Manchu cantonment, and, gathering troops from the various forts in his district, he deployed 400 Ch'ing soldiers outside Yarkand's eastern gate. The invading force that approached Yarkand numbered somewhere between 7,000 and 10,000 men, both foot and horse.³⁰ The Ch'ing defenders bombarded them with cannon fire, killing over 300, and eventually the invaders withdrew. On making a second attempt, they were again repulsed, and by this time they had heard that Ch'ing relief forces were on their way from Aksu. The Kirghiz and Andijanīs withdrew, leaving only the Dolans, who tried to raise a native Yarkand army in Muḥammad Yūsuf's name. Yarkand was mainly Ishāqī country, however, and most of the inhabitants fled rather than join the Āfāqī cause. So the Dolans plundered the towns and villages and after raising an army of 1,000 men, attacked Yarkand a third and a fourth time, but Pi-ch'ang's forces drove them off.

Meanwhile at Kashgar Jalungga had been unable to force the khoja to lift his siege. As at Yarkand, so also at Kashgar and Yangi Hisar: the invaders never succeeded in overpowering the Manchu cantonments, but they remained masters of the country and all the villages and towns.

Suddenly word came that troubles had arisen between Kokand and Bukhara and that Kokand needed her forces at home. The Andijanīs therefore abandoned Muḥammad Yūsuf and returned to Kokand, taking

³⁰ *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 179.17b-19a (20 Dec. 1830); Saguchi Torū, *Jūbachi-jūkyūseiki Higashī Torukisutan shakaisbi kenkyū*, 477; cf. Tseng, *Chung-kuo*, 309.

with them many captives and much loot. The Kokandis made slaves of all the 'Chinese' whom they took prisoner, and the khan sent a number of these as a present to the Russian tsar in St Petersburg. Even in the district of Kashgar, where the Āfāqiyya had their greatest strength, the rapaciousness of Kokand's army of Kirghiz and Andijanis had created such fear and bitterness that many of those traditionally associated with the Āfāqiyya had cooperated with the Ch'ing authorities. The Āfāqī cause had lost much of its popularity in Altishahr, and there was little that Muḥammad Yūsuf and his followers could do but follow the retreating Andijanis across the mountains to Kokand. Before the Ch'ing relief forces arrived from Aksu, about 20,000 East Turkestanis emigrated to Andijan and Tashkent.³¹ Muḥammad Yūsuf continued to live in Kokand until his death in 1835.³²

Kokand had made her point. Altishahr was remote, difficult to defend, and dependent on foreign trade. Kokand, independent, adjacent and protected by a huge mountain range, had achieved a special position in Altishahr and could make endless trouble unless the Ch'ing came to terms. In the invasion of 1830 the empire had lost its bargaining position, while the Āfāqī Makhdūmzādas had lost the enthusiasm of the Altishahr populace. Only Kokand had gained.

In 1831 the Manchus made a show of organizing a punitive expedition. It has been claimed that this frightened Kokand into building fortifications along her frontier and that she sent an envoy to Russia to beg for military assistance. The Russians, according to this story, refused even to allow the Kokand envoy to cross the Russian border.³³ In fact, Kokand did build some forts, but her purpose in doing so was the expansionist one of taxing and controlling the Kazakhs and Kirghiz. Any discussions that Kokand may have had with the Russian empire would seem not to have been prompted by fear of China. Kokand had revealed the Ch'ing weakness in Altishahr; so Sung-yün, president of the Board of War, who had considerable personal knowledge of Sinkiang, proposed that the embargo on Kokand's trade be lifted and that the East Turkestan natives be allowed to return to their former pattern of intermarriage with Andijan. Altishahr, he suggested, could be peaceful only if the natives were content with their lot.

When Ch'ang-ling, who had been appointed imperial high commissioner (*ch'in-ch'ai ta-ch'en*) for Altishahr, arrived in Kashgar in 1831, Zuhūr

³¹ Wathen, 'Mémorial on the U'sbek', 374, 376; *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 184.38a (5 Apr. 1831).

³² *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 283.2b (14 June 1836). The time of his death is given as the sixth lunar month. Since the *Shih-lu* entry is dated in the fifth month, the year cannot be Tao-kuang 16 (1836). Cf. Saguchi, *Jūbachi*, 408, who gives 1836.

³³ Tseng, *Chung-kuo*, 310.

ad-Dīn Tājī,³⁴ the acting hakim beg, led 20,000 Kashgaris 'great and small' ten miles outside the city and lined them up on both sides of the road to welcome him, all expressing gratitude for the emperor's benevolence and vowing not to follow rebels. Ch'ang-ling then learned from the Ch'ing garrison that Kokand had sent three envoys in succession to tell of the hardship that 'five years' of interrupted trade had caused, complaining of the Ch'ing government's confiscations and deportations, and asking that trade be re-opened. When Ch'ang-ling reported this to the throne, Peking fully realized, perhaps for the first time, that Nayanceng's embargo policy had brought on the war.

Ch'ang-ling detained one of the Kokand envoys and sent the other two back to Kokand with Zuhūr ad-Dīn Tājī. Zuhūr ad-Dīn, formerly a Kashgar tax collector, was a descendant of Amīn Khwāja, the first *jasak* of Turfan. During Jahāngir's jihad he had left Altishahr and travelled to Kokand, Petropavlovsk and Kazan, returning to Sinkiang by way of Semipalatinsk. At Kulja he had presented himself to the military governor, claiming to have been carried off a prisoner, and the Ch'ing had appointed him native lieutenant-governor of Kashgar, then hakim beg. Zuhūr ad-Dīn's travels had thoroughly acquainted him with central Asian commerce. For negotiations with Kokand, Ch'ang-ling could not have sent a better man.³⁵

At the outset, Ch'ang-ling had bluffly insisted that Kokand would have to hand over the leaders of the 1830 invasion and repatriate all prisoners-of-war, but Peking felt unprepared for hard bargaining. Even before the khanate had a chance to reply, the emperor authorized re-opening the Sinkiang-Kokand trade, remission of customs duties, and 'to show magnanimity' instructed Ch'ang-ling simply to drop the extradition demand and not to press for the return of 20,000 East Turkestanian *émigrés*.³⁶ By the end of 1831 trade between the two countries had been resumed.

Precisely what transpired in Zuhūr ad-Dīn's talks in Kokand appears not to have been published. Kokand and the Altishahr authorities exchanged several communications and in 1832 came to an understanding, by which the Ch'ing allowed 'free intercourse' to subjects of Kokand resorting to Altishahr 'for purposes of commerce' and also admitted 'religious mendicants', but, as before, no one, not even embassies, was permitted

³⁴ For the name, see A. A. Semenov, comp. *Sobranie vostochnykh rukopisei Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR*, 7.25, no. 5014. Saguchi's 'Zohr al-Dīn' (*Jūbachi*, 486-92) is impossible.

³⁵ Valikhānov, *Sobranie*, 2.325-6, represents the Ch'ing as suing for peace. Zuhūr ad-Dīn appears to have been the 'envoy . . . sent from Peking . . . to negotiate peace' mentioned in Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek', 375. Outlines of the 1835 Sino-Kokand accord may have been hammered out at this time. See also *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 195.12b, 15b-16a (28 Sept. 1831); 197.19b (3 Nov. 1831).

³⁶ *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 199.18a (27 Nov. 1831).

to enter China proper without express permission from Peking. The government paid an indemnity in silver for the Kokand merchants' confiscated property and exempted Kokand's subjects from payment of customs duties. In return, Kokand was willing to repatriate Ch'ing prisoners-of-war, but not *émigrés*, and the khanate would prevent the Makhdūm-zādas from invading Ch'ing territory. Ch'ang-ling reported that the Kokand ruler of his own free will had taken an oath on the Koran to be 'eternally respectful'. The Ch'ing authorities also took the precaution of sending an envoy 'to solicit the assistance of' the Bukharan emir 'in maintaining the peace of the western frontier of China, from the inroads of' the Kokand khanate. But the Bukharan emir 'wisely declined all interference'.³⁷

On Ch'ang-ling's recommendation, the Ch'ing extended the customs exemptions in 1832 to the merchants of all countries trading at Kashgar and Yarkand, including even the Kirghiz.³⁸ This was to avoid giving the impression that the Kokand merchantry, having intimidated the Manchus, were now masters of the place, and to keep the Kokandis from using a tariff advantage to monopolize trade.

Kokand sent a chief merchant who repatriated over eighty Kashgari prisoners-of-war and brought more than a hundred Andijani merchants. The Sinkiang authorities forbade local officials to interfere in Kokand-Kashgar business transactions and enjoined the Kashgar traders to set prices fairly 'for this barbarian chief merchant'. By the end of 1832 the Ch'ing had compensated all the expropriated Kokand merchants in silver for their confiscated tea, and the Yarkand councillor had settled Kokandi land claims at a total cost of over 10,000 taels in silver, even though the purchase of land by foreigners had always been illegal. The lands for which compensation was paid had belonged to Andijanians whom the Ch'ing had expelled on Nayanceng's recommendation as having resided in Sinkiang for less than ten years.³⁹

The Altishahr disorders had shown that the Ch'ing garrisons at the western end of the Tarim basin were far from adequate. The government therefore shifted the councillor's office and the Tarim basin command headquarters from Kashgar to Yarkand, which was Altishahr's main city, beautiful, abounding in dancing girls and musicians, and comparable to

³⁷ Wathen, 'Mémorial on the U'sbek', 376; CSL *Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 207.26a (13 Apr. 1832); Alexander Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara; being the account of a journey from India to Cabool, Tartary, and Persia; also, narrative of a voyage on the Indus, from the sea to Labore, with presents from the King of Great Britain*, 2.378.

³⁸ CSL *Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 209.18a-b (11 May 1832); cf. Wathen, 'Mémorial on Chinese Tartary', 661, where 'twelve years' is evidently an error for 'two years'.

³⁹ CSL *Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 214.19a-b (18 July 1832); 215.2b-3a (27 July 1832); 260.15a-b 15 Dec. 1834).

Bombay in the estimation of a Kokandi who visited both places. Its central position would facilitate mutual support between Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, Barchuk (or Maralbashi, the strategic importance of which was finally recognized) and the Khotan district. Pi-ch'ang's action of moving the Yarkand business community into the Manchu cantonment during the 1830 invasion had proved so effective in thwarting the invaders that it was considered unnecessary to build fortifications around the Altishahr markets, as some had proposed.

The government named Pi-ch'ang as the first councillor at Yarkand. To the 6,000 soldiers of the Sinkiang southern military district, the Ch'ing added 3,000 cavalry from Ili and 4,000 men from the Shensi-Kansu Green Standard forces, bringing the total of the southern military district, including 1,000 men each at Aksu and Ush Turfan, to 15,000 men. As late as 1835 none of these appears to have been a Tungan, because the government feared that Tungans, being Muslims, might join in an insurrection if one should arise.⁴⁰ Later the government changed its mind about this policy. To cover the pay and rations of the additional forces, Peking skimmed off 2 per cent of the Green Standard allocations from each province, in order to raise over 300,000 taels of silver annually.

The government, however, regarded provincial contributions as only a stop-gap and had been continuing its efforts to find a way of supporting the Altishahr garrison from local revenues. To this end, on Ch'ang-ling's recommendation, Peking had broken with the Manchus' long-standing policy of Inner Asian segregation and had approved, late in 1831, the immigration of Han civilians from China proper into Altishahr. The immigrants were allowed to take over abandoned and confiscated fields, open up dead lands, and even become tenants on farms owned by East Turkestanis. The first wave of colonists arrived in 1832 and established Han Chinese settlements at Qara Qoy in the Kashgar district and in the neighbourhood of Barchuk. For a while Peking remained apprehensive about the attitude of the Altishahr natives and in 1834 even reversed its decision by ordering that the Han Chinese settlements be disbanded. But the following year, before the Han settlers were removed, the government reversed its decision again and reinstated the colonies.

From 1834 on, Peking encouraged poor people to migrate from China proper to Sinkiang, and in particular to Altishahr. The nucleus of a Han population had begun to form. By the mid-1830s Yarkand alone had 200 Han Chinese merchants as fixed residents and many others who came and went. There was a resident community of Tungan merchants and a num-

⁴⁰ Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek', 375-7 (reporting a total of 20,000 infantry, of which 10,000 were stationed at Kashgar); Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 654-5.

ber of Han Chinese artisans. The Chinese language now became 'prevalent' alongside Turki.⁴¹

China's first 'unequal treaty' settlement (1835)

Kokand's continued effort to dominate Sinkiang's foreign trade remained a serious problem. The khanate already largely controlled the steppe caravan trade that entered northern Sinkiang from Tashkent and the city of Turkistān, as well as all commerce that crossed her own territory. Still outside Kokand's control were Zungharian commerce with the Russian empire, the caravan traffic from Badakhshan to Sarikol, and the caravan traffic from Ladakh to Yarkand. Kokand had 'no direct intercourse' with India through Ch'ing territory 'owing to the jealousy of the Chinese government'. For Kokand's traders, 'the passage through Tibet' (Ladakh) to India was 'interdicted'.⁴²

In 1833 Kokand sent an ambassador (*elchin*) 'to look after' trade and demanded the right to install her own political and commercial agents at Yarkand and other cities, empowered to levy customs duties from all foreign merchants coming to Altishahr for trade. This was tantamount to demanding a trade monopoly, and Peking was unwilling to grant it. The emperor agreed to having Kokand's commercial agents at Yarkand and elsewhere on the questionable ground that this would only restore an established practice, but he refused to allow Kokand to tax the merchants of other countries.

In the Ch'ing record, even the ambassador himself acknowledged the foolishness of this request.⁴³ But Kokand's military expansion soon obliged Peking to take a more conciliatory line. A Kokand force of over 500 Kirghiz invaded the Sarikol district; a Kokand envoy to the military governor of Ili demanded that the Ch'ing drive all Kazakhs beyond the guard post line so that Kokand could tax them; and Kokand made it clear that she was levying taxes on the Pamir Kirghiz.⁴⁴ The status of these Kirghiz had never been clearly defined, but both they and the Kazakhs – some of whom by now simultaneously acknowledged the authority of Kokand, Russia and the Ch'ing – were at least regarded as tributaries.

Kokand's demand for the expulsion of the Kazakhs was thus an open

⁴¹ Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 654; Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek', 376.

⁴² Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek', 376.

⁴³ *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 235.22a (2 June 1833); 238.4a–b (20 July 1833).

⁴⁴ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.325 (attributing the change in Ch'ing policy to the extension of Kokand's control over the Kazakhs and Kirghiz); *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 261.11b (1 Jan. 1835).

challenge to the dynasty's authority over them in Sinkiang. The military governor refused to drive them into the arms of Kokand tax collectors waiting beyond the guard posts. Indeed the guard posts, in the Ch'ing view, were not a boundary at all but only a military line well over a hundred miles inside the actual Sinkiang border. Since Kokand could not be brought to heel, Peking, following its precedent of non-intervention in Nepal (1814–16), renounced all responsibility for Kokand–Kazakh relations outside the guard post line and warned that there would be no shelter for Kazakhs who took refuge inside the line to escape Kokand's taxation. The Ch'ing dealt similarly with the Kirghiz, whom the emperor had exempted in 1832, along with foreign merchants, from the payment of import duties. The government made no attempt to protect the Kirghiz from annexation by Kokand in the Pamirs, and the Sino-Kokand accord of 1835 would soon give Kokand the right to tax Kirghiz traders on Ch'ing soil itself, making the Kokand khan 'responsible for the Kirghiz' and binding him 'to keep the Kirghiz in subjection'.⁴⁵

By occupying Sarikol, which was outside the guard post line but was part of the Yarkand district and a major centre for trade with India and Afghanistan, Kokand exerted military pressure in support of her demand to tax Altishahr's foreign commerce. When the Kokand forces entered Sarikol, a Kokand ambassador was already present in Yarkand; so talks were re-opened immediately. Several months later, in the summer of 1834, Kokand withdrew from Sarikol. By this time, however, Kokand had sent to Peking an ambassador named 'Ālim Bay, later known as 'Ālim Pādishāh, to renew the khanate's demand for a resident at Kashgar with both consular powers and the authority to tax all foreign traders in Altishahr. Official Ch'ing accounts make no mention either of this demand or of the government's eventual capitulation. All the Ch'ing sources say is that 'Ālim Bay's embassy came in gratitude for the emperor's remission of duties on Kokand's trade, that it repatriated some prisoners-of-war, and at the capital presented tribute and a memorial. Peking sent orders to the Sarikol hakim beg to fortify the place, but Kokand's strength in the Pamirs was constantly increasing. The khanate's forces took possession of Karategin that same year.

According to Ch'ing sources, the first of 'Ālim Bay's requests was that Kokand be enrolled as an annual tributary to Peking on the same basis as those Altishahr begs who had the right to present yearly tribute. Other requests were related to claims for compensation, repatriation and certain favours. Kokand also requested the Ch'ing government to extend its

⁴⁵ *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu* 244.18b–19a (30 Nov. 1833), 39a–40a (9 Dec. 1833); Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek', 375; Wathen, 'Note of a pilgrimage', 381.

remission of duties on foreign trade in Altishahr to include Badakhshani and Kashmiri merchants. The Kokand ambassador dealt mainly with the Li-fan Yüan but also saw the former imperial commissioner for Altishahr, Ch'ang-ling, at his home. When Ch'ang-ling refused 'Ālim Bay's gifts but accepted some grapes, the emperor reminded him, 'The duty of a subject is to have no dealings with foreigners'.⁴⁶

In response to 'Ālim Bay's demands, the emperor agreed to let Kokand send an annual tribute caravan on the two-month journey⁴⁷ from Kashgar to Peking. The other requests were disposed of one way or another, but 'Ālim Bay was told that the Yarkand trade of Badakhshan and Kashmir was none of Kokand's business.⁴⁸ The ambassador returned home in 1835. What the Ch'ing sources do not mention is that before 'Ālim Bay's departure, he had converted the 1832 understanding into a direct agreement with the Ch'ing throne and expanded it, forcing the emperor to concede the real points for which Kokand had sent the embassy to Peking, namely:

(1) that Kokand should have the right to station a resident political representative (or aksakal) at Kashgar and to station commercial agents (also called aksakals) at Ush Turfan, Aksu, Yangi Hisar, Yarkand and Khotan under the Kashgar resident's authority;

(2) that these aksakals should have consular powers and judicial and police jurisdiction over the foreigners who came to Altishahr;

(3) that the aksakals should have the right to levy customs duties (*bāj*) on all goods imported into Altishahr by foreigners.⁴⁹ A Kokand source suggests even greater concessions: 'The taxes (*zakāt*) of the merchants of the dependencies of Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aksu and Ush Turfan, and the taxes of Chātā [the Moghul steppe], and the taxes of the Ili region, and the taxes of Mughūliyya [Zungharia?] as far as the locality of Qizil Jar . . . came under the power of Muḥammad 'Alī Khan.'⁵⁰ The only exceptions to this surrender of Ch'ing authority to Kokand in Altishahr were the Kashmiris (a category that included the Baltis), Badakhshanis and

⁴⁶ CSL *Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 262.21a, 21b (15 Feb. 1835), 24b (16 Feb. 1835); see also 27a (19 Feb. 1835).

⁴⁷ Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek', 376. Cf. Aḥmad Shāh Naqshbandī, 'Narrative of the travels of Khwajah Ahmud Shah Nukshbunde Syud', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 25.4 (1856) 347, who speaks of 'six months' regular journey' between Yarkand and Peking.

⁴⁸ CSL *Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 254.5a–6a (9 Aug. 1834); 257.8a–10b (22 Oct. 1834); 260.15a–16b (15 Dec. 1834); 261.35b–36b (21 Jan. 1835); 262.20b–23a (15 Feb. 1835).

⁴⁹ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.325 (specifically crediting 'Ālim Pādishāh with winning the concessions), 341–2, 401; Muḥammad Amīn, in Davies, *Report*, cccxlv (also naming 'Ālim Pādishāh); cf. Henry Walter Bellew, 'History of Káshghar', in T. D. Forsyth, ed. *Report of a mission to Yarkand in 1873*, 185; cf. also the account of Khoja Bahādur Khan (Muḥammad 'Alī Khan's *qush begi*) in Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek', 375, and Wathen's 'Note of a pilgrimage', 381.

⁵⁰ 'Ta'rikh-i ṣighāri', anonymous MS, British Museum, Oriental 8156 (completed 1874), erroneously ascribed to 'Abd Allāh Pānṣadbashī, fos. 8v–9r.

those Bukharans who traded at Yarkand. These were to be under the supervision of Badakhshani and Kashmiri aksakals and not be subject to the Kokand aksakal's authority.⁵¹

None of this is mentioned in the Ch'ing *Veritable records*. In fact, the Ch'ing account's only hint of the main points for which 'Ālim Bay was negotiating is a reply to the throne from the Yarkand councillor, saying that since 1832 the Kashmiris and Badakhshanis had been enjoying the same freedom from duties as the Kokandis, and that 'Ālim Bay's demands were therefore simply 'greedy deceitfulness'. Apart from this attribution of greed, the *Veritable records* give no clue that Kokand was not only levying customs duties in Ch'ing territory but demanding the inclusion of Kashmir and Badakhshan merchants among the foreigners whom the khanate's aksakals could tax.⁵²

This was China's first 'unequal treaty', and it paved the way in Peking for the later unequal treaties with the West. The emperor had conceded full extraterritoriality, as he was soon to do for the trading enclaves on the coast and as the Dalai Lama's government would do in 1856 for the Nepalese in Tibet. It was only appropriate that formally acknowledged extraterritoriality should first have come into being on China's Muslim frontier, for merchant autonomy was a time-honoured custom among Muslim traders. Under the Sung, Arab merchants at Zayton (Ch'üan-chou) in Fukien had been left under their headman's jurisdiction. The European trading powers' demands for extraterritoriality in Asia had been inspired partly by the capitulations that they had secured from the Ottoman Porte at Constantinople. In sixteenth-century Calicut, Turkish traders and even local merchants had had their own headmen, as had the traders from Cairo and the Red Sea. Over them had stood a headman of all foreign merchants in Calicut governing and punishing them essentially without interference from the government's laws. Similar conditions had prevailed in Malacca and in most south and south-east Asian ports well before the dominance of the Dutch, English and French shipping of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁵³ Even in Altishahr, the emperor's concession to 'Ālim Bay was probably little more than an official confirmation of the customary state of affairs. It simplified Peking's administrative and political problems with respect to foreign trade.

From an imperial Chinese viewpoint – given the Son of Heaven's claims to universal political primacy – extraterritoriality did not com-

⁵¹ Cf. Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaia*, 6, 9, 136–9, 174, n. 23, whose criticism of earlier Russian writers fails to take account of the events of 1834–5.

⁵² *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 265.7a (5 May 1835); Saguchi, *Jūbachi*, 495–6.

⁵³ M. N. Pearson, *Merchants and rulers in Gujarat: the response to the Portuguese in the sixteenth century*, 17–18.

promise Ch'ing sovereignty in the slightest. Nor did Kokand's jurisdiction over other foreigners or the khanate's right to tax non-Kokandis on Ch'ing territory, although these latter two concessions (interesting indices of how much the Ch'ing system could tolerate) had been politically undesirable. The concessions to Kokand were not much greater than those that the Russians had been enjoying at Kiakhta for over a century, and Kokand had not insisted on the principle of national equality.

The Sino-Kokand accord of 1835 completed a new pattern for foreign commerce in Altishahr. Kokand aksakals, who 'held a farm' for the revenues of their posts from the Kokand ruler, took full jurisdiction over the khanate's subjects and replaced the old customs tariff with new rates that discriminated in favour of Muslims but represented a general lowering of import duties. Instead of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent *ad valorem* on livestock, 5 per cent on silk fabrics and furs, and $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on other goods, the aksakals levied $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent *ad valorem* – the prescribed rate of the Islamic *zakāt* – from Muslims and 5 per cent from non-Muslims ('Christians'). Exports from Altishahr to Kokand were tax-free.⁵⁴ The Kirghiz, like foreigners, paid the Kokand aksakals their $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on imports into Altishahr.

At Yarkand, the Ch'ing installed two other aksakals, one to represent the ruler of Badakhshan and the other to represent Kashmir. The Badakhshan aksakal evidently held his post on tax-farming terms from the Badakhshan government; like his colleagues from Kokand. Merchants of Fayzabad (the Badakhshan capital) brought an annual caravan to Yarkand, where they traded slaves and precious stones for silver ingots (*yambu*) and tea. Some Bukharans and others also passed themselves off in Yarkand as Badakhshanis, thus coming under his authority and his taxation.

The Kashmir aksakal, who had jurisdiction and taxation rights over merchants coming through Ladakh, was entirely a creation of the Ch'ing authorities and represented the Kashmir government (subject to the Sikhs in the Punjab) only in name. In practice, he did not levy duties for the Kashmir or Ladakh governments. For the position of Kashmir aksakal, the Ch'ing authorities' choice fell upon a certain Qāsim 'Āli Khoja, agent of an Amritsar trading house with long-established business connections in Yarkand. Trade with 'Kashmir' (going first to Leh, then on to India, the Punjab, Baltistan or Kashmir) went by horse caravan and consisted mainly of silver, a little gold, fine leaf teas, silks, steel and drugs from China proper, and shawl wool, lambswool felts, silks, camelhair camlet, sheepskins, horses, turquoises, sugar-candy, boots, leather brocades, velvets, broadcloths, *charas* and tobacco from Sinkiang or, *via* Sinkiang,

⁵⁴ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.401, 680.

from Russia and western central Asia. These were exchanged mainly for shawls, embroideries (*kimkehāb* and *chikin*), white piece goods, opium and leather. All foreign traders apart from those under the jurisdiction of the Badakhshan and Kashmir aksakals came under the authority of the aksakals of Kokand.

Ch'ing officials played down the concessions made to Kokand by continuing to refer to her aksakals as 'Andijani superintendents of trade (*būda-i da*)' and to all foreign traders in Altishahr – apart from Badakhshanis and Kashmiris – as Andijanis, giving the impression that nothing had changed. But the resident Andijani merchants soon came to number in the thousands, and Kashgar thus carried on an increasing commerce with Kokand by horse, mule and camel, importing piece goods, opium and other things, and exporting pure silver, chinaware and tea in boxes and bricks. Ch'ing subjects in foreign trade, most of whom were presumably East Turkestanis, continued to be liable for import duties at the former rates, namely 5 per cent *ad valorem* on livestock, 10 per cent on silks and furs, and 5 per cent on other goods. The accord, therefore, further increased the native importers' disadvantage, and the Altishahr customs revenues dwindled to virtually nothing.⁵⁵

Because the Ch'ing had ceased collecting customs duties from foreign merchants in 1832, the government felt absolved of any further responsibility to provide for the safety of the trade routes within Ch'ing territory. The Yarkand authorities pulled back their jurisdiction to the limits of the guard post line – far inside the imperial border – leaving the security of the trade routes to the Kokand, Badakhshan and Kashmir rulers. Kanjuti, Shighnani and Wakhani robbers, 'erroneously called Kirghiz', then crossed into Ch'ing territory and began to infest the country between the Karakoram range and the Yarkand River, plundering caravans and 'kidnapping men, women and children for sale, and carrying off herds of cattle by force'. Even merchants became their victims. The robbers took them to Badakhshan and western central Asia and sold them as slaves. The Kokand and Badakhshan governments responded to the termination of Ch'ing police power by supplying protection to their own caravans along the roads, but neither the Sikhs nor Ladakh provided any security along the Ch'ing segment of the Leh–Yarkand route.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.341; also Tseng, *Chung-kuo*, 312, who takes the merchants as being from the city of Andijan; Wathen, 'Mémorial on Chinese Tartary', 658; Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.357. Cf., however, the conflicting testimony of Aḥmad Shāh, 'Route from Kashmlr, *via* Ladakh, to Yarkand by Ahmed Shah Nakshahbandi', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 12 (1850) 382.

⁵⁶ Davies, *Report*, Appendix C, 29; Appendix XXIV, cxciii–cxcvi. Muḥammad Amīn, cccxlv, n. Aḥmad Shāh, 'Route', 381. Aḥmad Shāh, 'Narrative', 347.

Although banditry east of the Karakoram was too far south to affect the Kokand–Kashgar trade, Muḥammad ‘Ali Khan took advantage of it to extend Kokand’s power into the Pamirs in violation of Ch’ing territory in Sarikol. Shortly after the defeat of Jahāngīr’s jihad, the Sarikol hakim beg had applied to the Sinkiang garrison for aid against repeated slaving and plundering expeditions mounted by the Badakhshan, Shighnan, Wakhan and Kanjut governments. The ‘Chinese Government of Turkish China’ (a British Indian term for the Sinkiang authorities) had taken no action, and, after the termination of Ch’ing police power along the trade routes, the raids of the Kanjuti, Shighnani and Wakhani robbers had made life unbearable for the Kirghiz of Sarikol’s Pamir steppes. Sarikol had asked Kokand’s protection, and Muḥammad ‘Ali had invaded Sarikol, inducing the Tagharma and Watakhaf valley Tajiks and most of the Pamir steppe Kirghiz to migrate into Kokand territory. The remaining Kirghiz moved into the Yarkand and Kashgar valleys. Large parts of Sarikol thus became virtually depopulated.

After the withdrawal of the Kokandis from Sarikol in 1834 and the conclusion of the Sino-Kokand accord, the Sinkiang authorities reasserted their jurisdiction there, but in 1835 and 1836 Kokand armies reinvaded Sarikol, bringing cannon and 2,000 men. The khan renewed his demands for the right to tax all foreign merchants in Altishahr and tried to establish his right to levy customs duties in Sarikol on the Badakhshan–Yarkand route. Sarikol resisted with force, and Peking ordered the Altishahr authorities to warn Kokand that the emperor might in anger cut off trade again. But Kokand, expanding her hegemony in the Pamirs, occupied over half the ‘fourteen towns’ in the Sarikol district and sent armed detachments into Darwaz, Shighnan, Kanjut and Wakhan. Kokand forces continued to raid here and there but were eventually countered under the decisive leadership of I-shan, the emperor’s nephew, who was then assisting in Altishahr.

Thereafter, the Sinkiang authorities tried to minimize Ch’ing responsibility in Sarikol. The Sarikol chief became virtually ‘an independent sovereign’ and eventually, without an army of his own, obtained relief from the robbers’ raids by contracting matrimonial alliances with the rulers of Kanjut and Shighnan. Because Badakhshan’s Yarkand trade passed through Sarikol, the Badakhshan ruler also lent some aid along the Sarikol roads, being in a good position to do so inasmuch as Shighnan and Wakhan were his dependencies. The Sarikol chief ‘appropriated to himself the Yarkand valleys of Pil, Langar, Dhamsar, and Babajan’.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 267.19b–20a (16 July 1835); 283.2b (14 June 1836); 291.25b–27a (23 Dec. 1836); 292.3b–5a (9 Jan. 1837). V. P. Nalivkine, *Histoire du kbanat de Kokand*,

Kokand meanwhile promised to prevent future violations of the Ch'ing border. Possibly internal problems or the threat of Bukharan encroachment forced her to shelve her claim to tax foreigners in Sarikol. But it is also likely that Kokand feared to push the Ch'ing too far and thus lose the gains won in 1831–5. Indeed the khanate's docility was soon put to the test, for opium was entering Sinkiang in increasing amounts and reaching China proper by way of Hami and Chia-yü-kuan. In 1839 Peking recommended that the prohibition of the drug be extended to Sinkiang too. In Urumchi the authorities arrested both dealers and consumers. In Altishahr the Ch'ing soon confiscated over 60,000 Chinese ounces (*liang*) of opium from Kashmiri, Badakhshani and Indian (*Yin-ti*) merchants. Most of the opium was imported by Kashmiris to Yarkand. At one point in 1840, for example, the authorities confiscated over 97,900 ounces from a single Kashmiri named Karim 'Ali. But opium also came through Kokand to Kashgar, and at about the same time the authorities confiscated over 2,260 ounces from foreign merchants at Kashgar and over 540 ounces from Andijanians in Khotan. The Kokand aksakals may not have been happy about it, but the khanate did not threaten to break the peace.⁵⁸

The Ch'ing government believed that its Kokand policy had been a success, and it seems even to have been understood in Kokand that the khan had an obligation to assist the Ch'ing 'in case of any insurrection in Chinese Tartary in future'.⁵⁹ The 'unequal treaty' system in Altishahr appeared to have produced at last that very tranquillity for which Ch'ing policymakers had striven for so long.

In retrospect it is understandable that the Ch'ing government's successful policy for dealing with the trade-hungry Kokandis in the 1830s should have stood as a recent model for Ch'ing dealings with the trade-hungry British a few years later. After hostilities with the British, beginning with the exchange of cannon fire in the Boca Tigris in 1834, had dragged on inconclusively for several years (in much the same way as Kokand's invasion of Altishahr and her attacks on Sarikol had dragged on in Sinkiang a few years earlier), Peking dismissed its coastal commanders and appointed I-shan to apply his Sinkiang experience to the troubled coast. As I-shan's assistant, the government appointed Yang Fang, the officer who had captured Jahāngīr in 1828, and who had served in the operations

164. Muḥammad Amīn, in Davies, *Report*, cccxii, n.; cccxxvi–cccxxxiv; cccxlv–cccxlvi. His information does not fully accord with chronological evidence in the Ch'ing sources concerning the Sarikol chiefs.

⁵⁸ Suzuki Chūsei, *Chibetto o meguru Chū-In kankei shi: Jūhachiseiki nakagoro kara jūkyūseiki nakagoro made*, 222–3; *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 330.29b–30b (2 Mar. 1840).

⁵⁹ *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 293.23b–24a (2 Mar. 1837); 298.31b–32b (30 July 1837); 301.8b–9a (5 Aug. 1837). Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek', 375. Cf. Wathen, 'Note of a pilgrimage', 381.

against Kokand in 1830 and 1831. In 1843 the acting governor-general of Liangkang in charge of the opening of Shanghai was Pi-ch'ang, the defender of Yarkand in 1830. Examples could be multiplied.

When practical military considerations dictated a negotiated settlement (as had the strategic realities vis-à-vis Kokand in 1831), the Ch'ing concessions to the coastal trading powers in 1842-4 paralleled the concessions to Kokand of 1831-5. These can be listed as follows.

(1) *Extraterritoriality*, namely the foreign powers' right to appoint consuls with jurisdiction over their own nationals.

(2) An *indemnity*, paid in silver even for confiscated opium, although the opium trade had been illegal. The Ch'ing had compensated the Kokandis in silver for their illegally acquired lands.

(3) A '*fair and regular*' tariff and direct relations with the customs. The 1843 tariff was a far more modest concession than the one that the Ch'ing had made to Kokand, for in Altishahr the Ch'ing had relinquished the collection of customs duties from foreign merchants altogether, including in this category even the Kirghiz. Kokand had not needed to demand direct relations with the customs, because foreign merchants in Altishahr had been dealing directly with the Ch'ing customs all along. Abolition of duties on foreign merchants' imports made even this unnecessary.

(4) *Most-favoured-nation treatment*. One suspects that the Chinese power of suggestion lay behind Captain Elliot's idea of securing all privileges that might be granted to any other power.⁶⁰ Lord Palmerston had included it among the options open to Pottinger in negotiating the Treaty of Nanking, and the clause was afterwards included in 1843 in the Treaty of the Bogue. Far from being an onerous concession, the most-favoured-nation clause simply expressed the long-standing Chinese policy of 'impartial benevolence', by which China prevented any one foreign power from achieving a position of leadership over the others. The settlements with the Europeans, at least insofar as the most-favoured-nation clause was concerned, represented in Ch'ing eyes considerably less of a compromise with Chinese principles than the special position that Peking had accorded to Kokand in 1835.

(5) *Abolition of the Cohong monopoly* and the right to commercial relations between Ch'ing subjects and foreign merchants. Foreigners had done business directly with local merchants in Altishahr all along, unhampered by any Cohong-style monopoly. They had also been able to engage servants, interpreters, compradors, and rent houses, offices, warehouses and the like.

⁶⁰ So evidently also John K. Fairbank, 'The early treaty system in the Chinese world order', in Fairbank, ed. *The Chinese world order*, 260: 'The most-favored-nation clause originated in the imperial desire to show a superior impartiality to all non-Chinese.'

Other points in the Sino-Western settlements reflected specific conditions of coastal trade. The principle of 'absolute equality of England and China, and of their sovereigns' had not, it is true, been insisted upon by Kokand – since in central Asia the formal equality among sovereign states was not a basic assumption – but the Ch'ing had not forced Kokandi ambassadors to go through the full tributary ritual, and the empire had long ago conceded the principle of equality to Russia.

Seen against the Ch'ing experience in Inner Asia, the settlements made with the Western maritime powers following the Opium War take on a somewhat different significance from that which has commonly been ascribed. Most importantly, they were not, from the Ch'ing point of view, innovations. By the 1840s British naval power was stronger than anything the world had previously seen, but the treaty settlements are no proof that the Ch'ing had yet perceived the fact. H. B. Morse's much-cited study says that 'Up to 1839 it was China which dictated to the West the terms on which relations should be permitted to exist; since 1860 it is the West which has imposed on China the conditions of their common intercourse; the intervening period of twenty years was one of friction.'⁶¹ In light of the Ch'ing government's considerable concessions to tiny Kokand, the most likely explanation for Morse's observation is that those twenty years were the period in which China had not yet recognized her comparative weakness. 'The Manchus were a conquering race', as Arthur Waley has put it so nicely, 'and were reluctant to accept the fact that the weapons with which they had conquered China two hundred years ago were now out of date'.⁶²

As viewed from Peking, the only really new aspect of the treaty settlements of 1842–4 was their application to China proper. Equality of sovereign rulers had been easy enough between two great non-Chinese empires, Manchu and Muscovite, on their common Inner Asian frontier. Extra-territoriality had been quite acceptable in Altishahr, where Muslim Turkic-speaking subjects of the Ch'ing had been doing business with their Turkic-speaking co-religionists from western central Asia. But the toleration along the coast of such an un-Chinese principle as national equality would indeed introduce a policy that the Ch'ing empire had hitherto confined to Inner Asia. Within China proper it could not be easily accepted.

Ch'ing frontier policy as a whole has not been studied in any systematic way, but it is clear that there are more interconnections between coastal and Inner Asian policy than historians have yet brought to light. It is

⁶¹ *The international relations of the Chinese empire*, 1.299.

⁶² Arthur Waley, *The Opium War through Chinese eyes*, 185. Cf. the Mamluk parallel in David Ayalon, *Gunpowder and firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: a challenge to mediaeval society*.

noteworthy that many 'statecraft' scholar-reformers of the early nineteenth century – Sung-yün, Yang Fang, Kung Tzu-chen, Wei Yüan – had formative experiences studying policy questions over Sinkiang.

Continuation of the jihad

Seven leading Āfāqī Makhdūmzādas, known as the Seven Khojas, lived in the territory of Kokand. These were Muḥammad Yūsuf's sons Katta Khan and Kichik Khan, Bahā' ad-Dīn's son Walī Khan, Jahāngīr's son Buzurg Khan, Katta Khan's sons Ḥākīm Khan and Ḥāshīm Khan, and a cousin of Buzurg Khan known as Tawakkul Khoja. Although Katta Khan and Walī Khan were the principal leaders, the Makhdūmzāda religious succession seems to have passed from Jahāngīr to his young son Buzurg Khan. East Turkestanis passing through India *en route* to Mecca in the early 1830s had reported that Ch'ing rule in Sinkiang was increasingly unpopular. It evidently remained so,⁶³ but so long as Kokand wanted peace for the enjoyment of her trade advantages, there was little that the Seven Khojas could do.

By the late 1830s numerous Andijani merchants resided at Kulja, and Kokand aksakals began to be appointed in Ili. The Zungharian authorities, unable to obtain enough cloth to maintain the official Kazakh trade monopoly at a satisfactory level, relaxed their restrictions and permitted private Han Chinese merchants to participate in the trade with a wider variety of goods, first at Tarbagatai and later, in 1845, in Ili. Zungharia, which had to some extent been paying the military expenses of Altishahr, suffered severe grain shortages in the 1830s. The government accordingly stepped up its efforts to increase Zungharia's farmland and initiated various schemes to increase revenues there. Old barriers also began to crumble under the pressures of land shortage in China proper and the government's desire to reduce the outflow of silver to Sinkiang for the support of the garrison. With growing determination, Peking strove to induce Han Chinese immigration into Sinkiang to farm taxable revenue-producing lands. In 1835 the government granted the request of Han merchants to settle with their families in Karashahr.

At first not many Han immigrants were attracted to distant Altishahr. Nor was it easy for them once they arrived. Several incidents occurred between Han Chinese colonists and the authorities. In the Kashgar district in 1837 the Ch'ing garrison sent out soldiers, who burned the Han colonists' homes and pillaged their few possessions. At Barchuk the colonization effort was so badly handled that in 1838 the settlers abandoned

⁶³ Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 662; Gasfort, cited by Margulan, in Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 1.55.

their fields, despite military efforts to restrain them, and fled. Since the government had no money to cover the construction of new irrigation works or to provide seed, tools and farm animals for the expansion of colonization, it solicited private contributions from the Altishahr begs, offering promotions in return. In Ili meanwhile Buyantai, the military governor, arranged for the disgraced official Lin Tse-hsü, the anti-opium activist, to be put in charge of colonization in 1844. In 1845 the Ch'ing stopped remitting land taxes for newly arrived Han colonists in Altishahr, raised the colonists' taxes in Zungharia, and, pleased with Lin Tse-hsü's example, promised to shorten the exile of other disgraced officials who contributed to the opening of new lands. Between 1845 and 1848, almost 80,000 acres (about 525,000 *mu*) of farmland were reclaimed in Altishahr, not counting the Karashahr district. One quarter of this increase was achieved by Han Chinese, the remaining three-quarters by East Turkestanis.⁶⁴

Beginning in 1839 the government also used Han settlers to supplement the Altishahr garrisons, permitting undermanned units to make up their numbers by admitting settler volunteers. Since military colonies fell into decay whenever their soldiers were called upon to fight, in 1843 the army began giving up farms to make way for civilian immigrants. After 1845 soldiers who had completed their tours of duty in Altishahr were permitted to remain there as farmers with their families, and the government ordered that all pardonable exiles who had families should be sent to Altishahr to take up agriculture. These measures held out some hopes for relief of population pressures in China proper; they strengthened the Ch'ing presence amidst the East Turkestanis; and they integrated Altishahr more fully with the rest of the empire.

In addition to the outflow of silver from China proper to pay for the garrison, Peking was troubled by the export abroad of silver from Sinkiang, which was exacerbated by the silver losses that went to pay for opium on the coast. The silver outflow from Ili and Tarbagatai was not severe, but the outflow from Altishahr was. Jahāngīr's jihad and Kokand's invasion of 1830 had produced sharp price inflations. The shortage of copper money and the arrival of large numbers of Ch'ing soldiers (paid partly in silver from the Chinese provinces) had reduced the value of silver relative to copper. In 1827 the conversion rate had fallen as low as 80 *pai* per tael,⁶⁵ with repercussions in Zungharia. Foreigners, in Kashgar and Yarkand, took advantage of the low price to buy up big quantities of silver for export abroad.

⁶⁴ Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaja*, 79–80.

⁶⁵ Ts'ao Chen-yung, comp. *Cb'in-ting p'ing-ting Hui-chiang chiao-ch'in ni-i fang-lüeh*, 38.22b; Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaja*, 149.

The authorities had tried to counter the inflation by minting a new pure copper Altishahr *pūl* weighing only 0.15 Chinese ounces (1 *ch'ien* 5 *fen*) but labelled *tang-shih* ('worth ten'). They had set its official value at ten of the standard alloyed Ili cash and had allowed the new *pūl* to circulate side by side with the old. Arbitrarily the authorities had fixed the new *pūl*'s conversion value at one new for two old, even though the old *pūl*, worth five Ili cash, was disproportionately heavy (0.12 Chinese ounces). This new money made it possible to increase the amount of copper currency in circulation, and the army could thus increase the proportion of copper to silver in military pay. From 1838 the Aksu mint began to lower the copper coinage weights even further, striking new *pūl* that ranged from 0.12 down to 0.10 Chinese ounces.

By the 1840s the new coinage, coupled with the general outflow of silver from the Ch'ing empire, had bolstered the sagging value of silver. In 1845 the rate climbed to 400 *pūl* per silver tael. Thereafter, the Sinkiang garrison appears to have been paid primarily 'from the local revenues in local coins'. On the Yarkand market, silver rose from its earlier low of between 300 and 400 *tängä* (15,000–20,000 *pūl*, about 900–1,200 Indian annas) per *yambu* (50 taels) to as high as 1,000 *tängä* (50,000 *pūl*, about 3,000 annas).⁶⁶

The Ch'ing must have seemed more in control of Altishahr than ever, but Anglo-Russian rivalries had begun to be felt in central Asia, and in 1841 it had been falsely rumoured that the British, at war with China and Afghanistan, were summoning one of the Makhdūmzādas to Kabul. Under the surface, East Turkestani resentment and the spirit of jihad were growing. In 1845 some Kirghiz raided the outskirts of Yangi Hisar, and a Kashgari blacksmith named 'Iwaḍ led a rising of 500 people at Söklük. Han Chinese immigrants helped restore order. Buyantai reported that the Kirghiz had attacked at the encouragement of influential akhunds in Aksu, Khotan, Yarkand and Kashgar, and that Makhdūmzādas, in particular Buzurg Khan, had been behind 'Iwaḍ's uprising. Deeper investigations the following year – when there were reports of famine in Kashgar – concluded that the Seven Khojas had nothing to do with the uprising.⁶⁷

Kokand, nominally ruled by the young Khudāyār Khan but in fact suffering from divided leadership, also returned to a less cautious posture and in 1846 sent an ambassador to repeat the khanate's old request to levy duties from the Badakhshanis, Kashmiris and all the merchants of Ladakh (T'ui-i-po-t'e – 'Tibet'), adding a demand to charge land rent

⁶⁶ *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 419.19b (20 Aug. 1845). Davies, *Report*, Appendix XXIV, cxc; Muhammad Amin, cccxxxix.

⁶⁷ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.415; 3.152. *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu* 417.2b (6 June 1845), 12b–13a (13 June 1845), 21a–b (25 June 1845); 432.22b–23b (17 Sept. 1846).

from a Kirghiz tribe that lived mainly within Ch'ing territory. Not long thereafter some Kirghiz raided Altishahr guard posts and villages, then fled into the Pamirs towards Shighnan. A letter from the Shighnan ruler, 'Abd ar-Rahīm, implicated unspecified khojas, presumably the Āfāqiyya.⁶⁸ Peking remained unwilling to meet Kokand's demands. So the following year, 1847 (in which the last of the Senior Horde Kazakhs were formally incorporated into Russia), Kokand unleashed the Āfāqī jihad, and Katta Khan and Wali Khan led an invasion of Altishahr known as the War of the Seven Khojas. An army of Kokandis, *émigré* Kashgarians and Kirghiz defeated the Ch'ing forces at Mingyul, forcing them to retreat to Kashgar. Here, the Kokand aksakal stirred up the populace, who opened the native city to the army of the Makhdūmzādas, while the 3,000-man Ch'ing garrison locked themselves up in the Manchu cantonment. Wali Khan went to take Yangi Hisar, but failed. Rumours persisted that the Seven Khojas had an understanding with the British,⁶⁹ but the Kashgarians' memories of Jahāngīr's failures and Kokand's pillage in 1830 were too fresh. Although many joined the khojas' army, the Makhdūmzādas' cause evoked only half-hearted sympathy among the population at large.

Peking put Buyantai, who was now governor-general of Shensi and Kansu, in command of the reconquest and made I-shan councillor at Yarkand. I-shan brought with him several thousand troops from Aksu; an additional 3,000 came into Sinkiang from Kansu, while the Board of Revenue sent 1,000,000 taels of silver. By the time I-shan reached Yarkand in the autumn, the khojas had attacked the city but had been driven off and had retired to Kashgar. I-shan's superior firepower defeated them in engagement after engagement. The Makhdūmzāda forces besieging Yangi Hisar fled without even giving battle, and soon all the invaders abandoned Kashgar and retreated to Kokand, followed as before by their recent Kashgarian recruits and groups of sympathizers taking their households with them.

The imperial forces took terrible reprisals once again but forgave the taxes of the Kashgar district. A force of 2,360 soldiers from Ili and Urumchi strengthened the Kashgar garrison. At Barchuk, a key point, where roads from Kashgar, Yarkand, Aksu and Khotan converged, the Ch'ing built a New City (Yangi Shahr), separate from the older Muslim city, and stationed between 15,000 and 20,000 men, all infantry armed with guns. Whenever military forces were needed in the western districts, they were first sent from there. Hostility between East Turkestanis and Han Chinese

⁶⁸ CSL *Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 428.19a–b (18 May 1846); 432.8a–10a (1 Sept. 1846); 433.17a–18a (13 Oct. 1846); 434.5a–b (26 Oct. 1846); 436.17a–18a (9 Jan. 1847), esp. 17b4.

⁶⁹ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 3.152.

settlers, intensified by the invasion, temporarily halted colonization efforts at Achigh Yagh in the Kashgar district, but the government remained committed to its colonization policy. Early in 1848 Kokand, fearing the loss of her trading rights, sent an envoy to deny all responsibility for the Seven Khojas' invasion and to express continuing 'reverence and obedience' to the Ch'ing emperor. Peking was powerless to do anything but accept this apology, and reconfirmed all Kokand's rights.⁷⁰

The Ch'ing authorities – in particular the Kashgar and Yarkand hakim begs – nevertheless still 'failed to agree' with the Kokand aksakals, who sent 'complaints of their ill treatment' to Kokand. At Astin (Lower) Artish, also known as Altin (Golden) Artish, about forty miles north-east of Kashgar, the Ch'ing were particularly vulnerable because of the resentment against the officials' oppressive demands. Astin Artish was also the supposed burial place of the tenth-century Karakhanid Satuq Boghra Khan, whom tradition credited with having introduced Islam into Eastern Turkestan and from whom the Makhdūmzādas claimed descent. Inasmuch as the keeper of this important place of pilgrimage, Mir Aḥmad Shaykh – reputedly the richest man in Altishahr, after the hakim begs – was also the chief Āfāqī religious figure, Kokand was able to make plans with the shaykh's help. In 1852 Wali Khan, Katta Khan, Kichik Khan and Tawakkul Khoja, with a mainly Kirghiz army, raided in the vicinity of Astin Artish and invaded the Ush Turfan guard post line until Ch'ing forces put the invaders to flight. For a time, the authorities refused to be bullied and closed the Kashgar–Kokand road, suspending the Kokand aksakal's right to collect taxes from the foreign traders in Kashgar.⁷¹

Quite a different atmosphere seems to have prevailed at Yarkand, where the Ishāqiyya were in the ascendancy and the Kashmir and Badakhshan trades – unconnected with troublesome foreign relations – supported the region's economy. After the establishment of the Hindu Gulab Singh's authority over Ladakh in 1842, Kashmiri shawl merchants had taught the Yarkandis how to clean raw wool, so that 'Turfani' (Ush Turfan) and 'Kuchari' (Kucha) fleeces from Yarkand had come to equal in quality or excel those of Ladakh. Yarkand's exports of shawl wool had therefore increased, all of it going to Kashmir by way of Leh. In exchange, opium imports – which the Ch'ing authorities ceased to prevent – had grown rapidly, becoming by the late 1840s the leading item of trade, totalling at least 16,000 lbs annually, valued at £12,000. Since Yarkand's annual

⁷⁰ Aḥmad Shāh, 'Narrative', 347–8. *CSL Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 451.202–b (29 Feb. 1848); 453.7a (9 Apr. 1848).

⁷¹ Muḥammad Amin (somewhat garbled) in Davies, *Report*, cccxlix; Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.345, 670; Aḥmad Shāh, 'Narrative', 349.

exports to Leh, worth £18,000, did not cover Leh's yearly exports to Yarkand, worth £21,600, Yarkand merchants paid the excess in silver. Altishahr's India trade, in contrast to Zungharia's trade with Russia, had thus acquired an unfavourable balance.

After the War of the Seven Khojas, however, the balance began to change. Silver and the other products of China proper that had formerly been the staple articles of the Yarkand–Leh–India trade (tea, silks, precious stones, gold, kiriana and valuable drugs) ceased to arrive in Altishahr in quantity. Consequently, Yarkand's exports to Leh in the 1850s were reduced for the most part to Altishahr's own domestic products, principally shawl wool and *charas*.

Yarkand's foreign commerce began to decline. Banditry increased along the trade routes. Robbers infested the Yarkand–Leh routes and the road to Badakhshan. Caravans went armed but were overpowered from time to time by raiding parties of from 100 to 250 men. But despite this decline in trade, according to the British agent Khoja Aḥmad Shāh Naqshbandi Sayyid, who visited Yarkand for three months in 1853, 'The people generally are contented and well pleased with their rulers. There are no other taxes in the country save the land-tax, which amounts to about one-tenth of the produce.' In the Manchu cantonment there were some 6,000 to 7,000 Ch'ing troops, but they had 'little or no communication with the people of the country'.⁷²

Both the British and Gulab Singh, whom the Indian government had made maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in 1846, were now exploring ways of increasing their Yarkand trade. Gulab Singh made some 'weak and ineffectual' efforts to persuade the Yarkand officials to give him authority, in fact as well as in name, over the Kashmir aksakal, who was 'regardless of orders received from Jammu'. But the maharaja's influence in Altishahr remained 'not sufficient to procure his [the aksakal's] dismissal and the substitution of another'. In about 1856 Gulab Singh shifted his efforts directly to the aksakal himself, sending a representative 'to arrange for the levy of duty for him [the maharaja] from the Leh traders', but the aksakal replied that Gulab Singh must first provide for the caravans' safety on the roads. After Gulab Singh's death in 1857, his son Ranbir Singh sent another representative to Yarkand to follow up his father's initiative, but the Ch'ing authorities stopped him at a guard post outside the city 'for six months, and afterwards turned [him] out of Yarkund with *disgrace*'.⁷³

The British limited themselves to information-gathering, mainly by

⁷² Davies, *Report*, 66–7, 69, cxc–cxcii; Cunningham, *Laddk*, 245, 253; Aḥmad Shāh, 'Narrative', 348–9.

⁷³ Davies, *Report*, 69, 88, cxcii–cxcvi.

native agents. In 1856, however, two European explorers, Hermann and Robert von Schlagintweit, came down into the Khotan valley through the Karakoram pass, accompanied by a party containing seven Yarkandis. Noting sheep herders armed with Russian guns, the two brothers reached a point two or three days from Ilchi, then turned back, in the company of three Khotanis, for fear of running into trouble with the Ch'ing frontier officials. A third brother, Adolph, entered Altishahr the following year, only to be killed on the orders of Wali Khan, then in temporary possession of Kashgar.

In contrast to quiet Yarkand, the districts of Kashgar and Kucha seethed with rebellious sentiment. In 1854 a certain Shāh Mu'min, who claimed to be descended from Jahāngir's elder brother Muḥammad Yūsuf, led a revolt at Khan Ariq in the Kashgar district. At Kucha, where Muslims and non-Muslims lived together in one city, Muslim workers were angry about official abuses.⁷⁴ The imperial agent had some thirty of them executed in 1855 without any hearing or the consent of his superiors. Kucha, like Astin Artish, was the site of an important place of pilgrimage, the grave of Arshad ad-Dīn (fl. c. 1350), who had converted the Moghuls to Islam and was the ancestor of the Khojas of Kucha, a separate line of the Naqshbandiyya not related to the Makhdūmzādas. Local grievances against Ch'ing officialdom strengthened the political potentialities of these Khojas of Kucha, who attended the tomb.

That same year a Kokandi named Husayn Khwāja Ishān – a religious leader, to judge by his name – came in to fan the embers of the Astin Artish copper miners' discontent. He failed when the Muslims of Astin Artish seized thirteen of the infiltrators and handed them over to the Ch'ing garrison. Soon afterwards, Wali Khan and Tawakkul Khoja sent forces of several hundred men into Altishahr, but Ch'ing guns forced them back.⁷⁵

In 1857 the smouldering anger of the Kucha inhabitants turned into a popular rising. The Ch'ing quickly restored order, but Kokand, whose aksakal still had differences with the Altishahr authorities, took advantage of the unsettled atmosphere to send Wali Khan and Tawakkul across the Ch'ing border. The invaders joined forces with the people of Astin Artish and marched on Kashgar. Using the unpopularity of the Kashgar hakim

⁷⁴ Ch'en Ch'ing-lung, 'Çin ve Batı kaynaklarına göre 1828 isyanlarından Yakup Bey'e kadar Doğu Türkistan tarihi' (PhD dissertation, Ankara, 1967; printed Taipei, 1967), 39–40. Ch'en's date (30 Aug. 1854) is an error for 21 Oct 1854. I-hsin *et al.* ed. *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Shan Kan Hsin-chiang Hui-fei fang-lüeh* (preface 1896), 1.112, and *CSL Wen-tung shih-lu*, 228.22b (16 July 1857).

⁷⁵ Yü-san Huo-cho I-shan, which Saguchi (*Jūbachi*, 516) transcribes 'Yusan? Khwāja Ishān'. The first element of the name represents Ūsān, attested in Sh. Kibirov and Iu. Tsunvazo, eds. *Uigursko-russkii slovar'*, 287 – clearly a Turkicization of *Husayn*. *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Shan Kan*, 1.32a.

beg, Tawakkul made it widely known that 'Previously Ishāq [b. Muḥammad Hudawī] and others lured Tawakkul's uncle Jahāngir to his capture and death. Now that Ishāq's sons Aḥmad and Muḥammad are acting as hakims of Kashgar, Wali Khan is coming to take vengeance.' The Kokand aksakals and trading community, and also the Chalhghurts, rallied in support of the invaders; Aḥmad, the hakim beg, fled into the Manchu cantonment. Ch'ing-ying, the councillor at Yarkand, immediately sought help from Ili, Urumchi and Karashahr, and the pro-Ch'ing muftis issued a *fatwā* (legal opinion), saying that the Koranic law (*sharī'a*) required of Muslims that they kill the invaders or take them prisoner and that they must not associate with them for fear of losing their faith (*īmān*).⁷⁶

Meanwhile Wali Khan took the native city of Yangi Hisar, and the towns and villages of the surrounding countryside threw in their lot with the invaders. When Wali Khan sent about 7,000 men in a two-pronged attack on Yarkand, Ch'ing-ying's soldiers forced the khoja's western column to withdraw, but the eastern column mounted a surprise attack on the native city. Here the adherents of the Ishāqiyya far outnumbered those of the Āfāqiyya, and another branch of the Naqshbandiyya, the Mujaddidiyya, whose local leader was a certain 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Ḥaḍrat, also had a substantial number of followers. The populace and the Kashmiri merchants therefore cooperated with the garrison to withstand the invaders, with the result that Wali Khan's forces were unsuccessful.

Of all those hurt by the war, perhaps the most damaged were the Tungans, whom both sides distrusted, and many of whom must have been devotees of another tarikat, the Uwaysiyya of Khoja Muḥammad Sharif Pir (d. 1555/6 or 1566), buried in Yarkand, whose greatest strength was among the Tungans and Taranchis of Ili. Wali Khan's partisans, for example, slaughtered Tungans on the same legal basis as infidels. Another glimpse of the khoja's religious politics along these lines is to be found in the way in which he treated Adolph von Schlagintweit's four companions. Muḥammad Amin Yārkandī, an East Turkestani, was merely imprisoned. 'Abd Allāh, a Kashmiri Muslim, being 'an Indian', was sold as a slave to a Yarkandi for twenty-five rupees. Murād, a Bukharan Jew, converted to Islam to save his life, and so was permitted to join Muḥammad Amin in jail. The fourth companion, being a Tibetan, was killed for belonging to the Chinese 'race'.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Muḥammad Amin, in Davies, *Report*, cccl; *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Shan Kan*, 4.13b; *Qaṣida* on the raid of Wali Khan in E. Denison Ross, ed. and tr. *Three Turki manuscripts from Kashghar*, 7, 14; Haneda Akira, 'Wari Kan no ran no isshiryō', in *Tsukamoto Hakushi shōju kinen Bukekyō shigaku ronshū*, 65.

⁷⁷ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.341, n. 3; Hermann von Schlagintweit-Sakünliński, *Reisen in Indien und Hochasien: Eine Darstellung der Landschaft, der Cultur und Sitten der Bewohner, in Verbindung*

Before long Ch'ing relief forces approaching from Barchuk engaged the invaders, whose troops around Yarkand now numbered several tens of thousands.⁷⁸ The Ch'ing carried the day, routing the invaders and killing some 700 of them. Yarkand was relieved after a siege of about seventy days and Yangi Hisar after more than 100 days. At Kashgar, Wali Khan's forces fled without a fight. His occupation had lasted just under four months.

The Ch'ing decorated Šiddiq Biy (or Beg), a descendant of the Turaygir Kipchak Kirghiz hakim beg of Tashmalik, for his aid in putting down the disorders and took terrible reprisals against Wali Khan's sympathizers. Among others, the authorities executed Mīr Aḥmad Shaykh of Satuq Boghra Khan's tomb and his eldest son. Ostensibly, this was because of the shaykh's part in the rising (he had given his daughter in marriage to Wali Khan), but the begs also wanted to plunder his wealth. They confiscated his property. Other shaykhs began to live more modestly.⁷⁹ Since trade with Kokand had been suspended during the hostilities, Jalafuntai, the Ili military governor, now also urged that the Andijani trading community be removed to special market towns, which could be built for them outside Kashgar's city walls, as was the practice for Kazakh trade in Ili and Tarbagatai. But the Grand Council, the Boards of Revenue and War, and the Li-fan Yüan recommended against even this minor inconvenience to the Kokandis, for fear of further trouble.

At Ch'ing-ying's suggestion, however, Kokand was ordered *pro forma* to extradite Wali Khan as a condition for the resumption of trade. In 1858 Kokand responded: 'After Wali Khan created his disturbance we sent out men to block his way and forbade people to join him. [Now] we have also put Wali Khan under arrest. If you will permit the resumption of trade, we will bring charges against the ringleaders and punish them in accordance with Koranic law.'⁸⁰ Recognizing the weakness of its hold on Sinkiang, the Ch'ing government found it prudent to re-open the trade immediately. Thus, although the Andijani merchants had been active supporters of the 1857 invasion, they came through unscathed.

The Andijani community constituted a large – and virtually free – class of its own. In 1858–9, at the arrival of the new Kokand aksakal in Kashgar, some 6,000 Andijanians, not counting Chalgurts, came out to greet him. The foreigners at Kashgar were said to be about one quarter the number of

mit klimatischen und geologischen Verhältnissen: Basirt auf die Resultate der wissenschaftlichen Mission von Hermann, Adolpb und Robert Schlagintweit ausgeführt in den Jahren 1854–1858, 4.282.

⁷⁸ Tseng, *Chung-kuo*, 315. The figure seems high.

⁷⁹ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 2.345; Muḥammad Amin in Davies, *Report*, cccli.

⁸⁰ *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Shan Kan* 10.24a. *CSL Wen-tung shih-lu*, 267.5a (18 Nov. 1858); 247.13a–b (16 Apr. 1858).

the indigenous population, in other words, about 145,000 persons. These even included Russian Tatars, who were officially considered Andijanis but in private associations with 'Chinese' did not conceal their origin.

The *émigré* Kashgarian population in western central Asia was also large. In the 1850s there were more than 200 Makhdūmzāda family members living in Kokand and Margelan. About 50,000 families of emigrants from Kashgar, known as Taghliqs, lived in villages around Andijan, Shahrikhan (recently founded by 'Umar Khan and almost exclusively inhabited by Kashgarian *émigrés*) and Karasu, in addition to many others in the towns. Outside Tashkent was another settlement, Yangi Shahr, with some 56,000 Kashgarian emigrants. Almost all these emigrants, being adherents of the Āfāqiyya, had fled in successive waves from Ch'ing rule and the reprisals that had followed each Makhdūmzāda invasion.⁸¹

As of 1858 a new ruler, Malla Khan, sat on the Kokand throne, and in 1859 he sent the khanate's annual tribute embassy ('a reciprocal interchange of presents' from the Kokandi point of view⁸²) as provided in the 1835 Sino-Kokand accord. The khan's main purpose was to absolve himself of all responsibility for the invasions of Altishahr that had occurred under Khudāyār Khan, his predecessor; so the ambassador, Mīrzā 'Abd al-Karīm, brought with him Malla Khan's letter, 'animadverting on the absurd weakness and cowardice' of the Altishahr Ch'ing authorities 'in having allowed themselves, while in command of a large Chinese force on the spot, to be cowed by a robber', meaning Walī Khan.

That year, as an economy measure, the Ch'ing ended the practice of receiving tribute from the Altishahr begs. Consequently, when the Kokand embassy reached Yarkand, the councillor Yü-jui, 'fearing the consequences of this communication reaching the Emperor', had an excuse for stopping the Kokandis from proceeding to the capital. It became clear, however, that the ambassador was determined to deliver his message to Peking. The councillor therefore 'caused the whole party [consisting of Mīrzā 'Abd al-Karīm and twenty-four companions] to be sent for and assassinated at the Gulbagh (Chinese Cantonment) near Yárkand'. To justify his action, Yü-jui concocted a story to the effect that the Kokand ambassador had committed a series of outrages in the Yarkand native city, beating up people, ravishing native women, and eventually invading the councillor's yamen. Here, Yü-jui claimed, the Kokandis had drawn their weapons and had wounded thirteen Ch'ing soldiers, but Mīrzā 'Abd al-Karīm with all his party had perished in the fight. Kokand eventually

⁸¹ Valikhanov, *Sobranie*, 1.394, 602; 2.343–4, 369. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. 1: *S drevneishykh vremen do serediny XIX veka*, 662. Muḥammad Amin in Davies, *Report*, cccxlix, cccli.

⁸² Wathen, 'Memoir on the U'sbek', 375.

brought the truth of the matter to the Ili authorities, who relayed it to the emperor, and Yü-jui was removed.

The Ch'ing *Veritable records* give only Yü-jui's side of the story. And were it not for the report of the British agent Muḥammad Amīn Yārkaṇdī, one would take the Ch'ing account at its word that Kokand afterwards sent an embassy of apology for Mīrzā 'Abd al-Karīm's incomprehensible behaviour.⁸³

Following the murder of the Kokand ambassador at Yarkand, Kokand's trade with Altishahr declined. There were disturbing reports of troop movements beyond the frontier, and in the Yangi Hisar district in 1860 the authorities had to disperse a demonstration led by the Kokand aksakal, putting him in jail. In 1861, against a background of growing disorders among the Muslims of north-west China, the jihad gathered momentum again. Mīr Aḥmad Shaykh's second son 'Abd ar-Raḥīm and a son of Buzurg Khan mounted an expedition of about 200 men into the Kashgar district, and Walī Khan and 'Abd ar-Raḥīm then headed another invasion over three times as large. Ch'ing firearms and cannon prevailed. The imperial forces captured 'Abd ar-Raḥīm alive and killed 400 Āfāqī troops. But Walī Khan escaped to the mountains.

Kokand's ambitions and Ch'ing authority had not yet found their equilibrium. The jihad still stood. Altishahr was the weakest appendage of the Ch'ing empire. It had a troubled past and promised a troubled future.

TIBETAN SECLUSION AND PRESSURES FROM INDIA

The period between 1815 and 1862 virtually decided which of Lhasa's tributaries would remain within the Chinese orbit and which would fall under the hegemony of the British in India. The British were no less aggressive than the Russians but were impeded by the gigantic mountains of the Himalaya range.

Incorporation into the Ch'ing empire in 1792 had closed off Tibet from British India, but the British, like the Russians in Sinkiang, used 'native' agents to infiltrate Nepal, Tibet and the Tibetan tributary countries of the Himalayas and the Karakoram, scouting out trading opportunities for the East India Company. An encouraging report by one of the earliest of these agents, 'Abd al-Qādir Khan, whom the Company had sent into Nepal in 1795 with Indian and English manufactures, did much to stimulate British interest in trade with Tibet.

⁸³ Muḥammad Amīn in Davies, *Report*, ccclii (Abdul Kāim [*'Abd al-Qā'im] must be an error for 'Abd al-Karīm. Qā'im is not one of the 99 names of God. Ch'ing sources have A-pu-tu-k'ai-li-mu). Cf. the account as based on Ch'ing sources in Saguchi, *Jūbachi*, 525–6.

In 1810 a merchant named Gillman sent another native agent to Gartok (sGar-thog) in Tibet to obtain a sample of shawl wool, which was a monopoly of the traders of Leh and an item of trade that was to be responsible for much of the Anglo-Tibetan politics of the nineteenth century. Shawl wool, or pashmina, was of two kinds: the wool of the domesticated goat (*pashm shāl*) and the even more highly-prized wool of the wild goat, wild sheep and other animals (*asālītūs*). Although a little pashmina was produced in Ladakh, most of it came from Rudok (Ru-thog) and Changthang in Tibet. The Tibetan producers were required by treaty to export their wool only to Leh, whence Kashmiri and central Asian traders re-exported it exclusively to the weaving industry in Kashmir. Violations of the monopoly were punishable by confiscation, and its terms were so tight that they even excluded the excellent and cheaper shawl wool of Altishahr from the Leh market. When the Ladakh government heard of Gillman's effort, it announced that all violations of the monopoly would thenceforth be punishable by death.

A few Englishmen secretly explored in person. Thomas Manning made his way to Lhasa in 1811 and even managed to have an audience with the Dalai Lama. William Moorcroft and H. Y. Hearsey penetrated Tibet as far as Gartok in 1812, and Moorcroft sent his agent Mir 'Izzat Allāh on to Altishahr to gather information on trade. But these men went only as private individuals, for although the government of India did not prevent such explorations, it feared antagonizing the Ch'ing government and so refused to give the explorers any credentials. As a result, however, of the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814–16 and of Anglo-Russian commercial rivalries, the official British attitude began to change. Spurred on by rumours of Asiatic Russian merchants in Tibet, the British picked out Kumaon and Garhwal (both of which were inhabited by Bhotias along their northern fringes) as a good route for direct British commerce with Tibet.⁸⁴ Then, in the Treaty of Sagauli that ended the Anglo-Nepalese war, British India annexed Kumaon and confirmed Garhwal and the Simla hill countries as Indian protectorates. Now, for the first time, British territory adjoined that of the Ch'ing empire in Tibet. Contact between the East India Company's Capt. Webb and Tibetan border officials in 1816 on the new frontier increased British hopes of breaking through Tibet's isolation.

The British defeat of Nepal and the re-establishment of a British resident at Kathmandu alarmed Peking, because the Nepalese, in a last attempt to win Ch'ing aid, falsely informed the Ch'ing that the British were ordering

⁸⁴ Secret letter from Lord Moira, cited in Alastair Lamb, *Britain and Chinese central Asia: the road to Lhasa 1767 to 1905*, 51, n. 2.

Nepal to transfer her tribute from the Ch'ing dynasty to the Indian government and that they were demanding free passage through Nepalese territory to Tibet. So Peking sent an imperial high commissioner named Saicungga to Tibet in command of a small military force to find out what had happened. On learning the truth, Saicungga refused to support Nepal and limited himself to expressing the hope that the Indian government, 'in consideration of the ties of friendship' between China and India, might see fit to withdraw its resident from Kathmandu. When the British replied that they would do so if Peking would send a Ch'ing resident to Nepal to prevent Anglo-Nepalese disputes, Saicungga let the matter drop and returned to China proper in 1817.⁸⁵

Another result of the Anglo-Nepalese war was British contact with Tibet's tributary, Sikkim. In 1817 the British signed the Anglo-Sikkimese Treaty of Titalia, which restored territories to Sikkim that Nepal had taken from her in 1792 and declared British paramountcy over the country, including responsibility for Sikkim's foreign relations. But neither Lhasa nor Peking ever accepted the validity of the Titalia treaty.

The Anglo-Nepalese war and the declaration of British paramountcy over Sikkim marked a turning point for Tibetan foreign policy. That Tibet, being a Ch'ing dependency, had her own foreign policy reflects her anomalous position. Tibet had tributaries of her own, which were thus secondarily part of the Chinese political orbit but were not themselves territories or even formal tributaries of the Ch'ing empire. In the eighteenth century, the Lhasa government had shown some interest in widening its contacts with the British, and the Panchen Lama had suggestively broadened the setting in which the British viewed Tibet by asking George Bogle, the East India Company's envoy in 1774–5, about Anglo-Russian relations. After Tibet's incorporation into the Ch'ing empire, the British must at first have seemed a promising counterweight to Ch'ing influence. But after 1817 – despite the continuing growth of Han Chinese population in Tsinghai and eastern Kham – it became clear that Ch'ing authority rested lightly on Lhasa, hardly interfering at all in Tibet's domestic affairs. The emperor played the role of Buddhist patron, made donations to the monasteries, and supported the *status quo*. The commercial advantages that monastic and lay officials derived from Tibet's status as a Ch'ing dependency were enormous, particularly in the tea trade. So with reason, Lhasa did not want to exchange a remote, loose and compatible Ch'ing dominion for a nearer, more vigorous, and culturally less sympathetic British domination.

The Ch'ing response to British encroachment in Nepal and Sikkim had

⁸⁵ Leo E. Rose, *Nepal: strategy for survival*, 89–94.

been so minimal that Lhasa dared not count on Ch'ing protection. The morale of the Ch'ing garrison was low, and it was too small in numbers to meet a serious crisis. The Manchu soldiers had married Tibetan women who could not easily live on their husbands' poor pay, and the pay itself often failed to reach the garrison, so that the ambans had to seek humiliating financial help from the Tibetan government. The soldiers were forced to supplement their meagre stipends with other employment. Tibet would have to safeguard herself alone from British influence. The Tibetans closed off Sikkim as the British route for communications with the Lhasa amban. From 1818, attempting to enter Tibet through the Sutlej valley or the Kumaon passes became 'the favoured sport of British officials on leave or duty in the hills', but Tibetan border officials politely yet firmly barred their way.⁸⁶ Lhasa began building the myth of Ch'ing power in Tibet, pretending that it was the Ch'ing, not the Tibetans themselves, who prevented the British from dealing directly with the Land of Snows.

The government of India decided on a policy of caution, which some, like William Moorcroft, superintendent of the East India Company's military stud, regarded as too fainthearted a course. India, like China, had for centuries suffered from a horse-raising problem and been forced to import horses for military use. So Moorcroft succeeded in winning the Indian government's reluctant permission to cross the Himalayas – at his own risk and expense and without any accredited authority or political designation – in search of central Asian horses for domestication in the subcontinent. Many people in India were interested in what he might learn about the possibilities for British trade beyond the mountains, and the Calcutta firms of Palmer & Co. and Cruttenden & Co. entrusted about £3,000 worth of goods to his care.

In 1819 Moorcroft and George Trebeck set out, reaching Leh in 1820 to find Ladakh's external relations on the verge of change. Down to 1819 Ladakh had been a tributary of Tibet but had also paid a secondary tribute to the Afghans in Kashmir, as usufructuaries. In a loose sense, Ladakh was even understood to be 'nominally dependent on China'.⁸⁷ In 1810, however, the Sikhs conquered Kashmir and demanded that Ladakh transfer Kashmir's usufructuary rights to them. But at Moorcroft's encouragement, the Ladakhi king proffered his allegiance to the British instead. For fear of provoking the Sikhs, the Indian government censured Moorcroft, declined Ladakh's allegiance, and so informed the Sikh government. The Sikhs were reassured. Ladakh recognized them as usufructuaries and began paying them tribute. But Lhasa could only have regarded Moorcroft's unauthorized efforts as further evidence of British expansionism.

⁸⁶ Lamb, *Britain*, 62.

⁸⁷ Wathen, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', 638.

Moorcroft remained in Ladakh until 1822 trying, through his agent Mir 'Izzat Allāh, to persuade the Yarkand authorities to admit him into Ch'ing territory. Some of the Leh trading community may have been attracted by the prospects of British trade through Leh to Altishahr. A Khojandi merchant of Yarkand, who had been impressed by accounts of British merchants that he had heard in Russia, helped Moorcroft with his financial difficulties, and a famous Naqshbandī, Khoja Shāh Niyāz, who had many supporters in Yarkand, gave him essential aid and advice. But the Kashmiris, fearing that the East India Company would interfere in their shawl wool monopoly, persuasively argued their case in Yarkand, so that the Ch'ing authorities – despite Moorcroft's claim that an Englishman had entered Yarkand some twenty or thirty years earlier – declared that there was no precedent for British trade in Altishahr and denied his request for a passport. Moorcroft made his way through Kashmir and Kabul to central Asia, where he died in 1825, at Andkhui.⁸⁸

Although Moorcroft had failed in his mission to buy horses, his efforts did much to stimulate British interest. Particularly stirring to the British sense of commercial rivalry were his revelations about the Russian agent Āghā Mahdī (see chapter 7), his report that Russians were visiting the annual fair at Gartok, and his assertion that 'a very valuable portion' of the shawl trade was 'carried on through Bokhara and Yarkand with Russia'.⁸⁹ A few other Europeans also entered Ladakh from India. Moorcroft met the Hungarian scholar Alexander Csoma de Kőrös there, disguised as an Armenian, and in 1821 Capt. Alexander Gerard entered Ladakh in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain Tibetan permission to visit Lake Manasarowar. But the attitude of the Indian government was that official contacts with the Tibetan or Ch'ing authorities should be avoided, and the British concentrated their attention instead on their hopes for entering the trans-Himalayan trade, especially the trade in shawl wool, towards which Kumaon and Garhwal seemed to open an avenue.

In the aftermath of the Sikh conquest of Kashmir there was a famine that forced many Kashmiri weavers to emigrate to British territory, and despite the monopoly, a small supply of shawl wool from Tibet began to trickle through. The British wanted to expand this supply and tap the trade that moved from Altishahr and Tibet through Leh to Kashmir.

⁸⁸ Moorcroft, *Travels*, 1.xlvii–l; H. E. Richardson, *A short history of Tibet*, 72; Lamb, *Britain*, 39, esp. n. 2; Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaiia*, 175, n. 28; cf. Jack A. Dabbs, *History of the discovery and exploration of Chinese Turkestan*, 31, who uncritically follows Huc; and Suzuki, *Chibetto*, 203–12, whose case for Moorcroft's death in Tibet over a decade later is unconvincing.

⁸⁹ Moorcroft, *Travels*, 2.164.

Tibet's exports to Ladakh consisted of domestic Tibetan merchandise and re-exports from China proper. The main Chinese re-export, which reached Leh by caravans of yaks from Lhasa, was brick tea (weighing eight pounds per brick), but silks, velvets, brocades and silver *yambu* were included too. The Tibetan products consisted primarily of shawl wool and secondarily of Changthang sheep, borax (needed by silversmiths and braziers), sulphur and black salt. Tibetan imports from Leh consisted of cotton cloth, shawls, chintzes, copper tinned vessels, spoons, Indian and European manufactures, dried fruits and grain – all coming mainly from the Punjab and Kashmir. Leh also did a considerable trade with Yarkand, and in the 1820s, in spite of the Ladakh monopoly, growing amounts of shawl wool from Yarkand, Khotan and the Senior Horde Kazakhs were making their way to the Leh market. The price of shawl wool was increasing, and by the 1830s Ladakh's prohibition against its import from Altishahr was a dead letter.

British efforts to enter this trade were initially successful. The Ladakh monopoly gave way. Tibetan caravans began to go down to Bashahr in British India. But the British were not the only ones who had an eye on the Ladakh trade. In 1822 the Sikhs raised Gulab Singh, a Dogra Hindu, to the position of raja of Jammu, and in 1834 Gulab Singh sent his general Zorawar Singh with a 10,000-man Dogra army to conquer Ladakh. By chance an adventurer, Dr George Henderson, wandered into Leh before the Dogras, enabling the Ladakhis to pretend that a British emissary had come to accept Ladakh's allegiance, which had been offered through Moorcroft over a decade earlier. The British, however, believed that the Dogra invasion would only divert more Tibetan shawl wool into India; so they exposed the Ladakhis' hoax and reassured the Dogras. Although winter conditions gave the Ladakhis an advantage, their outdated weapons were no match for those of Zorawar Singh, who boasted to the Sikhs in 1836 that if they 'wished to give an order for the conquest of the country of China he was ready to kindle the fires of battle and challenge the King of China'.⁹⁰ But the Ladakhis rebelled in 1837, 1838 and 1839, and it was not until 1840, after Zorawar Singh conquered Baltistan, that the Dogras fully established their authority over Ladakh. Theoretically, nothing had changed. The Dogras were part of the Sikh kingdom, which retained titular possession of usufructuary rights in Ladakh, and Lhasa continued to receive its customary Ladakh tribute. But Sikh control of

⁹⁰ Sohan Lāl Sūri, '*Umdat at-tawārikh*', cited in Bawa Satinder Singh, *The Jammu Fox: a biography of Maharaja Gulab Singh of Kashmir 1792-1857*, 28; see also 204, n. 39. For the conquest, see Charles-Eudes Bonin, 'La conquête du Petit-Tibet', *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 11.6 (June 1910) 207-31.

Jammu was nominal at best,⁹¹ and Gulab Singh planned to reinstate the Ladakh trade monopoly. He even challenged Lhasa's traditional position by stopping the customary accommodations and transport that Ladakh had traditionally supplied to the Tibetan government's annual trade mission.

With Ladakh in turmoil, Tibetan traders increasingly avoided Leh and exported their goods to Bashahr, which became the main artery of Indo-Tibetan trade. As a result, the wool supply reaching the Kashmir weavers fell so low as to endanger the very life of the industry. Meanwhile British India's own trans-Himalayan trade expanded through the export of opium, which Indian traders, being non-belligerents, carried to Leh for re-export to Yarkand by Kashmiris and even some Indian merchants. Much of it, originating in the Punjab, must have passed entirely through Sikh and Dogra hands. A little opium reached Yarkand by way of Badakhshan, and some also came to Lhasa through Nepal, carried by Nepalese merchants and Indians who passed themselves off in Tibet as 'Nepalese'. Here it was consumed entirely by Ch'ing personnel, for neither the Nepalese nor the Tibetans were users.

To rechannel Tibet's shawl wool and tea along their old route through Leh, and thus take control of it, Gulab Singh sent Zorawar Singh to invade western Tibet in 1841, damming up the trade leak into British territory. The British, worried that the Ch'ing would blame them for the Dogra invasion, also feared the possibility of a Dogra-Nepalese alliance (perhaps with Ch'ing encouragement) against them, inasmuch as they were now tied up by wars in Afghanistan and China. These considerations, coupled with the desire to have their Tibetan trade restored, led them to send the Sikhs an ultimatum to order the Dogras to withdraw. The Sikhs passed this word along to Gulab Singh, but before he could contact his general in Tibet, the Tibetans, without assistance from the impotent Ch'ing garrison, routed the Dogra army, which the winter cold nearly annihilated, and killed Zorawar Singh. Immediately the Ladakhis revolted, and in 1842 the Tibetans invaded Ladakh to re-establish their ancient claims to authority there. But Gulab Singh rushed in reinforcements. The Tibetans retreated, and the Dogras' army – more modern than Lhasa's – flooded the Tibetans' camp near the Ladakh-Tibet border and soaked their powder, rendering their guns useless. The Dogras defeated the Tibetans, but both sides were exhausted and ready to compromise.

On 17 October, 1842, at Leh, the Dogras and the Tibetans concluded a peace treaty that re-established Ladakh's monopoly on Tibetan shawl

⁹¹ Cf. Khushwant Singh, *A history of the Sikhs*, 1.279 and 2.21, who suggests the Kashmir weavers' troubles and Sikh initiative as causes for the Dogra expansion.

wool and confirmed the traditional (but still undefined) Ladakh–Tibet boundaries. The Dogras renounced all claims over Tibetan territory, and the Tibetans recognized Dogra supremacy over Ladakh. The Hindu kingdom of the Dogras was still nominally a dependency of the Sikhs, and Tibet was a dependency of the Ch'ing, but the Tibetans and the Dogras had acted essentially as sovereign powers concluding an international agreement. The Ch'ing government could do nothing but acquiesce in a *fait accompli*. Ladakh's tribute embassies to Lhasa were to be continued, and the Dogras reinstated the symbolic accommodations and transport for the Tibetan government's annual trade mission to Leh, but the Tibetans had acknowledged the Dogras as the possessors of Ladakh, and Leh's tribute to Lhasa was reduced to the status of custom, paid in confirmation of Ladakh's monopoly on the Tibetan shawl wool trade. Officially, Ladakh and Baltistan thus became part of the Sikh kingdom. Ladakh departed from China's political orbit and entered the Indian subcontinent.

These events, coupled with the Ch'ing garrison's sorry state, lowered Ch'ing prestige in Lhasan eyes. When 'White Lotus' rebels from Szechwan invaded eastern Kansu in 1822, twenty-three Tibetan tribes in Tsinghai's Huang-chung region took up arms to repossess formerly Tibetan pastures in Kokonor from the Khoshuud, who had occupied them since the early sixteenth century. Ch'ing forces under Ch'ang-ling scored a temporary victory in the same year, but the Tibetans again shattered the peace. 'A long period of devastation and murder' had ensued, one of the principal instigators being the Mañjuśrī Khutughtu of the Tongkhor (sTong-'khor) monastery.⁹² In 1829 Lhasa sent its own soldiers to restore order in Kokonor. In 1835–8 Lhasa's army also warred, and won, against the ruler of Powo (sPo-bo), who had refused to pay his tribute to the Dalai Lama's government. The Tibetan expulsion of the Dogras must therefore be seen against a background of other Tibetan military acts.

For fear of the British, however, the Lhasa government continued to reinforce the protective image of Ch'ing authority. In 1830 the Tibetans had been alarmed to discover a Kashmiri agent named Aḥmad 'Ali, carrying letters in English and notebooks of geographical information, who admitted that he had been exploring for the government of India. Moreover, the Indian government, on defeating the Burmese in 1820, had assumed the disputed Burmese 'rights' in Assam, including a nebulous set of relationships with the tribes of the Assam Duars and the Tibetan

⁹² Louis M. J. Schram, 'The Monguors of the Kansu-Tibetan frontier, pt III', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, NS, vol. 51 May 1861 pt 3, pp. 1–117; Mañjuśrī Khutughtu = Tongkhor Khutughtu = Chaghan Nom-un Khan.

borderlands. In 1835 the British had pressured Lhasa's tributary, Sikkim, into ceding Darjeeling, and in 1841 they began annexing the Assam Duars, claimed by Lhasa's other tributary, Bhutan. In 1844 the British persuaded the chiefs of Tibet's Tawang tract along the eastern border of Bhutan to give up their rights to the Kariapara Duar in return for an annual compensation of 5,000 rupees. Of this sum, only 500 rupees were to go to the Tawang monastery (a subsidiary of Drepung), and the rest was to be forwarded to Drepung in Lhasa. In other words, the British recognized that they were encroaching upon Lhasa's domain, and from then until 1888, when they finished bringing the Assam-Tibet frontier tribes under their administration, the British would continue to eat away at Tibetan territory in Monyul (Mon-yul), Loyul (Lo-yul) and lower Zayul (rDza-yul). Since both the Lhasa and Bhutan governments suspected that the king of Sikkim was a British pawn, Lhasa withdrew some of his traditional grazing rights in Tibetan territory, and the Bhutanese tried to assassinate him.

In such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that members of the Lhasa government should have wanted to encourage gestures of Ch'ing power; so when the Kashag, allied with the Ganden and Drepung monasteries and the Panchen Lama, staged a *coup d'état* against the regent Tshe-smon-gling in 1844, they did so by requesting Peking's intervention. The emperor sent Ch'i-shan, who had been banished for alleged duplicity in the Opium War, and when Ch'i-shan arrived in Lhasa, he threatened the regent with torture unless he admitted having abused his powers. Tshe-smon-gling had been regent since 1819, and it was rumoured that he had murdered three successive incarnations of the Dalai Lama under his care. On Ch'i-shan's recommendation, Peking ordered the regent to be banished to Manchuria, but the situation in Lhasa was highly volatile because the populace, conscious of the weakness of Ch'ing control, was agitated by intervention from Peking against the head of the Dalai Lama's government. Monks from Sera, Tshe-smon-gling's home monastery, took to arms against Ch'ing authority, beat up two members of the Kashag whom they found in the regent's house, and freed the deposed regent from prison. The regent, however, was confident of vindication in Peking and told his supporters to return to their monastery, but at the Ch'ing capital he was unable to make his case and was exiled to the Amur. On the surface, at least, 'imperial authority was still unchallenged and everybody bowed to it. But it was to be for the last time.'

When Ch'i-shan tried to punish the monks at Sera, the Tibetan government immediately took the case out of his hands, and a dispute in Kham further underscored the superficiality of Ch'ing authority in Tibet. In 1844

the twin incarnates of Draya (Brag-g.yab) repudiated the authority of the 'Phags-pa-lha incarnation of Chamdo (Chab-mdo), Tibet's third-largest city. The quarrel degenerated into serious armed clashes in 1846, and the Chamdo incarnation sought help from the Ch'ing, bringing into the open the anti-Ch'ing sentiments of various regional chiefs, one of whom – resenting Peking's involvement in the Lhasa *coup d'état* – refused to supply porters for Ch'ing relief soldiers on their way into Tibet. The dispute ended only when Lhasa raised the Draya lamas' rank, thus re-affirming Tibetan authority and, in effect, rewarding the symbolic leaders of the anti-Ch'ing demonstrators in Kham.⁹³

The year 1846 brought renewed British pressure on Tibetan seclusion. The British overpowered the Sikhs, made Gulab Singh maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, and recognized his possession of Ladakh – sending a letter to the Lhasa amban to announce British suzerainty over the Dogra kingdom (over Ladakh's shawl wool monopoly in particular), to encourage Indo-Tibetan trade, and to call for joint Dogra-British-Ch'ing boundary commissions to fix the Ladakh-Tibet border. The substance of the letter was also communicated directly to the Ch'ing by way of Hong Kong. The Tibetan government, however, had no intention of permitting Ch'ing relations with the British and took no chances: when Lhasa expelled the Lazarist missionaries Gabet and Huc from Tibet in 1846, it refused to let them leave the country by way of India. British boundary commissioners explored the frontier region in 1847, but no Ch'ing commissioners ever arrived.

Moreover, Lhasa purposefully adhered to the 1842 Dogra-Tibetan treaty, limiting the Tibetan government's trade to the Ladakh route so as not to become involved with British India. At first this had enabled Gulab Singh to keep most of the shawl wool for himself, but his 'ruinous levies' and the constant meddling of his officials nearly brought the Kashmir weaving industry to a halt in 1849. In fact, so many shawl workers began to leave Kashmir that in 1851 the Dogra government issued an order forbidding their emigration. As a result, although the Dogras succeeded in preventing Yarkand's 'Turfani' wool, 'which is the finest', from passing into India, Tibetan shawl wool from Changthang began once again to supply the weavers living in British territory.⁹⁴

From the Bhotias' point of view, Lhasa still retained a special position. The Tibetan government compensated the Sikkimese king with an annual subsidy of grain, salt and tea for his losses in resisting British encroach-

⁹³ Petech, *Aristocracy*, 4; W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: a political history*, 180; Suzuki, *Chibetto*, 332–42; Günther Schulemann, *Geschichte der Dalai-Lamas*, 354.

⁹⁴ Bawa Satinder Singh, *Jammu Fox*, 169; Davies, *Report*, 52.

ment in 1849, and in 1853 Tibetan and Ladakhi officials reconfirmed Ladakh's Tibetan trade monopoly and concluded a formal agreement to strengthen the annual exchange of Leh's tribute embassies and Lhasa's trade missions. Bhutan, although a fully sovereign state with independent foreign relations, also sent an annual tribute embassy to Lhasa.⁹⁵ In Monyul, Loyul and lower Zayul, the relationships between allegiances to Lhasa and British authority also remained undefined in the Bhotias' eyes. Although the British were aware of their Buddhist hill countries' double allegiances, ecclesiastical and secular obligations were so closely inter-related that little could be done to clarify them without direct negotiations on the subject with Peking and Lhasa.

On Lhasa's initiative, direct Anglo-Tibetan negotiations did in fact take place as the result of a dispute between the Drepung monastery and the principal Tawang chief, who had failed to send Drepung its share of the Kariapara Duar compensation in 1852 and fled into British territory. When Lhasa sent an army to the Indian border, the British agreed to send the annual compensation to Tibet in return for Tibetan pardon of the fugitive chief. But the British were unable to extend these talks of 1853 to other topics or to provide for other direct contacts in future, and trouble with Nepal soon reinforced Lhasa's policy of seclusion.

In 1840, 1842 and 1846 Nepal had asked Peking for Ch'ing support against the British, but Peking had stood by its policy of 'impartial benevolence'; so in 1846, when Jang Bahadur of the Rana (Kunwar) family took power, he had shifted to a pro-British policy and had even cancelled Nepal's 1847 quinquennial tribute embassy to Peking. In 1852, however, he had reinstated it, and it carried to China opium worth nearly 300,000 rupees, duty-free under diplomatic privilege. On the embassy's return to Kathmandu in 1854, bearing news of the Taiping Rebellion, Jang Bahadur decided that the time was ripe to increase Nepal's privileges in Tibet (the more so, because Britain was preoccupied with the Crimean War). After offering Peking military aid against the Taipings and being refused, the Nepalese invaded Tibet in 1855 on the fantastic pretext of obtaining redress from the Tibetans for Nepal's expenses incurred in providing troops to aid the Ch'ing. Jang Bahadur also charged Tibetan violations of Nepalese trading rights and presented a list of extravagant demands. The Tibetans, without Ch'ing assistance, counter-attacked, and the fighting ended in a stalemate. The Tibeto-Nepalese Treaty of Thapathali, which ended the war in 1856, bore unmistakable resemblances to the Sino-Kokand accord of 1835: exemption from customs duties, a Nepalese resident at Lhasa with extraterritorial jurisdiction and,

⁹⁵ Ram Rahul, *Modern Bhutan*, 32, 49.

in particular, the right to adjudicate disputes between Nepalese and all other foreigners in Tibet. Nepalese were permitted to marry Tibetan women. Boys born of such marriages, like the Chalhurts of Altishahr, were considered Nepalese, whereas the girls were considered Tibetan. Lhasa agreed to pay Nepal an annual tribute of 10,000 rupees.

Tibet's treaty with the Dogras had been bad for Ch'ing prestige, and Peking found the Tibetano-Nepalese treaty doubly humiliating. A lame solution to the problem of peace was found in the Nepalese declaration that Kathmandu's dispute had been with the Tibetans alone and that Nepal had not intended to act against the Ch'ing. But the honorifics in the treaty put the Nepalese king and the Ch'ing emperor 'on a level of equality'. To save the emperor's face, the text was modified to say that he would be 'respected (or honored) as he had been respected (or honored) in the past'. After a further modification whereby Nepal's 'responsibility' to provide military assistance for Tibet's defence was limited to invasions by the armies of rulers other than the Ch'ing emperor, the amban put his seal to the treaty. But Peking instructed him to feign ignorance of the treaty's dishonourable terms and thus avoid compromising the 'integrity of the empire' (*kuo-i*).⁹⁶

Once again the Tibetans had defended their territory unaided, but although the Ch'ing dynasty had suffered some embarrassment in the process, the Tibetans themselves continued to profess their obedience to Peking's authority for fear of the British and the Nepalese. In 1861 Lhasa's determination to remain hidden within the Ch'ing empire deepened even more, for in that year the British invaded Sikkim and imposed the Anglo-Sikkimese Treaty of Tumlong, making the country a British protectorate. But neither Lhasa nor Peking ever recognized the treaty, and after the British forces withdrew, the Sikkimese ruler continued to receive insignia of rank from Lhasa.⁹⁷

In 1862, Ladakh, Sikkim and Bhutan were still Lhasa's tributaries, but seen from the other side of the Himalayas, Bhutan was independent, and Ladakh and Sikkim were, by treaty, dependencies of British India. Lhasa was a Ch'ing dependency but also tributary to Nepal. Nepal was a tributary of the Ch'ing but politically allied with the Indian government.

Internally, Tibet was at peace. Trouble in Kokonor had been quelled in 1854. A serious disturbance in the Chamdo region, involving the Powo ruler, had been put down in 1859. Cut off from most outside influences, Tibetan writers and painters had simply carried on in their own traditions, continuing to produce various forms of literature, philosophical com-

⁹⁶ Rose, *Nepal*, 115, 117; Suzuki, *Chibetto*, 329.

⁹⁷ Alastair Lamb, *The China-India border: the origins of the disputed boundaries*, 24.

mentaries, critical scholarship and religious paintings. But there was little in these works that was fresh or innovative. The only noteworthy new ingredients had come from China proper, for Han Chinese cultural influences had increased during the nineteenth century and were reflected in Tibetan painting, interior decoration, dress and cuisine. But even here, Han Chinese cultural imports affected only the Tibetan upper classes.⁹⁸ For most ordinary people, China proper remained a distant land.

In its heyday, Ch'ing power in Tibet had been far from overwhelming. In the 1860s the Tibetans still chose for reasons of their own to emphasize the empire's symbolic authority and make it seem substantial.

In the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, the separate histories of the three Ch'ing dependencies stood out from one another in sharp contrast. Mongolia declined under Ch'ing rule but stayed quiet. Sinkiang fared better and yet rebelled. Tibet, in her domestic life, remained largely unaffected by Ch'ing authority. The differences were rooted in the natures of these countries themselves and in the Manchus' original purposes in annexing them.

In Mongolia, the Ch'ing objective had been the ancient Chinese goal of transforming the nomads and rendering them incapable of threatening China. In this, the Manchus had succeeded, but at great cost to the Mongols, who from Manchuria to Zungharia decreased in population and grew poorer in livestock and territory.

In Sinkiang, the Manchus had wanted only peace and formal obedience to the Ch'ing throne. But these were impossible to attain, for the East Turkestanis were members of a vast Islamic civilization stretching far away into lands where China had no influence at all. Their world view challenged the very cornerstone of imperial order: the emperor's ultimate authority. Without being a lamaist the emperor could reign as the legitimate patron of the lamaist church, but he could not, as an unbeliever, have such a role in the Muslim world. For centuries Altishahr had been 'the abode of Islam'. Its inhabitants lived under the obligation of jihad. The rule of the unbeliever could be accepted only as a temporary thing. Kokand, close but militarily unreachable from China, was an obstacle even to temporary peace. In her own commercial interest, the khanate kept Kashgar in a continuing state of agitation. Although Jahāngīr's jihad had a heavy spontaneous ingredient of rebellion, most of the other disorders down to the 1860s stemmed essentially from Kokand. Also at large were the traditional Muslim leaders of Altishahr. Peking had failed to incorporate them into the Ch'ing system as it had incorporated the

⁹⁸ David Snellgrove and H. Richardson, *A cultural history of Tibet*, 230-1.

Dalai Lama and the Mongolian khans. Now the Makhdūmzādas haunted the imperial frontiers. Even in their role as Naqshbandī Sufis, their message was an activist one. Simultaneously, Naqshbandī leaders elsewhere were waging concurrent jihads – against the Sikhs and the British in India, against the Russians in the Caucasus – and were rapidly spreading their political influence in Malaya and Indonesia, in the Ottoman empire, in western central Asia and Afghanistan.

In Tibet, it had been the Ch'ing emperor's desire to make himself patron of the Yellow church, to which the Mongols also belonged. The Tibetans had willingly complied, for in Buddhist eyes the patron was seen as subordinate to the community of monks, and each side could thus see itself as supreme. Unlike Mongolia or Sinkiang, Tibet possessed an indigenous central government of her own. Tibetan military power posed no threat to China; so the Manchus made no move to weaken the Dalai Lama's authority over his ecclesiastical state. On the contrary, they reinforced it. Throughout the nineteenth century the power of the Dalai Lama's government increased, and Peking aided Lhasa in its efforts to exclude foreign influences and preserve Tibetan isolation.

Material wellbeing played little part in the political behaviour of the three dependencies. The Mongols, who truly suffered, bided their time – even though they, no less than the East Turkestanis, lived under an alien rule which they could blame for their unhappiness. The Altishahr Muslims were rebellious, but their rebelliousness does not seem to have emanated from any corresponding economic decline. The Tibetan trade economy and the monasteries clearly prospered under Ch'ing dominion, yet there is little reason to suppose that these were the major reasons for the Lhasa government's firm adherence to the empire.

Although Ch'ing authority in Inner Asia was superficial, it was strong enough to guarantee the safety of increasing numbers of Han emigrants from China proper, who settled in Inner Mongolia, throughout Sinkiang, and in the eastern fringes of Tibet. Seen as a whole, despite rebellions and European encroachment and the sagging fortunes of the Manchus, the years from the 1790s to the 1860s were the great period of Ch'ing imperial power.

CHAPTER 9

THE CH'ING RESTORATION

FACTORS BEHIND THE CH'ING VICTORIES

In July 1864, when the Taiping capital of Nanking was finally reduced by Tseng Kuo-fan's forces, many among China's scholar-official ruling class were already congratulating themselves on having witnessed a rare phenomenon in history – a dynasty that had reigned more than two hundred years, had seen glorious days and then declined, yet was able to defeat widespread and formidable rebellion. This was described in traditional historiography as restoration (*chung-hsing*, lit. 'again rising' or 'rising at mid-course'), and it had occurred in but few instances since ancient times. The parallel often cited in the 1860s was the T'ang restoration in the reign of Su-tsung (756–72), when the great An Lu-shan Rebellion was suppressed.

In historical perspective, the Ch'ing restoration was perhaps even more remarkable than that of the T'ang. The imperial commanders of the eighth century were not far removed from the military-aristocratic culture of the Northern and Southern dynasties (317–589), but the scholar-officials of the late Ch'ing vanquished the Taipings in spite of more than a millennium of increasingly stultifying literary culture. Moreover, while the T'ang restoration saw the rise of virtually independent satrapies, Ch'ing imperial authority survived the rebellion largely intact: provincial governors-general and governors gained greater leeway in administration but nevertheless continued to depend on the throne's favour for their tenure of office. Just as T'ang Su-tsung had received aid from the Uighurs of central Asia, so the Ch'ing of the early T'ung-chih period profited by the direct and indirect assistance of the Western 'barbarians'. But while the T'ang could count on the superior culture of the Middle Kingdom to overawe and even to assimilate their alien helpers, China in the nineteenth century was confronted by foreign peoples from overseas who not only were unassimilable but who also possessed a material culture superior to China's own.

The essential events of any *chung-hsing* were military: the rebels had to be defeated.

The Ch'ing success, as emphasized in chapter 6, was due to the fact that the Chinese elite, first of all, identified its own interests with those of the dynasty, and second, was able to maintain local order with the temporary military forces it organized.

While militia corps (*t'uan-lien*) and mercenaries (*yung*) were both valuable, it was a new breed of military organization that made possible the eventual victory. This new breed was the *yung-ying* (lit. 'brave-battalion') which, as a semi-regular imperial army, was a major innovation of the period.¹ The earliest and most important such army, although organized in Hunan, was hardly a 'regional army', since it was soon sent out of the province to fight the Taipings. The Hunan Army differed from the *yung* mercenaries in its size, which grew at one time to 136,000 men. While both militia corps and mercenary forces were principally financed by funds raised by the gentry, the Hunan Army was given imperial allocations of provincial funds. After trying with indifferent success to raise contributions from the Hunanese elite, Tseng Kuo-fan depended for the financing of his large force on imperially authorized funds of Hunan, Hupei, Kwangtung and other provinces, as well as the proceeds of the court-sanctioned sales of degrees, titles, and even offices. His agents travelled to several provinces to sell 'certificates' issued by Peking for these purposes.² While setting up a uniform system of organization and training for his large army, Tseng also built a new structure for the administration of funds and supplies. Remarkable men like Lo Tse-nan, Hu Lin-i and Liu Jung (1816-73), shared his fervent determination to save the dynasty and civilization by putting into practice humble but compelling Confucian ideals.

Tseng Kuo-fan: Confucian statecraft on trial

The philosophical basis of Tseng's outlook was the Ch'eng-Chu doctrine regarding the 'proper place' (*fen*) for each of the myriad things. In the human realm, the 'proper place' for each person existed in a hierarchy of status, both within the imperial system and in the family. Like the T'ung-ch'eng school of writers, Tseng stressed the concern for the people's welfare but believed nonetheless that an even greater issue was the 'proper order of human relations' (*jun-chi*). In his letters as early as the

¹ Wang Erh-min, 'Ch'ing-tai yung-ying chih-tu' (The 'Brave Battalions' system of the Ch'ing dynasty), *CYCT*, 4.1 (May 1973) 1-52. Richard J. Smith, 'Chinese military institutions in the mid-nineteenth century, 1850-1860', *Journal of Asian History*, 8.2 (1974) 122-61.

² Tseng Kuo-fan, *Tseng Wen-cheng kung ch'üan-chi* (Complete collection of Tseng Kuo-fan's papers; hereafter *TWCK*), *Shu-cha* (Letters), 2.13, 17b; 3.2, 7, 25, 41; 4.1b, 7, 15; *Tsou-kao* (Memorials), 2.10b, 21b, 27-8.

1840s, he had expressed the view that disregard for 'differentiation' (*shu*) in human relationships would 'in the end result in disorder in the empire, indeed until beasts are led to consume human beings!'³

A devout practitioner of self-cultivation (including rising at dawn, regularly practising calligraphy, reviewing classics and history, and keeping an introspective diary), Tseng was also a man of wide concern for problems of administration. His approach to statecraft leaned heavily on the side of 'rule by man' rather than 'rule by law'. As far as institutions were concerned, he was inclined to preserve Ch'ing governmental and social practices, including ceremonial rituals. He felt the urgent need of the government was to make 'the realities conform to the theory' (*tsung-ho ming-shih*, a favourite phrase of Ho Ch'ang-ling and Wei Yüan). Yet, following his T'ung-ch'eng masters, Tseng emphasized that only cultivated men grounded in orthodox learning could transform the customs within the bureaucracy: the greatest need was for 'earnest and solid scholars who would act upon their ideas'.⁴ In his famous early essay, 'The fundamentals of talent', Tseng argued that the decay of social mores, which was precipitating a grave crisis, could be remedied only by the emergence of 'men both virtuous and wise' (*hsien ch'ieh chih che*), and that the leadership and example of even a few such men, who would regard the welfare of the empire as their own, could transform the morale and customs of an entire generation. Tseng was not unaware of the importance of institutions. But his studies at the Hanlin Academy had led him to believe that a compendium such as *Wu-li t'ung-k'ao* (Encyclopaedia of five categories of rites and institutions) by Ch'in Hui-t'ien (1702–64), was a sufficient guide for administrative as well as social practices. The only addition he would suggest was a section on political economy (*ching-chi*), dealing with such matters as the salt monopoly, river conservancy and monetary policies.⁵ Since the Neo-Confucian philosophy always distinguished between 'inner' and 'outer' – or substance and function – Tseng believed that while the Ch'ing institutions were flawless in the moral and ritual realms, there was an area of practical function where change could and should be introduced. He wrote in his diary (August 1851): 'The mistake inherited from the previous age can be corrected by us. That which the previous age neglected, we can inaugurate [*tzu wo ch'uang-chih*]'.⁶

³ TWCK, *Shu-cha*, 1.6b–8b; *Chia-shu* (Family letters), 1.59b; see also *Tsa-shu* (Miscellaneous writings), 2.58.

⁴ TWCK, *Shu-cha*, 1.1b.

⁵ TWCK, *Wen-chi* (Collected essays) 1.4; 2.2; *Nien-p'u* (Biographical chronicle), 1.17.

⁶ Han-yin Chen Shen, 'Tseng Kuo-fan in Peking, 1840–1852; his ideas on statecraft and reform', *JAS*, 27.1 (Nov. 1967) 61–80, esp. p. 71.

After his appointment as commissioner of local defence for Hunan in January 1853, Tseng had been shocked and pained by the incompetence and corruption of the military and civil officials. Yet there was nothing for it but to offer the most earnest leadership, which according to Tseng's Neo-Confucian faith, might indeed alter what destiny had in store for the dynasty. 'I can only rely on my tiny but staunchly loyal heart and face our people across mountains of skulls and bones and deep pools of blood in the hope of bringing back to our side Heaven's will, which is against disorder'.⁷ Tseng was determined to apply his two-pronged approach to statecraft, stressing man's moral qualities on the one hand, and organizational effectiveness on the other. In selecting commanders and officers, he laid great stress on the candidate's 'spirit of loyalty and righteous duty'. He preferred scholars as commanders, but even more than experience in military matters, he wanted to see in the candidate 'red-bloodedness' (*hsüeh-hsing*) as well as 'integrity and awareness' (*lien-ming*). For lower officers and soldiers, he wanted 'simple, untarnished' men of peasant stock.⁸

To administer the funds and supplies for both his army and its naval auxiliary, Tseng had developed a bureaucracy under imperial authority. Although not at first given the title of imperial commissioner (*ch'in-ch'ai ta-ch'en*), he had an imperial commission (*ch'in-ming*).⁹ This gave him enough authority to issue letters of appointment (*cho-wei*) to officials and confer upon them the status of *wei-yüan* (often translated as 'deputy'). Tseng established a 'general staff' at his headquarters, calling it by the Green Standard term *ying-wu ch'u* (lit. 'office of battalion affairs'). After the Hunan Army moved to Hupei and thence to Kiangsi, a 'commissariat' (*liang-t'ai*) was established at a town not too far from wherever Tseng's headquarters might be, to oversee the shipment of provisions. There were also offices controlling funds and munitions at advanced positions.¹⁰

Tseng's great preoccupation was the quality of the men to whom tasks were entrusted. To command his waterforce, he chose Yang Yüeh-pin (1822–90), a minor Green Standard Officer who had had some experience with riverine warfare, and P'eng Yü-lin (1816–90), a *sheng-yüan* who had been connected briefly with local defence work. P'eng, especially, proved to be a brave, upright and conscientious scholar-commander after Tseng's

⁷ TWCK, *Sbu-cha*, 2.1.

⁸ TWCK, *Sbu-cha*, 2.24b–25; 3.11b. Lo Erh-kang, *Hsiang-chün hsün-chib* (A new history of the Hunan Army), 143–4.

⁹ TWCK, *Tsou-kaao*, 11.41.

¹⁰ For a chart, see Jonathan Porter, *Tseng Kuo-fan's private bureaucracy*, 74. 'Private' is debatable, since *wei-yüan*, unlike *mu-yu*, had the status of government functionary.

own heart. For the general staff, the commissariat and the various special bureaux, Tseng drew upon his group of personal advisers (*mu-yu*) – men who were nominally his ‘guests’ and were paid honoraria from his personal funds. Tseng was well-known for his capacity to attract able men to his ‘residence of personal advisers’ (*mu-fu*) and for the sagacious use he made of them. Frequently, he would appoint a member of his *mu-fu* to the general staff or to one of the commissariat offices, thus transforming the ‘guest’ into a government official with *wei-yüan* status, paid from government funds. For such managerial personnel, too, Tseng ideally wanted ‘men of rectitude’ (*cheng-jen*), distinguished by financial honesty as well as practical ability. In practice, however, among the Hunan Army’s commanders and battalion officers, he found to his sorrow that his standards of conduct had to be relaxed. Only by closing his eyes to the actual behaviour of his officers and men could he maintain the effectiveness of the Hunan Army at all. Its fighting capacity was salvaged by means that Confucian statecraft seldom acknowledged.

The Hunan Army’s capacity has, in fact, been grossly exaggerated by many admiring chroniclers. To be sure, its recovery of Wuchang in October 1854 had halted the momentum of the Taiping strategy of consolidating all the cities along the Yangtze. And the destruction, in December 1854, of a large Taiping fleet at T’ien-chia-chen, at the Hupei border, demonstrated the quality of Tseng’s naval force. But once Tseng proceeded on an expedition down the Yangtze to Kiangsi, he was decisively checked. At least half his waterforce was bottled up in Poyang Lake for more than two years; and the Taipings recaptured Wuchang in April 1855, despite the fact that the best of the Hunan forces returned to defend it. Tseng continued to be isolated at Nanchang, and Hu Lin-i, acting governor and then governor of Hupei, directed most of the Hunan Army’s operations for more than two years. By June 1856, when the Kiangnan Great Camp east of Nanking under Hsiang Jung collapsed (see chapter 6), the Hunan Army was simultaneously in great peril in Kiangsi and Hupei. Disaster was averted only because of the removal of Taiping pressure as a result of the internecine struggle within Nanking. Except for the waterforce, the units of the Hunan Army had by then mostly been shattered – this despite Hu Lin-i’s success in rallying his forces to recapture Wuchang in December 1856.

There was a temporary resuscitation of the Hunan Army, which expanded to some 40,000 men within two or three years. Despite some severe defeats it was able to clear Kiangsi as well as Hupei of the Taipings by mid-1859. But although the army had grown in size while on the whole retaining its organizational form, Tseng had had to compromise his

principles regarding the selection of its officers. Outstanding scholar-generals such as Lo Tse-nan and Li Hsü-pin had given their lives in battle. The new commanders on whom Tseng and Hu Lin-i relied were no longer outstanding Confucian personalities who could actually direct battles; the few scholar-generals that remained were more adept at 'controlling officers' (*yü-chiang*) than directing troops. Among the battalion officers, men of literati background no longer predominated. Most battalion chiefs were now only barely literate, yet some of these men were even promoted to command (*t'ung-ling*).¹¹ Experience showed that frontline duties required stamina rare among scholars, while among the illiterate and the semi-literate, there were brave men who were also brilliant tacticians. Pao Ch'ao, originally a low-ranking officer of Tseng's waterforce, was made a *t'ung-ling* by Hu Lin-i in 1855 and commanded 3,000 new recruits. It was said that the only thing he could write was his own name. Pao, with Pi Chin-k'o and Chu Hung-chang, both young men in their twenties, became Tseng's most valuable *t'ung-ling*. By his own account, Chu, who seldom batted an eye at ordering the massacre of thousands of enemy troops, had abandoned an opportunity for education in his early teens and had enlisted in a *yung* mercenary corps before he was twenty.¹²

While they were good at directing battles, men such as Pao and Chu were apt to allow great licence to their officers and men. The discipline of the Hunan Army steadily deteriorated. The capture of a town was followed invariably by pillage, if not also by indiscriminate killing. When Tseng Kuo-fan came back to active duty in July 1858 after spending fifteen months at home mourning his father, he found the Hunan troops behaving so badly that local militia corps often engaged them in battle. Tseng's brother, Kuo-ch'üan, had left his mourning earlier and the 2,000 men he brought from Hunan, led by uncouth but experienced battalion officers, won an important battle in Chi-an, Kiangsi, in September 1858. But in victory his force had become so unruly that it had to be disbanded immediately and replaced by new recruits. After the disastrous defeat at San-ho-chen in late 1858 (when the scholar-general Li Hsü-pin, as well as another brother of Tseng's, died), the Hunan Army managed to move again into Anhwei. But Tseng's battalions were now in fact made up mostly of recently enlisted officers and men, led by crude but battle-seasoned commanders like Chu Hung-chang. Despite Tseng Kuo-fan's exhortation to 'love the people' (the title of an army song written by

¹¹ Lo Erh-kang, *Hsiang-chün hsin-chih*, 106-7 (also his tables, pp. 55-64).

¹² Chu Hung-chang's memoir, *Ts'ung-jung chi-lieh* (Brief account of participation in war), was probably written through an amanuensis.

Tseng himself in late 1858), the Hunan Army's original good morale does not seem to have ever been recovered.

Early on, Tseng had written that the ideal military commander 'should not be eager for official honour or personal profit'. But by 1856, he found most officers of the Hunan Army 'cannot avoid fattening their private purse somewhat'. All that he himself could do was to refrain from doing the same, thus 'setting an example to my colleagues and thereby repaying the kindness of the sage-emperor'.¹³ By 1859, Tseng was all but ready to cast military officers into the category of immoral men that Confucians had always found it necessary to tolerate, like the yamen clerks and runners. Tseng now believed the great, virtuous generals of China's past must certainly have been idealized by historians. According to his own experience, such extraordinary scholar-commanders as Lo Tse-nan and Li Hsü-pin one 'might happen to run across but they cannot be found when one looks for them'. Even his best commanders were willing to exert themselves only when shown memorials recommending their promotion in Green Standard ranks, or when the prospects of loot were particularly good. Tseng showed his extreme pragmatism by remarking to Hu Lin-i that the best course was perhaps to learn from 'the old monk who neither sees nor hears . . . only by ignoring [the affairs of the world] could the ill-omens be purified'.¹⁴ Such was the Buddhist wisdom that came to the assistance of Confucian statecraft!

Imperial policy: the transition to the T'ung-chih reign

The three years 1859–61, which saw a resurgence of Taiping power, also saw Ch'ing policy towards the Europeans turn from belligerence to appeasement, partly as a result of a change in the decision-making personnel at court in a power struggle that attended the accession of a child monarch.

The transition to the T'ung-chih reign probably made little difference in the policy of employing Han Chinese in key provincial posts. The Ch'ing rulers had become quite trustful towards their thoroughly indoctrinated scholar-officials. Reportedly at the recommendation of Tu Shou-t'ien (1787–1852), the imperial tutor he greatly respected, the Hsien-feng Emperor had chosen a Han Chinese poet-statesman of the Neo-Confucian persuasion – Ch'i Chün-tsao (1793–1866) – as his chief grand

¹³ TWCK, *Shu-cha*, 2.24b; *Chia-shu*, 5.39.

¹⁴ TWCK, *Shu-cha*, 5.3, 5, 17, 24, 30b. On Tseng's financial arrangements see Hu Lin-i, *Hu Wen-chung kung i-shi* (Collected papers of the late Hu Lin-i; hereafter HWCK), 15.20b–22; 25–6; 30.9–10b. Lo Ping-chang, *Lo Wen-chung kung tsou-i* (Memorials of Lo Ping-chang), 11.53–4; 13.35.

councillor.¹⁵ Although Ch'i retired in 1855, many of his friends of kindred outlook continued to be in the high metropolitan bureaucracy. Ch'i's successor in the Grand Council, Wen-ch'ing, a Manchu of wide experience who had been president of the Board of Revenue since 1853, recommended that Hu Lin-i be named governor of Hupei and Lo Ping-chang retained as governor of Hunan. After Wen-ch'ing's death in 1856, the emperor increasingly listened to Su-chun (1815?–1861), the ablest among the group of imperial clansmen who attended the monarch daily. The brother of Tuan-hua, another favourite imperial cousin, Su-shun was first appointed in 1854 as imperial bodyguard as well as vice-president of the Board of Works. After serving in a series of high posts, including the presidency of the Mongolian superintendency (Li-fan Yüan), he was in late 1858 also president of the Board of Revenue. Su-shun was arrogant and fearless, but he showed Han Chinese literati many kindnesses and enlisted as advisers such Hunanese talents as Kuo Sung-tao and Wang K'ai-yün. It was at Su-shun's recommendation that Tseng Kuo-fan was given the Liangkiang governor-generalship in the summer of 1860.¹⁶

Su-shun was, in his own fashion, eager to correct the flagrant abuses of government. He was more Legalist than Confucian: severity was his style. In late 1858, a case of bribery was discovered in a *chü-jen* examination at Peking. The throne, at the recommendation of Su-shun and his colleagues, decreed capital punishment for the examiner, a high Manchu official, and six alleged accomplices. Eight months after the sentences were carried out, in November 1859, Su-shun again startled the Peking bureaucracy by conducting an investigation into the government banks issuing paper money. Together with the notoriously inferior large-denomination Hsien-feng coins, paper money had been one of the desperate means by which the court sought to solve its fiscal crisis. Su-shun jailed several dozen Board of Revenue clerks accused of corruption, as well as numerous government-licensed bankers. He gained the reputation of being industrious and tough-minded. But as Kuo Sung-tao, who was in Peking at the time, later remarked, Su-shun's actions fell short of thoroughgoing reform. The Ch'ing administration's principal weaknesses, in Kuo's view, lay in the bureaucratic preoccupation with appearances and in vacillation (*man-kan*) in government policy. Reminiscent of what Tseng Kuo-fan had said of his military commanders is Kuo's apparent assumption that certain malpractices were unavoidable. 'When vacillation is accompanied by leniency,' he wrote, 'harmony at least is preserved as a

¹⁵ Hsü Shih-ch'ang, *Ch'ing-ju hsüeh-an* (Records of the scholarship of Ch'ing Confucianists), 107.19.

¹⁶ Wu Hsiang-hsiang, *Wan-Ch'ing kung-t'ing chi-shih* (True account of palace politics during the late Ch'ing), 9, citing the accounts of Wang K'ai-yün and Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng.

basis for the maintenance of morale. When vacillation is accompanied by severity, the harm done is inestimable.'¹⁷

As president of the Li-fan Yüan, Su-shun had inherited the Ming-Ch'ing imperial policy of relying on the dignity of the Son of Heaven as a principal prop in ensuring China's control of the Inner Asian tribal chieftains. It was therefore particularly difficult for him to swallow the principle of equality between the Ch'ing emperor and the 'barbarian chieftains' of European origin. Su-shun was, from all indications, the moving spirit behind the informal body of princes that wanted to rescind certain provisions of the 1858 Treaties of Tientsin and encouraged Senggerinchin to fortify the Taku estuary (see chapter 5). That Su-shun was as inflexible in foreign policy as in his handling of the corrupt Board of Revenue clerks is indicated by the fact that in his talks with the Russian envoy Ignatiev in July 1859, a month after Senggerinchin's firing on the British ships at Taku, he not only rejected any territorial concessions east of the Ussuri, but repudiated the draft treaty of Aigun, which had been negotiated in 1858 by the Tartar-general of Heilungkiang and ceded the land north of the Amur.

After Senggerinchin's forces were routed by the second Anglo-French expeditionary force in August 1860, Su-shun and his colleagues found it necessary to accept the demand for foreign ministerial residence in Peking; but even while facing disaster, they would not give in on the issue of audience with the throne without the ritual of kotow. A 'punitive war' against the British and the French was ordered. The imperial forces were quickly dispersed by allied firepower, but Su-shun meanwhile was on his way with the emperor to the vacation palace in Jehol (normally six days' journey from Peking). Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang, the only grand councillor who did not accompany the emperor, were left behind to negotiate with the Europeans.

While at Jehol, Su-shun as minister of the Imperial Household and as president of the Board of Revenue gained in power. All major decisions in foreign and domestic policy still had to be made there at the court, although there was no alternative but to allow Prince Kung and his colleagues to proceed with the implementation of the conventions of Peking that were signed in October and November 1860. After the British and French withdrew from Peking, some 6,000 of their troops remained at Taku and Tientsin. The new order in China's relations with the West was thus inaugurated in the aftermath of warfare by the officials in Peking while the court remained beyond the Wall at Jehol nursing its sense of outrage. The divergence of views between Jehol and Peking grew steadily wider as the new treaties came into operation.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 13.

The new Tsungli Yamen to handle Western relations was authorized by the throne in January 1861, and inaugurated on 31 March, and two weeks later the British and French ministers arrived to begin their residence at the capital. Although, according to the treaties, ports on the Yangtze above Chinkiang – i.e., Kiukiang and Hankow – were to be opened to foreign shipping only after the suppression of the Taipings, Prince Kung, wishing to keep the Europeans on the Ch'ing side of the civil war, had obtained imperial approval for the opening of all three ports in December 1860. Plainly the Taipings and the Niens constituted a greater threat to the dynasty than the British and the French; even the Russians were satisfied for the time being. Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang also secured imperial orders that former Catholic properties were to be restored to the church and that, as the new ports were opened, arrangements were to be made for foreign settlements at them. In pursuance of the Sino-British trade regulations of 1858, the foreign-officered inspectorate of customs was extended to all treaty ports. An edict of January 1861 approved the proposal of Hsüeh Huan, governor of Kiangsu and acting imperial commissioner of trade (*t'ung-shang ta-ch'en*), that Horatio Nelson Lay, who had been named inspector-general of customs in 1858, be confirmed in that post. Lay's browbeating tactics as interpreter for Lord Elgin had earned him the hatred of Ch'ing officials, but he was in fact the nominee of Bruce, the British minister, even though the Rules of Trade of 1858 had provided that foreign governments were not to interfere regarding personnel of the inspectorate. Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang saw advantages in Lay's appointment, since Peking was in another financial crisis in early 1861, with the Board of Revenue's treasury down to 300,000 taels. Although 40 per cent of the customs revenue levied on trade in foreign vessels was to pay off the indemnities to Britain and France, it was believed that the Europeans, for this very reason, would try to maximize customs collections and that the new revenue would be larger than that to be expected of the native custom-houses – 'which frequently under-report and conceal embezzlement, and . . . cannot be thoroughly investigated'.¹⁸ During 1860, Lay had already established new custom houses at British-occupied Canton and at Swatow. He soon took leave to return to England for reasons of health, but Robert Hart (1835–1911), who acted for him during his absence, proceeded to work out further regulations and to establish new custom houses at the other ports.

Unwilling to face all these realities, especially while European troops were still in Tientsin, the Hsien-feng Emperor repeatedly postponed his return to the capital. He never did return, for he fell ill in February 1861

¹⁸ *IWSM* Hsien-feng (hereafter *IWSM-HF*), 70.3.

(probably with tuberculosis). He improved somewhat in early summer, but collapsed unexpectedly on 20 August. He regained consciousness only long enough to dictate two edicts before he died, two days later: one making Tsai-ch'un, his five-year-old only son, the heir apparent, the other authorizing four adjutant-generals (Tsai-yüan, Tuan-hua, Su-shun and Ching-shou, all imperial clansmen) and four grand councillors who were at Jehol to 'advise and assist [*tsan-hsiang*] in all affairs of government'. The authority received by the four men could not be construed as 'regency' – either *she-cheng* (in charge of government) as in the case of Dorgon during the Shun-chih Emperor's minority or *fu-cheng* (associates in government) as in the case of Oboi and three other officials during the K'ang-hsi Emperor's minority. (It may be conjectured that the eight men could not agree on a stronger description of their role. Su-shun, the most astute among them, was a junior imperial clansman and not qualified to be regent in any case.) Nonetheless, the eight men were so confident of their status as 'officials designated by the late emperor on his deathbed' (*ku-ming chih ch'en*) that they regarded themselves as the child monarch's guardians and looked forward to making decisions on his behalf.

The authority bestowed on them was incomplete, however. Authorized merely to 'advise and assist', they could not legitimately employ the imperial seals which would substitute for the usual 'vermilion endorsements' in the monarch's own hand. They had to invoke the inherent authority of the two dowager empresses who, owing to their maternal status, could properly use the seals on behalf of the child-monarch. The Hsien-feng Emperor had been survived by his 25-year-old empress, née Nihuru, who was kindly and not ambitious. But it was his concubine, née Yehonala, later Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi (1835–1908), who bore Tsai-ch'un, now Son of Heaven. As was proper, an edict of 22 August gave the title of dowager empress to Yehonala as well as to Nihuru, the senior consort. In audience with the two dowager empresses, the eight advisers suggested that they henceforth prepare all edicts and rescripts, to be endorsed by the two imperial seals in the possession of the empresses. However, Yehonala had had experience sorting out memorials for the late emperor – the empresses insisted on seeing all draft edicts and rescripts as well as memorials before the seals could be applied to any documents; and also that appointment of high officials, to be nominated by the advisers, must receive the empresses' approval. The eight advisers reluctantly agreed. The empresses, however, were not to hold open court and were to give audiences only to the eight men.

This procedure was not incorrect, for there had never been any occasion in earlier Ch'ing history when a dowager empress ever held court.

However, there were many such precedents in previous dynasties, and Chinese tradition could be invoked. Officials in Peking now initiated a movement which would enable the dowager empresses actually to rule – or ‘attend to government affairs from behind the screen’ (*ch'ui-lien t'ing-cheng*), as the practice was known in history.¹⁹ Prince Kung, who undoubtedly was behind the movement, was finally allowed to visit the Jehol palace. A letter from a Grand Council secretary in Jehol at the time says the prince managed to have audience with the two empresses and assuaged their fears of the Europeans.²⁰ On 14 September, three days after Prince Kung had departed for Peking, a memorial arrived at Jehol from a censor, proposing the empresses should rule ‘from behind the screen’ and that, furthermore, one or two princes should be designated ‘to support and aid [*fu-pi*] in all affairs of government’. The eight advisers, incensed, prepared an edict reprimanding the memorialist and declaring that under the Ch'ing ‘there had never been the usage of the dowager empress attending to government affairs from behind the screen’. Yehonala objected to the edict, but after a delay for a day and a half, nevertheless consented to put the imperial seals on it.

Su-shun and his colleagues apparently believed their own status to be unassailable. It was now announced that the imperial cortège accompanying the late emperor's coffin was to depart for Peking on 26 October and the new monarch's enthronement to take place on 11 November. Su-shun very likely had reached a secret understanding with Sheng-pao, the Manchu general, who had come to Jehol on 18 September, ostensibly to pay his respects to the imperial catafalque. Sheng-pao was the leading general recalled in the summer of 1860 from campaigns against the Nien to help defend Peking against the British and French. Although defeated by the Europeans, he still retained large forces just outside the capital. Possibly he was playing a double game and had promised support to the eight advisers; but he deserted them when the time came.

The two dowager empresses, accompanying the child monarch, returned to Peking on 1 November. Prince Kung was summoned immediately, and the next day during an audience with Prince Kung, Kueiliang, Wen-hsiang and Grand Secretary Chou Tsu-p'ei, the empresses handed them an edict said to have been drafted by Prince Ch'un (I-huan), a younger half-brother of the Hsien-feng Emperor, who had married Yehonala's sister. The edict charged the eight advisers, especially Tsai-yüan, Tuan-hua and Su-shun, with arrogating imperial authority, deceiv-

¹⁹ Lien-sheng Yang, ‘Female rulers in imperial China’, *HJAS*, 23, 50 (1960–1).

²⁰ Kao Lao, ‘Ch'ing-kung pi-shih’ (Secret history of the Ch'ing palace), *Tung-fang tsa-chih*, 9, 1 (July 1912, 18th article separately paginated) 3–4; see also Great Britain, Foreign office, General Correspondence, China, FO 17/354, p. 203, Bruce to Russell.

ing the late emperor, and giving wrong advice on foreign policy. Reportedly, while this audience was in progress, Tsai-yüan and Tuan-hua, who were supposed to be accompanying the slow-moving catafalque, suddenly arrived on the scene, shouting 'The dowager empresses are not supposed to give audience to outside officials!' They were seized by Prince Kung's guards, however. The same evening, Su-shun, who was with the cortège some distance from Peking, was arrested by troops led by Prince Ch'un. On 7 November, at a meeting of members of the metropolitan bureaucracy designated by the dowager empresses (including the top officials of the Grand Secretariat and of the 'six boards and nine ministries', as well as Hanlin academicians and censors), it was recommended that Tsai-yüan, Tuan-hua and Su-shun be sentenced to death by slicing. An edict the next day accused them of falsely claiming that the late monarch had named them advisers to his successor and charged that Su-shun had attempted to instigate differences between the two dowager empresses and had once sat down on the throne himself. The recommended punishments were reduced to 'committing suicide' for Tsai-yüan and Tuan-hua and decapitation for Su-shun – all carried out immediately. The other five advisers were recommended for banishment, but most of the sentences were commuted to mere dismissal from office.

On 2 November, the day after the two empresses returned, two memorials were received, begging them to rule. The empresses at once asked the same group of officials who were to deliberate on the crimes of the eight advisers to consider the arrangements for the imperial mothers ruling 'from behind the screen'. The empresses gave Prince Kung an eminent place in government, with the high-sounding title of 'deliberative prince' (*i-cheng wang*). Conferred in 1622 by the founder of the Manchu state, Nurhachi, on his sons and kinsmen who were leaders of the Eight Banners, this title had not been used since the Ch'ien-lung reign (1736–95).²¹ It was now revived without regard for the original usage to give Prince Kung special distinction. He was, moreover, appointed the chief grand councillor and also minister of the Imperial Household and presiding controller of the Imperial Clan Court. But Yehonala saw to it that the dowager empresses had the final say on imperial pronouncements and appointments; they not only held on to the imperial seals but were also to hold court for all officials in the presence of the child monarch – in other words, assume the regency. Regulations regarding holding court 'behind the screen' were defined by edict on 9 November. Even a memorial on military affairs, for example, was to be considered by the

²¹ Silas H. L. Wu, *Communication and imperial control in China; evolution of the palace memorial system, 1693–1735*, 10–11.

deliberative prince and the other grand councillors only after prior perusal by the dowager empresses. The imperial reply was to be drafted only after instructions were received in audience. When officials who received provincial posts came to court for the normally required imperial audience, the two dowager empresses were to hold court together with the emperor, sitting at the back of his throne behind an eight-panelled screen of yellow gauze.

On 11 November, the young emperor was enthroned under the new reign title of T'ung-chih. Thomas Wade, sinologue and diplomat, wrote that according to Wen-hsiang, the phrase was an abbreviation of the maxim *t'ung-kuei yü chih* from the *Shu-ching* or *Classic of documents*, meaning in the context that the government and the people both desired 'to return to (or see restored) *together* a state of *order*'. The two empresses held court for the first time on 2 December. A kneeling official in the spacious throne hall looked up to see the child emperor on his huge throne on the imperial dais, flanked by Prince Kung on his left and Prince Ch'un, who had been made an adjutant-general, on his right. But it was the yellow, almost transparent panels behind the throne that were particularly awe-inspiring.²²

Yehonala was to be China's real ruler for forty-seven years. Fortunately for the Ch'ing dynasty, her collaborator in the *coup d'état*, Prince Kung, was at first given a comparatively free hand in domestic administration as well as foreign policy. Prince Kung (1833–98) was, by all accounts, spoiled and avaricious, having early yielded to the temptation to receive bribes for the numerous appointments he was able to arrange. But he was young and capable of quick decision and, above all, had the good sense to rely on the counsel of a Manchu statesman of remarkable sagacity and devotion to duty – Wen-hsiang (1815–76). The son of an indigent official in Manchuria, Wen-hsiang, who had a *chin-shih* degree, started his official career at the Board of Works in the mid-1840s. Conscientious performance, as well as the fortuitous circumstance of being detached to work for imperial princes in charge of military affairs in Peking during 1853 (the year of the Taiping northern expedition), led to his talents being recognized by several high dignitaries and eventually by Su-shun. A series of rapid promotions culminated in his being made a grand councillor and vice-president of the Board of Revenue in 1859. When the monarch left Peking in September 1860, Wen-hsiang was asked to be acting general-commandant of the gendarmerie of Peking, as well as the deputy to Prince Kung in peace negotiations. He proved to be the real architect of the new Ch'ing foreign policy and was described by Western officials as the

²² See the eye-witness account in Weng T'ung-ho, *Weng Wen-kung kung jib-chi* (Weng T'ung-ho's diaries), *hsin-yu* (1861) 118.

'working member' of the Tsungli Yamen. After the *coup d'état*, he emerged as a pivotal figure in the Grand Council as well. With his genius for reconciliation and his industriousness and integrity, he not only continued to be relied on almost completely by Prince Kung, but was highly regarded by Tz'u-hsi also.

Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang had to conciliate a wing of the metropolitan bureaucracy that, despite its acceptance of compromise with the despised Europeans, continued to specialize in a high moral tone in its pronouncements on policies and personnel. Despite the pragmatism required by the internal war and external peace, the tendency that started with the first two or three years of the Hsien-feng reign had survived – honours were to be given to officials particularly respected for their scholarship in Sung Neo-Confucianism. At the suggestion of Tu Shou-t'ien, his venerated tutor, the Hsien-feng Emperor had invited to Peking the aged Hunanese scholar T'ang Chien (1778–1861), famous for his defence of those Ch'ing scholars who followed Chu Hsi's teachings literally. Subsequently, two grand secretaries of like mind, Weng Hsin-ts'un (1791–1862) and Chia Chen (1798–1874), though they had little decision-making power, were nevertheless influential among metropolitan and even provincial officials because they often served as examiners in the metropolitan examinations and could claim many of the successful candidates to be their 'students'. It was particularly appropriate, in 1861–2, for the empress dowager, whose authority depended on the Confucian principle of 'filial obedience', to emulate the high moral tone of the early Hsien-feng years. Almost immediately after the *coup d'état*, Wo-jen, the famous Neo-Confucian theorist of Mongol origin, was appointed president of the censorate. In the following year, he was promoted to grand secretary, serving concurrently as the imperial tutor. Li T'ang-chieh (1798–1865), who, like Wo-jen, was known for his scholarship in Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism as well as exemplary personal conduct,²³ was summoned from retirement in Honan to be president of the censorate and grand councillor.

While the new T'ung-chih reign required at least the window-dressing of orthodoxy, Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang were urgently concerned with the military threat that confronted the dynasty – not so much now from the Europeans as from the Taipings and the Niens. As early as the autumn of 1860, during the peace negotiations with the Europeans, they were already considering, although cautiously, whether one or another of the European powers might not assist the Ch'ing against the rebels. They accepted

²³ Li T'ang-chieh, *Li Wen-ch'ing kung i-shu* (The writings of the late Li T'ang-chieh), esp. *ch'uan* 2, *Sbu shuo* (Letters and essays).

Ignatiev's offer (first made in 1858) to supply the Ch'ing with rifles, cannon and military instructors, but only on the condition that the training be given not in Peking but in Kiakhta, where selected bannermen could be sent. They were uncertain whether the Ch'ing should also take up Ignatiev's offer to send a small Russian fleet to help attack Nanking, but they were sufficiently impressed by the opportunity to recommend to the throne that the matter be referred to Tseng Kuo-fan and other officials for deliberation. Tseng and others opposed it, however, and Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang were also warned by Thomas Wade of the British legation that any European power that sent forces to China's interior might never withdraw. Nevertheless, it occurred to the two Manchu statesmen that a fleet of Western-built gunboats, owned by the Ch'ing, could be used to bombard the Taiping capital. In June 1861, the French legation renewed an offer by the French commander at Tientsin that their country could help the Ch'ing to procure such a fleet. Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang decided, however, to accept instead the plan initiated by H. N. Lay and Robert Hart, involving British gunboats. With Bruce's knowledge, Hart suggested to the Tsungli Yamen that a dozen steamships, costing less than a million taels, could be maintained by an increase in the customs duties on opium as well as an excise on the drug when distributed. Hart also gave assurance that the ships could be manned by Chinese and even Manchu crewmen.²⁴ The court at Jehol, responding to the Tsungli Yamen's persuasive memorial, approved the plan in July 1861. After a delay to secure sufficient initial funds, in early 1862 Hart was able to write Lay to go ahead with the purchase of a fleet. Thus originated the famous Lay-Osborn Flotilla that was to create a diplomatic crisis the following year.

Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang continued their conciliatory stance towards the Europeans. Local officials at the newly opened treaty ports might refuse to cooperate with Westerners and their consuls, but pressure was always put on them by Peking.²⁵ In addition to the old 'commissioner of trade', a post now held concurrently by the governor of Kiangsu (and later by the governor-general of Liangkiang), a new commissioner of trade was created for the three new treaty ports of north China. Ch'ung-hou, the new commissioner, arranged with imperial approval to have some troops at Tientsin, as well as select bannermen sent there from Peking, trained by British officers under General Charles Staveley. During 1862, several hundred bannermen thus learned the use of Western small arms,

²⁴ Hart's petitions and memoranda in Chinese are preserved in *Hai-fang tang* (Archives on maritime defence; hereafter, *HFT*), *Kou-mai ch'uan-p'ao* (Procurement of ships and guns); see esp. 1. 10-18, 21-2, 76-7.

²⁵ Britten Dean, *China and Great Britain: the diplomacy of commercial relations, 1860-1864*, chs. III and VI.

and, upon their return to the capital, formed the nucleus of a select army directly controlled by the throne, the Peking Field Force (*Shen-chi ying*). Wen-hsiang, who was for a time commissioner in charge of the force, later personally served as one of its seven commandants. For some reason, the size of the force was restricted at first to under 6,000 men and the training programme at Tientsin was maintained for only four or five years.

The Ch'ing had to ensure that the Europeans refrained from aiding the Taipings and for this reason the dynasty tended to make concessions in disputes regarding trade and evangelism. The Treaty of Tientsin, in opening the ports of Newchwang and Chefoo, had, upon Chinese insistence, prohibited foreign vessels from trading in soy beans and beancake which were the staples of the Manchurian trade of the Kiangsu and Chekiang seagoing junks. Western shipowners and their agents clamoured for entrance to this trade, however, and in January 1862 the Tsungli Yamen yielded to Bruce's demand that the prohibition be removed. Again, after several early and violent anti-missionary outbreaks (including a Kweichow case of November 1861 and a Kiangsi case of March 1862), the court issued a proclamation to be widely distributed in the empire calling strongly for fair treatment for missionaries and their converts (see chapter 11). Nevertheless, in the 'regulations concerning the protection of converts' transmitted to the French minister in the summer of 1862, Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang saw to it that the provision was included that ecclesiastics should be warned not to 'interfere in public affairs'²⁶ – thus hoping to preserve, as far as possible, China's administrative integrity within the limitation of the treaties.

Foreign arms and the Taipings' defeat

The emergence of the Anhwei Army (Huai-chün) in 1862 marked the extension of Tseng Kuo-fan's military system to the Shanghai area. But compared with the Hunan Army, the Anhwei Army was to be the stronger force, not only because of the qualities of its officers and men but also because of the Western munitions available to them. Eight of the Anhwei Army's initial thirteen battalions were actually transferred from the Hunan Army. Among the Hunan Army commanders thus detached, two proved to be particularly valuable: Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i, a former Taiping who had surrendered to Tseng Kuo-ch'üan at Anking, and Kuo Sung-lin, a Hunanese who had begun life as a carpenter. Liu Ming-ch'uan (1836–96), who proved to be one of the best Ch'ing generals of the period, was a

²⁶ *IWISM T'ung-chih* (hereafter *IWISM-TC*), 9.28b.

former salt smuggler. He and the other Anhwei commanders had brought along fiery fighters of the hilly Western Villages (Hsi-hsiang) near Ho-fei, an area of strong lineage cohesiveness.²⁷ The more uncouth of Li Hung-chang's commanders proved to be more adaptable than the scholar-commanders in the use of Western weapons. As early as June 1862, Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i had converted one of his units into a 'foreign arms company' (*yang-ch'iang tui*) with one hundred muskets and rifles. By September, the Anhwei Army had at least 1,000 such small arms, purchased from foreign firms. The latter could not readily supply artillery, however. Through 1862, Liu Ming-ch'uan's 'anxious search for genuine [Western] cannon failed to obtain any'. However, by mid-1863, when the Anhwei Army had grown to 40,000 men by fresh recruitment from Anhwei and by absorbing surrendered Taipings, it did come into possession of a number of modern cannon, as well as at least 10,000 rifles. Liu Ming-ch'uan employed a few French gunners, and there were some twenty Westerners who were drill-masters of the Anhwei Army's 'foreign arms companies'.

While the Anhwei Army came to possess some Western arms, the greatest assistance it received in early offensives against enemy towns was from the cannon manned by foreign officers of the Ever Victorious Army (which also had Chinese riflemen more expert than the Anhwei Army's own). Although the British generally refrained from directly engaging in the war after May 1862, they found a convenient instrument in Ward, as a Ch'ing officer who now took instructions from Li Hung-chang. Although young and rash, Ward apparently had the leadership capacity to keep some 140 foreign officers together. Vice-Admiral Hope, once hostile to Ward, now gave him British munitions including siege guns. Ward's riflemen, transported in steamers jointly owned by him and the merchant Yang Fang, also helped in Li's quick victories in July and August of 1862. 'Ward is indeed dauntless in battle and he has all the good weapons of the Westerners', Li reported to Tseng Kuo-fan.²⁸

Li had meanwhile taken over Hsüeh Huan's post, becoming acting governor of Kiangsu in April, and governor in December 1862. In July he inherited the likin system from Wu Hsü (who continued to be financial commissioner until December). While the receipts of the Imperial Maritime Customs were earmarked for the Anglo-French forces guarding Shanghai and for the Ever Victorious Army, the likin receipts, which

²⁷ Ono Shinji, 'Waigun no kihonteki seikaku o megutte' (On the fundamental character of the Anhwei Army), *Rekishigaku kenkyū*, 245 (Oct. 1960) 27-30. Kwang-Ching Liu, 'The Confucian as patriot and pragmatist: Li Hung-chang's formative years, 1823-1866', *HJAS*, 30 (1970) 14-22.

²⁸ Li Hung-chang, *Li Wen-chung kung ch'üan-chi* (Complete papers of Li Hung-chang; hereafter *LWCK*), *P'eng-liao han-kao* (Letters to friends and colleagues), 1.54.

increased under Li, made possible the growth of the Anhwei Army as well as assistance to Tseng Kuo-fan and Tseng Kuo-ch'uan. Unlike Hsüeh Huan, Li made it a point not to encourage the Europeans to expand their role in the war. He was aware of a proposal discussed among foreigners in Shanghai that the country immediately surrounding the port should be put under the foreign settlement's government. While loyal to the Ch'ing throne, Li was nevertheless very conscious of the dignity of an entity which he called 'China' (*Chung-kuo* or *Chung-t'u*). He wrote Tseng Kuo-fan that 'no matter how urgent the military situation, I would not request them [the Europeans] to send forth columns to help us . . . [To ask them to do so] not only is humiliating but will also make them more arrogant.'²⁹ It was in this context that Li initially used the phrase 'self-strengthening'.

While desiring to avoid further European intervention in the war, Li nevertheless valued the help of the Ever Victorious Army, which although led by Westerners was effectively under Chinese command, a point worth noting in detail. History abounded in precedents of 'barbarian officers' serving in imperial Chinese armies, and the case of Ward, who was happy not only with his financial remuneration but also with his Green Standard rank of colonel, indicated that American or European personnel could be kept under Ch'ing control. After Ward died in September 1862, a plan for his successor Burgevine to lead the Ever Victorious Army to attack Nanking, though approved by Tseng Kuo-fan and by the throne, did not materialize because Burgevine had a violent quarrel with Yang Fang over finances. The expedition to Nanking had to be cancelled, and the leadership of the Sino-foreign contingent eventually went to Gordon. Li Hung-chang realized that the foreign officers of the force could never be commanded by a Chinese. In mid-January 1863, he came to an agreement with General Staveley that Gordon, who was to be on leave from British service, would be appointed a Green Standard brigade general and the co-commander of the Ever Victorious Army, along with a Green Standard commander who had worked with Ward. Li pledged regular payment to the force's officers and men as well as for the munitions to be supplied by the British. He insisted, however, that the force should be reduced from 4,500 to 3,000 men and that Gordon should be subject to Li's personal command. The major British condition to which Li acceded was that the movement of the force outside Shanghai's thirty-mile radius would require the prior agreement of British authorities. Yet in February, when Li wanted the Ever Victorious Army to besiege T'ai-ts'ang (north-east of Shanghai and outside the thirty-mile limit), Li prevailed over Staveley's opposition. Gordon took over command of the

²⁹ *Ibid.* 1.52; 2.47.

force in March 1863. Although he was soon asked by Li to participate in offensive actions that took him to Soochow and beyond, the British did not object.

Most officers of the Ever Victorious Army, rowdy Americans, resented Gordon's efforts to discipline them. Mutiny broke out at least twice and unrest continued. Gordon impressed his subordinates, however, with personal bravery no less than Ward's – and he was a superior tactician. He had inherited Ward's iron low-draught paddle-wheel *Hyson* (which carried a 32-pounder on a moving platform at her bow), and he had, moreover, new large British guns. Beginning in January 1863, the Anhwei Army had been attempting to rescue the surrendered Taipings besieged by the Loyal King's troops at Ch'ang-shu, a major centre of grain supply only thirty miles north of Soochow. It was not until Gordon arrived in April with his howitzers and Cohorn mortars that the siege was lifted. The Anhwei Army was then itself besieging T'ai-ts'ang, the strategic city *en route* to Soochow. In May, Gordon arrived on the *Hyson* and breached T'ai-ts'ang's walls after four hours of bombardment, enabling Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i's men to occupy the city. It was no wonder that Li Hung-chang became a permanent convert to Western technology. He wrote to Tseng Kuo-fan elatedly: 'In the path of the cannon's power, nothing remained intact . . . [Western artillery] as a means of defence or attack is unequalled under heaven.'³⁰ 'Humanity might have desired a smaller destruction', Gordon reflected in a private letter, but he believed that his operations would hasten Soochow's surrender and the end of the war.³¹

'Chinese Gordon' was important not only for the Victorian heroism he symbolized. His crucial contribution to the anti-Taiping war lay in the fact that his artillery corps, combined with Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army, caused the Loyal King to retain a large number of his forces in the perimeter of Soochow, troops which otherwise would have been available for a large-scale attack against Tseng Kuo-ch'üan outside Nanking.

As it was, Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's men narrowly escaped disaster. He and his 20,000 troops had arrived in late May 1862 at a salient only a few miles south of Nanking. Yet the Taiping capital was impregnable because of its heavy walls and fortifications and difficult to isolate because of the river and hills that surrounded it. The Loyal King, having left the Shanghai area for Soochow in June, prepared for a counter-attack from Nanking. This began in October, when he arrived with a huge force from Soochow,

³⁰ *Ibid.* 3, 16.

³¹ Cited in Richard J. Smith, 'Barbarian officers of imperial China: Ward, Gordon, and the Taiping Rebellion' (University of California PhD dissertation, Davis 1972), 246.

followed by men from Chekiang. Enfeebled by a severe epidemic and repeatedly repulsed, Tseng's forces were on the verge of collapse by January 1863. But the Loyal King remained distracted by concern for the Soochow area and the need for food supplies from Anhwei north of the River.³² He returned to Nanking in mid-July 1863 with funds and grain, and for more than a month repeatedly defeated Tseng Kuo-ch'üan with his 'foreign arms corps'. But in mid-September he hurried back to Soochow, this time to stay till late November, shortly before its fall. Since without Gordon and his artillery, the Anhwei Army could not have threatened Soochow so soon, the Loyal King was not exaggerating when later, in his famous 'confession', he repeatedly dwelt on the devastating effects of the 'foreign devils' cannon.³³

Ironically, with Gordon's help, the Hunan and Anhwei Armies enabled the Ch'ing dynasty to cope with the Taipings without the kind of foreign assistance for which it might have had to pay with its administrative integrity. As the threat of the Niens grew in Shantung and Honan through 1862 and the spring of 1863, the court was increasingly anxious to see that the Taipings were defeated quickly. In June 1862, at the urging of Bruce, the Tsungli Yamen obtained the throne's approval for the British and the French to train Chinese troops in Shanghai. In July, Li Hung-chang reluctantly turned over a thousand of Hsüeh Huan's worthless men to the British – and another six hundred to the French. But Li pleaded with the Tsungli Yamen not to expand such plans, for fear that the Europeans would 'gradually encroach upon [Ch'ing] authority'. Following Li's concept, an edict of November required that 'the training of officers' (*lien-chiang*) be stressed in such programmes, since Chinese troops 'must not be allowed to serve under foreign command'.³⁴ As late as March 1863, General Staveley proposed during his visit to Tseng Kuo-fan at Anking that the Chinese troops to be trained by the British in Shanghai be increased to 10,000 men. Staveley had in mind a plan to employ these 10,000 men to attack Nanking in coordination with the flotilla that H. N. Lay was fitting out, expected to arrive in late summer. Lay himself returned as early as May and, in his discussion with Li Hung-chang over finances, divulged that more than six hundred British officers and men, who were to enter Ch'ing service, were to come with eight gunboats. Li immediately noted that this differed from Hart's original proposal as modified by Tseng Kuo-fan in early 1862 – namely, that the flotilla was to be manned

³² Chien Yu-wen, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ch'üan-shih* (Complete history of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom), 3.2136.

³³ Li Hsiu-ch'eng, *Chung-wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu pen* (The Loyal King Li Hsiu-ch'eng's own account: the restored version), 41–2, 45, 46b–47b.

³⁴ *HFT, Kou-mai ch'uan-p'ao*, 1.188; *IW/SM-TC*, 10. 13–14.

chiefly by the Hunanese waterforce, while British personnel would merely provide training and assistance. Li warned the Tsungli Yamen that Lay was 'arrogant, dangerous, deceitful'. But the question was whether Peking was so impatient for victory as to allow Lay and Staveley their way.

Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang were aghast when, in early June, Lay produced in Peking his contract with Captain Sherard Osborn, who had been detached from the Royal Navy to command the Chinese fleet. According to the contract, Osborn would obey the orders of the Ch'ing emperor only when they were 'conveyed direct to Lay', and, moreover, Lay could 'refuse to be the medium of any orders of the reasonableness of which he [Lay] is not satisfied'. Besides presenting this contract as an accomplished fact, Lay demanded that he himself, as inspector-general of customs, receive duty payments which until then had gone to the 'customs banks' designated by the Chinese superintendents of customs; and, furthermore, that he should be in charge of disbursements from the customs revenue, not only for the new flotilla but also to all foreign-trained Chinese contingents, including Gordon's. Lay threatened to withdraw all foreign personnel of the customs if this condition were not met. 'Why should the inspector-general', he wrote the Yamen, 'collect duties for the sake of the local officials?' The Yamen wrote Li Hung-chang that Lay's intentions were 'to use the present undertaking [i.e., the prospective use of the gunboats against the Taipings] to turn over China's military and financial authority [*ping-ch'üan li-ch'üan*] entirely to the foreign countries.'³⁵

Lay had overlooked the fact that the Ch'ing fortunes in the Taiping war had vastly improved. Moreover, having been accustomed earlier to such spineless officials as Ho Kuei-ch'ing and Hsüeh Huan, Lay failed to realize that a new type of provincial administrator had emerged. Tseng and Li not only had viable armies and vigorous ideas, they also had the confidence of the court. Lay enlisted the support of Bruce, who believed the Ch'ing central authority stood to gain if customs revenue as well as the foreign-trained military forces were taken out of provincial hands. On 16 June 1863, Bruce proposed to the Tsungli Yamen (1) that 'the Imperial government take into its own hands [through Lay] the Customs revenues', and (2) that Chinese forces led by British personnel, such as Gordon, while operating jointly with the provincial governors, should 'not be under their control'.³⁶ Bruce's proposals were categorically rejected by

³⁵ HFT, *Kou-mai ch'üan-p'ao*, 1.156-8, 161. Lü Shih-ch'iang, *Chung-kuo tsao-ch'i ti lun-ch'üan ching-ying* (Early steamship projects in China), 80-2.

³⁶ Stanley F. Wright, *Hart and the Chinese customs*, 243.

Prince Kung, whereupon the British minister took a 'pleasure trip' to Mongolia, leaving Lay and Hart to negotiate on their own. Upon Hart's advice, a set of regulations was worked out to make Osborn 'assistant commander' (*pang t'ung tsung t'ung*) under a Chinese fleet commander to be appointed by Tseng Kuo-fan; both commanders were to be under the authority of Tseng and Li. These provisions received the throne's sanction, but Li complained that if the fleet was to be manned by six hundred British sailors, the Chinese commanders could not possibly have real control. Tseng wrote to Prince Kung that it was difficult for the Chinese to learn to use the ships unless they actually manned them. But the Yamen seems to have been satisfied, albeit reluctantly, with nominal Ch'ing control. It wrote Li in August that unless Nanking could be recovered before Osborn's arrival, 'it will be impossible under the circumstances not to order the warships to join the attack'. Since an imperial edict had stipulated that the fleet be under the command of Tseng and Li, the Yamen hoped that the two officials would make plans to exercise control and recover from Lay and Osborn 'the prerogative which is ours'.³⁷

Tseng and Li would probably have had to accommodate themselves to Peking's wishes somehow, since the Hunan Army was not to recover Nanking for many months. But Osborn, who arrived in September with the ships, resented being 'assistant commander' to a Chinese, regardless of who had the actual power. In Peking he was egged on by Lay to take an adamant stand. On 18 October, Osborn gave the Yamen forty-eight hours to confirm his contract with Lay or he would 'immediately disband the force'. When the Yamen failed to reply by the 20th, Bruce wrote to Prince Kung that he could not allow the Ch'ing government to take over the fleet without referring the matter to London – thus creating the possibility that the gunboats would fall into other hands. Wen-hsiang believed, however, that Bruce really would not risk seeing the ships go to the Taipings. He sought the mediation of the American minister, Anson Burlingame, declaring the Ch'ing court would rather 'retire beyond the Great Wall' than accept Osborn's terms.³⁸ The solution was finally worked out that the ships were to return to England and be sold there. The Tsungli Yamen gave generous compensation to Lay and Osborn but dismissed the former as inspector-general of customs, in favour of Hart. The modernization of China's navy was delayed, but greater foreign influence in China's military and financial affairs was avoided.

Gordon, however, continued to assist the Anhwei Army, although he was more than once repelled at the execution by his Chinese colleague,

³⁷ HFT, *Kou-mai sh'uan-p'ao*, 1.203–4. LWCK, *P'eng-liao han-kao*, 4.5b.

³⁸ Wright, *Hart*, 247. W. A. P. Martin, *A cycle of Cathay*, 232.

Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i, of surrendered Taiping leaders, an act which he felt was against the rules of civilized warfare. After eight Taiping leaders, who defended Soochow but decided to surrender, had been executed by Li Hung-chang, Gordon regarded his own honour as compromised because he had seemed, in a personal interview, to guarantee their safety. Enraged, he almost led his force to attack Li, but was persuaded by Robert Hart and others that Li had not committed 'premeditated treachery', and he took the field for Li again.³⁹ However, discipline within the Ever Victorious Army had meanwhile degenerated. After it assisted in besieging a few more cities, the last being Ch'ang-chou in May 1864, Gordon and Li agreed to disband the force. Similar instructions shortly arrived from London. Gordon was delighted to receive the Green Standard title of general-in-chief (*t'i-tu*), but he continued to refuse an imperial gift of 10,000 taels.

Meanwhile, the recovery of Ningpo in May 1862 was the outcome of a dual initiative, by Europeans on the one hand and a treaty port 'barbarian expert', on the other. Chang Ching-ch'ü, the Ningpo taotai at the time the port was won by the Taipings in December 1861, had fled on a French ship to Ting-hai, reportedly with large funds from the customs treasury. He organized a small force of 300 men, called the 'Green turban mercenaries' (*Lü-t'ou yung*, known later as *Ch'ang-an chün*, or the Ever Secure Army). The former taotai had, moreover, obtained the services of Apak (Pu Hsing-yu), the notorious Cantonese pirate who had been made a Green Standard major and commanded eighty pirate ships and a large body of 'Cantonese mercenaries' (*Kuang yung*).⁴⁰ This bizarre array of forces was ready for action, when, on 10 May, Captain Roderick Dew, RN, claiming that foreign shipping had been shelled by Taiping cannon, opened fire on Ningpo from his four British gunboats, assisted by two French warships. Some 300 British and 70 French troops moved their artillery on top of the city wall, and under heavy shelling the Taipings evacuated the city. Anglo-French troops as well as the Chinese mercenaries entered the gates, pillaged and occupied the city for the ex-taotai, who soon exacted donations from the merchants to finance further joint Sino-Western operations.

Li Hung-chang, who had been asked by the throne to help in north Chekiang, sent several hundred men of Ward's Ever Victorious Army to garrison Ningpo. Dew's officers also undertook to train the 'Green turban mercenaries', who eventually grew to 1,000 men. Meanwhile a

³⁹ H. B. Morse, *The international relations of the Chinese empire*, 2.106.

⁴⁰ Chien Yu-wen, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo tien-chih t'ung-kao* (A comprehensive study of the Taiping institutions), 2.1057-61. Tso Tsung-t'ang, *Tso Wen-hsiang kung ch'üan-chi* (Complete collection of Tso Tsung-t'ang's papers; hereafter *TWHK*), *Tsou-kao* (Memorials), 2.3-4.

French lieutenant assisted by Prosper Giquel, commissioner of customs at Ningpo, organized a Chinese contingent called the 'Patterned turban mercenaries' (*Hua-i'ou yung*), also known as *Ch'ang-chieh chün* (the Ever Triumphant Army), and identified by foreigners as the 'Franco-Chinese force'. It soon grew to 2,000 and at one time even to 3,000 men.⁴¹ By late December 1862, these several contingents were converging on the wine-making city of Shao-hsing, commanded by Ensign Paul d'Aiguebelle; they recovered Shao-hsing on 15 March.

Tso Tsung-t'ang felt it was dangerous to have Chinese troops led by Europeans lest 'the guests [i.e., the foreigners] should grow in strength, while the hosts are enfeebled'.⁴² The new Ningpo taotai provided customs funds but planned only for some 2,000 Chinese troops and 150 European officers. As with the force of Ward and Gordon, the principal concern of many foreign officers, as well as their Chinese troops, was the looting that followed the capture of each town.

Tso in the end utilized Westerners and the Chinese they trained as adjuncts to his own forces. In the summer of 1863, when d'Aiguebelle had difficulties recovering some 'debts' from the Shao-hsing gentry who had pledged large sums to his force, Hu Kuang-yung (1825?-1885), the wealthy Hangchow merchant banker, arranged a meeting for him with Tso Tsung-t'ang. Hu had served Tso since 1862 as a purchasing agent for supplies. He arranged it so that d'Aiguebelle would not lose dignity yet would comply with Tso's conditions for accepting his services. Although Tso had recently been made governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang and d'Aiguebelle, aged thirty-two, was only a Green Standard colonel, Tso excused him from kneeling and instead shook hands with him. On his part, d'Aiguebelle returned for a second audience 'with his sideburns shaven, to show that he does not wish to be barbarian'.

In attacking cities, d'Aiguebelle's guns like Gordon's were invaluable (especially in creating a crucial breach of some thirty-five feet in Hangchow's wall three days before that city's fall on 31 March 1864).⁴³ After d'Aiguebelle returned to France with an imperial reward of ten thousand taels and the title of general-in-chief, Prosper Giquel succeeded to the command of the Franco-Chinese contingent, but in October 1864 he and Tso agreed that it should be disbanded.

To stress the Western assistance to the Ch'ing cause is not to deny the central role played by Tseng Kuo-fan. Tseng masterminded the general strategy, and the forces under his personal direction defended a long arc

⁴¹ Kuo T'ing-i, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih*, 2, Appendix, p. 166.

⁴² TWHK, *Tsou-kaio*, 3.30; 4.44, 46.

⁴³ TWHK, *Shu-tu* (Letters and official communications), 6.12b; 35-6; 47-8. Also *Shu-tu*, 7.15b-16; *Tsou-kaio*, 7.35b-36; 8.40b.

of cities from northern Anhwei to Kiangsi, vital to the logistical system focusing on the siege of Nanking. The success of such Hunan Army generals as Chu P'in-lung and T'ang I-hsün, under Tseng's supervision and encouragement, was vital to the stability of the Nanking front. In June 1863, the formidable Pao Ch'ao, sweeping the north bank of the Yangtze opposite Nanking, occupied Chiang-p'u, adjacent to the vital port of Chiu-fu-chou, on which the Taiping capital had been relying for supplies from the numerous lorchas that traded under foreign flags. When Chiu-fu-chou was occupied on 30 June, Nanking was henceforth cut off from its largest source of supply.⁴⁴ This success, reported to Peking immediately, may have helped the Tsungli Yamen's firm policy regarding the Lay-Osborn flotilla. Meanwhile, steamers purchased by Li Hung-chang were carrying large amounts of gunpowder and rifles to Tseng Kuo-ch'üan.

The strongest of the Taiping generals who survived the fall of Nanking in July 1864 (except for Lai Wen-kuang, who joined the Niens) were Li Shih-hsien and Wang Hai-yang, a native of Anhwei still in his thirties, who had joined the Taipings in the mid-1850s and had been fighting in Chekiang. Li and Wang went through Kiangsi separately and both entered Fukien. In October 1864, Li Shih-hsien occupied Chang-chou, on the Fukien coast, where he hired some sixteen foreigners to help drill his troops in the use of Western arms. Li Hung-chang, under orders from the throne, sent to Chang-chou 8,000 Anhwei Army troops under Kuo Sung-lin, including riflemen trained by British drillmasters. Tso Tsung-t'ang, making his headquarters in northern Fukien to watch other Taiping movements, instructed the Chinese troops trained by Baron de Meritens, a Frenchman who was commissioner of customs at Foochow, to help the offensive against Chang-chou, which was recovered in mid-May 1865.⁴⁵ The two rebel leaders, Li Shih-hsien and Wang Hai-yang, now joined forces in Kwangtung, but an unfortunate feud developed and Li was murdered in August at Wang's instigation. Wang Hai-yang died in battle on 1 February 1866. Western armament plainly contributed to the end of the rebellion.

⁴⁴ Chien, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ch'üan-shih*, 3.2242, citing Tseng Kuo-fan's remarks. On the fall of Nanking see details noted by Gordon, British Museum, Add. Mss. 52, 393, 30 June 1864; also Great Britain, Admiralty, 125/105, Lee to Kingston, 29 July 1864. On the looting, Chao Lieh-wen, *Neng-ching chü jib-chih* (Chao Lieh-wen's diary), 3.1887-8, 1919.

⁴⁵ Chien, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ch'üan-shih*, 3.2300.

POST-WAR PROBLEMS IN THE LOWER YANGTZE

Revenue needs and civil government

The Taiping war put the scholar-official government through a severe test. Even with the full use of imperial authority, there had been no assurance of military victory. Then, as cities and surrounding territories were recovered from the rebels, civil administration had to be revived. Problems of rehabilitation followed hard on victories and, again, Confucian statecraft was on trial. What, after all, were to be the priorities of government in an area emerging into the post-bellum phase? What was more urgent – the proper social order and the financial desiderata of the imperial government, or the rapid recovery of rural life? Given the best of intentions, was it possible for a few statesmen to change the customs and institutions of the pre-Taiping local government?

Only eight days after arriving in Nanking, Tseng Kuo-fan had decided to demobilize all 120,000 men of the Hunan Army under his command (but not including those under Tso Tsung-t'ang). As early as 14 August 1864, some 25,000 of Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's best troops, together with their officers, were released from service, probably because they had looted enough and wanted to go home in any case.⁴⁶ The remainder of the 120,000 men were released in stages, mostly in 1864–5 and some in 1866, since they were needed to guard the Anhwei-Kiangsi area against the revival of Taiping remnants.

In disbanding the Hunan Army under his own command, Tseng Kuo-fan demonstrated his lack of ambition for personal power. He also believed that the Anhwei Army under Li Hung-chang and the other part of the Hunan Army under Tso Tsung-t'ang would be sufficient to cope with the rebellions that were still raging elsewhere in the empire. But Tseng's decision was in any case necessitated by painful realities: the discipline of his forces had further degenerated, at the same time that he found it extremely difficult to raise adequate funds to pay them on a regular basis. Since becoming governor-general of Liangkiang as well as imperial commissioner, he had had large financial resources at his disposal. But his expenditure had grown even faster. In 1862, the payment of the Hunan Army troops in Anhwei was sometimes eight months in arrears; by late 1863, that for the troops in the Nanking area was sixteen months in arrears.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, the *t'ung-ling* commanders, many of whom had already attained the Green Standard title of brigade general or general-

⁴⁶ Lo Erh-kang, *Hsiang-chün hsün-chih*, 204–7.

⁴⁷ *Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k'ao* (Hitherto unpublished letters of Tseng Kuo-fan), 214.

in-chief, were inclined more than ever to 'fatten their private purses', and what was worse, their troops were becoming a scourge to the populace. Pao Ch'ao's frequently triumphant forces were also the most notorious. But even commanders closest to Tseng's headquarters like Chu P'in-lung and T'ang I-hsün, men of non-literati background, set very poor examples. Knowing that Chu and T'ang had padded the rosters of the battalions under their command, Tseng wanted to make a thorough check of their troops but he could not find an officer willing to undertake the task 'at the expense of friendship and face'. Moreover, commanders often quarrelled. Chu and T'ang, besides allowing their men to forage among the shops and homes of townsmen, were found to have committed what Tseng regarded as an inexcusable fault – namely, failure to come to each other's assistance in battle even while facing general defeat.⁴⁸ Disappointment in such behaviour, as well as the atrocities committed in Nanking, led Tseng to doubt that his officers and men were worth retaining.

Tseng's effort to guard the long line from northern Anhwei to Kiangsi, as well as to conduct the siege of Nanking, had strained his financial capacity. Agriculture in many parts of the Yangtze provinces having been devastated, the only large and dependable revenue was the likin tax – either internal transit duties or excise (see chapter 6). Hunan Army commanders had occasionally taken civil government into their own hands and established likin stations, though usually forbidden to do so by local officials. But even the likin was not an unlimited resource, considering the 'middleman's provender' (*chung-pao*) taken by the collecting agencies, as well as the financial needs of each province. To combat corruption Hu Lin-i, as governor of Hupei after 1855, had adopted a principle of employing only literati as likin collectors, following the example of the famous revenue system of the T'ang statesman Liu Yen (715–80). In 1860, Tseng decided on a similar policy of entrusting the likin collection at the local stations to gentry members. He hoped that among this social group, there would be men who possessed 'integrity . . . without the bureaucratic air, capable of clear thinking and not given to boasting'.⁴⁹ For the recruitment of such ideal managers, Tseng relied on members of his staff of proven ability and character. Tseng particularly trusted, for example, Li Hung-chang's elder brother, Li Han-chang (1821–99), who held a *kung-sheng* degree won by examination. The elder Li had joined Tseng's service as early as 1854, after having been an acting district magistrate in Hunan. He had served as the principal administrator of the Hunan Army's

⁴⁸ Lo Erh-kang, *Hsiang-chün hsün-chib*, 198, note 5; 199, notes 1, 3. *TWCK*, *P'i-tu*, 30b–1.

⁴⁹ *TWCK*, *Sbu-sha*, 6.35.

commissariat and was described by Tseng as 'upright but flexible, always careful in managing affairs'. In June 1860, when Tseng memorialized requesting that the likin of the entire province of Kiangsi be allocated to the Hunan Army, he recommended Li Han-chang to be head of one of the two central likin bureaux of the province, while serving concurrently as a territorial taotai in southern Kiangsi.

In 1862, however, when Shen Pao-chen, formerly a Kiangsi prefect, was appointed governor on Tseng's recommendation, he conscientiously felt he had to give greater priority to the defensive needs of Kiangsi. He would not remit to Tseng the entire proceeds of the province's likin, nor that part of the converted grain tribute funds allocated to Tseng earlier. Tseng had eventually to appeal to the throne to see that Shen delivered more. Though falling short of Tseng's hopes, Kiangsi did produce a total of 8.5 million taels for the Hunan Army between mid-1860 and mid-1864, equivalent to about half of the total reported income during these four years received by forces directly under Tseng's command (that is, not counting those under Hu Lin-i or Tso Tsung-t'ang and those detailed for service in Kwangsi and Kweichow).⁵⁰ Kiangsi's contributions were particularly crucial to Tseng, since the large likin receipts of the Shanghai area were expended chiefly by Li Hung-chang for his Anhwei Army. Besides regularly sending large amounts of munitions to Tseng Kuo-ch'uan, Li was able to deliver out of his likin receipts only about 300,000 taels per year to the Tseng brothers.

Tseng's likin system extended beyond the Liangkang provinces. In the summer of 1860, he obtained the consent of Lo Ping-chang, governor of Hunan, to create an agency in Changsha called the Bureau of the Eastern Expedition (Tung-cheng chü). Huang Mien, an ageing gentry friend of Tseng's, who had helped design the Hunan likin system in 1855, was appointed to head the bureau. It was then authorized by the Hunan governor to levy an additional 50 per cent of likin on salt, tea and other major commodities, especially for the needs of Tseng's forces. This was reported to the throne in January 1861, and until mid-1864 Hunan likin paid for the cost of recruiting new troops from that province as well as for remittances to Tseng totalling two million taels over a four-year period. In April 1862, the throne approved Tseng's request that the likin system of Kwangtung be expanded for the sake of the Hunan Army. New likin bureaux were created at Shao-kuan in northern Kwangtung and in Canton itself, both to be staffed from Tseng's headquarters.⁵¹ Such

⁵⁰ David Pong, 'The income and military expenditure of Kiangsi Province in the last years (1860-1864) of the Taiping Rebellion', *JAS*, 26.1 (Nov. 1966) 63. Lo Erh-kang, *Hsiang-chün tsin-chib*, 119, 127.

⁵¹ *TWCK, Tsou-kao*, 15.40-1; 18.38-40.

cross-province arrangements were possible only because of the imperial support Tseng enjoyed.

Tseng's likin system had to confront, however, the unmistakable deficiencies of the traditional personnel training as well as deep-rooted behavioural patterns. Just as most military commanders prized rank and wealth over the virtue of self-discipline, so the few literati who possessed the capacity for financial management were found lacking in devotion to the commonweal. Although Tseng continued to repose his faith in the integrity of such men as Huang Mien and Li Han-chang, he was compelled, as his likin system rapidly expanded after mid-1860, to appoint to the likin bureaux men whom he knew to be more capable than they were incorruptible. As early as the spring of 1861, Tseng's likin agents as well as his military commanders had developed such a reputation for corruption that, according to Tseng himself, Hu Lin-i had written twice to admonish him for being 'not strong enough in his hatred of evil, gradually becoming inured and flexible instead of retaining an upright and uncompromising spirit'. The only justification Tseng could offer was that the exigencies of war, as well as the kind of men available to him, left him no choice. In 1862, Tso Tsung-t'ang wrote Tseng that he, too, found that men who were capable in practical matters unfortunately were usually avaricious. Tseng replied: 'In my humble opinion, among the greedy there are still talents of special usefulness. But the incapable must decidedly be rejected'. Tseng lamented, 'it is difficult enough to find someone who has either virtue or competence. It is rare indeed that one encounters a combination of both qualities'.⁵²

Tseng felt it was not entirely the fault of his own staff that his likin system was corrupt. For the best his deputies could do was to choose, among the local gentry, men of comparative integrity who not only would condescend to become likin collectors but were also competent enough to see that sizeable revenues would be produced. Li Han-chang's experience in Kiangsi convinced Tseng that only the petty and self-seeking among the local gentry would be interested in managing likin stations. 'The system devised for the Kiangsi likin was strict and careful enough', Tseng asserted. 'But since there were too few virtuous personnel [*hsien-yüan*] at the likin stations, the impression was created that the system was a mere formality'. Despite his subscribing to the moral precepts of the Ch'eng-Chu school, Tseng was ready by 1863 to concede that there should be a place for 'financial interests' (*li*) in the training of a Confucian

⁵² Cited in Ch'ien Mu, *Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien hsüeh-shu shih* (A history of Chinese scholarship of the recent three hundred years), 2.583, and in Ho I-k'un, *Tseng Kuo-fan p'ing-chuan* (Tseng Kuo-fan: An appraisal and biography), 340, 360.

gentleman. Tseng regretted that ever since the failure of Wang An-shih's reforms in the Northern Sung, it had been a fashion among Confucianists never to talk about 'financial interests'. Tseng found himself in agreement with the Southern Sung pragmatist, Yeh Shih (1150–1223), who wrote that 'No benevolent gentleman should ignore the study of the management of [public] finance.'⁵³

Together with the governor of each of the three provinces under his jurisdiction, Tseng had the duty of supervising local government, including the land tax, the administration of justice, and the rehabilitation of war-torn areas in respect of morals and customs no less than of the economy. In southern Anhwei, where his first gubernatorial headquarters were situated, Tseng found in both town and country utter devastation. 'There is not a house that has not been damaged, not a tree that has not been hewn, no wealthy family that has not been ruined and none among the poor that has not been transgressed against.' Tseng felt in the summer of 1860 that warfare was no more important than selecting good officials to 'bring peace of mind to the people [*an-min*]. Neither task should be given greater weight than the other'.⁵⁴ Yet the military situation was so hazardous that Tseng simply had to give it greater attention. While the economic recovery of the devastated areas was greatly desired, there was also the necessity of reviving the land tax as soon as it was feasible – not only to meet military needs, but also to keep the court at Peking supplied with the funds it required. To an imperial official, the dynasty's finances (*kuo-chi*) were, after all, as important as the people's livelihood (*min-sheng*). The expression of dutifulness on the part of the emperor's subjects in the form of tax payments should not be limited to the merchants who bore the primary burden of the *likin*, but should also be made by land-owners big and small, once their fields again could yield harvest. Moreover action was necessary to strengthen the orthodox ethical doctrines as well as the literati's morale. Posthumous honours should be given to men who had died in the service of the dynasty and to women who had committed suicide rather than compromise their chastity.

Consistent in his principles, Tseng believed that the key to good government at the local level lay also in 'men both virtuous and wise'. Although he himself never had experience as a magistrate or prefect (as Hu Lin-i had), Tseng was not ignorant of the deep-rooted abuses of the yamen sub-bureaucracy. He was also quite aware of the fact that the local magistrates themselves often initiated irregular levies, and that demands of various kinds were imposed on the magistrates by higher provincial officials. Yet Tseng believed that such corrupt practices could be ameliora-

⁵³ *Ibid.* 360. TWCK, *Shu-chia*, 7.8; 12.31.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 6.36b–37; 7.7.

ted (and that was the best he could hope for) if good men were selected as local officials. Tseng greatly admired what Hu Lin-i had done as governor of Hupei. As that province was cleared of the Taipings in 1856–7, Hu was able to obtain the throne's approval of employing men chosen by him as *acting* magistrates in some of the vacant posts instead of the magistrates chosen by the regular process at court in Peking. 'Local government depends entirely on the choice of personnel', Hu wrote in a letter, 'while the choice of [proper] personnel is only possible when there is a departure from the rules [*p'o-ke*].'⁵⁵

Beginning in 1857, the collection of the land tax and of the grain tribute (converted into money payment) had been resumed in most areas of Hupei. Hu repeatedly wrote the chou (department) and hsien magistrates exhorting them to tax all landowners equitably according to the legal rates, to realize the traditional maxim: 'nourish the people in the very process of pressing for tax payments' (*chi fu-tzu yü ts'ui-k'o*). The seeming contradiction was explained by the idea that since taxes were unavoidably needed by the state – since they had to be paid anyway – then it was only by the greatest justice in the process of collection that the people's welfare could be safeguarded. The Ch'ing had established light legal rates for levies on land since the early eighteenth century, but the surcharges (*fou-shou*) now were often a great deal heavier than the regular levies themselves. Some surcharges, such as the 'meltage fee' (*huo-hao*) and certain levies in connection with the grain tribute were imperially sanctioned, but many others were 'customary fees' (*kuei-fei*) never defined by statute but nonetheless a necessary source of revenue for the provincial hierarchy, including the hsien yamen. Some such surcharges were frankly described as 'disreputable customary fees' (*lou kuei*), sometimes justifiable as necessary supplements to official expenditures but frequently mere extortion for the personal benefit of collectors.

Hu Lin-i particularly lamented the fact that the so-called 'major households' (*ta-hu*), who had influence enough to keep the yamen runners away from their doors, could usually get off paying the surcharges and sometimes even the regular levies. The bulk of the land levies actually fell on the 'minor households' (*hsiao-hu*), usually small landowners of commoner status, whose best defence against the irregular exactions was to bribe clerks and runners in exchange for lighter assessments, or else to seek the assistance of gentry members who would contract (*pao-lan*) for the payment of their taxes and surcharges, normally for a pecuniary consideration. Hu Lin-i ascribed the plight of the minor households principally to the yamen clerks and runners, who were in collusion with

⁵⁵ *HWCK*, 14.4b–6; 23.8–10; 59.31; 63.19b; 65.3b–4, 5b–6.

the powerful but were relentless towards the peasantry – like ‘birds and beasts feasting on human flesh’. He wanted the magistrates to impose harsh penalties, including dismissal and imprisonment, on yamen underlings who committed irregularities. But Hu also realized that the ‘disreputable customary fees’ were frequently the result of pressure from above, not only from the magistrate himself, but also from the prefect or the taotai. ‘Before prohibiting the surcharges’ Hu wrote in his memorial of 1857, ‘it was necessary to abolish first the miscellaneous fees [*jung-fei*].’ Hu actually ordered the elimination of dozens of petty fees that had long been standard in most provinces.⁵⁶ Yet by Hu’s own admission, corrupt and inequitable practices had continued in many places in Hupei.

Almost as soon as he was appointed governor-general of Liangkiang, Tseng began to look for good men whom he could place as acting hsien magistrates to set an example of incorruptibility in Anhwei province. He asked his friends to try to persuade ‘one or two chou or hsien officials of great probity and industry to come here so that a new vogue and reputation can be established’. Too busy to pursue this matter personally, he entrusted the task of selecting acting local officials for southern Anhwei to Li Yüan-tu, a *chü-jen* scholar and commander of a Hunanese force. ‘It is only by making a painstaking effort in civil government’, Tseng exhorted Li, ‘that the populace [which was on the verge of total exhaustion] may gain revival to some degree.’ With the reluctant cooperation of Weng T’ung-shu, governor of Anhwei, Tseng hoped also to change most of the officials in the northern part of the province. He applied to Hu Lin-i for help: ‘Regarding the chou and hsien in northern Anhwei, I hope to change each and every one of them with the talents in your coat pocket; I will recommend them in a supplementary memorial [*fu-p’ien*].’ It seems that there were but few men in Tseng’s own *mu-fu* whom he regarded as suitable for local government posts or as available in view of the urgent tasks connected with the war.

Tseng apparently stuck to his belief that it was ‘only with the availability of proper men that policies could be carried out’.⁵⁷ But what were the policies that he wanted to carry out? Tseng seems to have given higher priority to the reassertion of the Confucian obligations than to economic rehabilitation. In July 1860, as acting governor-general he issued a proclamation to the officials and literati of the Liangkiang provinces, urging the officials to be frugal and inviting the gentry to recommend talented men for government service. He stressed the urgent duty of local officials to provide relief – not to the rural populace, however, but to

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 23.5–8; 60.25b; 61.23; 64.18b. Also 23.3b, 6–7.

⁵⁷ TWCK, *Shu-chia*, 6.29b, 35, 37–8b, 41, 41b–42; 7.1b–2; 8.47; 8.25.

indigent gentry and scholar families and particularly to those whose members had died as a result of the war. One of Tseng's first acts as governor-general was in fact to establish a Bureau of the Loyal and Dutiful (Chung-i chü). He invited officials and literati to submit facts about martyrdom to the bureau, to be verified and eventually to be reported to the throne, so that monuments and memorial shrines could be authorized.

After the recovery of Anking, in September 1861, Tseng did sponsor poor relief together with the gentry, giving out cash and rice to refugees that clogged the streets. But at the same time Tseng levied 400 cash per *mon* on the nearby countryside that did produce a harvest, to meet urgent military needs. Tseng also gave priority to the re-opening of the Ching-fu shu-yüan (Academy of Reverence and Broad Benefit), the principal institution at Anking that prepared scholars for the provincial examinations.⁵⁸

Tseng now issued a series of 'simple exhortations' to three groups: the chou or hsien magistrates, the supernumerary officials (*wei-yüan*, defined by Tseng as 'officials who did not have a post in the past yet now have a government function') and the gentry.⁵⁹ Officials should 'emphasize agriculture as a matter of the greatest importance', not only because farmers had suffered the most but also because 'without food the soldiers will unavoidably disturb the populace; without food the populace will follow the rebels; and without food the rebels will become roving bandits and insurgency will never cease'. Local officials should tax farmers as lightly as possible, reduce corvée service, help in water control, and even assist indigent farmers to buy cattle. Magistrates were urged to be frugal and to abandon any thought of acquiring large family property; they should stop giving presents to official superiors, thus making certain surcharges unnecessary. Magistrates should settle lawsuits fairly and speedily, not avoiding harsh punishment for 'evil persons' (*o-jen*). 'Elimination of the evil' Tseng wrote 'is for the sake of the peace of mind of the good.' However, Tseng did not stress equal severity in punishing yamen clerks and runners. All he had to say about them was that magistrates should themselves 'have nothing to hide regarding all receipts and expenditures, no matter how small', thus setting an example for their staffs.

Tseng's severest strictures were for the gentry, particularly those who formed local defence corps and then profited personally from the levies for their support. Although the Hunan Army had early on absorbed some militia corps, Tseng was extremely sceptical about their usefulness. 'I have been with the army for several years now', he wrote in 1861, 'and I have learned nothing except never to believe in *i'uan-lien*. When I hear people

⁵⁸ TWCK, *Nien-p'u*, 6.23b-24; *Shu-cha*, 7.9b; *Nien-p'u*, 7.20.

⁵⁹ TWCK, *Tsa-tsu*, 2.50-1, 53-4.

saying that *t'uan-lien* has won a great victory against the rebels, I can never contain my laughter, and I put my hands over my ears and walk away.' Tseng now warned the gentry that whoever took advantage of the *t'uan-lien* bureaux to extract funds from 'the ignorant and the weak' would be seriously dealt with: 'even eminent gentry [*chü-shen*] would be subject to capital punishment'. In a letter about this time, Tseng vaguely suggested that the 'ancient system of *pao-chia*' was sufficient for local security. But he did not elaborate on how that system was to be resuscitated.⁶⁰

While Tseng was aware of the deep-rooted problems of the Chinese countryside, he was plainly too preoccupied with military and financial questions to do much about civil government. He pinned his faith on the 'established institutions' (*ch'eng-fa*). He hoped that good men serving as local officials could make 'adjustments which would not go against principle [*li*]'. Tseng was to be disappointed, however, by the new chou and hsien officials under his jurisdiction. To Li Hsü-i, governor of Anhwei, he confessed in early 1862 that the magistrates he had chosen had not developed 'satisfactory reputations' and that those whom Governor Li had retained were not 'suitable choices either'. Tseng now felt that the criteria for choosing local personnel should be broadened: perhaps less harm would be done by the 'middle-level talents' (*chung-ts'ai*). Tseng prepared another list of candidates and asked Li Hsü-i to join him in recommending them to the throne as replacements for some incumbents. But the new list also proved disappointing. In the early summer of 1863, Tseng confessed to Kuo Sung-tao that ever since he became governor-general 'there was not the slightest improvement in local government [in my jurisdiction] and I am extremely ashamed'. Tseng told Kuo that for magistracies in Kiangsi, he had memorialized to ask for sixteen men upon whom the *chin-shih* degree had newly been conferred.⁶¹ Apparently he was reverting to the orthodox view that those who could pass the highest literary examination would somehow make the best local officials.

Resumption of levies on agriculture

While Tseng Kuo-fan tried to retain his faith in the influence of good men, he had occasion to consider a matter of institutional adjustment: the reduction of taxes and surcharges as the levies on land were resumed in war-torn provinces. Thanks to the industry of the peasantry – tenants as well as proprietors who worked their own land – agriculture in some areas revived more quickly than had been expected. Officials and gentry rendered

⁶⁰ TWCK, *Shu-cha*, 8.3; *Tsa-chu*, 2.54b–55; *Shu-cha*, 7.7b.

⁶¹ TWCK, *Shu-cha*, 8.25b; 10.11b–12; 12.5.

some help: there are known cases of their distributing farming and weaving equipment and even encouraging immigrants from other provinces to resettle on devastated land. Tseng estimated that in Kiangsi the autumn harvest of 1862 probably amounted to 70 per cent of the normal yield, and in Anhwei, somewhat below 50 per cent.⁶² The throne would usually approve a governor-general's recommendation that areas newly won back from rebels be exempted from land tax and grain tribute wholly or partially for at least a year. But Peking wanted quick resumption of its grain tribute from the Yangtze provinces. Although it was infeasible to continue to ship taxes-in-kind up the Grand Canal, the court hoped that the tribute rice could at least be collected in money to be used to procure rice in Shanghai for shipment by sea to Tientsin. This demand for tribute grain, sanctioned by precedents since the Sui dynasty (589–618), vied with the urgent military needs of the lower Yangtze provinces themselves. It was impossible to waive the levies on agriculture altogether. Yet memories of the tax-resistance revolts in pre-Taiping years and the fact of Taiping liberality regarding the land tax in certain areas all pointed to the need for lightening the farming population's burden.⁶³

Between 1855 and 1863, three approaches to the question of the land levies were considered by officials of the Yangtze provinces. (1) Since the most onerous part of the agricultural taxes was not the land tax or the grain tribute according to the statutory rates but the surcharges that accompanied them, any tax relief must involve the reduction of these irregular levies. The quotas expected by Peking would not be affected, because the surcharges were in all but a few cases for use by provincial and local governments and for the benefit of local officials and their underlings. (2) It was necessary, in order to appease the majority of the taxpayers no less than for the sake of equity, to prohibit the differential treatment of the major and minor households – a distinction long accepted as custom but nevertheless extra-legal. (3) The annual grain tribute quotas were extraordinarily large in two comparatively small areas, in eastern Kiangsu and northern Chekiang, which happened also to have suffered greatly in the war. Beginning in the Tao-kuang reign, only part of the heavy quotas from these two areas had in fact been delivered annually; imperial waivers had had to be granted from year to year. Substantial lowering of the quotas for the two areas would therefore not involve any real loss to Peking.

Initiatives were taken by provincial officials along all these lines. In

⁶² *Ibid.* 11.12.

⁶³ Hsia Nai, 'T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ch'ien-hou Ch'ang-chiang ko-sheng chih t'ien-fu wen-t'i' (The problem of land levies in the Yangtze provinces around the time of the Taiping Rebellion), *Ch'ing-hua hsüeh-pao*, 10.2 (April 1935) 429–39.

Hunan, early in the autumn of 1855, Governor Lo Ping-chang, advised by Tso Tsung-t'ang, decided to make new assessments of the land tax and the 'converted grain tribute'. The new rates, which varied with each hsien, were arrived at after consultation between the magistrate and selected local gentry. The new consolidated rate of the regular land tax plus surcharge was about 20 per cent less than the former total rate, while that of the 'converted grain tribute' plus surcharge was as much as 50 per cent less. To make such reduction possible, Governor Lo abolished a number of perquisites that went to the officials of the provincial hierarchy. The governor also asked the magistrates to discuss with the more respectable gentry the methods for curbing tax-farming (*pao-cheng* or *pao-lan*). 'Scholars and gentry who were public spirited and upright were allowed to submit memoranda on the abuses of the past and to establish a bureau [in each hsien] to conduct investigations.' The yamen clerks and runners, as well as 'bullies among the lower-gentry' (*chin-kun*) were henceforth forbidden to contract for tax collections or payments.⁶⁴ For a few years beginning in 1855, the total annual receipts from the land tax and the grain tribute in Hunan, including surcharges, were supposed to have been reduced by one fourth, as compared with ante-bellum times. Thanks to likin, the province could still aid Tseng Kuo-fan's war effort.

As part of his house-cleaning efforts in Hupei, Hu Lin-i dealt with the question of tax-reduction in the autumn of 1857. Because of damage done by war or by floods, he requested that a number of hsien be exempted temporarily from their land-tax and grain-tribute quotas. But for the thirty-three hsien where tribute grain was normally due, he sought the throne's approval for a major reform – drastic cuts in the extremely heavy surcharges and the abolition of literally dozens of what Hu described as 'superfluous fees'. These included perquisites formerly enjoyed by the governor himself, the financial commissioner, the grain intendant and the local taotai and prefect. Hu further believed that only when the abuses of the bureaucracy and the sub-bureaucracy were corrected would the 'depraved gentry and holders of purchased degrees' (*tiao-shen lieb-chien*) stop claiming their share of the spoils by contracting for tax payments. These unscrupulous local notables could indeed threaten to expose the corruption of the hsien yamen and so force the magistrate and his underlings to acquiesce in their tax-farming practices. Before the Taiping disturbances, the major households in Hupei paid the tribute grain in kind while the minor households paid in cash at exorbitant and arbitrary conversion rates both for rice to silver and for cash to silver. All households were now

⁶⁴ Lo Ping-chang, *LWCK*, *tsou-i*, 12.19b–21. Lo Ping-chang, *Lo-kung, nien-p'u* (Chronological biography of Lo Ping-chang), 38–39b.

to make money payments according to uniform rates in cash, but Hu had to rely on the magistrates' disciplining of the clerks and runners to see that the new rates were really observed. The Hupei grain intendant and his deputies travelled to each hsien and conferred with the magistrate as well as the 'gentry and elders' (*shen-ch'i*) before a new consolidated rate was decided upon, taking account of the price of rice and the silver-copper exchange rate in each locality as well as the financial needs of local administration. The new rates for most hsien hovered around 4,000–5,000 cash per picul of rice due, while the former total rates had been sometimes as high as 12,000 or even 20,000 cash.

Hu genuinely believed that 'the middleman's provender' (*chung-pao*) could be made to go either to the government or to the people.⁶⁵ He sometimes took strong measures to enforce the new rules. In early 1858, he dismissed from office a chou magistrate who permitted additional surcharges. More often, it seems, he merely used stern words in his instructions to the local officials, exhorting them to be vigilant and deal harshly with delinquent clerks and runners. 'The chou and hsien magistrates are officials close to the people', runs a typical passage. 'If they are unable even to restrain the clerks and runners, they are actually leading the beasts to consume the humans; how can they alleviate the sorrows of the people?' Meanwhile, the regular land tax was revived in many parts of Hupei. Hu's letters not long before his death in late September 1861 indicate that 'disreputable customary fees' were still common in the province's local government.⁶⁶

In late 1860, Tseng Kuo-fan suggested to the authorities in Kiangsi that both the land tax and the 'converted grain tribute' should be revived the following year. Li Huan, the acting financial commissioner, accordingly began consultations with local officials and in September 1861 the regulations he drafted were approved by Tseng. As in Hunan and Hupei, a great many fees imposed by the higher provincial authorities upon the hsien were abolished, but the new consolidated rates for the land tax or the grain tribute were made uniform throughout the province, which was not the case in Hunan and Hupei. Writing to Li Huan and to the governor of Kiangsi, at a time when he was greatly saddened by Hu Lin-i's death, Tseng seems to have been determined to push through the land-tax reform in Kiangsi. He hoped that the new rates would create a fresh impression among the people who would then 'pay up enthusiastically'. Tseng worried, however, that since the plan was 'against the interest of

⁶⁵ *HWCK*, 23.3, 5–8; 26.1–6; 31.8b–10, 14b–17. Also 23.6b–7; 31.9b–13; 60.23–4.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 26.1b–3b; 31.15b; 60.27–9; 61.9b–10, 12b, 21b, 22; 63.18, 19; 64.19–20; 89.5, 15–17, 23–4, *et passim*.

the officials', the latter might attempt to obstruct it. He pledged to impeach magistrates who 'might resist the new regulations'.⁶⁷

While Tseng made such exhortations almost in memory of Hu Lin-i, he doubted that, given the low quality of the local officials in Kiangsi, the surcharges could really be substantially reduced. He was cheered when in 1862 Ting Jih-ch'ang, an unusually conscientious Kiangsi magistrate, responded to his queries by suggesting concrete measures to lighten the burdens of the local officials. Memorializing jointly with the new governor, Shen Pao-chen, Tseng obtained imperial approval to cancel the outstanding deficiencies in the quota payments by Kiangsi magistrates, amounting to more than two million taels (most of which had in fact been made up to Peking by the Kiangsi provincial government annually, at the time that the deficiency occurred). Tseng and Shen also obtained a reduction of the land-tax and grain-tribute quotas for areas of the province that suffered from Taiping invasion in 1861.

Despite such efforts to make things easier for the Kiangsi magistrates, however, Tseng found in the ensuing two years that their actual burden was not substantially reduced, and that some of them were hard put to it to meet their obligations. This was partly owing to the decline in the value of silver, which was the stipulated currency for the agricultural levies in Kiangsi, until another change in the regulations in 1864 made copper cash the unit of collection. In June 1863 Tseng described the Kiangsi situation: 'The income of the chou and hsien suddenly declined, while the expenditures did not even slightly decrease. The magistrates were greatly inconvenienced, while even with the large reduction [of surcharges], the gentry and people still responded hesitatingly to the prompting of payments.'⁶⁸ The rise of the Hunan Army expenditures during 1863 made Tseng regret even more the low rates set for the Kiangsi land levies.

At this juncture, Tseng considered a major question – the proposal to reduce the Kiangsu tribute grain quota (and with it the statutory rates) along with the surcharges in an area where the quota had been extraordinarily high. Tseng supported the idea, although he was hesitant about related questions such as surcharges in view of the recent tax-reform experience in Kiangsi.

As Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army had consolidated the Sung-chiang area and moved towards T'ai-ts'ang in the spring of 1863, the possibility of a long-needed fiscal reform became apparent to many officials and prominent gentry. Ever since the early Ming, the circuit of Su-Sung-T'ai,

⁶⁷ TWCK, *Sbu-cha*, 9.8b, 16b-17; 9.8b-10b.

⁶⁸ Wang Ting-an, *Cb'iu-ch'ieh chai ti-tzu chi* (A disciple's record of Tseng Kuo-fan's life), 28.35b-44; TWCK, *Sbu-cha*, 11.33.

comprising the prefectures of Soochow and Sung-chiang and the independent department of T'ai-ts'ang, had borne a grossly disproportionate share of the empire's grain tribute. An area of about four thousand square miles, with a population of roughly ten million in the 1850s spread over thirty-one hsien, Su-Sung-T'ai was favoured with a large rice and cotton output, although its single annual harvest of rice very likely yielded no more than comparable areas in Hupei or Hunan. Yet as of the early nineteenth century, Su-Sung-T'ai was required by statute to provide 32.7 per cent of the total quantity of rice levied annually under the grain tribute system – 1.7 million out of the empire-wide statutory total of 5.2 million piculs.⁶⁹ This anomalous situation had resulted from unfortunate historical developments during the period from the Southern Sung through the Ming – the conversion of the *rents* charged to the tenants in government-owned fields to *taxes* when the land came into private hands, and the levying of tax-in-kind according to the *rent rates* inflicted by the first emperor of the Ming upon a few prefectures in Kiangnan that offered him the most stubborn resistance. Although the silver taxes from Su-Sung-T'ai had been reduced somewhat in the early Ch'ing, the gross inequity in tribute quotas was never changed; they were at least three times as high as those of the adjacent Ch'ang-chou prefecture, which was also rice-rich and enjoyed equal access to the Grand Canal. Through the Ming and early Ch'ing, the formal tribute quota of Su-Sung-T'ai was seldom more than partially met. Only from the 1760s through the 1820s, when the lower Yangtze was particularly prosperous, was Su-Sung-T'ai's annual grain tribute delivered in full fairly regularly. Since the great flood and famine of 1833, however, Kiangsu had had to beg the throne every single year to grant partial remissions on the grounds of 'disasters and harvest deficiencies'.

It was plain by mid-century that such a system could not long endure. Now that Su-Sung-T'ai had become a crucial area of warfare, the opportunity arose for Peking finally to be persuaded to change the unrealistic quota. As early as February 1863, Fang Ch'uan-shu, prefect of Sung-chiang, petitioned Li Hung-chang suggesting that a substantial reduction of the Su-Sung-T'ai quota be proposed to the throne.⁷⁰ Feng Kuei-fen, from Soochow, a long-time advocate of Su-Sung-T'ai fiscal reform who had joined Li's *mu-fu* in April 1862, had in fact been briefing Li on the matter. Reduction of the exorbitant *quota* was obviously desirable. Support came from many quarters. In June 1863, two officials in Peking memorialized in the same week to recommend reduction, avoiding the issue of the

⁶⁹ Harold C. Hinton, *The grain tribute system of China*, 9a.

⁷⁰ *Chiang-su chien-fu ch'üan-an* (Complete record of the tribute-grain reduction in Kiangsu), 5.25.

surcharges (either legal or extra-legal) that went with the grain tribute: P'an Tsu-yin, a director of the Imperial Banqueting Court, a native of Soochow and grandson of a grand councillor, and Ting Shou-ch'ang, a censor and a native of northern Kiangsu. Meanwhile, Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang jointly memorialized on the Su-Sung-T'ai quota on 27 June. Kuo Sung-tao, the recently appointed grain intendant in Kiangsu, as well as Governor Li himself, conjectured that the throne would be more likely to approve a reduction when T'ai-ts'ang and Soochow were yet to be recovered and when popular support was needed, rather than at a future date when military action had ceased.

But discussions in Shanghai actually went beyond the question of the quota. Both Feng Kuei-fen and Wu Yün, the former prefect of Soochow whom Kuo also consulted, emphasized the necessity of reducing the surcharges as well. These had been extremely numerous in Su-Sung-T'ai, including legal surcharges for 'rice wastage' (*hao-mi*) and for grain transport, as well as dozens of extra-legal fees that went to yamen clerks and runners (who handled the collection of the rice or its conversion to cash), or to granary keepers, or to boatmen and banner guards. The more respectable among the major households would at best pay only the statutory surcharges, while the less respectable could get away with paying nothing (not even the tribute rice itself) by arranging with the yamen underlings to have their land 'registered as having been visited by disaster' (*chu-huang*). 'Because of the large numbers of major households in Kiangsu, their power is more than enough to make the magistrates yield to their wishes, without daring to pursue the matter further. All the surcharges would then be extracted from the minor households.'⁷¹

Feng and Wu described vividly the plight of the minor households. Some of these proprietors deemed it wise to pay commissions to a tax-farmer – a yamen runner or a 'degraded member of the lower gentry', either of whom could arrange exemption for the proprietor concerned by getting him reclassified as a major household. 'The major households thus became even more numerous while the situation of minor households worsened.' The unassisted peasant proprietors would be assessed the heavy surcharges many times over and were made to pay up by harassment and torture. Some would flee the land; others might join a tax-resisting revolt.

Wu Yün and Feng Kuei-fen both regarded the situation as intolerable, but their views differed regarding the remedy. Wu believed that once the heavy statutory quota was reduced, all would be well. In the post-war re-

⁷¹ From a letter by Kuo Sung-tao in Kuo T'ing-i *et al.*, *Kuo Sung-tao hsien-sheng nien-p'u* (Chronological biography of Mr Kuo Sung-tao), 1.246.

habilitation, the magistrates 'could invite public-spirited and fair-minded gentry members to assist them, so that through the combined efforts of officials and gentry, the abuses might be wiped out and the atmosphere cleansed'. Wu hoped, in other words, to rely on the more respectable among the local elite to offset the influence of 'big lineages and local bullies' (*chü-shih t'u-hao*) and of the yamen clerks and runners.

Feng, on the other hand, insisted that the yamen clerks and runners had such a vested interest in the surcharges that they were bound to exploit them. He believed they actually got the lion's share of the corruption from the grain tribute: ten times as much as the magistrate and three to five times as much as the gentry. Feng insisted that only the imperially recognized surcharges should be retained; even these could be reduced if the tribute rice were to be shipped by sea instead of the Grand Canal.⁷² The first version of the memorial he drafted for Li and Tseng stressed that all extra-legal surcharges should be abolished and the distinction between 'major and minor households' prohibited. Feng's draft went from Li to Tseng, but Kuo Sung-tao privately warned the governor-general that complete equalization of assessments might be impractical. Kuo realistically accepted the existence of the yamen clerks and runners upon whose devious conduct the Chi'ng bureaucracy actually subsisted: 'Without gentlemen [*chün-tzu*], there is none to rule over the degenerate persons [*hsiao-jen*]. Yet without the degenerate persons, there is none to provide for the living of the gentlemen. We are engaged in establishing institutions which may become permanent. To tie up the hands of the chou and hsien functionaries and to impose hardship on them may not be the way to bring peace of mind to the people.'⁷³

Tseng and Li eventually despatched a compromise between the views of Kuo and Feng, with the principal emphasis on reducing the statutory quota. Tseng shared Kuo's realism. Replying to Kuo 2 June, he referred to the experience of Kiangsi, where, owing to the drastic cut in surcharges, 'chou and hsien are extraordinarily deficient in income, yet the people continue to be slow in tax payments'. Experience had forced Tseng to abandon in effect a basic faith of the T'ung-ch'eng school, namely, that proper leadership and scholarly effort could transform 'customs' (*feng-su*). He now conceded that certain tendencies in government were indeed intractable: 'It seems that once the customs have been formed, they are like currents flowing down the river that cannot be turned back. Even if Yao and Shun [the ancient sage emperors] should be alive today, they

⁷² Wu Yün, *Liang-lui hsien ch'ib-tu* (Letters from the Pavilion of Two Jars), 5.13-15. Feng Kuei-fen, *Hsien-chib i'ang chi* (Collected writings from the Hall of Manifest Aspirations; hereafter *HCTC*), 5.36-7, 43-4; 9.21, 23; 10.104. Also 4.11b-12; 9.12b-13, 19-20; 10.7-10.

⁷³ Kuo, *Kuo Sung-tao*, 1.246.

could not make over the present society into that of their own eras. In actions taken by the virtuous, the system to be established should be along the lines of existing customs [*yin-su li-chih*]. This is what is meant by “avoiding excesses in government”.⁷⁴ Tseng felt that Feng Kuei-fen’s draft was ‘too lofty in theme’, that the part recommending reduction of the surcharges should ‘decidedly not be included so abruptly in a memorial’. Tseng advised Li Hung-chang that even if surcharges were to be reduced in Su-Sung-T’ai in the future, ‘the matter does not have to be mentioned in a memorial, nor be proclaimed publicly’. Tseng suggested that each hsien should decide on its own system of surcharges according to local custom and sentiment. ‘The status of major household might be prohibited should it be feasible, but the method by which the prohibition is accomplished need not be uniform; nor is it necessary to have the same reduced rates [for all taxpayers] as long as there is some actual reduction for the minor households.’⁷⁵

These compromises of Tseng’s explain the final content of the joint memorial. Its only recommendation was that the ‘excessive quota’ (*fon-fu*) for Su-Sung-T’ai be reduced to a figure arrived at by averaging the amounts of rice actually forwarded from the circuit in seven years of comparatively large delivery in the 1850s – an average of about half the statutory quota. It was claimed that the reduction was not only equitable but would help rehabilitate war-torn Sung-chiang and T’ai-ts’ang and encourage popular support of the forthcoming Ch’ing campaign against Soochow. However, Li Hung-chang decided, apparently on Feng Kuei-fen’s advice, to append to the joint memorial a brief ‘supplementary memorial’ of his own recommending that should the Su-Sung-T’ai quota be reduced, there should also be ‘a reduction of the disreputable customary fees as a basis for the prohibition of surcharges’ and that the use of ‘the terms major and minor households should be prohibited’. Further departing from Tseng’s suggestions, Li proposed that a bureau be created to determine the appropriate amount of surcharges for the Su-Sung-T’ai grain tribute, to be paid ‘uniformly by the upper and lower gentry and the commoners’.⁷⁶

To the surprise of many, imperial replies came swiftly in two edicts dated 9 and 18 July respectively. The first expressed sympathy for the taxpayers of Su-Sung-T’ai, decreeing that the distinction of ‘major and minor households be permanently prohibited’ and that Tseng and Li should deliberate on how to get rid of ‘the surcharges, disreputable customary fees and tax-farmers [*pao-hu*]’. The edict of 18 July, based on

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 247–8. TWCK, *Shu-cha*, 11.34b.

⁷⁵ TWCK, *Shu-cha*, 11.33, 34.

⁷⁶ LWCK, *Tsou-kaou*, 3.56–65.

the Board of Revenue's response to the censor Ting Shou-ch'ang, approved in principle (pending details to be worked out) that the grain tribute quota of Su-Sung-T'ai be reduced by one-third of the former statutory requirement, while the lighter original quotas of two neighbouring prefectures, Ch'ang-chou and Chen-chiang, should be reduced by one-tenth. Reduction of grain tribute from three over-taxed Chekiang prefectures was referred to Tso Tsung-t'ang. The throne reiterated its oft-repeated maxim that fiscal policy should be 'considerate toward the people's livelihood below yet without loss to the dynasty's finances above'.⁷⁷

Unfortunately, further deliberations led to controversies that did not end in real reform. The bureau for Su-Sung-T'ai tax reduction was established in August 1863 in Shanghai, with Feng Kuei-fen as a member. But Liu Hsün-kao, Kiangsu financial commissioner and head of the bureau *ex officio*, was against overhauling the ante-bellum system. A native of Honan and a *chin-shih*, Liu had been magistrate successively in three hsien in Su-Sung-T'ai in the 1850s and knew the local problems well. Both he and Feng felt that one-third reduction of the tribute quota was too little. Feng persuaded Li Hung-chang to consider memorializing again for a further cut of 10 per cent of the original rice quota, but for some reason Liu adamantly insisted it would be better to request a 20 or 25 per cent reduction of the regular land tax paid in silver. Liu, while also wanting tax reduction, always had in mind what might be feasible for the yamen personnel. He insisted on retaining the more than *fifty* grades of land that were maintained in official registers with a rate assigned to each classification. Feng and Liu disagreed over the surcharges. Feng argued that the tribute rice was bound to be shipped increasingly by seagoing junks. Freight by the sea route was much lower than the corrupt Grand Canal transport charges. Feng was incensed when Liu, undoubtedly with the interest of the Su-Sung-T'ai magistrates in mind, proposed to add a surcharge of 1,000 cash for 'transport subsidy', and another 1,000 cash for 'miscellaneous fees'. Feng and a few gentry friends protested vehemently, fearing that Liu would include such surcharges in the second memorial Tseng and Li were to submit on Su-Sung-T'ai, thus nullifying the beneficial effects of the quota reduction. Feng never himself proposed any provision for the sustenance of the hsien establishment. He simply quoted an ancient classic: 'With the most self-denying laws, abuses will arise out of avarice. If the laws should be based on avarice, how many more abuses will arise?'⁷⁸

⁷⁷ *Chiang-su chien-fu ch'üan-an*, 1.1-4.

⁷⁸ *HCTC*, 4.9; 5.11b-12; 9.1. Frank A. Lojewski, 'Confucian reformers and local vested... interests: the Su-Sung-T'ai tax reduction of 1863 and its aftermath' (University of Cali-

Feng's proposals had the support of eminent Su-Sung-T'ai gentry, who owned large landed properties. As landlords dependent on their tenants' toil, such retired officials as P'an Tseng-wei (1819–86, youngest son of P'an Shih-en, a grand councillor of the Tao-kuang reign) were not necessarily sympathetic with the lower gentry who either competed against or colluded with yamen underlings for petty gain. There was, moreover, no necessary conflict of economic interest between prominent gentry like Feng or P'an and the several hundred thousand peasant proprietors who belonged to minor households in Su-Sung-T'ai.⁷⁹

With his usual pragmatism, Li Hung-chang tolerated the views of both Feng and Liu. At least by December 1863, when his yamen removed to recaptured Soochow, Li had asked Feng to draft the second memorial he was to submit jointly with Tseng Kuo-fan. The draft was severely criticized by Liu, as financial commissioner, but Tseng was not entirely unsympathetic with Feng.⁸⁰ Liu was asked to redraft the memorial, but it was not despatched until 9 June 1865, after Tseng had departed for the Nien campaigns in Shantung.

In the meantime, a parallel case had arisen. A second area of inordinately high tribute rice quota was the Hang-Chia-Hu circuit of Chekiang, comprising the wealthy prefectures of Hang-chou, Chia-hsing and Hu-chou. Sharing a similar historical background with Su-Sung-T'ai – of former rent rates having been converted to tax rates – Hang-Chia-Hu's grain tribute quota as of the early nineteenth century was 1.1 million piculs as compared with Su-Sung-T'ai's 1.7 million. Since as early as 1823, however, partial remission of the amount had had to be granted almost every year. As in Su-Sung-T'ai, the practice prevailed in Hang-Chia-Hu of the influential landowners 'registering disasters', while the local officials had no recourse other than making up for the delinquency of the major households by the surcharges imposed on the minor households. The exorbitant surcharges included fees for transport, although they had been reduced after 1852, when Chekiang tribute rice began to be shipped to Peking by sea. As in Su-Sung-T'ai, peasant proprietors sometimes acquired major household status with the assistance of so-called 'tax-farming households' (*pao-hu*).⁸¹

fornia PhD dissertation, Davis, 1973), 186–200. Also *HCTC*, 4.11b–12b; 10.7–10. *LWCK*, *P'eng-liao han-kao*, 3.27.

⁷⁹ Wu, *Liang-lui hsien ch'ih-tu*, 5.11, 16–17. *HCTC*, 5.44b–45. Ku Yen-wu and later writers estimated 80 or 90 per cent of Su-Sung-T'ai's farmers were tenants. Assuming a total population of ten million in the 1850s, at least two or three hundred thousand must have been peasant proprietors, probably more.

⁸⁰ *LWCK*, *P'eng-liao han-kao*, 4.11, 26b; 5.1b, 8, 12, 36; 6.4b–5. *TWCK*, *Shu-cha*, 12.33b–34; 13.7b–8, 11b–12.

⁸¹ *TWCK*, *Tsou-kao*, 11.40b–41; 7.42b.

For most of 1863, Tso Tsung-t'ang, governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang and concurrently governor of Chekiang, was at his headquarters in Yen-chou, making only slow progress in the offensive against Hangchow, which was not recovered until 31 March 1864. Ten days earlier, Li Hung-chang's forces had recovered Chia-hsing, but Hu-chou was not subdued until late August 1864, more than a month after the fall of Nanking. In January 1864, Tso's first response to the court's offer to reduce Hang-Chia-Hu's tribute grain quota very perceptively explained why, as in Su-Sung-T'ai, the grain tribute had been a frequent cause of popular revolts. Peasant proprietors normally had to pay at least an additional eight or nine pecks for each picul of the tribute rice due. 'They exhaust themselves in hard work the entire year so that the clerks and runners can get their middleman's fees, to be shared by the bullies among the lower gentry [*chin-kun*].'⁸²

In November 1864, Tso reported on the new grain tribute planned by a bureau he set up to formulate regulations. He counted on a reduction of the statutory quota by one third. The rates for each *mu* of land were adjusted accordingly. The task was much simpler than in Su-Sung-T'ai, since there were only nine grades of land. Tso also wanted to attack the question of surcharges. Realizing that local government expenditures had to come from somewhere, he proposed a regular surcharge under the title 'transport fee' (*yün-fei*). This would be in addition to the imperially authorized surcharge for tribute rice, also used for transport purposes. Tso implied that hsien magistrates might spend the proceeds of the additional 'transport fee' as they saw fit, without having to account for them. However, he set only a modest fee of 8 cash for each picul of tribute grain levied – 4.5 cash more than had been assessed in Hang-Chia-Hu for the special expense of sea transport in the 1850s.⁸³ Unlike Feng Kuei-fen, Tso did not see his 'transport fee' as an inducement to greater greed. Like Tseng Kuo-fan, Tso felt that institutions should be adjusted only 'along the lines of existing customs'.

In the outcome, the Board of Revenue recommended reduction of the old quota by eight-thirtieths, and this was approved by the throne in May 1865. The task of reviving the grain tribute in Hang-Chia-Hu now fell on Ma Hsin-i, the new governor of Chekiang. A schedule of rates higher than what Tso had visualized was worked out by the bureau in charge, and collection under the new system began in the autumn of 1865.⁸⁴

Meanwhile, in Soochow the controversy regarding Su-Sung-T'ai

⁸² *Ibid.* 7.41b; cf. Wu, *Liang-lui hsien ch'ib-tu*, 5.22–5.

⁸³ *TW'HK, Tsou-kaio*, 11.43b.

⁸⁴ Hsia, 'T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ch'ien-hou', 456–7.

grain tribute continued. P'an Tseng-wei, probably the most influential gentry-scholar of the city, tried in vain to persuade Liu Hsün-kao, the financial commissioner, to accept Feng Kuei-fen's views. In mid-May 1865, Yin Chao-yung, an official in Peking and a native of Wu-chiang in Su-chou prefecture, memorialized attacking the taxation system in Kiangsu, including not only Li Hung-chang's heavy-handed likin levies but also exorbitant surcharges that seemed to have revived along with the land tax.⁸⁵

Tseng and Li's second memorial of 9 June 1865 requested a 20 per cent reduction of the regular land tax for Su-Sung-T'ai as well as the Ch'ang-chou and Chen-chiang prefectures. It also recommended that the imperially sanctioned surcharge known as the *ts'ao-hsiang*, levied in silver nominally for transport of tribute rice, should be cut 20 per cent for the same localities. A supplementary memorial reported that during the past year, when the levies on land had resumed under a temporary system in Su-Sung-T'ai, all 'meltage fees' had been reduced by half. The distinction between major and minor households was no longer made and henceforth, whoever should practice tax-farming, be he official or gentry, would be dealt with severely.⁸⁶

Unlike the earlier request from Tseng and Li, the reductions sought in this second memorial were rejected bluntly by the Board of Revenue. An edict of August 1865 declared that since *ts'ao-hsiang* was needed for the transport of tribute rice, reducing this revenue could lead only to the collection of local 'subsidies' that would vary in amount.⁸⁷ With the vanquishing of the Taipings, the court was not inclined to yield regarding its levies on agriculture.

Yin Chao-yung's bitter attack on Li Hung-chang's allegedly corrupt likin system made Li particularly self-conscious about his reputation as a fiscal administrator. As acting governor-general of Liangkiang, he worked through Liu Hsün-kao, who became acting governor of Kiangsu, to reduce in Su-Sung-T'ai and other areas such surcharges as the meltage fees, rice wastage and silver-copper conversion differentials. Yet in 1866, after Li had left Nanking for the Nien campaign, a surcharge of 800 cash was added on Liu's instructions to each picul of tribute rice due from the Su-Sung-T'ai proprietors under the new rates.⁸⁸ This amounted to the restitution of the extra-legal charges that had been abolished. The acting governor was perhaps only doing what was unavoidable, since he had to make up for the abolished customary fees needed to maintain the local

⁸⁵ HCTC, 4.10. Yin Chao-yung, *Yin P'u-ching shih-lang tzu-hsi nien-p'u* (Chronological autobiography of Vice-president Yin P'u-ching), 54.

⁸⁶ L'W'CK, *Tsou-kao*, 8.60-6.

⁸⁷ *Chiang-su chien-fu ch'üan-an*, 1.5-6; 2.29-33.

⁸⁸ HCTC, 4.12.

government establishments, for legitimate or illegitimate purposes. Furthermore, Tseng and Li's second memorial having been rejected, Su-Sung-T'ai's regular tax-quotas continued to be excessive. As the security of the Yangtze area became assured, the dynasty was less disposed to reform the land tax there.

THE NIEN WAR AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS

The Nien impact on north China

Even as the defeat of the Taipings brought security to the Yangtze valley, the growing power of another group of rebels, the Niens, posed a great threat to north China itself. The Ch'ing war against the Niens had two phases, each calling eventually for an effort at suppression no less strenuous than that against the Taipings. The first phase comprised the decade up to early 1863, during which the Niens acquired and then held on to a rural base in the north-western corner of Anhwei. During this decade, Nien raids on adjoining provinces catalysed separate local rebellions on a wide scale. In the second phase of the Nien war, an expanded and increasingly skilful Nien cavalry waged from 1864 to 1868 a wide-ranging war all across the north China plain. The Nien problem grew more serious and drew closer to Peking itself.

By the mid-1850s, there were some thirty top Nien chieftains, many of them salt smugglers, who led sizeable bands organized chiefly from their own lineages or home villages (see chapter 6). Most leaders seem to have come from families of what in the twentieth century would be called 'middle peasants'. Only a very few lesser Niens were holders of low degrees. With gingalls and other simple firearms, these bands were increasingly able to stand up against the small local Green Standard units. Some magistrates paid them to keep them away.

The Niens were champions of justice and philanthropy from their standpoint. A proclamation issued by Chang Lo-hsing (1811-63), the 'lord of the alliance', at the market town of Chih-ho in late summer 1855, attacked specifically the incumbent prefect and magistrate of the area, who were said to have taken people's lives by judicial torture for the sake of money: 'They punish with knife and saw instead of rod. . . . The judgments they hand down depend solely on bribes.' The very few Nien documents of the 1850s that have been preserved suggest neither hatred for the Manchus nor White Lotus millenarianism. The Niens felt themselves a 'righteous force' (*i-chün*) that must rely on their own effort and good discipline, and not any divine agency, to bring peace to society –


'to save our lacerated people by doing away with the wicked and tyrannical'.⁸⁹ Orthodox Chinese values were attacked with symbols and with deeds. In the Po-chou and Meng-ch'eng area that bred so many Nien leaders, Ch'ing officials were horrified to find temples that had existed since the Ming, but had recently been luxuriously renovated, in which the only deity worshipped was Tao Chih – the famous bandit of the Ch'un-ch'iu period, regarded in Chinese literature as the 'greatest robber of all ages'. Yet the Nien military regulations forbade unauthorized pillaging of villages as well as rape, the penalty for both to be death. Many leaders evidently subscribed to the traditional bandit slogan 'rob the rich and succour the poor'.⁹⁰ Moreover, many lesser Nien headmen were known to prefer death to giving their comrades away, even if their own parents and children were also to perish. Yüan Chia-san (1806–63), the scholar-commander in charge of the war in Anhwei, was amazed at the light-heartedness with which the Niens faced death. 'Before execution, they talk, laugh, sing and dance, neither fearing imperial laws nor cherishing sentiment about their blood relations.' Yüan's son, Pao-heng, wrote that the Niens 'regard the keeping of one's word and the levity with which one faces life and death as the dictates of duty [i]'.⁹¹ The strength of character that lay behind such attitudes no doubt explains the Niens' appeal to many among the populace.

Their success in dominating so many rural communities in north-western Anhwei after 1855 must also be ascribed to the unexpected forms that the imperially encouraged *t'uan-lien* defence organizations took in north China. Unlike Kwangtung, Hunan or Kiangsi, where the upper gentry frequently took initiative in organizing militia bands and mercenaries, in northern Anhwei, Honan, Shantung and Chihli, few among the prominent local elite would actually undertake such measures by themselves. Evidently, the dissident White Lotus heritage was far more pervasive among the north China peasantry than the influence of the Triads among the rural populace of Kwangtung or Hunan. Rural violence being so common, prominent gentry with large properties would not want to have armed and unpredictable men about. The upper gentry of north China much preferred to live in the cities and there promote

⁸⁹ Chiang Ti, *Ch'u-chi Nien-chün shih lun-ts'ung* (Studies on the early history of the Nien Army), 21–3, 26–7. See appendix, 241–3 for proclamation discovered by archivists of the People's Republic, first published in *Chün-p'u jih-pao* (*Progress Daily*), 3 February 1951.

⁹⁰ Yüan Chia-san, *Tuan-min kung chi: tsou-i* (Collected papers of Yüan Chia-san: memorials), 5.31–2; Chiang Ti, *Ch'u-ch'i Nien-chün*, appendix, 244–5, esp. the sixth regulation. Chiang Hsiang-nan, *Chiang Tzu-hsiao hsien-sheng i-chi* (Collected writings of the late Chiang Tzu-hsiao), reprinted in Fan Wen-lan *et al.* comp. *Nien-chün* (The Nien Army), 1.323.

⁹¹ Yüan Chia-san, *Tuan-min kung chi: tsou-i*, 2.40b–41; 5.31b; Yüan Pao-heng, *W'en-ch'eng kung chi: tsou-i* (Collected papers of Yüan Pao-heng: memorials), 1.4.



MAP 15. The Nien War and related uprisings 1855-68

urban defence organizations (*ch'eng-t'uan*) or official mercenaries (*lien-yung*).⁹²

Since the flatland north of the Huai River had few paddy fields and was devoted only to dry farming, a village or a market town could best protect itself against cavalry raids by building earthwalls (*yü* or *chai*) with surrounding moats. The heavy walls (usually only seven or eight feet high) could be reinforced by bricks and have gunports for gingsalls. Except when the hanging bridge was down the deep moats, some fifteen feet wide, could not easily be crossed. Within an earthwall community, power often gravitated to the leader of the militia corps, usually a member of a large lineage but not necessarily of even lower gentry status. The militia leader of a single earthwall community assumed the title *t'uan-tsung* or *t'uan-chang* (chief of local defence organization), while the commander of a number of such corps was called *lien-tsung* (chief of multiplex defence organization). A knowledgeable writer of the time thus described a typical north Anhwei community: 'Young and courageous men were selected to learn the military arts and one person was given general charge and called *lien-tsung*. . . . During the autumn harvests, the *lien-tsung* would lead his men to reap the crops and divide them equally with the owners of the land, who could not regard the property as privately owned.'⁹³ Such behaviour by *t'uan-lien* bosses was comparable in some respects to that of Nien chieftains.

Not surprisingly, Ch'ing commanders in north Anhwei did not find the country militia a ready source of manpower. Most mercenaries they organized came from the city poor, where heterodox influences were not as deep-rooted. In 1854, Yüan Chia-san of Honan, a *chin-shih* of 1835 and an admired friend of Tseng Kuo-fan, tried to do in north Anhwei what Tseng was doing in Hunan: absorb the manpower of the countryside into a new imperial army. He selected men from 'village militia' to make five battalions of seven hundred men each, under the high-sounding titles 'Loyal and benevolent', 'Loyal and dutiful', 'Loyal and propriety-observing', 'Loyal and wise' and 'Loyal and faithful'. But in their first expedition against the Niens near Meng-ch'eng, the five battalions were badly defeated. Yüan had to let this 3,500-man army 'return temporarily to farming'. Henceforth, he relied principally on Green Standard forces and a few cavalry from Chahar and Manchuria, transferred to his command by the throne.⁹⁴

⁹² Wing-hong Tang, 'Local Defense organizations in Shantung, 1853-1863: from loyalism to rebellion' (University of California MA dissertation, Davis, June 1975). See also writings of Li T'ang-chieh (1882) and Meng Ch'uan-chu (1910) reprinted in Fan, *Nien-chün*, 6.171-2; 300-3.

⁹³ Wang Ting-an, *Ch'iu-ch'üeh chai ti-tzu chi*, 15.1b.

⁹⁴ Yüan Chia-san, *Tuan-min kung-chi: tsou-i*, 3.40b, 51, 55-6; 4.12b; 8.2, 4, 14-15, 19-20, 36b, 42, 51; 9.52-3; Yüan Chia-san, *Tuan-min kung-chi: han-tu* (Collected papers of Yüan Chia-san: letters), 1.9b, 12, 16b, 19b, 27b.

During the three years 1856–9, the Niens consolidated the area between the Kuai and the Sha Rivers, both tributaries of the Huai. The Ch'ing could only defend the three principal cities, Po-chou, Meng-ch'eng and T'ai-ho, within this rural Nien base of approximately 4,000 square miles. Village leaders dropped the former militia titles and were now merely described as 'master of the earthwall community' (*yü-chu*). For their own organization, the Niens adopted the titles *t'ang-chu* (master of the lodge) for community leaders, and *ch'i-chu* (master of the banner) for military chieftains. It seems that they did not have a many-layered hierarchy. The titles *t'ang-chu* and *ch'i-chu* were merely prefixed by the characters *ta* (big) and *hsiao* (small), indicating primarily the size of the command.⁹⁵ Periodically, the Nien 'master of the banner' would hold a meeting with the masters of pro-Nien communities. Each would pledge the number of men and horses his community was to contribute for an expedition. The total booty was to be divided upon completion of the mission, with the Nien leaders keeping a sizeable portion (some say half), the remainder to be distributed – one share for each person and two for each horse. A festive gathering 'to form contingents for the banner' (*chuang-ch'i*) would then be convened. Operas were staged, feasts consumed and the venture would be launched.

Chiang Ti, the most meticulous historian of the Niens for the period before 1863, believes that the diverse efforts of the Nien leaders reflected the inherent disunity of the movement. Every top chieftain chose a particular region for his ventures. Chang Lo-hsing, despite his title of 'lord of the alliance', not only had control over very few leaders, but elected to stay away from the Nien base area for the six years between 1856 and mid-1862; as far as is known, he returned home for a short visit only in 1858.

Chang was among the very few Nien leaders who not only aspired to but also was able to capture and hold cities. His ability to do so is perhaps explained by the fact that he and Kung Te (the mysterious Nien leader, reputed to be blind, who was nonetheless a brilliant strategist) chose to ally themselves with the Taipings, who had ample experience in siege warfare. Chang's own forces managed to capture the Huai River junction, San-ho-chien, on 1 March 1857. But he was soon visited by the Taiping commanders, Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, who were struggling to consolidate their position north of the Yangtze. For nine months, Chang and Kung Te garrisoned on behalf of the Taipings the city of Liu-an, about fifty miles south of the Huai. But in mid-1858, Chang and his allies, with Taiping help, captured the large city of Huai-yüan, north

⁹⁵ Life in a Nien family, Nien morality, discipline and organization, are described by Liu T'ang, a merchant's son, kidnapped near Chih-ho in late 1858; see in Fan, *Nien-chün*, 1.348–55.

of the Huai, together with a cluster of other big towns near Hung-tse Lake that controlled the waterways through which the salt smugglers between north Kiangsu and Anhwei had to pass. Chang Lo-hsing presumably amassed great wealth from 1858 to early 1860, when he controlled this region. From the Taipings, Chang received the title of 'Commander-in-chief for northern campaigns' (*Cheng-pei chu-chiang*), although he does not seem to have been invested as the 'Enrichment King' (*Wu wang*) until 1861, when he still retained one major Huai city, Ting-yüan. Chang rendered invaluable service to the Taipings by protecting the outer periphery of Nanking from north Anhwei, although the Taipings apparently expected him to do more. Li Hsiu-ch'eng complained in his 'confession' of 1864 that Chang 'accepted [Taiping] investiture but not instructions'.⁹⁶

While cooperating with the Taipings only to some extent, the Niens set an example of anti-Ch'ing disaffection among the local defence leaders. The most conspicuous case is that of the lower-gentry villain Miao P'ei-lin, who eventually commanded (before his demise in 1863) a rebel force in the mid-Huai area even stronger than the Niens. A *sheng-yüan* of Feng-t'ai, just south of the Nien base, Miao emerged in 1856 as the 'chief of multiplex defence organization' there, and quickly seized the power of taxation in the city and its vicinity, including both land tax and *likin*. Assuming a fence-sitting stance between the Ch'ing and the Niens, he had the wealth and the force to bribe or intimidate the leaders of numerous earthwall communities into becoming his allies. He sent agents to establish a 'militia bureau' in each centre. Like the Niens, he identified the local forces that supported him with colourful banners. By 1857 Miao had 'made alliance with scores of earthwall communities and had the support of several thousand men'. He then decided to befriend the Ch'ing commanders, particularly Sheng-pao. Having received from the throne the title of 'circuit intendant of northern Szechwan', he expanded his own realm at the expense of the Nien and helped Yüan Chia-san. But Miao was dissatisfied with the nominal office Yüan obtained for him – an honorary provincial finance commissionership. Around October 1860, realizing that the Hsien-feng Emperor had fled to Jehol and that the Taipings had occupied most of south-eastern Kiangsu, Miao now saw himself as the master of the wealthy Lianghuai region. In a letter addressed to Yüan and the governor of Anhwei, he said he had under him more than 100,000 'militiamen' (*lien-chung*) organized under 'five banners and fourteen

⁹⁶ Chiang Ti, *Ch'u-ch'i Nien-chün*, esp. 130–4. Also 97, 103–7. Chang Lo-hsing's proclamation (*hui-wen*), c. 1858, and his 'confession' of 1863, discovered in the Grand Council archives, were included in an article by Ma Ju-yen and Liu Shou-i in *Kuang-ming jib-pao* (Illumination Daily), 10 Oct. 1962.

battalions'; that he intended to occupy Shou-chou, the governor's temporary seat; and he demanded that 'the salt likin collectorates of the Lianghuai area be my personal responsibility'.⁹⁷ In December he openly defied Ch'ing authority by seizing government vessels on the Huai River. In March 1861, he sent a letter of friendship to Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, now the Taiping 'Heroic King' (Ying wang). In prolonged negotiations with Yüan and the governor, Miao was granted control of the likin stations on the Huai River. Yet he occupied Shou-chou anyway in October 1861.

Earlier in the year, Miao had accepted Taiping investiture as the 'Forward-Going King' (Tsou wang) and had ceased warring against the Niens. But Ch'ing fortunes had been on the rise after the Hunan Army's capture of Anking in September 1861. Miao in March 1862 rewon the 'friendship' of his old patron, Sheng-pao, and in early May he turned against the Taipings and Niens again. On 15 May, when the unsuspecting Ch'en Yü-ch'eng passed through Miao's new base of Shou-chou, he was respectfully greeted at the city gate, then seized and delivered to the Ch'ing officials. Unlike Chang Lo-hsing, who, although a bandit, was at least consistent, Miao P'ei-lin must go down in history as modern China's first warlord – an unprincipled militarist ready to make any alliance to advance his separatist cause.

While Chang Lo-hsing and Kung Te were obsessed with the Huai cities, other top Nien leaders stayed on in their nest area and made periodic expeditions to nearby provinces, at first particularly Honan. Since the cavalry skills of their forces were constantly improving, and these leaders were inexpert in the siege of cities protected by high stone or brick walls, they were satisfied with plundering prosperous market towns. Yet it was precisely at the market-town level that the Nien movement could become infectious. Potentially dissident groups had long existed – peasants who got together to resist taxes, bandit gangs, heterodox religious sects. In the turmoil created by Nien invasions, the militia bands encouraged by the government could turn against it. Especially in Honan, local self-defence organizations were sometimes called 'village federations' (*lien-chuang hui*), which differed from the model *t'uan-lien* in that the leaders were peasant landowners, free from official or gentry supervision. These had sprung up during the Taiping northern expedition of 1853. As soon as the Taiping threat had passed, however, many such federations turned against the local government, demanding reduction of taxes and surcharges and murdering the yamen underlings who came to 'prompt tax payment'. Villagers, armed against the Taipings, frequently entered the hsien city to storm the prison. In the mid-1850s, such acts of 'defying officials and

⁹⁷ Chang Jui-ch'ih, 'Liang-huai k'an-luan chi' (Dealing with rebellions on both banks of the Huai River) in Fan, *Nien-chün*, 1.288, 291.

taking the lives of yamen runners' (*k'ang-kuan sha-ch'ai*) spread to some two dozen counties in Honan.

The very first expedition the Niens made after their formation of a league in 1855 was to invade the wealthy Honan market towns around the great city of Kuei-te. On their way home, their loot, including horses and goods in wagons, made a caravan that extended many miles. By the late 1850s, Nien expeditions penetrated central Honan and pressed towards the Yellow River. In October 1859, the 'Anhwei rebels' (*Wan-fei*), by which name the Niens were also known, were less than thirty miles from Kaifeng, the Honan capital. In September 1861, they approached the ancient metropolis of Loyang.⁹⁸ These far-flung expeditions, chiefly mounted raids, in turn augmented the Nien cavalry by the capture (and even purchase) of government horses.

The Nien raids into Honan stimulated not only tax-resistance, but also banditry. Many local bandits also called themselves niens, as a generic term, meaning essentially organized bands. In 1856 in the Chüeh-tzu mountains in south central Honan, astride six counties, a federation of five nien bands was formed, at first with less than 250 members. Among their leaders were men with such colourful names as 'Chang the Bat', 'Yü the Monk' and 'Li the Big Black Face'. They convoyed illicit salt, and often descended on the wealthy homes of the market towns to rob and to be feasted, sometimes in a half-friendly manner. Within a year, the federation totalled 10,000 men, with a base area of about 3,000 square miles. These peasant bandits were soon joined by some 800 illicit miners, who were being pursued by government troops for working silver mines that had been closed. But the Chüeh-tzu-shan brigands somehow failed to obtain the aid of the Niens from Anhwei. Government troops defeated them in 1858.

In 1860-1, a major Honan nien movement arose under Ch'en Ta-hsi, a former petty officer of a government mercenary force. As leader of the local militia corps at his native Ju-yang, he fortified its earthwalls and began plundering nearby market towns. By mid-1861, several hundred earth-wall communities in Ju-yang and three nearby counties had given him allegiance. Ch'en Ta-hsi survived all government attacks, thanks largely to his several thousand horsemen. He moved freely from prefecture to prefecture, and received help from the Anhwei Niens in Honan. He developed a firm friendship with Chang Tsung-yü, nephew of Chang Lo-hsing and the future great Nien leader, and joined up with him in 1863.

The Niens also rekindled dissidence of the White Lotus type that had

⁹⁸ Chiang Ti, *Ch'u-ch'i Nien-chün*, 99-101; for the diverse Nien operations, see chronology, 188-238. Yin Keng-yun *et al.*, *Yü-chün chi-lüeh* (A concise history of the Honan Army; hereafter *YCCL*), 2.2.8; 2.4.1; 6.2.13b-14.

lain underground. The first such revolt took place in 1858 in Ying-chou (present Fu-yang) near the Honan border in north-west Anhwei, where a certain Wang T'ing-chen styled himself 'Military adviser obeying Heaven', preached 'supernatural doctrines', and dressed his followers in 'weird garments'. In the villages and market towns of east Honan, a sectarian force of some five thousand now arose, including mounted troops in bright red jackets, wielding 'flying knives' supposed to be invincible. But in April 1858, this rising, hardly five months old, was crushed by forces under the Ch'ing banner commander, Te-leng-o.

In 1861, a new sectarian revolt, of White Lotus heritage, arose in an earth-wall stronghold some fifteen miles east of Kuei-te. The leader, Ku Yung-ch'ing, was from a sectarian family; both his father and grandfather had been executed for practising heterodoxy. He now prophesied an impending 'great calamity' (*ta-chieh*), but claimed he could help his followers to escape this fate, since in his person a new era was to be inaugurated. Among Ku's devotees were some Honanese bandits, and the Anhwei Nien leader Liu Yü-yüan (Liu the Dog). Ku prepared to besiege Kuei-te, but instead, strong provincial forces broke into his fortified base, the famous Chin-lou-chai (Golden Chamber Fort), and Ku was killed. But the movement was carried on by the widow of Ku's brother, née Yao, in the White Lotus tradition. The Golden Chamber Fort was recovered and the revolt gained wider support, until suppressed with cannon fire in March 1862.⁹⁹

While the Niens had catalysed risings in Honan from 1855 on, they found it difficult to enter Shantung in force, owing to the concentration of Ch'ing troops under Yüan Chia-san and others in the Anhwei-Kiangsu-Shantung border area. However, in October 1860, a reported 70,000 men with perhaps more than 10,000 horses broke into Shantung in numerous bands, spreading out to four prefectures and pillaging twenty counties, from Ts'ao-hsien in the extreme south-west, to places almost as far north as the new course of the Yellow River.¹⁰⁰ East of the Grand Canal, the Anhwei marauders met strong resistance at Ch'ü-fu, the ancient home of Confucius, but large numbers besieged Ning-yang and Yün-ch'eng, two vital cities flanking the metropolis of Chi-ning, the strategic bastion of the Grand Canal in south Shantung.

Earlier in 1860, the court had appointed Tu Ch'iao, a vice-president of the Board of Revenue, as commissioner of local defence in Shantung, just as Mao Ch'ang-hsi, a deputy mayor of Peking, had been given the

⁹⁹ On these cases, see YCCL, 3.3.2b-4, 16b; 3.4.2b, 4b; 3.5.6. YCCL, 4.9.1, 6, 10-11; 4.10.1b-3, 21; 4.11. 4b-6. YCCL, 2.3.1-2, 3b-4, 5, 7. YCCL 2.5.1, 3b-4, 5b.

¹⁰⁰ I-hsin *et al.*, *Chiao-p'ing Nien-fei fang-lüeh* (Campaigns to suppress the Nien bandits; hereafter CPNF), 85.1 ff.

same role in Honan. But the crisis in Shantung, as well as banditry in southern Chihli, prompted the throne on 5 November (even before the British troops had left Peking) to appoint Senggerinchin as imperial commissioner, to move with the greatest dispatch against the Niens in Shantung and Honan. In mid-December, the Mongol prince arrived at Chi-ning with 3,500 cavalry, 20,000 banner infantrymen and 5,000 Green Standard troops. But in his initial encounter on 26 December, his forces were routed some thirty miles west of Chi-ning. Other reverses followed. The Niens threatened Tsinan, the provincial capital, and moved eastward into the peninsular part of Shantung, reaching the vicinity of the treaty port of Chefoo. The imperial commissioner did not pursue them, because he had to cope with fast-growing local rebellions. Small landholders predominated in Shantung agriculture, the dissident tradition of heterodox sects and banditry was strong, and peasants who lived near mountain fastnesses or in the marshes created by the great shift of the Yellow River in the early 1850s were tactically mobile. Peasant discontent could be readily mobilized, since taxes had increased in Shantung, while crops were reduced by natural disasters.¹⁰¹

A stubborn rebellion of religious background centred in Chou hsien, less than thirty miles east of Chi-ning. Several dozen mountain villages had been a haven for White Lotus remnants. Their leader was Sung Chi-p'eng, whose home village was Pai-lien ch'ih (The White Lotus Pond). His sect, barely camouflaged by the name Wen-hsien chiao (Literary and virtuous sect), had many illiterate members who transmitted orally the incantations and passages from the sutras. Sung was reputed to be capable of healing diseases. At nocturnal meetings, he preached and performed esoteric rites. Sometime after 1853, through followers including two members of the lower-gentry (a *lin-sheng* and a *chien-sheng*), he gained control of numerous militia bands. Sung proclaimed a reign title of T'ien-tsung (lit. 'liberated by Heaven'), and bestowed official ranks and titles on the sect's leaders. Later, when they were captured by the Ch'ing forces, many sectarians apparently found solace in their unnamed deities. Their long hair sometimes covering their faces, 'while they were taken out to be decapitated they mumbled from their sutra, put their two palms together, and prostrated themselves in homage [to their gods]'.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ See Ching Su and Lo Lun, *Ch'ing-tai Shan-tung ching-ying ti-chu ti she-hui bring-chih* (The social characteristics of Shantung managerial landlords during the Ch'ing period), esp. Appendices 1 and 2. Li Wen-chih, ed. *Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh shih tzu-liao* (Materials on the agricultural history of modern China), 1 (1840-1911) 337. *Lin-ch'ing hsien-chih* (Gazetteer of Lin-ch'ing county), 1.14-15.

¹⁰² Kuan Yen, Chao Kuo-hua et al., *Shan-tung chün-hsing chi-lueh* (Brief record of military campaigns in Shantung; hereafter *STCH*), 19A.1-2, 4, 8b. My research for this section has been guided by Tang, 'Local defence organizations in Shantung, 1853-1863'.

In January 1861, the Chou Sect rebels were defeated, but Sung Chi-p'eng was not captured. He arranged to capitulate, but was not given a place in the imperial military bureaucracy, as were so many surrendered local rebels that retained their forces in the early 1860s. Soon he brought his forces out to besiege Chou hsien, 4,000 strong, but was again badly defeated. Yet Sung was again allowed to surrender through an intermediary. He refortified his stronghold, accumulated food stocks, and built watch towers in the surrounding hills. In September 1861, he again rebelled, and was reported to have 100,000 men by June 1862.

Another group, the Long Spear Society (Ch'ang-ch'iang hui), can best be described as a league of bandit chiefs, even though many of them were also official mercenaries (*lien-yung*) fighting off the invading Nien bands in south-west Shantung. Indeed the experience of invasion had for some years past inspired these mercenary chiefs to form nien-like organizations among themselves, even north of the Yellow River's new course. They, too, put their forces under banners and the territories they controlled under 'lodge masters'. Among the leaders was at least one gentry-member, Kuo Ping-chün, a *sheng-yüan*. But Liu Chan-k'ao, a former yamen runner, was recognized as the 'lord of the alliance north of the Yellow River' (*Ho-shuo meng-chu*). The Long Spears grew to some fifty to sixty thousand, before being decisively defeated in November 1861. Some leaders went to Honan to join the Niens; most either surrendered or were killed.¹⁰³

Shantung in 1860-2 also saw the rise of an Eight Diagram (or White Lotus) Rebellion north of the Yellow River. Its principal leader was Chang Shan-chi, from Lin-ch'ing in north-west Shantung. His father having been exiled to Sinkiang for his heterodox faith, he had been brought up by his mother with the same convictions. By 1860, Chang was heading a military organization known as the Five Banners (*Wu-ch'i*), each with the insignia of a different trigram. Each member accepted a small emblem, and the several hundred home villages would each be identified as a *Pai-lien she*, or 'White Lotus community'. Official reports also accused Chang of the extreme crime of assuming an imperial title (*chien-hao*).¹⁰⁴ The Five Banner Rebellion surfaced in March 1861, with a reported strength of 50,000 men in four or five counties, all adjacent to the metropolitan province itself. Peking reacted quickly. General Sheng-pao was sent to Lin-ch'ing in June, and his crack troops won some battles, but in July were defeated by sectarian forces led by Chang Shan-chi himself. Sheng-pao

¹⁰³ *STCH*, 19A.7; 11A.4-5; Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh hui Chi-nan fen hui (Tsinan Branch of the Chinese Historical Association), comp. *Shan-tung chin-tai shih tzu-liao* (Materials on the modern history of Shantung; hereafter *STCT*), 1.264-5; *CPNF*, 115.12-14.

¹⁰⁴ *STCH*, 13A.9b; 12B.5. *CPNF*, 111.6-7.

then demonstrated his notorious skill at arranging for the capitulation of rebel leaders without reorganizing the rank and file under them. In late July, he accepted the surrender of Sung Ching-shih, a leader whose courage and martial skills had made him chieftain of the black flag in three separate Five Banners systems, commanding, reportedly, as many as 20,000 men. Sung now turned against his erstwhile comrades. Under pressure, Chang Shan-chi crossed the border to Chihli and was captured and executed in August. A new leader, a woman known as Ch'eng Wu-ku (Ch'eng the Fifth Aunt), lost her life in battle in September. In December, the sectarians surrendered *en masse* under generous terms. Sheng-pao encouraged rebel cavalymen to form new battalions under his own command. Others were given certificates of pardon (*mien-ssu p'ai-p'iao*, lit. 'tickets for exemption from death').¹⁰⁵

While the Nien invasions rekindled White Lotus activism, in Shantung especially they also stimulated numerous scattered tax-resistance movements. Imperial encouragement of *t'uan-lien*, reiterated in 1860,¹⁰⁶ gave power to the villages. Recent research, amplifying a list compiled by Tsinan historians, shows only six known cases of tax-resistance in Shantung in the seven years up to September 1860, but in the fifteen months after the massive Nien invasion in October 1860, at least eighteen such officially recorded incidents. The basic cause of these protests was the grain tribute and related charges levied in the six northern and central prefectures of the province. Their violent mood was reflected in the complaint of a yamen runner in 1862: 'Ever since the organization of militias, we runners have not dared go a mile outside the county seat.'¹⁰⁷ Among these eighteen cases, there were at least nine gentry participants (a *chin-shih*, a military *chü-jen*, two *kung-sheng*, four *sheng-yüan* and one military *sheng-yüan*).

One of the gentry tax-protesters, a *sheng-yüan* with a sense of justice but unrealistic imperial ambitions, was Liu Te-p'ei, the son of a dismissed yamen clerk. In late 1860 he 'wrote with his own brush and posted several hundred placards' urging fellow villagers to pay the grain tribute only at the legal rate, without the surcharges. Liu was arrested, but escaped and became an officer in unauthorized militia bands. In early 1862, Liu won a pardon from the new magistrate by offering to organize militia against the Niens. He quickly took control of the hsien city, confiscated the property of yamen runners, and pillaged market towns in other counties. Offering

¹⁰⁵ Fox Butterfield, 'The legend of Sung Ching-shih: an episode in Communist historiography', *Papers on China*, 18 (Dec. 1954) 134-9. *STCH*, 13c.1, 7b-8.

¹⁰⁶ Liu Chin-tsao, ed. *Ch'ing-ch'ao hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao* (Encyclopaedia of the historical records of the Ch'ing dynasty, continued; hereafter *HWHTK*), 215.9624.

¹⁰⁷ *STCH*, 22c.11b.

generous pay, he built up a force of several thousand men under five banners, each under a grand marshal (*ta Chiang-chün*). He himself headed a sixth banner, with the emblem of dragon and phoenix. In November 1862 he proclaimed himself 'Virtuous Sovereign of the Great Han' (*Ta-Han te-chu*). The academy in the city was transformed into his imperial court, with offices for a 'grand council'. A small bureaucracy was created, which included at least two scholars – a *sheng-yüan* and a *chü-jen*.¹⁰⁸

Confronted with hydra-headed risings all across the densely-populated north China plain, the imperial commissioner Prince Senggerinchin was a busy man. Occupied during most of 1862 in Honan and Anhwei, he won a crucial victory in Po-chou, just north of the Nien base area, and Niens from both banks of the Wo River began to capitulate. Urged by the throne to push on southward, towards the end of the year he encountered fierce resistance from Chang Lo-hsing and other Nien leaders. A great battle, said to have involved some 200,000 Nien troops, eventually ended in Chang being encircled near the Chih-ho market town. Liu Yü-yüan, the Nien chief believed to be of White Lotus persuasion, was killed in battle, and several top leaders surrendered.¹⁰⁹ Chang Lo-hsing was captured towards the end of March 1863.

The Nien base area was barely conquered, and the renegade Miao P'ei-lin still controlled important cities of the Huai delta. But the situation in Shantung was so serious and so threatening to Chihli, that the throne authorized Senggerinchin to return to Shantung. The imperial pretender, Liu Te-p'ei, was first on his list. Arriving at Tzu-ch'uan with an infantry force of 3,000 plus 4,000 cavalry, Senggerinchin built a high fort on the city wall and used a cannon weighing 5,000 catties to bombard buildings and streets. In early August, Liu broke out of the starving city with 300 troops, was overtaken, and died by his own hand.¹¹⁰

The dynasty's prize commander then turned to the Chou Sect rebels at White Lotus Pond, where he again showed his ingenuity in siege warfare by having ramparts built around Sung's stronghold before launching a full-scale attack in September. The defence collapsed and a massacre of perhaps 30,000 sectarians followed, including Sung Chi-p'eng himself. The prince then went after Sung Ching-shih, who had turned rebel again in May 1863, revived his Black Banner force of 7,000 men and built a stronghold near his home in T'ang-i county. A scholar in the area at the time wrote that in villages where few able-bodied men were left, mounted bandits presumably under Sung 'not only did not pillage, but on the

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* 20A.1–3. *STCT*, 1.35–6, 58, 67, 71, 92–6, 117–18.

¹⁰⁹ Chiang Ti, *Cb'u-ch'i Nien-chün*, 222–3.

¹¹⁰ *STCH*, 20B.4b. *STCT*, 1.92, 122.

contrary gave out money and goods' – which accords with the testimony of old peasants there interviewed by Peking scholars in 1951–2.¹¹¹ Defeated at first, Senggerinchin salvaged the situation by employing a battalion of foreign-trained troops – the Tientsin Foreign Arms Corps (*yang-ch'iang tui*), which by imperial order had been sent on by Ch'ung-hou, the commissioner of trade at Tientsin. Sung Ching-shih's forces were crushed by mid-October and Sung vanished, to reappear only in rumour and legend.

His prime mission of defending Shantung and Chihli accomplished, the Mongol prince moved in November through Honan to Anhwei, to face Miao P'ei-lin, the chameleon '*i'uan-lien* leader'. Returning to the imperial fold in May 1862, Miao had found his position precarious when his patron, Sheng-pao, was cashiered for malfeasance and licentious conduct in early 1863. In May, Miao made his final gamble, rebelling again, occupying several Huai cities, and besieging Meng-ch'eng at the heart of the old Nien territory. Several Anhwei and Honan provincial armies participated and, with Senggerinchin's cavalry making the principal assault, Miao was defeated and died in battle in early December 1863.

The second phase of the war

In early 1864, a new Nien army emerged in western Honan so superior in strength and in battle tactics that Senggerinchin, following it to Hupei, southern Anhwei and Shantung, was to be repeatedly defeated and eventually lose his life. Nien power rose to a new height. In 1865–6, even Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army, equipped with modern weapons, was routed by the new Nien forces in several major engagements.

This spectacular transformation has been ascribed by scholars to the fact that in the spring of 1864 a Taiping force, blocked in Hupei in an attempt to relieve the siege of Nanking, joined the Niens. These Taiping and Nien leaders decided in March 1864 to form four task forces, each under joint Nien and Taiping command. The principal force, to invade Hupei, was to be led jointly by Lai Wen-kuang, the Taiping 'Obedient King' (Tsun-wang) and by Chang Tsung-yü, who had assumed the Taiping title 'King of Liang'. Chiang Ti and Lo Erh-kang have both suggested that it was Taiping influence that made the Nien army henceforth consist of regular, permanent forces (rather than 'half-farmers, half-soldiers') with a more concentrated leadership and the superior cavalry techniques for which the

¹¹¹ *STCT*, 1.201. *STCH*, 19c.8b. Butterfield, 'Legend of Sung', 140–3; Chiang Ti, 'I-pa liu-wu nien – i-pa liu-liu nien ti Nien-chün chan-cheng' (The Nien War of 1865–1866), *Li-shih chiao-hsiieh* (Tientsin; no number, Nov. 1954) 86, citing observations of Tu Sung-nien (*chu-jen*, 1849) on Sung and the Niens.

Niens became famous.¹¹² This hypothesis must, however, be modified by the well-documented view of the historical seminar at Ho-fei, as summarized by Chang San, who points out that Lai Wen-kuang's surviving force was small and that, moreover, cavalry had never been a Taiping speciality. There is clear evidence that the Nien banner system continued after 1863 and lasted till the very end of the movement, whereas Taiping organizational terminology apparently was not used by the combined Nien-Taiping forces.¹¹³

In any case, since their 'nest area' could no longer be held, the Niens were constantly on the road and were compelled to emphasize in particular their cavalry techniques. Though Chang Tsung-yü recaptured Chih-ho in June 1863 he decided in August to 'empty his nests' and return to southern Honan. Large numbers of Niens followed him there with their families and even some clansmen. As Li Hung-chang observed later: 'The Niens have made a profession of moving about. . . . In most cases they are accompanied by their relatives and clansmen, both male and female, who during their year-round rapid excursions have conditioned themselves to become shrewd as well as sturdy.'¹¹⁴ The Niens had in fact become professional roving bandits.

Forces under Chang Tsung-yü alone in late 1863 were reported to be over 10,000, including 'a few thousand horsemen'. Thereafter many more Nien horsemen than mounted Taipings went to Hupei. Senggerinchin, who pursued the new Nien-Taiping task force to Hupei, worried much more about the Niens than about the Taipings. He had at this time more than 5,000 horses. In May 1865, the prince, after pursuing the enemy almost continuously for two months, succumbed to a brilliantly executed Nien ambush near Ts'ao-chou, in south-western Shantung. After his death, only some 2,000 of his horses remained in government hands. Many of his Manchurian horsemen had in fact absconded with their mounts and gone over to the Niens.¹¹⁵

The turning-point in the Ch'ing war against the Niens is usually considered by historians to have been Tseng Kuo-fan's appointment as imperial commissioner for their suppression on 25 May 1865, five days

¹¹² YCCL, 1.3.8-9. Chiang Ti, *Nien-chün shih ch'u t'an* (A preliminary study of Nien Army history), 38, 40, 46. Lo Erh-kang, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo hsün-chün ti yüan-tung chan* (The mobile warfare of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom's new army), esp. preface.

¹¹³ Chang San, 'Kuan yü Nien-chün ti tsu-chih wen-t'i' (Problems of the Nien Army's organization), *Anhui shih-shieh t'ung-hsin*, 14 (Dec. 1959) 34-8; and on Nien mobile warfare, *ibid.* 39-50. Chang San's evidence accords with the account of a Chefoo Chinese who spent two weeks with Lai Wen-kuang's forces in 1867; US consular dispatches from Chefoo, no. 33, 24 Aug. 1867.

¹¹⁴ YCCL, 9.13.8b-10; 10.14.1b. CPNF, 195.22. LWCK, *P'eng-liao ban-keao*, 7.29.

¹¹⁵ CPNF, 195.22b; 205.12, 13b; 211.15b, 16b; 214.33-4; 232.20b. TWHK, *Tsou-keao*, 21.5b.

after Prince Senggerinchin's death. This new assignment for the veteran statesman marked the court's full acknowledgment that the safety of Peking itself now depended on Han Chinese officials. In 1860–1 the governorships of Honan and Shantung had been entrusted to Han Chinese. In 1863, Liu Ch'ang-yu, a former Hunan Army commander, just promoted governor-general at Canton, was made instead governor-general of Chihli, a post rarely occupied by a Han Chinese. Tseng's imperial commissionership, with military authority over Anhwei, Shantung and Honan, was a landmark in this trend. Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army, still 60,000 strong, and Li's commanders serving under Tseng, were now the bulwark of the dynasty's safety. More than thirty battalions of the Anhwei Army were now rushed to Shantung. On 6 June, Li sent to Tientsin on four steamships and five Western sailing vessels some 6,000 men including 1,000 riflemen and gunners who had some of Gordon's artillery and who had been trained by the British near Shanghai. Modern weapons plainly had the advantage over the Nien cavalry. One of Li Hung-chang's officers recalled how 'strong cavalrymen arrived suddenly and descended on us like a storm', but were repulsed and in fact routed by 'repeating rifles and guns' (*lien-huan ch'iang-p'ao*).¹¹⁶

Many historians have ascribed the Niens' defeat to policies Tseng initiated in 1865–6 – first, to control the earthwall communities in northern Anhwei by going after 'the people and the chiefs'.¹¹⁷ Tseng offered rewards for information on Nien chiefs and pardons to those who had joined the Niens 'either by accident because of poverty or under duress'. He asked the earthwall communities to keep their ramparts and protect their people, livestock, food and fodder, so they would not be lost to the Niens – the classic stratagem of 'strengthening the walls and clearing the fields'. The new head of each community, nominated by the inhabitants, was to be approved by the magistrate and given a certificate by the imperial commissioner himself. The head was then to compile a 'register of the wicked people' (*yu-min ts'e*), to include all Nien chieftains and those who 'followed them willingly', and a 'register of the good people' (*liang-min ts'e*), for former Nien followers who had 'renovated themselves', as well as 'good people who never adhered to the bandits in any manner'. A person's 'good people' status had to be guaranteed by five families willing to sign a bond before the community head, who, in turn, would sign a bond before the county magistrate.

¹¹⁶ See Li Hung-chang, *Li Hung-chang chih P'an Ting-hsin shu-cha* (Li Hung-chang's letters to P'an Ting-hsin; hereafter *LHCC*), 22–4. Chou Sheng-ch'uan, *Chou Wu-chuang kung i-shu* (A collection of Chou Sheng-ch'uan's papers), introductory volume *Tzu-hsi* (Autobiography), 18–19.

¹¹⁷ Siang-tseh Chiang, *The Nien Rebellion*, 101.

To ensure performance Tseng sent special agents as his 'deputies' (*wei-yüan*) to visit the Nien-infested communities, consult the magistrates as well as 'gentry and elders', and ferret out and exterminate Nien activists in hiding. By August 1866, after thirteen months work, fifty-nine 'oldtime Niens' were captured and executed in Meng-ch'eng, forty-six in Po-chou, none in Hsü-chou and five in Ying-chou. Some deputies, however, merely went through the motions of investigation. They did not get the cooperation of magistrates, nor of the 'gentry and elders'. In many places, the new community heads were merely the former 'masters of the community' in disguise, only no longer identified with the Niens. Tseng was dismayed that certain 'wicked people' actually were Green Standard soldiers and also despaired over the irresponsibility and cynicism of some deputies.¹¹⁸

The results of Tseng's 'investigation' of the earthwall communities were in any case marginal because the main Nien forces had left their nest area in July 1865 and never returned. Their absence, as well as the growing strength of imperial armies, mainly explained the return of the old order in these former lairs of hero-bandits.

During the seventeen months that Tseng Kuo-fan conducted the war against the Niens, he is also believed to have contributed a major concept to the Ch'ing victory – the strategy of blockade. He proposed in July 1865 that his best forces instead of pursuing the Niens should guard four key bases – Lin-huai in Anhwei, Hsü-chou in Kiangsu, Chi-ning in Shantung and Chou-chia-k'ou in Honan – strategic points from which to attack the Niens should they return to Anhwei or Shantung. A year later, in July 1866, Tseng contributed the further idea of selecting certain waterways as natural barriers to restrict rebel movement. This concept of *hua-ho ch'üan-ti* (lit. 'drawing lines with waterways to encircle an area') was probably first described by Chao Lieh-wen, Tseng's one-time secretary, whose ascription of Li Hung-chang's eventual victories over the Niens to Tseng's strategy has been followed by Lo Erh-kang and others.¹¹⁹ Yet this ascription confuses the issue. For Tseng's strategy of river blockade was one of using troops as well as rivers, dikes, and canals, to prevent Nien ingress into a vital but vulnerable area, whereas Li's subsequent strategy in 1867–8 is better described by his own phrase of *mi-ti tou-wei* (lit. 'to find the terrain for encirclement'). He made greater use of cavalry and artillery to encircle the Niens, while relying on rivers and canals to prevent their egress.

¹¹⁸ TWCK, *Tsa-chu*, 2.26–30; *Tsou-kao*, 30.51–2; *P'i-tu*, 3.40b–43b, 45b–46, 48–50, 51b–53, 55–6, 68b–69; 4.1, 2b, 5; *Shu-cha*, 13.33b.

¹¹⁹ Chao Lieh-wen's preface to Chou Shih-ch'eng, *Huai-chün p'ing Nien chi* (The Anhwei Army's suppression of the Niens). Lo Erh-kang, *Nien-chün ti yün-tung chan*, 51–2.

From Hsü-chou in Kiangsu, Tseng set his forces to defend thirteen prefectures in four provinces that constituted the eastern approaches to Chihli and Peking. The Nien cavalry now relied on their mobility more than on the support of the populace, whose risings became far fewer as new provincial armies were deployed in north China. Thus the second phase of the Nien War was principally between the Niens' speed of movement and skilful tactics, and the Ch'ing forces' counter-advantage of modern weapons especially in the Anhwei Army. Tseng estimated that Nien horsemen could gallop fifty miles (150 *li*) a day. In June 1866, he noted that the Niens still lacked firearms. He consoled himself that 'firearms can hurt more people and the Niens are, after all, no match for us in this respect'.

In Tseng's view the Niens' great aspiration was to enter the prosperous coastal areas of Shantung. Lai Wen-kuang believed the Taipings' greatest failure had been to upset their 'peaceful agreement' with the foreigners by attacking Shanghai. Perhaps Lai in 1866–7 hoped for friendly Western contact and arms at Chefoo. In May 1866 a Nien attempt to enter Shantung was beaten back by Liu Ming-ch'uan, whose principal gunner (J. Pennell, a Frenchman now a Ch'ing subject and brigade-general) used cannon to bombard the Nien horsemen. Tseng Kuo-fan proposed to build dikes and wooden barriers along the Grand Canal, and make it deeper in places, to keep the Niens from crossing. In July, having moved his headquarters to Chou-chia-k'ou in Honan, Tseng recommended 'defence along the rivers' in Honan also. Troops were to guard two virtually connecting waterways (the Ying and the Chia-lu) that formed a line from the Huai almost up to the Yellow River. Tseng hoped to shut off the eastern plain from the Niens and so 'make the war against the rebels more effective'.

Tseng's strategic plan was promptly approved by Peking but it came to naught within two months and merely reflected his helplessness. On 24 September the entire Nien force, under all three top leaders (Chang Tsung-yü, Jen Chu and Lai Wen-kuang) overcame poorly constructed barriers south of Kaifeng and moved rapidly eastward to enter Shantung. On 1 October Tseng recommended that Li Hung-chang, acting governor-general at Nanking, be temporarily stationed in Hsü-chou, where he could stimulate the Anhwei Army commanders in Shantung to greater efforts. Tseng realized that Li could deal more effectively with real military men, such as Liu Ming-ch'uan, than he himself could. He also recommended that his brother, Kuo-ch'üan, governor of Hupei since March 1866, be given a greater role in the war in Honan. To Li Hung-chang, Tseng confided that the Niens were actually 'increasing in number daily and each

time they attack with greater ferocity. Poor people whose earthwall communities have been destroyed follow the Niens as if returning to their own homes. I do not know how the disaster created by those roving rebels will end'. The fall of the Ming came to mind. Tseng's strategies had failed and he could only revert to his old, proven methods. With the backing of imperial authority, he would sustain men he trusted – especially Li Hung-chang and his brother, Tseng Kuo-ch'uan.¹²⁰

At this critical juncture, the Anhwei Army commanders Liu Ming-ch'uan and P'an Ting-hsin used both cavalry and artillery to keep the Niens out of Shantung, where British-made guns were now trained on the bandit lair of Liang-shan, famous from the novel *Water Margin* (*Shui-hu chuan*). Thus defeated, the Nien leaders between 20 and 23 October came to a crucial decision. Lai Wen-kuang and others would aim to go back to Shantung, while Chang Tsung-yü and his men would go west across Honan to Shensi, in this way splitting into two forces, western and eastern. Perhaps Chang Tsung-yü started for Shensi because the Muslim Tungan Rebellion had persisted there and he hoped to find a new base.¹²¹

Lai and the Nien leader Jen Chu, who styled himself 'King of Shantung' (Lu-wang), were repulsed from Shantung again in December, and invaded Hupei in January 1867. Perhaps their idea was to get to Szechwan like the late Ming rebels. But if so, their reliance on cavalry tied them to the plains. Trying to cross the Han River, they were badly defeated in February, abandoned their plans in Hupei, backtracked, and in June succeeded in breaking into Shantung east of the Grand Canal.¹²²

Meanwhile, on 7 December 1866 the throne accepted Tseng's resignation on grounds of health, and appointed Li Hung-chang imperial commissioner. As the new commander, Li used the financial system that he had built up in Kiangsu,¹²³ as well as modern weapons, and a total of 4,900 cavalymen, many of them from Chahar and Manchuria. A combination of inner Asian cavalry power and European arms was now brought to bear upon the roving bandits.

The Eastern Niens in Shantung reached the vicinity of Chefoo on 30

¹²⁰ *TWCK, Chia-shu*, 10.19b, 20b, 30; *Shu-cha*, 13.17b, 21b, 22b, 34. Lai Wen-kuang's 'confession' in Hsiang Ta *et al.*, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo* (The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom) (hereafter *TPTK*), 2.863. *TWCK, Tsou-kao*, 30.13–19, 23, 30–3; *Chia-shu*, 10.32b–33. On Pennell, see *LWCK, Tsou-kao*, 6.59–60. *TWCK, Shu-cha*, 13.24b–25, 36–43; *Chia-shu*, 10.28b, 37–8; *Tsou-kao*, 30.10–12, 45–9.

¹²¹ Chou Shih-ch'eng, *Huai-chün p'ing-Nien chi*, 11.5b. *TWCK, Tsou-kao*, 31.4b. Hsiang, *TPTK*, 2.863.

¹²² Wang Ting-an *et al.*, *Tseng Chung-hsiang kung nien-p'u* (Chronological biography of Tseng Kuo-ch'uan), 2.12–16. Chiang Ti, *Nien-chün shih*, 72–3. *TWCK, Chia-shu*, 10.43. Ssu-yü Teng, *The Nien Army and their guerrilla warfare, 1851–1868*, 184–7, 198. Tseng Kuo-ch'uan estimated the strength of the Eastern Niens in Hupei to be 30,000 infantry and 7,000–8,000 cavalry.

¹²³ *LWCK, P'eng-liao han-kao*, 6.24, 46b, 47b. *TWCK, Tsou-kao*, 25, 29, 52b.

June, alarming Peking. Local officials invited foreign help, which took the shape of 200 British and French marines ready to defend the treaty port. The American consul at Chefoo found the Niens still a disciplined force: 'They do not kill or harm unless they meet with resistance'. Lai evidently got the help of a few foreigners and a few muskets, but little more.¹²⁴

On his part, Li set up an outer blockade line on the Grand Canal with considerable cooperation from commanders and troops sent by the governors of Honan and Anhwei. An inner blockade was attempted at the Chiao-lai Canal with the reluctant help of Ting Pao-chen, the Shantung governor. When the section of the canal defended by one of Ting's commanders failed to hold, both Li and Ting were severely criticized. However, the rebels were forced into north Kiangsu and defeated there again in November. Nien attempts to break out of the Grand Canal blockade repeatedly failed. Finally, Jen Chu was assassinated by one of his 'battalion officers' who succumbed to Li's promise of reward. In December, the remaining Nien forces were decisively beaten near the Mi River not far from the north coast of Shantung. Lai Wen-kuang escaped to Yang-chou in Kiangsu, but was captured in January 1868 and executed, 'cocky and stubborn' to the last.¹²⁵

Imperial control in north China was restored locally *pari passu* with the growth of provincial armies that in time superseded the local militia forces. In the reorganization of the Shantung provincial forces, a Hunan Army type of training produced new provincial forces totalling about 20,000 men, not counting 1,500 mounted troops from Manchuria.¹²⁶ These expanding provincial forces began to deprive the local *t'uan-lien* managers of their power to levy fees themselves. As early as 1 January 1864, the court had decreed that for Shantung, Honan and Chihli, only those militias 'managed by officials' (*kuan wei ching-li*) were to be allowed to continue. Under this imperially approved system, a number of 'militia battalions' (*t'uan-ying*) were established in the Shantung cities along the Grand Canal in 1866-7. The 'militia chief' (*t'uan-chang*) could be a gentry member, but he was put under the command of the provincial military

¹²⁴ CPNF, 278.16b-17; 286.2b-3. STCH, 6B.9b-10. Ssu-yü Teng, 'Some new lights on the Nien movement and its effect on the fall of the Manchu dynasty', *Symposium on Chinese Studies: commemorating the Golden Jubilee of the University of Hong Kong, 1911-1961*, 3 (1968) 56. Ting Pao-chen, *Ting Wen-ch'eng kung i-chi* (Papers of the late Ting Pao-chen; hereafter TWCKIC), *Tsou-kao*, 2.49-50.

¹²⁵ 'Li Hung-chang hsin-kao' (Copies of Li Hung-chang's letters [recently discovered]), in Chiang Shih-jung, ed. *Nien-chün shih-liao ts'ung-k'ao* (A collection of historical materials on the Nien Army), 2.50-64. LWCK, *P'eng-liao ban-kao*, 7.16-28; *Tsou-kao*, 12.73. CPNF, 282.10-12, 18-19; 288.9, 22-3, 28b.

¹²⁶ STCH, 4A.8. *Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu* (Veritable records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty; hereafter CSL), T'ung-chih, 86.51-3. TWCKIC, 1.4, 36b-37b; 4.9, 16a.

officers and paid by the local officials who had managed, meanwhile, to revive the taxation system through their sub-bureaucratic apparatus.¹²⁷

While the Eastern Niens were being crushed in Shantung, the Western Niens were in distant Shensi. In January 1867 near Sian, Chang Tsung-yü soundly defeated the armies of the Shensi governor, and got Tungan Muslims to join in attacking Sian again in April. However, Tso Tsung-t'ang, the new governor-general of Shensi and Kansu, announced his strategy of dealing with 'the Niens first and then the Muslims, Shensi first and then Kansu'. In October, the Niens were pushed northward to the highlands, and by mid-November had gone even further than the present Yen-an. Crossing a frozen section of the Yellow River in December, Chang Tsung-yü moved some 17,000 troops, mostly cavalry, into Shansi.¹²⁸ By early January 1868, he entered north Honan, and was in the metropolitan province by 17 January. On 3 February, only seven weeks after leaving north Shensi, Chang Tsung-yü reached the vicinity of Paoting, the Chihli capital, about eighty miles from Peking.

The throne now mobilized its elite metropolitan forces, and threatened punishments and offered rewards to rouse the armies of nearby provinces. The Peking Field Force (*Shen-chi ying*), which had grown to nearly 20,000 men under Prince Ch'un, was to remain in the capital for its defence. But other units were mobilized to attack, while the recently created Shantung Army as well as the Honan Army (*Yü-chün*), a similar *yung-ying* force reorganized in 1866, pushed the Niens further south.¹²⁹ In danger of being boxed in between the T'ai-hang mountains in the west and the Yellow River on the south and east, Chang Tsung-yü broke out with his entire force north-eastward and entered Shantung in April.

Chang Tsung-yü's crossing of the Grand Canal was a fatal move, for blockade again became possible, using the Yellow River on the south, the Grand Canal on the west, and the sea in the east. On 16 May, Li Hung-chang was given one month to 'exterminate' the Niens on pain of punishment. He and Tso Tsung-t'ang, who had followed the Niens to Chihli and was given the general command of troops there from several provinces,

¹²⁷ *Shih-erb ch'ao tung-hua lu* (The Tung-hua records of twelve Ch'ing reigns), T'ung-chih, 28.16b-17. Liu, *Ch'ing-ch'ao hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao*, 216.2629. Chang Hsi-lun, *Chün-shu hui-ch'ao* (Collected copies of military dispatches; reprint with pagination added), 1.305-6, 479-81. *TWCKIC*, 1.51-3; 8.11.

¹²⁸ Chang Sheng-wan, 'Hsi-Nien chün tsai Shensi ti k'ang-Ch'ing tou-cheng' (The anti-Ch'ing struggle of the western Nien army in Shensi), *Shih-hsüeh yüeh-k'an* (Kaifeng; issued unnumbered, Dec. 1964), 350-2. *TWHK*, *Shu-tu*, 9.9. *CPNF*, 274.20b.

¹²⁹ For example *CSL*, T'ung-chih, 221.24-27b; 222.3b-8; 222.9-10, 13b-14. *TWCKIC*, 5.1-4. *YCCL*, 12.22.5-6, 8; 12.23.4-5. *CPNF*, 295.15-16, 19-20; 296.2-4, 7b, 11b. *LHCC*, 72; cf. Morse, *International relations*, 2.114, note 1.

met on 21 May and agreed on a strategy of 'long encirclement' (*ch'ang-wei*). The strategy involved guarding about 400 miles of the Canal from Tientsin to the Yellow River, which it would take more than 100,000 troops to defend. Only some 80,000 men could be raised from Li's own forces and the Shantung and Honan armies, and so 'long walls' (*ch'ang-ch'iang*) had to be built on the banks. Both Li and Tso had seen the animosity the populace felt towards the government troops. Using the armed forces to compel the people to work might lead to disaster. Besides having the troops do the construction work, Li had devised a system of 'the people making donations and the people undertaking the work' (*min-chüan min-pan*). The gentry were promised imperially conferred honours and the commoners, tax remission. By relying on 'people's efforts' (*min-li*), the Chihli part of the long wall west of the Grand Canal was completed in early June, and the Shantung section later in the month.¹³⁰ The Anhwei Army now forced all the Niens from Chihli into the trap in northern Shantung. In July Chang Tsung-yü was severely defeated, and many Niens now responded to Li Hung-chang's call for their surrender. On 16 August, Chang jumped into the T'u-hai River and vanished. The entire Nien movement was now suppressed.

THE RESTORATION IN PERSPECTIVE

The fourteen years up to 1868 – ever since the first Taiping setback in Hupei – had seen not only the dynasty's survival but also a reassertion of the essential features of the Ch'ing polity. Thanks to the genius of a modern historian, 'restoration' has gained a firmer meaning for this period. As Mary Clabaugh Wright put it: 'not only a dynasty but also a civilization which appeared to have collapsed was revived to last for another sixty years by the extraordinary efforts of extraordinary men in the 1860s. This was the T'ung-chih Restoration.'¹³¹

Students today with less sympathy for the old China may not share Mary Wright's enthusiasm, or may question how extraordinary these statesmen really were. But the fact remains that Tseng, Li and their colleagues, creatures of China's past, did succeed in putting down the rebellions, restoring the dynasty's position, and even reviving the spirit

¹³⁰ *LWCK*, *P'eng-liao han-keao*, 8.14, 16b–17, 20–2, 24–5, 31, 41. *LHCC*, 79–80. *TWCKIC*, 5.39b, 44–5, 47–8. On the popular hatred of government troops, see also Tso Tsung-t'ang, *Tso Wen-hsiang kung chia-shu* (Family letters of Tso Tsung-t'ang; 1920), extracted in Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i, ed. *Nien-chün tsu-liao pieb-chi* (Supplementary materials on the Nien Army), 223–4.

¹³¹ Mary C. Wright, *The last stand of Chinese conservatism: the T'ung-chih restoration, 1862–1874*, pp. vii (preface to the Atheneum edn), 18.

of its statecraft. The *yung-ying* armies they created were, to be sure, outside the old Ch'ing military system and now rivalled the banner forces and the Green Standard army. But they were, nevertheless, imperially sanctioned and equally loyal, and now constituted the bulwark of the dynasty's security. On this basis of force, the Ch'ing throne had continued to employ the advantages that stemmed from its long-recognized legitimacy – as the cultural and moral arbiter that conferred academic degrees and authorized rewards, monuments and shrines; and as the only source of bureaucratic appointments down to hsien magistrate level. Despite certain necessary adjustments, the inherited institutions persisted.

The Sung school of Confucianism continued to be patronized by Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi, partly as a counterweight to the pragmatic Prince Kung, and partly to perpetuate the identity of state and culture that marked the success of Ch'ing leadership of the ruling class. During the eighteen years from the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion to the end of the Nien War, the metropolitan examinations as well as the *chü-jen* examinations held at Peking were not once suspended. There were, moreover, three years in which special metropolitan examinations as well as *chü-jen* examinations for all the empire were scheduled by imperial favour. The provincial examinations in rebel-infested areas were of course disrupted: these normally triennial examinations were unaffected in only one province – Shansi. There was one postponement in Hupei; two postponements in Szechwan, Honan and Shantung; three in Kiangsi, Chekiang Fukien, Kwangtung and Shensi; four in Hunan and Kiangnan; five in Kwangsi; and six in Kweichow and Yunnan. As soon as feasible, however, special make-up examinations were planned and held. In Hunan, such examinations were given as early as 1857; a make-up examination normally given in Nanking for Kiangsu and Anhwei provinces was held in Hangchow in 1859, even while imperial victory was by no means certain.¹³² Since the provincial degree entitled one to receive an official post eventually, these prompt make-up examinations kept the literati oriented towards the dynasty for their official careers. Not only were examinations kept going wherever possible on schedule; nearly all the interrupted years had been made up by 1870.

The quality of most office-holders seems, however, to have deteriorated in the meantime. Continuing the practice of the previous Ch'ing reigns, the dynasty had sold not only the usual *chien-sheng* degree and certain ranks and titles, but actual official posts, even hsien magistracies. Governors had also recommended candidates for 'military merit' alone.

¹³² Shang Yen-liu, *Ch'ing-tai k'o-chü k'ao-shih shu-lu* (A descriptive account of the civil service examination under the Ch'ing), 97–100, 151–2.

Data in the gazetteers for some 512 of the empire's approximately 1,290 hsien show roughly a doubling, an appreciable increase, in the number of hsien magistrates who purchased office after 1850.¹³³

Actually, many of the low-level *sheng-yüan* who became hsien magistrates undoubtedly would not have been able to do so, had their degree qualification not been combined with a money donation; and of course some talented literate men without even the *sheng-yüan* degree rose by purchase. But most of the candidates who bought magistracies are believed to have been city-dwelling merchants, with an eye for pecuniary gain through surcharges and other forms of exploitation.¹³⁴ Such abuses were made worse by the increasingly short tenure of office for all hsien magistrates, briefer than that of prefects and other higher officials.

This short tenure of the county magistrates could only mean the further deterioration of local government. For among the institutions restored by the T'ung-chih reign was the crucial role of the sub-bureaucracy. Ting Jih-ch'ang, the extremely conscientious governor of Kiangsu, 1868–70, believed that the power of the yamen clerks was growing. Not only were the clerks more numerous than the magistrate and his private advisers and servants, and more familiar with the rules and with local conditions; their power stemmed chiefly from the fact that they outlasted their superiors. 'The officials [i.e., the magistrates with regular appointments] are at their work at most for four or five years and, in cases of shorter periods, two or three years, while the sons and grandsons of the clerks are all raised in the business.' Ting reported in 1868 that a clerkship 'vacancy' in Kiangsu could be sold by the incumbent for 10,000 taels, a higher price than that of the magistracy itself.¹³⁵ For the eighteenth century, Hung Liang-chi (1746–1809) had estimated there were between 200 and 1,000 clerks in a hsien, depending on its size. For the post-Nien period, the censor Yu Po-ch'uan, *chin-shih* of 1862 and a native of Shantung, estimated that there were 2,000 or 3,000 clerks in a large hsien and 'at least 300 or 400 in a small hsien'. The clerks collaborated, moreover, with the yamen run-

¹³³ See data in Li Kuo-ch'i, Chou T'ien-sheng and Hsü Hung-i, *Chung-kuo ti-fang-chib yen-chiu: Ch'ing-tai chi-ti's'eng ti-fang-kuan jen-shih shan-ti hsien-hsiang chib liang-hua fen-hsi* (Chinese gazetteer studies: a quantitative analysis of the careers of prefects and magistrates in the Ch'ing dynasty), 1.212–13. The findings of this large-scale study are generally compatible with statistics on magistrates' qualifications and length of service for random years or localities presented by Chang Chung-li, Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, Thomas A. Metzger and John R. Watt (see bibliography). Ping-ti Ho found that in 1871 51.2 per cent of local officials between the 7th and 4th ranks purchased their offices, as compared with 29.3 per cent for 1840; *The ladder of success in Imperial China*, 48–9.

¹³⁴ Hsü Ta-ling, *Ch'ing-tai chüan-na chib-tu* (The Ch'ing dynasty system of obtaining degrees, ranks and offices through monetary contributions), 146–9. Cf. Li Kuo-ch'i et al., *Chung-kuo ti-fang chib yen-chiu*, 1.384–7.

¹³⁵ Ting Jih-ch'ang, 'Ting Chung-ch'eng cheng-shu' (Political papers of Governor Ting; manuscript copy), 5.19b–20.

ners who did the travelling to the rural areas to contact the village agents (*ti-pao* or *ti-fang*). In the early nineteenth century, there were already as many as 1,500–1,600 runners in some counties in Chekiang and at least 1,000 in a large hsien in Shantung. In 1851, the Hsien-feng Emperor remarked upon the report of a censor: 'How did it come about that in Chihli and Honan and other provinces, the "unauthorized yamen runners" (*pai-i*) in each chou and hsien number in the thousands (*ying-ch'ien lei-pai*)?' Evidence of the post-1870 era indicates that a manslaughter case in a village would bring out 100–200 runners who accompanied the clerks who also came as investigators. All had to be provided with meals and expenses for their trouble.¹³⁶ Most magistrates had to rely on these underlings to make both ends meet and to accumulate a competence within one or two years. Thus the local government practices that constituted a major cause of the mid-century rebellions undoubtedly survived the holocaust.

Sub-county affairs continued to be an area where the unlearned yamen underlings either colluded or competed with the local notables and lineages for influence. However, Peking did see to it that officials of the provincial hierarchy were predominantly high degreeholders whose commitment to the dynasty was firmer. The best statistics currently available¹³⁷ suggest that for the T'ung-chih period, 65.9 per cent of the prefects were qualified by high examination degrees – *kung-sheng* or higher – and that, moreover, there was a greater percentage of prefects who served more than three years than there was of county magistrates.

At the leadership level of the provincial governors and governors-general, the throne had shown flexibility. Usually, it would agree with the Board of Civil Appointments that men who had 'military merit' still needed proper academic qualifications for high provincial posts. But until the mid-1860s, Peking had no choice but to permit exceptions. The typical governor was a civil official who could manage military men and collect *likin* successfully and, moreover, had passed some kind of examination and perhaps served as a provincial judicial or financial commissioner – normal stepping stones to governorship.¹³⁸ Hunan Army commanders

¹³⁶ T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, *Local government in China under the Ch'ing*, 39, 59. Sheng K'ang, comp. *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen hsü-pien* (Collection of Ch'ing dynasty writings on statecraft, continued), 28.46b. *Ta-Ch'ing shih-ch'ao sheng-hsün* (Sacred instructions for the ten reigns of the Great Ch'ing), Hsien-feng, 7.4. Ko Shih-chün, comp. *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen hsü-pien*, 22.6.

¹³⁷ Based on data for 70 out of the total of 180 prefectures of China proper. Li Kuo-ch'i *et al.*, *Chung-kuo ti-fang shih yen-chiu*, 1.206–7, 374–7.

¹³⁸ Wei Hsiu-mei, 'Ts'ung liang ti kuan-ch'a t'an-t'ao Ch'ing-chi pu-cheng shih ti jen-shih shan-ti hsien-hsiang' (A quantitative analysis of the careers of provincial finance commissioners of the late Ch'ing period) *CYCT*, 2 (June 1971) 525, 529–30, 533. See also her article on provincial judicial commissioners, *ibid.* 3.2 (Dec. 1972) 487, 491–2.

who became governors included Tse Tsung-t'ang and T'ang Hsün-fang (both *chü-jen*); Liu Ch'ang-yu, Tseng Kuo-ch'uan, and Li Han-chang (all three *kung-sheng* through examination); and Liu Jung and Liu K'un-i (both merely *sheng-yüan*). After the defeat of the Taipings, fewer *yung-ying* commanders got high civil posts. The Anhwei Army commanders included few degreeholders, and only three of them became provincial judicial or financial commissioners in the 1860s – Liu Ping-chang, a *chin-shih* and Hanlin academician; P'an Ting-hsin, a *chü-jen*; and Chang Shu-sheng, a *sheng-yüan*. As the Nien War ended, Peking closed out the eligibility of candidates with 'military merits' to become financial or judicial commissioners, unless they had regular high degrees or were otherwise qualified according to the civil service rules.¹³⁹

By swallowing Manchu ethnic pride and by sticking to the faith that scholar-officials who advanced through the orthodox route (*cheng t'u*) would make more reliable provincial administrators, the court hoped to ensure the loyalty of its bureaucracy. But the throne also had ways to compel provincial governors and *yung-ying* commanders to give up the lax practices of wartime. The key here lay in the throne's absolute power of making bureaucratic appointments, combined with its new methods for tapping the financial resources of the provinces. Land taxes were remitted up to the sixth year of T'ung-chih (ending 24 January 1868) in areas recently devastated in the Nien war.¹⁴⁰ But from their other land levies and from likin, provincial officials were made responsible annually for various payments to Peking and to other provinces at Peking's instruction that went beyond the practices of the past. With the land-tax and grain-tribute system of many provinces disrupted, the Board of Revenue during the 1850s had found it increasingly difficult to gauge the surplus funds available in each province. Traditionally, estimates of surplus made regularly by the provinces had enabled the Board to work out from year to year comparatively realistic assessments of each province's future obligations – a system known as 'spring and autumn transfers' (*ch'un-ch'iu po*). Amounts to 'transfer' to Peking or to other provinces had been determined by the 'winter estimates' of the next year's land-tax, which each province submitted along with its report on its own expenditures. Since this system was no longer dependable after the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion, the court had decided in the 1850s to rely rather on arbitrary assessments, based on rough estimates of each province's finances made by the Board itself. Throughout the Taiping and Nien wars, the court had made allocations from specific sources in certain provinces as 'revenue

¹³⁹ Sheng, *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen hsü-pien*, 21.20, 31b.

¹⁴⁰ CPNF, 320.7b–8.

assistance' (*hsieh-hsiang*) to other provinces that had military expenses. To meet Peking's own expenditures, the court now resorted also to this method of *t'an p'ai* (apportioning quotas). The first such move was in 1863, when several provinces were allotted *fixed* annual quotas for their contributions to the traditional Peking Fund (*Ching hsiang*), which hitherto had been assessed on each province from year to year. Soon after 1868, when all provinces and most of the new custom houses had been assigned quotas for the Peking Fund, a total of 8 million taels a year was regularly collected for it. Other funds to meet specific needs at the capital were soon established, and assessments made in the provinces.¹⁴¹

How could Peking ensure that such assessed revenues would be promptly and in large part delivered? Here we see the importance of the throne's unquestioned prerogative over appointments. For the tenure of a governor or governor-general was never fixed. Except for those with special ties to military forces serving the dynasty, such as Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang, the primary function of other provincial governors, besides maintaining order, was to raise revenue for the throne or for imperial military needs in the provinces.¹⁴² A fact that often escapes historians of this period is that Peking could easily remove a gubernatorial official, if his apportioned revenue was not delivered. The average tenure of governors-general and governors during Hsien-feng and T'ung-chih was remarkably short. Some 87.5 per cent of governors under Hsien-feng and 60.4 per cent under T'ung-chih served for less than three years. Among governors-general, 73 per cent under Hsien-feng and 52 per cent under T'ung-chih held office less than three years.¹⁴³ In the throne's decision to remove or transfer a provincial administrator, his ability to deliver revenue was a major criterion. An edict of 1866 making assessments for a new fund called *Ku-pen Ching-hsiang* (Peking fund for vital security purposes) sternly warned: 'From the day this document arrives [this revenue] should be delivered once a month, or once every two or three months, and must be expedited so as to arrive on schedule; arrears of any amount will not be permitted. If the governor-general and governor concerned should wilfully delay and not make any delivery for over three

¹⁴¹ P'eng Yü-hsin, 'Ch'ing-mo chung-yang yü ko-sheng ts'ai-cheng kuan-hsi' (The fiscal relationship between central government and the provinces during the late Ch'ing), *She-hui k'o-hsieh tsa-chih*, 9.1 (1947) 83-91. Liu Chin-tsao, *Ch'ing-ch'ao hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao*, 69.8261.

¹⁴² See S. A. M. Adshead, 'Vice-regal government in Szechwan in the Kuang-hsü period', *Papers on Far Eastern History*, 4 (1971) 41-52. Kwang-Ching Liu, 'The limits of regional power in the late Ch'ing period: a reappraisal', *Ch'ing-hua hsüeh-pao*, NS, 10.2 (July 1974) 219-23.

¹⁴³ Wei Hsiu-mei, 'Ts'ung liang ti kuan-ch'a t'an-t'ao Ch'ing-chi tu-fu ti jen-shih shan-ti' (A quantitative analysis of the careers of provincial governors-general and governors of the late Ch'ing period), *CYCT*, 4.1 (May 1973) 259-92; see tables pp. 276-81.

months, they shall be named for severe impeachment by the Board of Revenue and given administrative punishment in accordance with the precedents of delinquency for the Peking Fund.' A recent study of Liu K'un-i's governorship of Kiangsi (1865–74) shows that he won imperial favour chiefly by his conscientious delivery of revenue.¹⁴⁴

As a result of these pressures, both the likin and the maritime customs revenues – the new commercial taxes – were very much under imperial control. The actual amounts of customs revenue at the various ports were regularly reported by Robert Hart. Disposition of that revenue was directly supervised by the throne. Undoubtedly only a portion of the likin that was actually collected ever came into the hands of the high provincial officials.¹⁴⁵ But this portion came within reach of the long arm of the throne, since it was Peking, after all, that appointed the gubernatorial officials of the likin-rich provinces. By 1869, likin receipts from all the empire reported to the throne (14.6 million taels) still exceeded the total maritime customs revenue (10 million taels, including transit dues).

Because the throne decided who would serve as governors-general of Liangkiang and of Hukwang (and as governors of Kiangsu and Hupei), this indirect control over fiscal resources enabled the throne to keep a grip on Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army as well. Similar to the last years of the Nien War, the funds for the Anhwei Army in 1870–1 amounted annually to 7 million taels, of which 38 per cent came from Kiangsu likin, 29 per cent from the Shanghai and Hankow customs, 15 per cent from 'assistance' from other provinces, and the remainder mainly from Kiangsu and Hupei provincial funds.¹⁴⁶ Continuing to show full support for Li, the throne appointed Li's friend Ting Jih-ch'ang as Kiangsu governor in early 1868. When in September 1868, Tseng Kuo-fan, who had supported Li and Ting, was transferred to the governor-generalship of Chihli, Ma Hsin-i (1821–70), governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang and a *chin-shih* classmate of Li, was made governor-general of Liangkiang. The throne plainly relied on Li as a most valuable servitor.

Towards the end of the Nien War, in 1867, Li had been appointed governor-general of Hukwang at Wuchang, where he finally arrived in January 1869. But in November he was sent to Szechwan to investigate the case of the governor-general, Wu T'ang, impeached for corruption. While there, Li was also charged with settlement of anti-Christian out-

¹⁴⁴ Edict quoted in Liu K'un-i, *Liu Chung-ch'eng kung i-chi* (Collected papers of the late Liu K'un-i), *Tsou-shu* (Memorials), 3.40b. Li Kuo-ch'i, 'T'ung-chih chung-hsing shih-ch'i Liu K'un-i tsai Kiangsi hsün-fu jen-wei ti piao-hsien' (Liu K'un-i's performance as governor of Kiangsi during the T'ung-chih restoration), *Kuo-li Shih-fan ta-hsüeh li-shih hsüeh-pao*, 1 (1972) 260.

¹⁴⁵ See Liu, 'The limits of regional power', 195, n. 22.

¹⁴⁶ Wang Erh-min, *Huai-chün chih* (Treatise on the Anhwei Army), 276.

breaks in Szechwan and Kweichow. In February 1870, he was ordered to Kweichow to take charge of the campaign against the rebels there. But in mid-March, while Li was preparing for this expedition to the south-west, he was ordered to Shensi to war against the Muslims while Tso Tsung-t'ang concentrated on the rebels in Kansu. Li arrived in Shensi in May; he seemed destined to help suppress a third great rebellion. But in June, the so-called Tientsin Massacre raised the possibility of war with France (see chapter 10), and Li was asked to bring most of his forces back to Chihli immediately. There, on 29 August, he was appointed governor-general of Chihli, replacing the ailing Tseng Kuo-fan. The throne's favours to Li increased with time and he was to have many occasions to reciprocate by patriotic service and otherwise. As Mary Wright put it: 'Li Hung-chang lived to his death in a world closer to that of the Imperial Commissioners of the pre-Taiping period, than to that of the warlords of the early Republic.'¹⁴⁷

Was China of the 1870s, then, much the same as in the pre-Taiping decades? Of course, the wider world could not be ignored – 'the demonic new world of expanding national power' with which Li Hung-chang strove to cope. Whatever may be said of his performance in that regard, he and the Western armaments that he first learned to admire with Ward and Gordon did bring tranquillity – or rather, effective repression of disorder – to the province that guarded Peking itself. Nor was Li the only official who enforced internal order by military means. In Shantung and Honan, the new *jung-ying* armies had continued to develop and as in Chihli, there was also a separate effort to retrain the Green Standard forces into the so-called *lien-chün*. Imitating Tseng Kuo-fan in Chihli, Governor Ting Pao-chen obtained imperial approval in October 1869 to reorganize the Shantung Green Standard army of 14,000 men, releasing many who were 'tired and weak' and drilling the more vigorous. In 1872, the governor of Honan reported that he had infused energy into the Green Standard 'battalion outposts' (*ying-hsin*), which were now able to search out 'hidden bandits and traitors', under the supervision of local officials or of military officers sent to the area.¹⁴⁸ Unlike Li, who increasingly had his eyes on China's international relations, these governors were more concerned with the essential tasks of maintaining domestic order and raising revenue.

It was, of course, also the task of the governors and governors-general to promote scholarship, good customs and incorrupt government. Such

¹⁴⁷ Wright, *The last stand* (Preface to the Atheneum edn), p. vii.

¹⁴⁸ TWCKIC, 7.23b–24, 37a. Ch'ien Ting-ming's memorial cited in Lo Erh-kang, *Lü-ying ping-chih* (A treatise on the Green Standard Army), 204.

were the desiderata of Neo-Confucianism frequently reiterated in the imperial pronouncements of the Hsien-feng and T'ung-chih reigns. In fact, however, the examination system with its emphasis on the eight-legged essay created its own momentum. The *shu-yüan* or academies sponsored by officials and gentry in prefectural or county seats seldom did more than prepare a few selected scholars in the techniques of writing florid and meaningless poetic prose. In order to encourage donations to the war effort by 'gentry, merchants, and commoners', the throne had been granting permanent increases in the quotas for *sheng-yüan* licentiates in localities in every province since 1853. By 1871, when permanent increase of the *sheng-yüan* quotas was no longer allowed, the empire-wide limit for successful candidates in the annual prefectural examinations for this degree had increased by 20 per cent – from 25,089 in 1850 to 30,113. The empire-wide limit for successful candidates in the triennial provincial or *chü-jen* examination remained, however, below the 1851 quota of 1,770 – dropping as low as 1,254 in 1881 but restored in the mid-1880s to a norm around 1,500. (In 1881, the *chü-jen* quota was, for example, as small as 114 for the two provinces of Kiangsu and Anhwei, 60 for Shantung and 72 for Kwangtung.)¹⁴⁹ To help promising students, including those who already had won the lower degrees, prepare for the higher examinations, additional *shu-yüan* academies were considered desirable. Available studies indicate that during the T'ung-chih period, as many as twenty-nine such academies were built in Chihli province (either from scratch or on the foundation of old academies fallen into disuse), while the corresponding figure was thirty-seven for the Tao-kuang period and ten for the Hsien-feng period. In Kwangtung, the new academies built in the Tao-kuang, Hsien-feng and T'ung-chih reigns were, respectively, forty-six, twenty-eight and thirty-one.¹⁵⁰ Another ante-bellum system was thus reinvigorated. However, the 20 per cent increase in the *sheng-yüan* quota meant that the new academies were compelled to be even more oriented towards exercises in writing eight-legged essays, based on little real understanding of the meaning of even the *Four Books* from which fragmentary excerpts were chosen as essay topics. The fact that each academy usually could take only ten or fifteen students, very rarely over a hundred, further restricted their usefulness.

As in the Tao-kuang period, high provincial officials sometimes arranged endowments to maintain at the provincial capital or other large cities academies devoted to genuine scholarship. Such special *shu-yüan*,

¹⁴⁹ Chung-li Chang, *The Chinese gentry*, 87–8, 124.

¹⁵⁰ Wang Lan-yin, 'Hopei-sheng shu-yüan chih ch'u-kao' (Draft history of local academies in Hopei), *Shih-ta yüeh-k'ao* 25 (Feb. 1936) 1–63; 29 (Sept. 1936) 1–105. Liu Po-chi, *Kwangtung shu-yüan chih-tu yen-ko* (Institutional history of the local academies in Kwangtung), 67–74, 314.

through the outstanding scholars chosen to head them, could have had considerable influence on the intellectual climate. For sixteen years after 1840, the director-professor (*shan-chang*) of Hsüeh-hai T'ang at Canton (see chapter 6) had been Ch'en Li (1810–82). In 1858, as a refugee away from Canton during British occupation, Ch'en had published his *Han-ju t'ung-i* (*Compendium of the ideas of the Han scholars*), an anthology of profound influence in the ensuing decades. Although a long-time resident of Canton, Ch'en had little to say on the challenge of foreigners now within the gates, although his essays also written in 1858 did refer to the internal problem of misgovernment: 'Government depends on human talent, while human talent depends on scholarship.' A savant of the Han school in the tradition of Hsüeh-hai T'ang's founder, Juan Yüan (1764–1849), Ch'en went further than Juan in his belief that emphasis on textual research must not mean the neglect of 'moral principle' (*i-li*). While empirical philological research should not be abandoned, there should be *pari passu* a search for the ethical meaning behind the classics – which, however, Ch'en believed to have been authoritatively and thoroughly elucidated by a number of great scholars of the Han, T'ang and Sung eras. While granting Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism due respect, Ch'en asserted nevertheless that the philosophical formulations of the Sung philosophers themselves were not as valuable as their commentaries on the classics. Despite his own penchant for textual research, Ch'en took the catholic view that Han and even T'ang scholars had already grasped the truth behind the Confucian canon. Their various commentaries were therefore as helpful to the student as the classics and the Sung commentaries. For most students, in fact, the concentrated study of *one* single classic *together with standard commentaries* was preferable to roaming through a number of the classics themselves. Paradoxically, Ch'en thus combined his own rigorous textual research with an almost mystical faith in ancient classical scholarship.¹⁵¹ Yet through the T'ung-chih reign, when he continued to teach at the rebuilt Hsüeh-hai T'ang and also headed a new academy devoted to high learning (Chü-p'o ching-she, founded by the Canton salt commissioner in 1867), Ch'en's influence grew apace. His prescription of the study of a single classic with commentaries was essentially what the young Chang Chih-tung, *chin-shih* of 1863 and provincial commissioner of education of Szechwan, 1873–6, applied to a new academy he founded there.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Wang Tsung-yen, *Ch'en Tung-shu hsien-sheng nien-p'u* (Chronological biography of Mr Ch'en Li), 67–9, 90, 97. Ch'en Li, *Tung-shu chi* (Collected writings of Ch'en Li), 2.14, 28b–30. Ch'ien Mu, *Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien*, 2.602, 607, 614.

¹⁵² Chang Chih-tung, *Chang Wen-hsiang kung ch'üan-chi* (Complete papers of Chang Chih-tung), 204.13–15; 213.21–2, 24b. William Ayers, *Chang Chih-tung and educational reform in China*, 50–4.

At the other end of the spectrum of T'ung-chih scholarship stood Feng Kuei-fen (1809–74), appointed by Li Hung-chang as director-professor of Cheng-i Academy of Soochow in 1864. While Feng had advocated land-tax reform in Kiangsu in 1863, he had in fact a more comprehensive and radical reform programme. Prior to his becoming a Hanlin academican in 1840, he had served for seven years as a *mu-yu* of Kiangsu officials, initially of a hsien magistrate. He espoused the study of administrative statecraft, and was an admirer of Ku Yen-wu's essays on local administration and social issues. Towards the end of 1861, Feng completed some forty essays of his own which he put together under the title *Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i* (Straightforward words from the Lodge of Early Chou studies).¹⁵³ He suggested concrete reforms that went much further than Wei Yüan (see chapter 3). More than Wei, Feng appreciated the strength and the institutions of the Western nations. But unlike Wei, who seems to have had a quasi-Legalist obsession with administrative and military efficiency aiming at the build-up of the state's wealth and power, Feng, while as anxious as Wei to cope with the challenge of Western aggression, was equally concerned with the welfare of the populace, especially small proprietors of agricultural land, whom he believed to be the backbone of the society. His essays relentlessly assailed the entrenched Ch'ing institutions that bred intolerable abuses – the low nominal salaries of officials, the impossible complexity of administrative procedures, the despised but wealthy yamen clerks and runners, the sale of substantive offices, the inequity in tax assessments. His radical proposals included replacing all the yamen clerks with literati who would bear the title 'secretary' (*mu-chih*), to be chosen from among *sheng-yüan* who were unfortunate enough not to have passed the provincial examinations. To provide incentive for good performance and conduct, such functionaries, after nine years of service, would have the opportunity to be promoted to the regular bureaucracy. Feng further proposed that for the sub-county government, 'headmen' (*tung*) who did not possess even the lower gentry status should be elected by villagers, using paper ballots. 'A full one hundred households shall elect an assistant manager and a full thousand a chief manager.' Such popularly chosen officers were to be paid monthly salaries, each serving a three-year term, and were to be empowered to adjudicate disputes at local temples in consultation with the village elders. Government at this basic level was to be further bolstered by sub-county magistrates chosen from lower degreeholders with experience as hsien

¹⁵³ The best biography of Feng remains Momose Hiromu, 'Fū Kei-fun to sono chojutsu ni tsuite' (On Feng Kuei-fen and his writings), *Tōa ronbō*, 2 (1940) 95–122. For the meaning of the title *Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i*, see Feng's own preface, 1898 edn, 4.

secretaries, who were to have appellate jurisdiction over 5,000 households, with authority to impose light punishments.¹⁵⁴ Feng's remarkable proposals, if adopted, would have lightened the hsien magistrate's heavy personal workload, prolonged his tenure of office, and done away with many of the abuses of the yamen underlings.

While Ch'en Li's views on Han scholarship enjoyed immediate vogue during the T'ung-chih period, Feng Kuei-fen, at his academy in Soochow, could only watch helplessly the continuation of the many abuses he sought to remove. In 1862, Feng had sent a copy of his manuscript to Tseng Kuo-fan, requesting a preface representing Tseng's endorsement. Tseng looked through some dozen of the essays, found their ideas 'mostly difficult to put into practice', and did not reply to Feng until after the recovery of Nanking in 1864. Tseng did, however, arrange to have a copy of the essays (or of some of them) sent to his friend Li T'ang-chieh, the scholarly grand councillor. Referring to Feng's proposals, Li wrote a memorandum to his Grand Council colleagues, bringing up only one of the issues Feng raised, namely, the desirability of replacing the clerks of the metropolitan boards with degreeholders. Li noted, however, that 'unless the court made a thoroughly considered plan and persevered with it, disregarding irresponsible opinion (*fou-i*), the idea will certainly come to nought'.¹⁵⁵ Feng was cautious enough, in fact, not to publish his *K'ang-i*, and in his remaining years, besides teaching 'classics and history' at the academy, he devoted himself chiefly to absorbing studies in philology and in Western mathematics (through Chinese translations that were available). It was only after his death in 1874 that his sons decided to print the more innocuous half of the *K'ang-i* essays along with his other writings. The complete text of *K'ang-i* was not published until 1885, and his more important proposals were not taken seriously by most statecraft scholars even then.¹⁵⁶

While Feng Kuei-fen and Ch'en Li differed in their principal concerns, Tseng Kuo-fan, who survived into the 1870s, espoused still another scholarly emphasis. Having seen evil even among the ranks of the loyalists and having been compelled to make many compromises to achieve hard-won victories, Tseng in his old age reverted to the view that an immoral society must after all be redeemed by moral men and that the

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* esp. 1.13b-14, 16b.

¹⁵⁵ Tseng Kuo-fan, *Tseng Wen-cheng kung shou-bsieh jih-chi* (Tseng Kuo-fan's holograph diary), 3.1428, entry of 8 Nov. 1862. *TWCK, Shu-cha*, 13.7. Li T'ang-chieh, *Li Wen-ch'ing kung i-shu*, 5.17b-18.

¹⁵⁶ However, Ting Jih-ch'ang, who knew Feng well, proposed to the throne in 1868 that a special examination category (*k'o*) on law be created to recruit new clerks and be opened to degreeholders; Ting, 'Chung-ch'eng cheng-shu', 5.20b.

fostering of the correct values and attitudes must therefore be the primary aim. Practical statecraft, however important, had to take a subordinate place. In August 1869, as governor-general of Chihli, he published his famous essay, 'Exhortation to learning, to be shown to the Chihli literati', and listed the four categories of scholarship recognized by most eclectic scholars of the time: (1) 'moral principle' (*i-li*), to be obtained through self-cultivation; (2) empirical textual research; (3) literature; (4) statecraft (*ching-chi*). Tseng affirmed, however, that knowledge of practical affairs must be preceded by the devotion of all of one's faculties to the 'proper order of human relations' (*lun-chi*), and this devotion could be achieved only through establishing a purpose for one's life (*li chih*), by holding fast to 'seriousness' (*chü ching*) and by other prescriptions of Ch'eng-Chu self-cultivation. 'If one has mastered the study of moral principle', Tseng declared, 'practical statecraft ought to have been already covered [*kai-hu ch'i-chung i*].' Unlike Ch'en Li, who would approach the classics through Han and T'ang as well as Sung commentaries, Tseng preferred Chu Hsi's commentaries only, as well as that sage's own philosophical writings. However, Tseng had no objection to seeing those who had absorbed Chu's teachings take up textual research or literary endeavours, or for that matter the study of Ma Tuan-lin's *Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao* and Ch'in Hui-t'ien's *Wu-li t'ung-k'ao* – the two works that, Tseng believed, together offered 'exhaustive and clear knowledge' of statecraft.¹⁵⁷ Unlike Feng Kuei-fen, Tseng's wartime experiences had burnt into his memory the limitations of the adjustments that could be made in the inherited institutions. The system was indeed so firmly established that it had assumed the sanctity of *li* (proper social usage). On the other hand, the Ch'ing administrative practices had, after all, been bent with the approval of the throne to make possible the victories of the Hunan and Anhwei Armies. Tseng saw no alternative but to espouse the preservation of the inherited polity as a whole.

In this context, Mary Wright's insight will continue to illuminate this period of history. For it was her final judgment that the Ch'ing restoration represented 'the last great effort to reassert the validity of Chinese traditional institutions. . . . The great men of the age saw the triumph amid lengthening shadows.'¹⁵⁸ In Kiangsu, Shantung or Chihli, as early as the 1870s, the old order had plainly returned. The 'major households' of Su-Sung-T'ai continued to evade taxes; the yamen runners were again active in Shantung, serving as tax-farmers and pocketing surcharges; lower gentry, even of the metropolitan province, who saw little chance of

¹⁵⁷ TW'CK, *Tsa-chu*, 2.57b–58; *Shu-cha*, 32.29b–32.

¹⁵⁸ Wright, *The last stand* (Preface to the Atheneum edn), p. ix.

advancing to the *chü-jen* degree, either colluded or competed with the yamen underlings, as tax-farmers or as troublesome 'litigation rascals' or plaintiff's agents (*sung-kun* or *sung-shih*). The fact that new, large-scale rebellions did not arise must be ascribed in a large measure to the Western weapons then available to the *yung-ying* armies of many provinces and even to the retrained Green Standard Forces.¹⁵⁹ Meanwhile, as the dynasty tightened its control over bureaucratic personnel, the flexibility that allowed governors-general and governors to seek administrative improvement by expanding their own role in appointing local officials was increasingly restricted. Before his death in 1872, Tseng Kuo-fan, who had spent the better part of his life searching for 'talent', lamented that with the return of peace to most of the land, times were easier, and there were fewer challenges to stimulate real talent. 'Moreover, the high authorities are no longer willing to make frequent exceptions to the personnel regulations, so as to allow opening for [those who may be regarded as] opportunists. Everything has to go by qualifications and regular procedures and everyone continues to play the old tune.'¹⁶⁰ Though Tseng's career must still be regarded as a triumph of the statecraft of China's scholar-official ruling class, his successes had in fact been made possible by the support and flexibility that imperial authority granted during the war years. Given the inherited values, the loyal scholar-officials, at any given time, had indeed to be content with whatever leeway the throne allowed. This fact had affected adversely proposals for basic institutional reform such as those advanced by Feng Kuei-fen. The same limitation was also faced by the few scholar-officials who had turned their attention to international relations and to the acquisition of what they believed to be the secret of Western power.

¹⁵⁹ Lojewski, 'Confucian reformers and local vested interests', 245–8. *CSL*, Kuang-hsü, 12.6. *Shan-tung t'ung-chih* (General gazetteer of Shantung), 81. 2565. Li Wen-chih, *Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh shih tzu-liao*, 3.342; cf. *TWCK, Tsa-chu*, 2.68. Ch'ien Ting-ming, *Ch'ien Min-su kung tsou-shu* (Memorials of Ch'ien Ting-ming), 4.1–2, 22; 6.23, 26.

¹⁶⁰ Quoted in Ch'ien Mu, *Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien*, 2.583.

CHAPTER 10

SELF-STRENGTHENING: THE PURSUIT OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY

THE THEORY: EARLY PROPOSALS FOR SELF-STRENGTHENING

The suppression of the rebellions during the T'ung-chih period enabled the Ch'ing dynasty to survive for another half century, even though China's international position on the whole worsened after the treaty settlement of 1860. The humiliation of the Anglo-French occupation of Peking could not easily be forgotten by the statesmen who lived through the event. However, not until the mid-1870s did the rise of Japan and European encroachment again make a foreign war likely. The intervening years of peace gave the Ch'ing government an opportunity to build its military and financial strength in preparation for future confrontation with the powers. Such strength was of course also valuable for the maintenance of internal order.

Beginning in 1861, the phrase 'self-strengthening' (*tsu-ch'iang*) appeared frequently in memorials, edicts and the writings of the literati-officials. It expressed the realization that a new policy was needed to meet the unprecedented change in China's position in the world. A considerable range of activities was proposed toward this end, but not all the proposals were put into effect, and among them, not all were carried out successfully. In time, 'self-strengthening' became less a rallying cry for genuine efforts at innovation than a shibboleth that served to justify expenditures and vested bureaucratic interests. Domestic order was in general maintained: numerous local outbreaks were easily suppressed. But China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 revealed the failure of a policy proclaimed to be for defence against foreign powers.

Nevertheless, the innovations made in the name of self-strengthening did produce far-reaching results. The new policy led inevitably to a departure from traditional statecraft; the search for 'wealth and strength' (*fu-ch'iang*) gradually gained precedence over the Confucian emphasis on government by virtue. The halfway measures that were taken never amounted, to be sure, to significant institutional changes. Yet new knowledge and attitudes were introduced, and despite the lack of change in the

educational and civil service systems, some opportunities – though still haphazard and all too few – were opened up for new types of managerial and technical personnel. The desire to enhance China's 'wealth and strength' spread not only among statesmen in responsible positions, but also among an increasing number of enlightened literati.

As first proposed in the aftermath of the Anglo-French occupation of Peking in 1860, self-strengthening was part of a new Ch'ing foreign policy that emphasized conciliation with the European powers and the acceptance of the treaty system. While the major emphasis was on peace with the powers, the build-up of China's own strength was regarded as helpful to the preservation of such a peace. The formula, however, was all too simple: since European military power appeared to depend on technology, the adoption of this technology was regarded as the primary task. Nonetheless, among the officials and scholars who deliberated on this question there was some divergence of views – both on what China needed to do in order to appropriate Western technology and on the degree to which adjustments had to be made in inherited institutions.

Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang

In Peking the chief advocates of self-strengthening were the two Manchu leaders who bore responsibility for dealing with the European invaders. Their views were shared by the leading provincial officials of the lower Yangtze and also, at least in the early 1860s, enjoyed support among metropolitan officials, including censors and Hanlin academicians.

Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang realized, first of all, that Sino-Western contacts were unavoidable and that a great deal might be gained through careful diplomacy. They were impressed by the fact that the Western powers generally observed the treaties faithfully. 'After the exchange of treaties, the barbarians withdrew to Tientsin and sailed south in groups. Moreover, all their requests were based on the treaties. It is clear that these barbarians do not covet our land and our people. . . . The present case seems somewhat different from previous dynasties.'¹ This view was shared by Shen Chao-lin, president of the Board of War during the crisis of 1860 and a bulwark of the 'war party'. Shen, too, was struck by the fact that the British and the French could have done whatever they wished after they occupied Peking. But they 'departed after exchanging the treaties, leaving our capital city unharmed. From this we can truly believe

¹ *Ch'ing-tai ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo* (Complete record of the Ch'ing dynasty's management of barbarian affairs; hereafter, *IWSM*), Hsien-feng, 71.18.

that their sole interest is profit and that they did not have other intentions. If we can show them our sincerity and good faith, they can still be reined in (*chi-mi*).²

Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang realized, moreover, that the Europeans apparently cherished some goodwill towards the dynasty and could be utilized for the latter's purposes. It was thanks partly to the Anglo-French troops that Shanghai was kept safe from the Taipings in the three years beginning in 1860. In early 1862, Prince Kung decided to 'borrow' foreign troops to help in suppressing the Taipings and to encourage the foreign-led Ever Victorious Army (see chapters 6 and 9). Foreigners also helped to administer the maritime customs, which contributed revenue for the war.

While the Peking leaders sought temporary advantages from conciliating the Western powers, they realized the need for a more positive, long-range policy. In early 1861, they summarized it under the phrase self-strengthening. Diplomacy, they argued, was only a palliative that could not solve the fundamental problem. 'The policy that gets to the fundamentals is self-strengthening and the way to strengthen ourselves must first be to train troops. . . . It is urgently necessary to do our best to re-invigorate ourselves so that when the barbarians are compliant we can live in peace with them and when they are recalcitrant we shall be prepared.'³ The proposal to train fresh Manchu troops no doubt was aimed primarily at the current threat from the Nien rebels to the metropolitan province. The sequence of disasters from the outbreak of the Taiping rebellion to the Anglo-French war had taught them that internal disorder and foreign aggression were 'mutually conducive'; and the troubles created by the British, the French and the Russians were by no means over. These worries were shared by such court officials as Chao Shu-chi, a Hanlin compiler. In a memorial of early 1861 Chao warned that negotiated agreements with barbarians were unreliable and that the only safeguard for the future lay in 'searching for the method of self-strengthening'. Chao hoped for an effort towards real rejuvenation: 'If only we would keep an unceasing vigilance, put forth every effort, make it clear to all in the realm where the imperial will resides, and let every man of intelligence put forth ideas; every man of courage, energy; then the disaster last autumn could be regarded as a scheme of heaven to bring the arrogance and ferocity of the barbarians to an extreme, and to warn our country of the fault of inertia during past decades. To snatch good for-

² Shen Chao-lin, *Shen Wen-chung kung chi* (Collected writings of Shen Chao-lin), 1.16–19. See Masataka Banno, *China and the West, 1858–1861: the origins of the Tsinli Yamen*, 215–16.

³ *IW'SM* Hsien-feng (hereafter *IW'SM-HF*), 72.11.

tune out of disaster, to transform weak to strong, this should provide China with cause for great rejoicing.⁴

While Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang emphasized the need for training troops, perhaps not surprisingly they believed that China's problem was not so much the quality of her troops as that of their weapons. Western fire-power had made an indelible impression on them in 1860. Since then they had been obsessed by the idea that with a few gunboats the Taiping redoubt in Nanking could be easily reduced. This led to the ill-fated Lay-Osborn flotilla scheme (see chapter 9). Taking up a British offer to provide military instructors on the use of new muskets, the court approved in late 1861 a plan to train a few hundred troops in Tientsin, including selected banner officers sent from Peking. Wen-hsiang himself took part in organizing the Peking Field Force (*Shen-chi ying*), which did not use foreign instructors but employed some of the arms which Russia presented to the Ch'ing court in 1862.⁵

The next step was not only to use Western firearms and gunboats but to produce them in China. The French had offered to help the Chinese forge cannon even during the peace negotiations of 1860, but the prince and Wen-hsiang were sceptical that the Europeans would so readily part with the secrets of their power, although they did encourage Tseng Kuo-fan and Hsüeh Huan to consider establishing new arsenals.⁶ That the ministers of the new Tsungli Yamen were not necessarily more imaginative than some lesser officials is indicated by a remarkable memorial from a censor, Wei Mu-t'ing, dated November 1861. Wei pointed out that precisely because the Europeans were more interested in trade than in territorial aggression, there was a chance that they would instruct the Chinese not only in the operation of their ordnance and steamships, but would also allow them, like the Russians of the Petrine period, to learn the techniques of munition-making and shipbuilding. Wei claimed that the vaunted European weapon technology was, after all, a legacy of China herself. Typical of many Chinese writers of the next three decades, he asserted that it was the Mongols of the Yüan dynasty that had introduced firearms to Europe, although these had been greatly improved there so that 'extraordinary skills have multiplied in a hundred ways'.

Wei wanted China to relearn her lost arts. After all, Adam Schall and Ferdinand Verbiest had been permitted to forge guns in Peking, and Western arms had contributed to the military exploits of the great em-

Cited in Wang Erh-min, *Ch'ing-chi ping-kung-yeh ti hsing-ch'i* (The rise of the armament industry during the late Ch'ing), 39-40.

⁵ *IWSM-HF*, 79.16b; T'ung-chih, 25.1-2.

⁶ *Hai-fang tang* (Archives on maritime defence; hereafter *HFT*), *Kou-mai ch'uan-p'ao* (Procurement of ships and guns), 1.3; cf. *IWSM-TC*, 25.1a (line 8)-1b (line 4).

perors, K'ang-hsi and Ch'ien-lung. It was fortunate, Wei argued, that the aggressive intent of Western nations was moderated by their eagerness to develop markets in China under conditions of domestic peace. The Ch'ing might begin a programme of manufacturing firearms and building warships with the help of the Europeans. Given the talent among the loyal subjects of the empire, China could indeed surpass the West in such matters in the future.⁷

These recommendations were reminiscent of the ideas of Wei Yüan expressed in his *Illustrated treatise on the maritime kingdoms* (*Hai-kuo t'u-chih*) (see chapter 5). They were soon reinforced by further experience. Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang were deeply chagrined in 1863 by the behaviour of H. N. Lay, who simply because he had a few gunboats that promised to subdue the Taipings, heaped insult on the grand councillors of the Ch'ing court. Despite the traditional Manchu aversion to things nautical, Wen-hsiang seemed to have resolved that China must build her own steam fleet, one way or another.⁸

The Manchu leaders were particularly enthusiastic because Li Hung-chang in Kiangsu was already, in 1863–4, not only employing foreign officers to train his troops, but also getting foreign help to manufacture Western-type munitions. Li's efforts seemed to promise a long-range plan for self-strengthening. By mid-1864, Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang had redefined this concept as follows: 'The training of troops is essential to self-strengthening, but the manufacture of equipment [*chih-ch'i*] has priority while the troops are being trained'. They commended Li's efforts to the throne and proposed that selected banner troops be sent to Kiangsu to serve apprenticeship at Li's arsenals. China should take advantage of the present opportunity to 'make a thorough study of the various kinds of [military] equipment and to gain knowledge of all the secrets of the foreigners, so that we can defend against aggression in times of trouble and demonstrate our strength in times of peace'. Although still unaware of the complexity of Western technology, Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang felt they had arrived at a formula that would eventually enable China to meet her external challenge: 'If we can strengthen ourselves, we [and the Europeans] can live with each other in peace and we can quietly subdue their ambitious schemes against us. Otherwise we will have nothing to rely upon and it will be difficult to ensure their not bullying us. . . . Now that we know what they depend on for victory, we should try to master it.'⁹

⁷ *IWASM*, T'ung-chih (hereafter *IWASM-TC*), 2.35–6.

⁸ See Lü Shih-ch'iang, *Chung-kuo tsao-ch'i ti lun-ch'uan ching-ying* (Early steamship projects in China), 105, 117, 152.

⁹ *IWASM-TC*, 25.1, 2b–3.

Tseng, Li and Tso

Unlike the lull that followed the Opium War, there were now, thanks to the war against the Taipings, vigorous governors-general and governors in the provinces. Although preoccupied with civil war, Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang were also concerned with the frequently irksome problems arising from contacts with Western traders, missionaries and consular officials. They supported the court's policy of adhering to the treaties but they also took concrete action towards self-strengthening.

Their interest in Western technology was directly inspired by the civil war. As early as 1854, Tseng had purchased 'foreign cannon' from Kwangtung. The Hunan Army's victories in the Hunan-Hupeï region were, according to Tseng himself, due partly to foreign cannon. In 1860 and again in early 1862, when the Taiping armies at Shanghai were easily repulsed by Anglo-French fire-power, Tseng was deeply impressed. In December 1860, while opposing the Russian offer of naval aid against the Taipings, he nevertheless advocated learning from the 'barbarians' intellect', and trying to manufacture Western cannon and build steamships. In August 1861, when Tseng supported buying a fleet from Britain, he stressed the need to learn the techniques necessary to produce new military equipment in China. 'Scholars of broad intellect as well as artisans who are skilful and ingenious should be recruited, first to practise the use of [Western ships and guns] and later to make them.'¹⁰ After the recovery of Anking in 1861, Tseng brought to his arsenal there several Chinese mathematicians who had acquired some knowledge of science and technology, including Hua Heng-fang, Hsü Shou and Li Shan-lan.

Tseng's idea of self-strengthening was broader than merely adopting Western technology. He always returned to his view that placing 'virtuous and wise' men in administrative posts constituted the foundation of the military strength, and he set great store by his own formula of organizing and training troops. But he realized that Western technology was urgently needed. His diary of June 1862 reads, 'In order to attain self-strengthening, improvement in administrative affairs [*hsiu cheng-shih*] and the search for virtuous talent are after all the urgent tasks; but one concrete effort should be to learn the casting of cannon and the construction of steamships and other equipment.'¹¹

Li Hung-chang, while preparing to rescue Shanghai in early 1862, seems

¹⁰ Cited in Lü, *Chung-kuo tsao-ch'i*, 47, 53.

¹¹ Cited in Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, comp. *China's response to the West: a documentary survey, 1839-1923*, 62.

already to have determined 'to have China adopt barbarian ways, . . . and to work harmoniously [with foreign armies] while seeking methods of self-strengthening'.¹² When Li and his Anhwei Army sailed down the Yangtze through Taiping-held territories on steamers hired from British firms, he had three days on board a steamship and an opportunity to reflect on the value of Western technology. From Shanghai, Li repeatedly wrote Tseng in praise of the orderliness of the foreign armies and the devastating effectiveness of their cannon. He observed a battle where 'the rifles and cannon of several thousand foreign troops go off at the same time, and whatever is in the way is immediately destroyed. The shells that explode before touching the ground are indeed a device of the gods!' Li's Anhwei Army began to equip some of its units with Western weapons and to learn Western drill. Li was 'ashamed that Chinese munitions are far inferior to those of the foreigners, and I daily exhort my officers to be humble-minded and bear humiliation, so that they can learn one or two secrets from the Westerners to benefit ourselves. . . . If we encamp at Shanghai for a long time but cannot make use of the superior techniques of the foreigners, we will regret it in the future.' Li was, moreover, able to add to his personal experience the knowledge of world affairs he acquired in Shanghai. In 1863, he wrote Tseng: 'If Chinese firearms could match those of the West, they would not only be more than adequate in suppressing internal disorder, but also sufficient to resist foreign aggression.' In recent years, both Russia and Japan had acquired Western technology; their cannon and steamships were gradually becoming serviceable, enabling them to rival Britain and France. 'If China would pay attention to these matters, she will be able to stand on her own feet a hundred years from now and long after.'¹³ Aside from China's military weakness, Li was also aware of China's poverty in contrast with the wealth of the Western nations. He resented the economic influence the foreigners had acquired in the treaty ports, and so considered self-strengthening a long-range necessity.¹⁴

Li's vision went beyond merely employing Western weapons. From his experience in Shanghai, he got some idea of the complexity of machine production and also of Western methods of selecting and training personnel. He concluded that self-strengthening called for adjustments in China's existing system of education and civil service recruitment. When he

¹² Li Hung-chang, *Li Wen-chung kung ch'ian-chi* (Complete papers of Li Hung-chang; hereafter LWCK), *P'eng-liao han-kao* (Letters to friends and colleagues), 1.9b.

¹³ Cited in Teng and Fairbank, *China's response to the West*, 69, and in Kwang-Ching Liu, 'The Confucian as patriot and pragmatist: Li Hung-chang's formative years, 1823-1866', *HJAS*, 30 (1970) 15, 32.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 18-19, 30, 37-42.

proposed a foreign-language school in Shanghai, he wanted it to teach also Western mathematics and sciences. His famous letter to Prince Kung in the spring of 1864¹⁵ embodied a proposal which he described as reform of institutions (*p'ien-fa*). Li regretted the exclusive emphasis on literary culture in the government's personnel system. The result was to leave military matters to untutored men who nevertheless shared the elite's disdain for technology:

Chinese scholars and officials have been indulging in the inveterate habits of composing stanzas and verses [*chang chü*, i.e., the eight-legged essay] and practising fine calligraphy; while our military officers and soldiers are, on the other hand, crude, ignorant and careless. Thus what we use is not what we have learned, and what we have learned is not what we could use. In peacetime we sneer at the effective weapons of the foreigners as things produced by strange techniques and tricky crafts, which we consider unnecessary to learn. In war-time we are alarmed by these weapons; we marvel at them but regard them as something which we cannot possibly learn. We do not realize that for several centuries the foreigners have considered the study of firearms indeed as important as that of body and mind, human nature and destiny.

Li pointed out that China suffered also from the lack of coordination between learning on the one hand and craftsmanship on the other. 'In China the way of manufacturing is for the scholars to understand the principles, while the artisans put them into practice. Their respective competences are not coordinated, hence their respective achievements cannot reinforce each other. The most skilful of the artisans will at most become a head artisan.' Li surmised that the system was different in Europe, where bureaucratic honours must presumably have been heaped upon the inventors of machines: '[In the West,] he who can make a machine which benefits the country will become a prominent official, his family for generations can live on the trade and keep their positions hereditary. There are grandfathers and fathers who learn the art of a machine but cannot thoroughly master it, and the sons and grandsons will practise it for generations, insisting upon mastering it before they stop.'

Li was impressed by Japanese efforts to learn Western techniques. He learned that the Tokugawa shogunate had sent young men of distinguished lineage to Western countries to serve as apprentices in the factories and had acquired 'machines that make machines' and installed them at home. If Japan, a small country beyond the seas, could change her policy in time, should not China also change her policy? Li cited the dictum from the *Book of changes* that 'when a series of changes has run its course another change ensues, and after change, things will proceed unimpeded'. He

¹⁵ *IWSM-TC*, 25.4-10. Teng and Fairbank, *China's response to the West*, 70-2.

suggested that the court adopt a new policy for the selection of personnel, perhaps by establishing a new category (*k'ö*) in the examination system for candidates specializing in technology:

If we wish to learn about the superior weapons of foreign countries, there is nothing better than to seek machines which make machines. We can learn their methods but need not employ their personnel. If we seek machines that make machines and men who make machines, we should perhaps establish a special category of examination to select scholars. If the scholars will regard this new category of examination as their lifelong goal by which to achieve wealth, rank and honour, it is likely that they will carry their studies through, that their techniques will be perfected, and that talents will foregather.

Li's proposal regarding the examination system was never seriously considered by the throne, although Prince Kung did attach Li's letter to one of his memorials. The concrete result of Li's advocacy was imperial sanction for the Kiangnan Arsenal, established in 1865. In his memorial on this major undertaking, Li discussed the contributions machinery could make to the people's livelihood.

Western machinery can produce farming, weaving, printing and pottery-making equipment for the daily use of the people. It is not solely for the purpose of making weapons. What is wondrous is that it utilizes the power of water and fire to save labour and material resources. . . . Several decades hence, among the rich peasants and prosperous merchants of China, there will inevitably be men who follow the example of Western machine-manufacturing in their pursuit of profit.¹⁶

Some of Li's ideas on self-strengthening were shared by Tso Tsung-t'ang, who was governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang in 1863–6. Tso had not been really impressed by the challenge of the West until 1862–4, when he conducted campaigns against the Taipings in Chekiang and decided, after initial hesitation, to accept the help of the Franco-Chinese force led by Frenchmen (see chapter 9). Such men as Paul D'Aigubelle and Prosper Giquel brought him knowledge about Western steamships and firearms. After the suppression of the Taipings, and partly upon the advice of these Frenchmen, he recommended to Peking the adoption of Western techniques, particularly in shipbuilding. Tso was not particularly impressed by Western cannon, perhaps because the French-trained contingent that assisted him did not possess such modern guns as those possessed by the British and the Ever Victorious Army and witnessed by Li. But he greatly appreciated the contribution of the steamship in the campaign to recapture Hangchow in 1864 and in the operations against coastal piracy in the two years that followed.

¹⁶ *LWCK, Tsou-kao* (Memorials), 9.34b.

Like Tseng, Tso believed that the policy of self-strengthening should include improvement in government administration and a more rigorous system for military training. But he emphasized the need to learn Western technology. 'Since the West is ingenious, China should not rest content in the lack of ingenuity; what the West has, China cannot be proud of not having.' Tso was humble enough to see that there were weaknesses in China's intellectual heritage: 'Chinese wisdom operates in the abstract, while foreign intelligence attaches to the concrete. . . . Since we are inferior to foreign countries in this respect, we should let them lead us. We should not let them monopolize their capacities.'¹⁷ Beginning with his advocacy of a navy yard in Foochow (established in 1866), Tso considered himself a champion of self-strengthening. But during the next fifteen years in north-west China, although he eventually built a woollen mill at Lanchow, his responsibilities were different from Li Hung-chang's and he had less chance to carry out his ideas.

Kuo Sung-tao and Feng Kuei-fen

Self-strengthening originated with the new awareness of China's needs among certain high officials, but its implications were discussed more fully by men of lesser position, who advised the high officials and had some influence on them. During the Hsien-feng period, Kuo Sung-tao (1818–91), a Hanlin scholar, had conceived a philosophical rationale for a conciliatory foreign policy. Kuo had witnessed the Opium War in eastern Chekiang at the age of twenty-four. Reflection shortly after the war led him to the realization that 'since ancient times, trouble in border areas has all originated with improper handling'. Continuing to read extensively in history and ponder the major issues of frontier problems, he came to the general conclusion that in all affairs of the world, circumstances (*shih*) as well as principle (*li*) should be emphasized – in other words, truth is always tempered by the realities of life. Since the essence of history is change, one should adapt oneself to the needs of the situation. In 1856 he visited Shanghai; his admiration for Western strength and wealth increased, and he further clarified his ideas on 'circumstances' and 'principle'. In 1857, after hostilities had commenced in Canton, Kuo went to Peking to resume his post at the Hanlin Academy (to which he had been admitted in 1847). When the British and French fleet approached Taku in 1858, many officials in Peking advocated war; Kuo was one of

¹⁷ Tso Tsung-t'ang, *Tso Wen-hsiang kung ch'üan-chi* (Complete collection of Tso Tsung-t'ang's papers; hereafter TWHK), *Tso-kuo* (Memorials), 18.2–4, 10–13. Teng and Fairbank, *China's response to the West*, 81–3.

the very few who felt that 'affairs concerning foreigners can easily be settled without war; once war is started, they cannot be settled'. Ordered to help with the coastal defence of Tientsin in 1859, he suggested to Senggerinchin that 'the foreigners consider commerce as a righteous cause; we should seek ways to meet the situation and not take up arms'. When Senggerinchin appeared to have won great victories after the Taku incident in 1859, everyone in the capital was delighted. Kuo, however, was worried, and he returned to his native Hunan, pretending sickness.¹⁸

Kuo lamented the fact that China had learned no lessons from her contacts with the West over two decades. After Li Hung-chang's arrival at Shanghai in 1862, he became one of Li's advisers. Kuo persistently maintained that in handling foreign affairs, one should try to understand the foreigner's motivation and consider the realities, not simply principles. In the early 1860s, he was already groping for a deeper understanding of the West's strength, beyond technology, and he seems to have avoided discussing armies and armament.

Kuo Sung-tao's influence on Li was, however, less than that of Feng Kuei-fen (1809–74), another Hanlin scholar interested in the problems of statecraft (see chapter 9). Feng was engaged in research and teaching at the academies in Soochow until its fall to the Taipings in 1860. He then found himself among the refugee gentry community in Shanghai, where he witnessed the effectiveness of Western cannon against the Taipings and heard of the Anglo-French occupation of Peking. His *Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i*, written in 1861, made far-reaching proposals regarding the internal reforms that China badly needed. The last four essays of the volume set forth his ideas on how the challenge of the West could be met. Feng did not rule out war as a policy but he deplored China's vacillation. In the past, 'we either made peace when we should have engaged in war or engaged in war when we should have been making peace, which resulted in disaster . . . ; we vacillated between peace and war, which again resulted in disaster; when we failed to carry through either war or peace, even greater disaster resulted'. Feng noted that 'the barbarians often speak of principle [*i*]; we should therefore use their own methods to control them. If the principle is acceptable, we should agree to it; if the principle cannot be accepted, we should argue with them on grounds of principle.'

Feng believed that Britain, Russia, France and the United States were equal in power, and each of them was balanced and checked by the others, resulting in a stalemate at least for the time being. But in the future any of

¹⁸ Kuo T'ing-i (Ting-ye Kuo) *et al.*, *Kuo Sung-tao hsien-sheng nien-p'u* (Chronological biography of Mr Kuo Sung-tao), 1.42, 114, 126–7, 130, 181–7.

the four countries might reach an agreement and jointly plot against China, or one country might gain hegemony over the others; China would be the loser in either case. It was therefore imperative that China should strengthen herself in time. 'Without self-strengthening any emergency will mean danger Once we have strengthened ourselves, we can ward off emergencies.'¹⁹

How, then, was self-strengthening to be achieved? Feng believed that real self-reliance called for an introspective self-criticism; moreover, while looking for one's own faults, one should not hesitate to learn from others. 'When methods are faulty, we should reject them even though they are of ancient origins; when methods are good, we should benefit from them even though they are those of the barbarians.'²⁰ This was indeed a bold statement! Feng was broadminded enough to find the West superior to China in the utilization of human and material resources, in the facilities for communication between monarch and subject, and in the unity between name and reality, i.e., between administrative theory and practice. Feng stated, however, that China's own wisdom concerning statecraft was adequate for reform in these matters. He set forth numerous proposals for administrative reform, and he thought Western ideas were not necessarily better. But China could learn science and technology from the West only when a major reform was made in the examination system.²¹

It was presumably at Feng's suggestion that Li Hung-chang proposed to Prince Kung in 1864 that a new category be established in the examinations for candidates specializing in technology. Feng went even further. He attacked the existing examinations for their sterile contents and their influence on the career goals of the literati. 'Scholars of intelligence have spent their entire lives and exhausted all their energies on such useless matters as the eight-legged essay and on calligraphy of a prescribed style. There are, moreover, no fixed criteria for excellence or for success in the examinations. That the scholars have not changed their careers is to be accounted for by the weight the government attaches to the examinations.'

¹⁹ Teng and Fairbank, *China's response to the West*, 34–5. Feng Kuei-fen, *Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i* (Straightforward words from the Lodge of Early Chou Studies; 2 chüan, 1898 edn), 2.45–7.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 2.10. Feng made this statement along with his discussion of Dutch and Swedish welfare and educational systems which he said he had learned of from *Ti-ch'iu shuo-lüeh* ('Illustrated geography'; rev. edn), published in Chinese in 1856 by the American Presbyterian missionary in Ningpo, Richard Quarterman Way. In another context, Feng praised the foreign staff of the Maritime Customs in Shanghai for 'making accurate assessments and delivering (*sic*) accurate amounts of duties', observing that while Confucius believed faithfulness can 'prevail among the barbarians', the barbarians were now, ironically, demonstrating this virtue in China; *ibid.* 1.43–4.

²¹ *Ibid.* 2.40b–42. Lü Shih-ch'iang argues, however, that even Feng's ideas on governmental reforms had been influenced by his new knowledge of Western institutions; see Lü, 'Feng Kuei-fen ti cheng-chih ssu-hsiang' (The political thought of Feng Kuei-fen), *Chung-hua wen-hua fu-hsing yüeh-k'an*, 4.2 (Feb. 1971) 1–8.

Feng proposed a drastic change. He suggested that craftsmen who distinguished themselves in arsenals and shipyards be awarded the *chü-jen* degree and that those who could improve upon the Western product be awarded the *chin-shih* degree and allowed to participate in the palace examination. 'Now we should allow half of the candidates to pursue examinations in machine-manufacturing, surveying [and other sciences]. . . . Whatever the government favours, the people will follow. Out of the enthusiastic response, extraordinary talents will come forth with new ideas going beyond the Western methods. At first we would learn from the barbarians; then we would be their equals; eventually we would surpass them.'²²

The ideas of Li Hung-chang and Feng Kuei-fen show that there were at least a few scholar-officials who, in their desire for Western technology, were willing to see adjustments made in the sacrosanct examination system. Other proposals of the late 1860s called for reform in the traditional military system. In 1864–5, when Li was considering reducing his Anhwei Army to 30,000 men, he proposed that the Green Standard forces all over the empire be greatly reduced in number, so that the revenue saved could be used to equip and train the remainder. Similar proposals for the reorganization of Green Standard forces were brought forward by several officials in the next few years. In August 1866, the Tsungli Yamen itself obtained the throne's approval for a programme which would produce 'retrained Green Standard forces' (*lien-chün*) totalling 15,000 men out of the Green Standard army in Chihli. The new forces were to be equipped with Western weapons and, contrary to the former Green Standard practice, were to be stationed in only a few centres and led by officers permanently assigned to their units. Later in 1866, a similar proposal was made by Tso Tsung-t'ang regarding the Green Standard forces in Fukien and Chekiang. In 1867, Ting Jih-ch'ang, the financial commissioner of Kiangsu, proposed that the Green Standard forces in all provinces should be reduced by at least half, in order to save funds for new weapons and new training programmes; in 1869, as governor of Kiangsu, he got permission for the 1,600 Green Standard troops under the governor's personal command (*fu-piao*), to be reduced by one-third and given rigorous training.²³

Why were such proposals not approved for the whole empire or at least carried through in the few provinces where a beginning was made? The answer relates to the general intellectual climate of the time and the

²² Feng Kuei-fen, *Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i*, 2.42.

²³ Liu, 'The Confucian as patriot and pragmatist', 35–6. Wang Erh-min, *Huai-chün chi* (Treatise on the Anhwei Army), 103–4. TWHK, *Tsou-kao*, 19.16–21. Lü Shih-ch'iang, *Ting Jih-ch'ang yü tzu-ch'iang yüan-tung* (Ting Jih-ch'ang and the self-strengthening movement), 186–7.

inertia of firmly-rooted inherited institutions. Even during the tumultuous decade of the 1860s, there were, after all, not many scholar-officials convinced of the need for Western technology; the hold of traditional cultural values was as strong as ever. Such institutions as the examination system and the Green Standard army not only were upheld by vast vested interests but had gained sanctity because of tradition. Modernization would plainly require the breaking of cultural and institutional barriers.

THE POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK

Court politics and the Tsungli Yamen

The self-strengthening programme received support at Peking from the Tsungli Yamen, of which Prince Kung was the senior minister until 1884 (except for brief intervals during which he was nominally deprived of all his offices). Originally the Yamen was in charge of negotiations concerning trade relations, but it became the principal coordinating agency of all 'Western affairs' (*yang-wu*), a new type of Ch'ing government activity which included the handling of diplomacy, foreign trade revenues and all matters concerning traders and missionaries, as well as the management of new programmes in which things Western were involved, such as language schools, army training, arsenals, shipyards, mines, merchant steamships and the navy. The Yamen either directly instituted such programmes or promoted them at court. The success or failure of self-strengthening efforts thus depended at least partly on the political influence of the Yamen.

For some twenty-three years after its creation in 1861, the Tsungli Yamen was closely identified with the Grand Council; indeed it could be regarded as a committee of the latter. The number of Tsungli Yamen ministers continued to increase: seven in 1861, ten in 1869 and twelve in 1876. From 1861 to 1868, three of the five grand councillors were concurrently Tsungli Yamen ministers; from 1869 to 1875, four of the five grand councillors; from 1876 to 1881 all of them (from 1880, the number of grand councillors increased to six); and from 1882 to the great shift in 1884, four of them held concurrent posts as Yamen ministers.²⁴ Since the Grand Council was the crucial advisory body to the throne, concerned with matters of high policy and key personnel, the Tsungli Yamen was in a strategic position to realize its policies and programmes.

But all major proposals still had, of course, to be approved by the throne itself. The amount of influence enjoyed by Prince Kung and Wen-

²⁴ S. M. Meng, *The Tsungli Yamen: its organization and functions*, 53.

hsiang (who until his death in 1876 served both in the Grand Council and the Tsungli Yamen) depended on the pleasure of the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi, who wielded the authority of the throne. Beginning in the mid-1860s, if not earlier, Tz'u-hsi (who overshadowed her co-regent, Empress Dowager Tz'u-an) schemed to cut down Prince Kung's power by promoting counterbalancing factions among high officials at court and among imperial clansmen.

It was thanks to Prince Kung's cooperation, of course, that Tz'u-hsi had managed the *coup d'état* of 1861. In the years that followed, still lacking experience as a ruler, she had to rely heavily on the prince in diplomatic and military matters. Prince Kung did enjoy considerable influence, but in 1865, Tz'u-hsi dealt a blow to his position. An imperial edict of early April, which Tz'u-hsi drafted herself in faulty Chinese and handed to the grand secretaries to edit and promulgate,²⁵ listed a number of charges against the prince, including disrespect for the sovereign, obstructing the imperial will, and secretly fostering discord. Other imperial clansmen as well as high officials pleaded for him. Tz'u-hsi decided, within ten days, to restore him to his posts in the Grand Council and the Tsungli Yamen. She was worried that the dismissal of the prince would cause uneasiness in the provinces as well as within the metropolitan government, and was perhaps even more concerned about the attitude of the foreign powers, who were believed to have particular faith in Prince Kung. Tz'u-hsi feared that the Europeans would again create trouble and the situation would get out of hand.

Although he was reinstated in the Grand Council and the Tsungli Yamen, Prince Kung's prestige and power were not fully restored. He was permanently deprived of the title 'deliberative prince' (*i-cheng wang*), accorded him in 1861. The officials at court now knew that he was not always in the throne's favour, and Tz'u-hsi began to promote those officials who had high scholarly reputations and whose memorial-writing ability could be a counterweight to Prince Kung's tendency to disregard precedents. During the ten days that Prince Kung was out of power, Tz'u-hsi had particularly consulted Chou Tsu-p'ei and Wo-jen, grand secretaries who had been jealous of the Grand Council's power. In the winter of 1865, Li Hung-tsaio, a chancellor of the Grand Secretariat who, as the principal imperial tutor, had frequent audiences with Tz'u-hsi, was appointed a grand councillor as well as a vice-president of the Board of Revenue. Ideologically supercilious and politically astute, Li soon became

²⁵ For a photographic copy of the original document in Tz'u-hsi's own hand, see Wu Hsiang-hsiang, *Wan-Ch'ing kung-t'ing shih-chi* (True account of palace politics during the late Ch'ing), plate 10.

the leader of a faction at court that included Wo-jen (until his death in 1871), and such other conservatives as Hsü T'ung and Weng T'ung-ho, who were eventually to become very prominent. Generally critical of Prince Kung's conciliatory policy towards the Europeans, Li Hung-tsao's faction, particularly the young censors who looked to Wo-jen for ideological guidance, were sceptical of the need to adopt Western techniques. In the aftermath of the Tientsin Massacre of 1870, Li and his friends defended the officials who had encouraged the riots at Tientsin and argued against appeasement of the French, as advocated by Prince Kung and Tseng Kuo-fan.²⁶

In the new alignment at court after 1865, Prince Ch'un, a brother-in-law of Tz'u-hsi and the younger brother of Prince Kung, ranged himself against the latter. Emotionally anti-Western, he was said to have played a role in instigating the Tientsin Massacre; in any case he bitterly attacked Prince Kung for the manner in which the affair was settled. In a secret memorial to Tz'u-hsi in March 1871, he accused Prince Kung and another Tsungli Yamen minister, Tung Hsun, of 'being industriously engaged in meeting the barbarian's wishes [without regard for justice or dignity]'. Prince Ch'un resented the fact that ministers of the Yamen served also as grand councillors. 'The officials who manage barbarian affairs are none other than the ministers in charge of political affairs. . . . Often measures which should never have been taken were agreed upon with the barbarians first before an edict was requested and a conference was held with other officials'.²⁷ Tz'u-hsi deemed it wise not to make this memorial public, but she saw to it that henceforth all matters of foreign and defence policies would be discussed in court conferences which included Prince Ch'un and like-minded officials and imperial clansmen. The decision-making power of the Tsungli Yamen was thus reduced.

Too proud to hide his resentment, Prince Kung continued to offend the imperial mother. In 1869, he and other grand councillors so manipulated matters that Tz'u-hsi had no choice but to authorize the governor of Shantung, Ting Pao-chen, to arrest and execute An Te-hai, a favourite eunuch of Tz'u-hsi, who had violated the palace laws by departing from Peking on an extravagant and ostentatious trip to the south. An Te-hai had been notorious for his secret reports to Tz'u-hsi on the behaviour of many high officials; Tz'u-hsi now blamed Prince Kung for his death. In 1873, after the T'ung-chih Emperor gained his majority and began to rule, Prince Kung opposed the young monarch's plan to rebuild the Yuan-

²⁶ See Li Tsung-t'ung and Liu Feng-han, *Li Hung-tsao hsien-sheng nien-p'u* (A chronological biography of Mr Li Hung-tsao), I, 144-6, 171-4.

²⁷ Wu, *Wan-Ch'ing kung-t'ing*, 121-4.

ming Yuan summer palace for Tz'u-hsi's enjoyment. Prince Kung's memorial, as righteous in tone as that of a daring censor, remonstrated against the emperor's indiscretions (including his incognito trips to pleasure quarters) and urged the monarch to be less extravagant with the funds of the treasury, beginning by discontinuing the reconstruction of the summer palace. In September 1874, the emperor, undoubtedly at the suggestion of his mother, deprived Prince Kung of all his positions and demoted him in rank – at least for one day. The edict of the second day states that, according to the wishes of the dowager empresses, the offices and honours were to be restored to the prince. This double stratagem, demonstrating leniency as well as power, was meant to humiliate Prince Kung.²⁸

In January 1875, the T'ung-chih Emperor died without an heir. Tz'u-hsi selected Tsai-t'ien, son of Prince Ch'un, as the new emperor, with the reign name of Kuang-hsü. The transition to the new reign was apparently smooth, although a few officials did remonstrate that according to the Ch'ing dynastic laws, the new emperor should be chosen from a succeeding generation, in order to maintain the ritual observances demanded by filial piety. Tsai-t'ien was only four years old; his mother was Tz'u-hsi's younger sister. For a second time the two dowager empresses (Tz'u-an and Tz'u-hsi) assumed the regency; Tz'u-hsi would long continue to be the active ruler.

Prince Ch'un, the new emperor's father, temporarily retired from official posts. But on important matters, he would participate in court conferences in his capacity as prince and his opinion had greater weight than before. In 1876, Wen-hsiang, who by his personality and tact had won the respect of all factions at court, died of illness, and the position of Prince Kung further deteriorated.

The commissioners of trade: the rise of Li Hung-chang

In the actual planning and overseeing of self-strengthening programmes, two commissioners of trade, for the south coast and the north coast, respectively, played a crucial part. The original commissioner of trade for the five ports, a post established after the Opium War, had been transferred to Shanghai in 1859. After 1860 it was referred to as commissioner of trade for the southern ports (*Nan-yang t'ung-shang ta-ch'en*). The five old treaty ports and the newly opened ports on the Yangtze and in the south were under this commissioner's jurisdiction. In 1860, Hsüeh Huan,

²⁸ Hsiao I-shan, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih* (A general history of the Ch'ing period), 3.661–4, 672–4. Li Tsung-t'ung and Liu Feng-han, *Li Hung-tsao*, 1.164, 214–16.

governor of Kiangsu, held the post concurrently and he continued to be commissioner even after he relinquished the governorship in April 1862; from early 1863 through 1866, Li Hung-chang, governor of Kiangsu, held the commissionership. When Tseng Kuo-fan returned to his post in Nanking in late 1866, he became the commissioner. Henceforth the latter office was always held concurrently by the governor-general of Liangkiang.

The commissioner for the northern ports originated in 1861, at the time of the opening of Tientsin. Since the governor-general of Chihli could not be there regularly to handle problems of foreign relations, Ch'ung-hou, an aide to Prince Kung, was appointed commissioner (usually referred to as the commissioner of trade for the three [northern] ports), to reside at Tientsin and handle matters regarding foreigners that arose in that port as well as at Newchwang and Chefoo. Unlike the southern commissioner, Ch'ung-hou did not have the status of an imperial commissioner (*ch'in-ch' ai ta-ch'en*); in important matters he acted jointly with the governor of Chihli, the governor of Shantung, or the prefect of Feng-t'ien. However, in 1870, when Li Hung-chang became governor-general of Chihli, it was decided to put him in charge of matters concerning foreign trade and of the metropolitan province's coastal defence with the full status of imperial commissioner. The title commissioner of trade for the three [northern] ports was abolished and Li's concurrent post came to be described as commissioner of trade for the northern ports (*Pei-yang t'ung-shang ta-ch'en*). Li was to reside at Tientsin for most of the year and at Paoting, the Chihli capital, only during the winter.

Since the two commissioners of trade were responsible for matters arising from Western contacts at the treaty ports, an edict of 1862 gave them supervisory authority over the circuit intendants within their respective jurisdictions whose territory included the treaty ports – e.g., the Foochow taotai and the Ningpo taotai would report on 'Western affairs' to the commissioner of trade for the southern ports at Nanking.²⁹ The authority of the commissioners also came to include the overseeing of all new undertakings involving the utilization of Western knowledge and personnel. In the early 1860s Hsüeh Huan and, after him, Li Hung-chang supervised the special military training programmes in which foreign instructors were employed. Li founded the Kiangnan Arsenal in 1865 and Ch'ung-hou, the Tientsin Arsenal in 1867. After Tseng Kuo-fan returned to the Nanking governor-generalship in late 1866, he oversaw

²⁹ Wang Erh-min, 'Nan-pei-yang ta-ch'en chih chien-chih chi ch'i ch'üan-li chih k'uo-chang' (The institution of the southern and northern commissioners of trade and the expansion of their power), *Ta-lu tsa-chih*, 20.5 (March 1960) 153. The extent to which this requirement was actually followed by the taotais at the outports is yet to be investigated.

the arsenals and the foreign-language school Li had established. In 1870, Tseng obtained imperial permission to establish a Kiangnan Steamship Training Bureau (Chiang-nan lun-ch'uan ts'ao-lien chü), bringing it the naval vessels built by the Kiangnan Arsenal at Shanghai and even some built by the Foochow Navy Yard. The southern commissioner was at this time the actual coordinator of most self-strengthening programmes. However, Foochow was a separate centre. After Tso Tsung-t'ang, the governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang, left for the north-west in late 1866, the Foochow Navy Yard was managed by Tso's nominee, Shen Pao-chen, who was appointed imperial commissioner for the purpose. Shen had difficulty, however, in winning the cooperation of the new governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang and of the governor of Fukien.

With Li Hung-chang as commissioner of trade for the northern ports from 1870, leadership in self-strengthening programmes was assumed by this vigorous personality. Li had the cooperation of Tseng Kuo-fan, who accepted Li's advice regarding new plans for the Kiangnan Arsenal and, together with Li, memorialized and won imperial approval for sending young Chinese students for education in the United States. Li's interference in affairs outside of north China was administratively justifiable, given the ambiguity of the commissioner system. As the commissioner responsible for the defence of the vital metropolitan province, Li could communicate directly with the Shanghai taotai on matters relating to defence and even to trade, although Shanghai was not under Li's jurisdiction. Since the Kiangnan Arsenal had been established upon the approval of Li's memorial of 1865, he was recognized as entitled to a voice in the arsenal's affairs, even though the final say belonged to the southern commissioner. Since the educational mission to the United States was approved on the basis of a memorial submitted jointly by Tseng and Li in 1872, it came under the joint supervision of the southern and northern commissioners.³⁰ Tseng died in March 1872 and thereafter Li tried to co-operate, as far as possible, with whoever was appointed to be governor-general of Liangkiang and the southern commissioner. The Liangkiang administration controlled the tribute rice which Li's China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company (founded in early 1873) depended on for its privileged freight northwards. Even more important, the likin of Kiangsu province continued to supply a large portion of the Anhwei Army's annual funds. Although the Anhwei Army was stationed in five provinces

³⁰ See Thomas L. Kennedy, 'Industrial metamorphosis in the self-strengthening movement: Li Hung-chang and the Kiangnan shipbuilding program', *Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong*, 4.1 (1971) 215. Kwang-Ching Liu, 'Li Hung-chang in Chihli: the emergence of a policy, 1870-1875', in Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphey and Mary C. Wright, eds. *Approaches to modern Chinese history*, 84-7.

in the early 1870s (and only 15,000 men were in Chihli), Li, who founded the army, was looked upon by the throne as its coordinator.

When the Foochow Navy Yard as well as the Kiangnan Arsenal's shipbuilding programme came under attack by court officials in January 1872, Li as well as Tseng came to its defence. Li aligned himself with Shen Pao-chen, the imperial commissioner of the Foochow Navy Yard, and pleaded with the grand councillors especially for the continued financial support of the Foochow yard. During the Taiwan crisis with Japan in 1874, Li and Shen both memorialized recommending a broad plan for self-strengthening, including a new naval programme, working mines with Western machinery, and reform of the existing personnel system (Shen reiterated his earlier recommendation for a new category of examination in mathematics and Li proposed schools of Western learning at the capitals of the coastal and Yangtze provinces, the graduates to be given civil service status).³¹ While these last proposals were ignored by the court, a new naval programme was approved and two mining projects were authorized. But most gratifying to Li was that, at his recommendation, Shen was appointed in May 1875 to be the Liangkiang governor-general and the commissioner of trade for the southern ports, while Li and Shen were each given the additional title of commissioner for coastal defence, for the north coast and the south coast, respectively. In September 1876, Ting Jih-ch'ang, another nominee of Li's, was appointed director-general of the Foochow Navy Yard (which now came under the authority of the commissioner of trade at Nanking). Ting was soon given the Fukien governorship and the responsibility for developing the defence of Taiwan. Li, Shen and Ting cooperated well and a degree of coordination in self-strengthening programmes was achieved – for example, in the naval plans and the sending of trainees to Europe.

While Li and Shen as commissioners did enjoy considerable power, it is plain that their influence on policy in the last analysis depended on the support of Peking. The Tsungli Yamen enthusiastically endorsed some proposals of Li and Shen, but it either was indifferent or found it infeasible to support others. In connection with the financing of the Foochow Navy Yard, Li had proposed in 1872 that the construction of war-junks be discontinued altogether, and that the appropriation for the traditional water-force be shifted to steam warships;³² this proposal failed to obtain the support of the Tsungli Yamen. When coastal defence was discussed at a

³¹ Shen K'o, ed. *Hsien Wen-su kung cheng-shu hsü-pien* (Supplement to the political papers of my father, Shen Pao-chen; transcription made by hand from a volume printed in 1885, courtesy of Prof. David Pong), memorial dated Dec. 1874. Liu, 'Li Hung-chang in Chihli', 96.


³² John L. Rawlinson, *China's struggle for naval development, 1839–1895*, 68. Liu, 'Li Hung-chang in Chihli', 85.

court conference in May 1875, Wen-hsiang was sympathetic towards Li's ideas on railways and telegraphs and even the schools of Western learning to be established at each provincial capital. But two Chinese officials who were conservative partisans so bitterly attacked Li's recommendations as to prevent their being further discussed. The following winter, when Li visited Peking, he suggested to Prince Kung that a railway should be built from a point in Kiangsu to Peking, to facilitate transport of vital supplies. As Li recalled: 'The prince agreed but said that no one would dare to take responsibility for the idea. I asked the prince to speak at his leisure to the two dowager empresses on the matter. He replied that even the two empresses dowager could not decide on such a major policy.'³³ The conservative partisans at court had apparently become a force to be reckoned with. Nevertheless, Li had developed a working relationship not only with Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang but also with Shen Kuei-fen and Pao-yün, both grand councillors, so that several of his programmes did enjoy the court's support. In time, he was to find that in order to further his naval and industrial plans, he had to ally with Prince Ch'un in order to win the favour of Tz'u-hsi herself.

Although Li and Shen were imperial commissioners, they had no authority over other governors-general and governors. Ting Jih-ch'ang was a close ally, but he was severely attacked by officials in Peking and decided to resign his governorship in 1878. Thanks partly to Li's recommendation, three former Anhwei Army commanders became governors in the 1870s – Chang Shu-sheng as governor of Kiangsu, 1872–4; Liu Ping-chang, as governor of Kiangsi, 1874–8; and P'an Ting-hsin, as governor of Yunnan, 1876–7. Li frequently wrote to these men and other provincial officials who were friendly to him, urging the establishment of arsenals and the use of Western machines in mines. Many responded by seeking Li's assistance in founding arsenals, but on such questions as mining and especially the establishment of schools of Western learning, few of the provincial officials would take action without positive encouragement from Peking itself.³⁴

³³ Liu, 'Li Hung-chang in Chihli', 101, n. 78. *LWCK*, *P'eng-liao ban-kao*, 17.13.

³⁴ On Peking officials' attacking Ting Jih-ch'ang, see Lü, *Ting Jih-ch'ang*, 244–5, 361–2. For a striking example of one of Li's own partisans disagreeing with him on policies of innovation and being criticized by Li as 'proper and cautious' but shirking real responsibility, see his letter to Governor Liu Ping-chang, dated Feb. 1875, *LWCK*, *P'eng-liao ban-kao*, 15.3–5.



MAP. 16 Growth of the treaty port system

Hart and the customs revenue

Although proposals for self-strengthening had to come from the enlightened Chinese and Manchu statesmen, certain Westerners in China played key roles in stimulating and facilitating such efforts. In the mid-1860s, the British diplomats, Rutherford Alcock and Thomas Wade, as well as the Ch'ing employee, Robert Hart, gave the Tsungli Yamen advice regarding not only the techniques of conducting foreign relations but also the adoption of Western innovations that would benefit China. The famous Wade–Hart memoranda of 1865–6, which were submitted by the Tsungli Yamen for perusal by the throne and for comments by provincial officials, suggested certain internal reforms but stressed especially the need to send diplomatic representatives abroad and to adopt Western technological innovations, including the railway, the telegraph and machine-worked mines. Both Hart and Wade recommended, however, that such innovations be introduced by Western enterprises and that Sino-Western cooperation in these fields be encouraged. This part of the Hart–Wade proposals was vehemently opposed by officials at the time, especially because of the fear of such Western-dominated enterprises. Even Li Hung-chang, who realized the value of the innovations themselves, was against investment by foreigners in railways, telegraphs and mines. Referring to the Western demands in connection with the revision of the Sino-British treaties, he merely recommended that foreign engineers be employed in Chinese-owned iron and coal mines.³⁵

Hart's chief contribution to the Ch'ing government lay in the efficient customs service that he organized. China's traditional customs administration, which had to produce an annual 'surplus quota' for the Department of the Imperial Household, was notorious for corrupt practices. The new maritime customs at the treaty ports was really built up by Hart, after he took charge in 1861 when H. N. Lay went home on leave. In 1865, the office of the inspector-general of customs was moved from Shanghai to Peking. According to the 'regulations concerning the recruitment of foreigners in assisting the management of revenue for the maritime customs', approved by the throne, Hart continued to enjoy complete authority over the staff of the service. Foreign personnel – from the commissioners of customs at each treaty port to the assistants and tide waiters – as well as the Chinese assistants and clerks were controlled by

³⁵ Knight Biggerstaff, 'The secret correspondence of 1867–1868: the views of leading Chinese statesmen regarding the further opening of China to Western influence', *Journal of Modern History*, 22 (1950) 132.

Hart according to service regulations that he designed and conscientiously observed. Hart repeatedly reminded his staff that they took their pay from and therefore were the 'servants of the Chinese government'. The duties collected were paid over to Chinese customs banks under the control of the Chinese superintendents of customs (in most cases, the taotai of the treaty port). But the assessment of duties and the compilation of accounts and reports were performed by Hart's staff, which succeeded remarkably well in preventing smuggling and ensuring accurate accounting. By 1875, the maritime customs service grew to 408 Western and 1,417 Chinese employees and a decade later, 524 and 2,075 respectively. Meanwhile, the total maritime customs revenue increased, from 8.3 million taels in 1865 to 12 million taels in 1875 and 14.5 million taels in 1885.³⁶

Without Hart's efficient customs machinery, the orderly trade and shipping at the treaty ports would not have developed as it did. In this sense, his principal contribution was to the commercial development of China, from which a great many interests, Chinese no less than foreign, derived profit. But the Ch'ing government was nonetheless the greatest beneficiary. Since the maritime customs receipts were fully known to Peking and the treaty-port taotai could be held accountable for them, an increasing and dependable revenue came under the court's control. In the late 1870s, the total revenue of the empire, central and provincial, that came to the cognizance of Peking was about 60 million taels. While the largest portion still came from the land tax, likin accounted for 18 million (or 30 per cent) and maritime customs revenue, 12 million taels (or 20 per cent).³⁷ Since the older sources of revenue and even the likin had by the early 1860s been earmarked almost entirely for established and inflexible expenditures, the customs revenue was invaluable for any new undertakings of the government, as well as its emergency needs. Maritime customs funds furnished part or all of the revenues of such new undertakings as the Peking T'ung-wen Kuan, the Peking Field Force, the Kiangnan and the Tientsin Arsenal, the Foochow Navy Yard, the educational mission to the United States, the legations abroad and the new naval programmes after 1875.³⁸

³⁶ Stanley F. Wright, *Hart and the Chinese customs*, 325 and Appendix 4. The revenue figures are from Srinivas R. Wagel, *Finance in China*, Appendix B, which includes customs duties on vessels under foreign flags plying between Chinese treaty ports.

³⁷ Lo Yü-tung, 'Kuang-hsü ch'ao pu-chiu ts'ai-cheng chih fang-ts'e' (The remedies adopted for the fiscal crisis during the Kuang-hsü period), *Chung-kuo chin-tai ching-chi shih yen-chiu chi-k'an*, 1.2 (May 1933) 190-1, referring to several computations.

³⁸ Ch'en Wen-chin, 'Ch'ing-tai chih Tsung-li Ya-men chi ch'i ching-fei, 1861-1884' (The Ch'ing Tsungli Yamen and its financial support, 1861-84), *ibid.* 1.1 (Nov. 1932) 49-59. Ch'en Wen-chin, 'Ch'ing-chi ch'u-shih ko-kuo shih-ling ching-fei, 1875-1911' (The funding of the Chinese legations and consulates abroad during the late Ch'ing), *ibid.* 1.2 (May 1933) 270-310.

Since the allocations from the customs revenue were controlled from Peking, imperial sanction for each of these undertakings was the key to its financing. The practice developed that 60 per cent of the maritime customs receipts was allocated to the provinces concerned, to be expended partly for centrally-directed activities such as the financing of the new armies stationed in the provinces or remittances to Peking, for example for imperial construction operations. The remaining 40 per cent was at first earmarked for indemnities to Britain and France incurred in the Anglo-French War. After the full amounts of the indemnities had been paid in mid-1866, the 40 per cent was set aside for the Board of Revenue at Peking, although special requests for the use of these funds were at times approved by the throne. In 1874, Li Hung-chang proposed that four million taels from this account should be allocated annually to a coastal defence fund. The fund was approved, but the throne soon regarded other expenditures as having prior claim on the 40 per cent account – especially Tso Tsung-t'ang's military needs in the north-west and the imperial constructions around Peking. Tso's successful campaigns were made possible by five loans he secured from British banks totalling 14.7 million taels, which were guaranteed by and eventually repaid from the customs revenue – partly from the 60 per cent and partly from the 40 per cent account.³⁹

Because Hart as inspector-general was responsible for the successful collection of the steadily increasing customs duties, his work must be regarded as a principal underpinning of the Ch'ing government's finances. On his part, Hart was in full control of the maritime customs service. The large allowance which the throne approved for the inspectorate's expenditures (which was raised to a million taels per annum in 1876) enabled the foreign commissioners of customs to maintain a life-style that was the envy of many Chinese officials and often aroused the jealousy of British consuls. The confidence reposed in Hart by the Tsungli Yamen was built up over the years by his remarkable virtuosity in several roles – first as an all-powerful administrator of the service, second as a hired employee of the Yamen acting on its instructions, and third as a Britisher in the era of Britain's hegemony in the treaty ports. In effect, Hart became the Yamen's principal foreign adviser and occasionally could have some influence on policy – for example, the promotion of missions abroad that began with the semi-official Pin-ch'un mission of 1866, and the expansion of the T'ung-wen Kuan to include a department of mathematics and science. Hart's advice on foreign policy and his assistance in diplomatic negotiations were greatly valued by the Yamen; there were several times when his intervention was of crucial importance to Ch'ing relations with

³⁹ See C. John Stanley, *Late Ch'ing finance: Hu Kuang-yung as an innovator*, 48–52, 81–4.

European states. However, despite his desire to see China become stronger, Hart's direct influence on her self-strengthening policies during the 1870s was limited. He tried to persuade the Ch'ing government to establish a modern mint; the idea was neither supported by the British minister, Wade, nor seriously considered by the Ch'ing officials themselves. Hart advocated a national post office, but succeeded in the 1870s only in establishing a postal department of the inspectorate of customs, offering a restricted general service.⁴⁰ Hart found that he was unable to win acceptance of his ideas about the reforms needed in China's educational and civil service systems – just as Li Hung-chang and Shen Pao-chen were unable to arouse interest in their proposals regarding the examination system.

Ever since the abortive Lay-Osborn Flotilla of 1863, Hart had hoped to help China organize a modern naval fleet, with British nationals assuming some responsibility over ships and men as well as providing training. Beginning in the mid-1870s, Hart helped Li Hung-chang and other officials to procure naval vessels from Britain, mainly from the British firm of Armstrong and Company. Hart's agent, J. D. Campbell, his commissioner of customs detached for duty in the London Office of the Customs, could act for him in purchasing ships and other materials and even in quasi-diplomatic contacts with British authorities. Even after the first Chinese minister to Britain, Kuo Sung-tao, opened his legation in London in 1877, Hart and Campbell, in close communication by post and telegraph, could provide special services over a wide range – for example, setting up lighthouses and a meteorological service on the China coast, representing China at international exhibitions in Paris, Vienna and elsewhere, as well as hiring professors for the T'ung-wen Kuan. From this inside position, in close contact with Prince Kung and yet with his own private access to London, Hart saw many opportunities for innovation. He even hoped at one time that the imperial government would appoint him to a new post as inspector-general of coastal defence (*tsung hai-fang ssu*) 'I want to make China strong, and I want to make England her best friend.' Hart believed that with a naval organization similar to the customs service he had fashioned, China could have a formidable navy within five years. He saw no conflict between the strategic interests of Britain and of China. But he was also very cautious and always aware of his situation as an adviser who was relied upon because he got results. He was faithful to his position as inspector-general of customs and entered into several lengthy lawsuits against the British government in defence of China's rights in customs

⁴⁰ See Frank H. H. King, *Money and monetary policy in China, 1845–1895*, 222. Ying-wan Cheng, *Postal communication in China and its modernization, 1860–1896*, 70–7.

matters under the treaties. One principal aim, in which he succeeded, was to establish that when British employees of China acted officially on her behalf, they must be regarded primarily as Chinese officials, not as British nationals. However, foreign employees had their limitations. In September 1879, a memorandum in which Hart set forth his plans for an inspectorate-general of coastal defence was considered by the Ch'ing court, but was set aside, after comments were received from Li Hung-chang and Shen Pao-chen.⁴¹ Between these loyal Chinese officials and a subject of Britain, however tactful and cooperative, the imperial government's choice was very clear. Plainly it was one thing to entrust the assessment and reporting of customs duties to foreign advisers, and quite another to have them run military affairs.

THE EARLY PHASE: LONG-RANGE PLANS

It has been suggested above that, given the structure of power at the T'ung-chih court and Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi's reliance on certain particularly conservative officials as a counterweight to Prince Kung's influence, basic proposals for reform such as the modification of the examination system stood no chance of being considered. Nevertheless, the political-ideological environment did permit a number of programmes to be initiated – principally the introduction of technology concerned with equipment for war but including also the first steps in the transmission of Western science and in the modernization of certain economic facilities. These early enterprises were all too few, yet in retrospect the period up to the late 1870s must still be regarded as a time of hope. For domestic politics were not yet so complicated – and the pressure from China's international environment not yet so acute – as to render impossible plans of a long-range nature concerning these few undertakings. The Kiangnan Arsenal and the Foochow Navy Yard both set their sights on a programme for the training of personnel, including the sending of students abroad. Both the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company and the Kaiping Mines were founded not so much for immediate profit but as an assertion of China's control over her own economy, in competition with Western-owned shipping in Chinese waters and foreign-imported coal.

Ambitious as some of these programmes were, they were beset by weaknesses of organization as well as difficulties of operation. The new under-

⁴¹ *LWCK, P'eng-liao han-kao*, 18.37b–38; 19.1; *I-shu han-kao* (Letters to the Tsungli Yamen), 9.37–8. Cf. Hart's letter to Campbell, 4 Sept. in J. K. Fairbank, K. F. Bruner and E. M. Matheson, *The IG in Peking. Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese maritime customs 1868–1907*, 1.301; and Wright, *Hart*, esp. 478.

takings usually took the form of specially created new government agencies, more flexible in their regulations than the ordinary government offices yet still not free from the habits and customs of the Ch'ing bureaucracy as a whole. The Peking T'ung-wen Kuan, for instance, was administered by the Tsungli Yamen itself. The school inherited certain practices of the Manchu banner academies, although an American missionary-scholar (W. A. P. Martin) was eventually given the responsibility for directing its instruction. Most of the other programmes – arsenals, shipyards, even merchant steamships and mines – were administered at the provincial level through newly created bureaux (*chü*). These were imperially authorized bodies after the precedent of *ad hoc* agencies that had always been allowed by the Ch'ing government but which became particularly numerous after the beginning of the war against the Taipings. The managing personnel were typically chosen by a commissioner of trade or a governor-general and given a letter of appointment (*cha-wei*) by him. Such a manager, who usually had the title of bureau director (*tsung-pan* or *hui-pan*), could also be described as an official deputy or 'commissioned official' (*wei-yüan*).⁴² The new bureaux were more efficient than the old-style yamen, if only because their procedures were simpler and because modern technology and business methods compelled the acceptance of certain standards. But the new agencies nevertheless retained many time-honoured practices and the abuses were often exacerbated, sometimes grievously so, by interference from other sectors of the bureaucracy.

Since the new undertakings often involved expensive imported machinery as well as new knowledge and processes, the Ch'ing officials were faced with serious problems of financing and technical expertise. Only weighty influence at court, in addition to manipulation in the provinces, could assure regular allocations from the precious maritime customs funds. Moreover, various other resources that were required – natural and human – were yet to be developed. An arsenal badly needed cheap coal and good roads to transport it, to say nothing of the support of a metal-refining industry. Engineers, machinists, teachers of science, competent ship captains and even skilled labourers such as trained smiths and miners were all lacking. There was just enough will within the Ch'ing government to see that some of its scarce treasure was devoted to the new-fangled undertakings; and there were just enough Western personnel in the treaty ports, as well as Western-trained Chinese, to give the self-

⁴² The pre-1850 antecedents of such 'less regular but still official jobs' are discussed in Thomas A. Metzger's review of Kenneth E. Folsom's *Friends, guests, and colleagues: the 'mu-fu' system in the late Ch'ing period*, in *HJAS*, 29 (1969) 315–19.

strengthening undertakings a start. It was remarkable that the programmes were successfully launched, but the real question was whether they could continue to grow and whether they could, by the stimulus of their success, lead to changes in their institutional and economic environment.

Arsenals and shipyards

The Ch'ing pursuit of Western technology began in 1862, when Tseng Kuo-fan established the famous Anking Arsenal at that newly conquered bastion against the Taipings. Its work was directed by Hsü Shou and Hua Heng-fang, Chinese mathematicians who had acquired some knowledge of Western mathematics and sciences. Besides the making of such old-fashioned firearms as gingalls and matchlocks (which China was already producing during the Opium War), the manufacture was attempted of shrapnel and of copper percussion caps.⁴³ Hsü Shou built a small engine for a steam launch, which unfortunately did not work well. In 1863, Yung Wing (Yung Hung), a Cantonese who had gone to the United States under missionary auspices, had graduated from Yale College in 1854, and was then engaged in commercial pursuits in Shanghai, was recommended by Tseng's engineers for an audience with the governor-general. Although not an expert on industrial matters, Yung was wise enough to argue that what China needed was all-purpose machinery that could, in turn, produce the equipment needed for the manufacture of ordnance and the construction of steamships – in other words, 'machines that make machines'. Tseng decided to send him to the United States to make the appropriate purchases; the initial funds were partly provided by Li Hung-chang in January 1864.

Li had, prior to this, established two small arsenals in Shanghai, one of them under Ting Jih-ch'ang, who had had some experience supervising the manufacture of munitions in Kwangtung. Li had also authorized Halliday Macartney, a former British army surgeon, to establish an arsenal in Sung-chiang (which was moved to newly recovered Soochow in 1864, when it acquired equipment from a machine shop brought to China by the Lay-Osborn fleet).⁴⁴ In 1865, Li approved the recommendation of Ting, now Shanghai taotai, that the government should purchase the machine shop and shipyard of Thomas Hunt and Company, an

⁴³ Wang Erh-min, *Ch'ing-chi ping-kung-yeh*, 24–8; Gideon Chen, *Tseng Kuo-fan: pioneer promoter of the steamship in China*, 20–5, 40–2.

⁴⁴ Li En-han, 'Ch'ing-mo Chin-ling chi-ch'i chü ti ch'uang-chien yü k'uo-chang' (The establishment and expansion of the Nanking Arsenal of the late Ch'ing period), *Ta-lu tsa-chib*, 33.12 (Dec. 1966) 368–70. Demetrius C. Boulger, *The life of Sir Halliday Macartney, KCMG*, 123–32.

American firm in the Hongkew section of the Shanghai foreign settlement. With the sanction of the throne, a bureau was established to administer the works: the Kiangnan General Bureau of Machine Manufacturing (Chiang-nan chi-ch'i chih-tsao tsung-chü), known in English as the Kiangnan Arsenal. Later in 1865, the machinery Yung Wing purchased arrived and was incorporated into the plant at Hongkew. Meanwhile Macartney's works was moved from Soochow to Nanking and was given the title of Nanking Manufacturing Bureau (Chin-ling chih-tsao chü) or Nanking Arsenal.

The effort to introduce Western machinery was not confined to the Shanghai-Nanking area. In 1866, the throne approved the recommendation of Tso Tsung-t'ang that a large shipyard be established in Foochow under contract with Frenchmen. In 1867, Ch'ung-hou, with Prince Kung's support, sought Li Hung-chang's help in the establishment of an arsenal at Tientsin. All these plants aimed at the immediate production of ordnance or vessels, but the two major centres – the Kiangnan Arsenal and the Foochow Navy Yard – from the beginning also emphasized the training of Chinese personnel for the technical work involved.

The early operations of the arsenals and shipyards unavoidably depended on foreign employees. The Nanking Arsenal was nominally under a Chinese director (*tsung-pan*) but was actually managed by Macartney. With an annual appropriation from Li Hung-chang's military funds, probably little more than 50,000 taels, the plant manufactured fuses, shells, friction tubes for firing cannon, and small cannon for the Anhwei Army. In 1867–8, some new machinery was added, as well as a few British machinists who had worked at Woolwich. Macartney attributed his early success to the fact that he had direct access to Li Hung-chang and also the confidence of Tseng Kuo-fan. By 1869 Nanking was manufacturing rockets and trying to forge larger guns.⁴⁵

In comparison, the Kiangnan Arsenal at Shanghai was far larger, having expended some 250,000 taels on production facilities during its first year, principally from the maritime customs funds at Shanghai. The men chosen by Li to be bureau directors were probably the best available. The Shanghai taotai (in 1865 Ting Jih-ch'ang and in 1866–8, Ying Pao-shih) was *ex officio* the principal director. Two others with special responsibility were Shen Pao-ching, who had been procuring munitions for the Anhwei Army, and Feng Chün-kuang, who despite his *chü-jen* degree was

⁴⁵ Boulger, *Sir Halliday Macartney*, 161–7. Wang Erh-min, *Ch'ing-chi ping-kung-yeh*, 107. Thomas L. Kennedy ascribes the Soochow Arsenal's moving to Nanking in 1865, as well as the throne's allocation of maritime customs funds to the Tientsin Arsenal in January 1868, to the military needs created by the Nien War; see his 'The establishment of modern military industry in China, 1860–1868', *CYCT*, 4.2 (Dec. 1974) 807–18.

said to be acquainted with 'Western learning'. All technical work was, in any case, in the charge of foreigners. T. F. Falls, Hunt's chief engineer, an American who had been employed by the New York Novelty Works, was the superintendent (*chiang-mu*, later *chien-kung*). Eight of Hunt's foreign machinists were retained, and other Western personnel were added. An early effort to manufacture rifles failed, but it was not long before the arsenal, using partly the machines and equipment produced on the premises, was able to produce serviceable muskets and small howitzers. By mid-1867, the arsenal was turning out fifteen muskets and a hundred 12-pound shrapnel daily, while 12-pound howitzers were produced at the rate of eighteen per month – munitions which proved to be immediately useful in the war against the Nien.⁴⁶

Although Li later credited his success in the Nien war partly to the Kiangnan Arsenal, it was on the whole a great disappointment to him. From the beginning, Li had wanted the arsenal to produce a good rifle. It was not until 1871, when additional machinery as well as foreign personnel arrived, that Kiangnan began making breech-loading rifles of the Remington type. Some 4,200 such rifles were produced by the end of 1873, but the product was not only more costly than, but also far inferior to the imported Remingtons. Li's own Anhwei Army refused to use it.⁴⁷ Since imported weapons still had to be relied upon, Li decided, when he re-organized the Tientsin Arsenal in 1871, to concentrate on making the cartridges and shells needed by Remington rifles and Krupp guns. Thanks to imperial allocations from the maritime customs revenue at Tientsin and Chefoo, the Tientsin Arsenal expended as much as 256,000 taels for plant and production in the two years 1871–2. Shen Pao-ching was transferred from Kiangnan to take charge; three additional shops were erected and new foreign personnel engaged. By 1874 the arsenal was producing a ton of powder daily, as well as large quantities of cartridges and shells; it was only then that Li ordered machinery for making the Remington rifle itself at Tientsin.⁴⁸ Li was not reassured as to China's capacity for making Western weapons when in 1875 three 68-pound guns made by Macartney at Nanking exploded while being tested at Taku. Partly on Li's advice, the Kiangnan Arsenal in 1874–5 established a branch to produce powder and cartridges and was henceforth to pay greater attention to this work.

⁴⁶ Thomas L. Kennedy, 'The establishment and development of the Kiangnan Arsenal, 1860–1895' (Columbia University PhD dissertation, 1968), ch. II. *North-China Herald*, 16 August 1867.

⁴⁷ Wei Yün-kung, *Chiang-nan chib-tsao chü chi* (Record of the Kiangnan Arsenal), 3.2. Kennedy, 'Establishment and development', 49–51, 82–4, 124–5, 169.

⁴⁸ L'WCK, *Tsou-kaio*, 24.16. Mark S. Bell, *China: being a military report on the north-eastern portions of the provinces of Chib-li and Shan-tung; Nanking and its approaches; Canton and its approaches; etc., etc.*, 89.

Like the incipient ordnance industry, the early efforts at steamship construction also proved disappointing. In July 1866, Li Hung-chang had authorized the Kiangnan Arsenal to begin work on small gunboats designed for harbour patrol. During the following year Tseng Kuo-fan decided, upon the recommendation of Ting Jih-ch'ang, that the arsenal should build larger ships, partly because the best foreign personnel available happened to be more expert in shipbuilding, and partly because both Ting and Tseng felt that the steamship was vital to China's long-range defence.⁴⁹ Hitherto the arsenal's annual maintenance had been drawn from the Anhwei Army's funds (which came mainly from the *likin* but also from the maritime customs). In May 1867, Tseng obtained permission to set aside for the Kiangnan Arsenal 10 per cent of the maritime customs revenue at Shanghai – an allocation that was increased two years later to 20 per cent, amounting to more than 450,000 taels annually. In late 1867, the arsenal moved to a ten-acre site south of the Chinese city of Shanghai. A dry-dock was built and new machinery was acquired for shipbuilding; six or seven British and French engineers and workmen were added to the staff. In August 1868, the first workable Chinese-built steamship was launched – a 600-ton side-wheeler, to which Tseng gave the cheerful name *T'ien-ch'i* ('peaceful and auspicious'). Although the engine was foreign-made, the boiler and the wooden hull were constructed at the arsenal. Five screw-driven wooden ships (ranging from 600 to 2,800 tons) were built in the next five years, as well as three small armour-plated vessels equipped with twin propellers. For all but two ships, the engines as well as boilers were made at the arsenal – not an unimpressive achievement. Unfortunately, the ships proved to be slow, drawing too much water for some treaty-port harbours, and consuming too much coal – to say nothing of the inordinate cost of construction itself. Up to 1875, when the shipbuilding programme was discontinued at Kiangnan, the programme, as well as the maintenance of the ships (under the Kiangnan Steamship Training Bureau established by Tseng in 1870) accounted for about 50 per cent of the arsenal's annual income, and the ships built were believed to be at least twice as costly as comparable vessels available for purchase in Britain.⁵⁰

The Kiangnan Arsenal's high costs in both munitions-making and shipbuilding must be attributed principally to two factors: that nearly all the material needed was imported and that the personnel cost (especially salaries of foreigners and Chinese officials) was high. In the mid-1870s, about 50 per cent of the arsenal's total expenditure was for material (not

⁴⁹ Kennedy, 'Industrial metamorphosis', 208–10.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 210 (esp. n. 21), 219, 224.

including new machinery or other permanent investment) and nearly 30 per cent for salaries and wages. Laxity in procurement practices was sufficiently serious to move Tseng Kuo-fan, some time before his death in 1872, to establish a system under which all of the arsenal's purchases should be authorized by the principal bureau director himself and by each of the three offices concerned: purchasing, disbursing and accounting.⁵¹ The personnel costs were mounting partly because of the unavoidable growth in the size of the foreign staff (who were paid well even by Western standards), and partly because the number of the Chinese administrative personnel also increased. Not counting the lesser staff, the number of Chinese 'officials' attached to the arsenal increased from forty in the early 1870s to twice as many at the end of the decade – many of them presumably sinecure-holders who got on the payroll through influence.⁵²

As compared with Kiangnan, the shipbuilding programme in Foochow demanded even larger resources. Tso Tsung-t'ang's plan, approved by the throne in July 1866, called initially for an expenditure of three million taels over five years. The construction of sixteen steamships, as well as the training of Chinese builders and navigators, was undertaken by the two Frenchmen, Prosper Giquel and Paul d'Aiguebelle, who signed an 'agreement of guarantee' (*pao-yüeh*), witnessed by the French consul. Since Tso himself was to leave for the north-west, he recommended the appointment of Shen Pao-chen, former governor of Kiangsi, then on mourning leave in his native Foochow, as imperial commissioner overseeing the bureau to be created. Shen was assisted by the bureau managers (*i-tiao*) Tso had chosen, including Chou K'ai-hsi, acting financial commissioner of Fukien, an experienced administrator of likin and military supplies. Shen and Chou had to contend with the opposition of the new governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang, Wu T'ang. Only when Wu was replaced by a more cooperative official in early 1868 – a measure of Tso's influence in Peking at the time – was the annual allocation of 480,000 taels assured, as well as the payments to the French for the machinery ordered.⁵³

At the shipyard site by the Pagoda Anchorage on the Min River, Chinese officials superintended the work of two thousand Chinese craftsmen and nine hundred labourers, seeing that a foundation was built on the

⁵¹ Kennedy, 'Establishment and development', 74.

⁵² *Ibid.* 148. Wang Erh-min, *Ch'ing-chi ping-kung-yeh*, 82–5.

⁵³ David Pong, 'Modernization and politics in China as seen in the career of Shen Pao-chen (1820–1879)' (University of London PhD dissertation, 1969) 118–32, 140–4. The financial and other difficulties of the Foochow Navy Yard until 1874 are also detailed in Chang Yü-fa, 'Foochow ch'uan-ch'ang chih k'ai-ch'uang chi-ch'i ch'u-ch'i fa-chan' (The founding and early development of the Foochow Navy Yard), *CYCT*, 2 (June 1971) 177–225.

riverfront site for 2,000 tons of French machinery to be installed, and arranging for the construction of buildings and procurement of materials. Giquel, who had the title of *chien-tu* (which he translated as *le directeur*) returned from France in late 1867 with forty-five Europeans, followed by M. Trasbot, an experienced engineer who was to serve as chief superintendent (*tsung chien-kung*). Among the facilities erected during the next three years were rolling mills for iron and copper, a metal shop which included hammers with action up to 7,000 kilogrammes, and a launching slip capable of serving vessels up to 400 feet long. In June 1869, the *Ouan-Nien-Tsing* (Wan-nien Ch'ing, meaning 'Ch'ing forever'), a 1,450-ton screw-driven transport, was launched, followed by fourteen more steamships in the next five years (one short of the contract, but one of the ships built was of greater horsepower than originally specified). Beginning in 1871, most vessels built were equipped with engines made at the yard itself. Foochow did not produce 2,800-ton vessels like the Kiangnan Arsenal's *Hai-an* and *Yü-yüan*. On the other hand, it did build, within the five-year period, ten ships between 1,000 and 1,450 tons, bigger than any of the Kiangnan vessels except for those two. Although the Foochow ships were said to be superior to those built by Kiangnan, they were also slow and costly to operate; with their wooden hulls and single-beam engines, they, like the Kiangnan ships, were really obsolescent by European standards of the 1870s.

The expenditures at the Foochow shipyard totalled 5.35 million taels for the six-and-a-half years to July 1874, exceeding the original estimates considerably. Salaries of the French personnel constituted the largest item of maintenance (12,000 taels out of the total monthly operation cost of between 50,000 taels and 80,000 taels). The total wages for the 2,000 Chinese workmen amounted to 10,000 taels per month, while the total salaries of the administrative staff of 150 Chinese was given at only 1,200 taels – obviously not counting expenses and perquisites that were allowed.⁵⁴ Many opportunities for corruption existed in construction contracts and in the distribution of the workers' wages. Shen Pao-chen had an exceedingly difficult time controlling the staff members who were relatives of, or recommended by, officials of the prominent gentry of Foochow. Extensive peculation existed in the bureau's system of procurement, especially during Shen's first year; the lumber, coal and metal purchased were often found to be unusable. Shen, who was to gain a reputation for exemplary probity as well as strictness in dealing with corruption, punished a large number of functionaries severely and replaced them with more reliable men, but in the end he had to depend in such matters as

⁵⁴ Pong, 'Modernization and politics', 261.

procurement on able deputies like Yeh Wen-lan, a man of treaty-port experience who was formerly one of Tso Tsung-t'ang's arms-buying agents. Yeh's staff of some thirty bought materials from Taiwan, Hong Kong and south-east Asia; he even had an agent residing in Rangoon, whence he sent home regular shipments of teak.⁵⁵ Shen's success lay primarily in his ability to see that his Chinese staff cooperated efficiently enough with Giquel and his Europeans so that the construction plans were carried out in orderly fashion during the contract period. But this record was made possible only by the support Shen continued to receive from Peking as well as from high officials in Fukien.

Western learning: the T'ung-wen Kuan's limitation

The Kiangnan Arsenal and Foochow Navy Yard were parts of a larger programme aimed at probing the secrets behind Western power; from the beginning Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang wanted to have training schools along with the arsenal or shipyard. Hundreds of semi-literate artisans and apprentices worked in the shops under the direction of foreign foremen and many Chinese were to become highly skilled workers. The intelligence and manual dexterity of the younger apprentices were particularly admired by foreign observers.⁵⁶ But it was at the small schools, where youths from literati families took up mathematics and sciences as well as the usual Chinese studies that, it was hoped, Western technology could take root among the Chinese. The schools were supposed to co-operate with the arsenals and shipyards and teach practice as well as theory.

Although a new government school (the Peking T'ung-wen Kuan, translated by W. A. P. Martin as 'the school of combined learning') had been established under the Tsungli Yamen's auspices as early as 1862, its original purpose was simply to train the translators needed in Sino-Western diplomacy. The precedent followed was therefore that of a Russian-language school (O-lo-ssu wen kuan) established under imperial auspices in the mid-eighteenth century. The 'regulations' in 1862, patterned after those of the Russian language school, initially restricted its enrolment to twenty-four youths chosen from Manchu families of the Eight Banners; the pupils were to learn a European language while pursuing Chinese studies.⁵⁷ A search in Shanghai and Canton for suitable Chinese who could teach English or French having failed, J. S. Burdon,

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 112, 145–51. For a vivid report of his initial difficulties, see Shen's memorial of 18 July 1867 in Shen Pao-chen, *Shen Wen-su kung cheng-shu* (The political papers of Shen Pao-chen), 4.1–4.

⁵⁶ See, for example, *North-China Herald*, 16 Aug. 1867.

⁵⁷ Knight Biggerstaff, *The earliest modern government schools in China*, 96–102.

a British missionary, was employed to teach English, with the understanding that Christian proselytism among the students was prohibited. Less than a year later, in April 1863, a French priest and a Russian interpreter were hired to start the French and Russian departments. (The O-lo-ssu wen kuan was by then abolished, the Manchus who were supposed to teach Russian there being found not really to know that language.) Some of the T'ung-wen Kuan students did at least learn something of a foreign tongue: in 1866, three of them were chosen as junior members of the first unofficial Ch'ing mission that Robert Hart took to Europe.

Meanwhile, in April 1863, Li Hung-chang recommended to the throne that similar foreign-language schools be established at Shanghai and Canton. The schools Li envisaged were, however, broader in aim and were to teach mathematics and sciences as well. 'That which the Westerners are good at, such as mathematical studies, the principles of science (*ko-chih*), and the techniques of manufacturing and surveying, have all been the subject of specialization and practical treatment and have been written up in books. . . . Can the Chinese be inferior to the Westerners in ingenuity and intelligence? If there are men well versed in the Western language and one person can teach another, then all the skilful techniques of steamships and firearms can be gradually mastered.' Li's proposal was approved, and the Shanghai T'ung-wen Kuan was inaugurated in July 1864 under the superintendence of the taotai of that port. The pupils were limited to forty youths below fourteen *sui*, 'recommended [*pao-sung*] by reputable officials and gentry', in addition to ten older students who already had thorough Chinese literary training.⁵⁸ Besides a Chinese curriculum that included classics, history, the writings of Chu Hsi, and literary composition, the students were taught English by Young J. Allen, the American missionary, and mathematics by a Chinese teacher.

Although also founded on the basis of Li's memorial, the Canton T'ung-wen Kuan, inaugurated likewise in the summer of 1864, came largely under the control of the Tartar-general of Canton. While a missionary was hired to teach English and mathematics, the regulations of the school seem to have been designed against excessive Western influence among the Chinese residents of that city (which had been under British occupation for nearly four years, as a result of the Anglo-French War). The enrolment was set at twenty youths, sixteen places being reserved for sons of the local banner garrison; ten older students could be either Manchu or Han Chinese. Although its regulations were partly based on those

⁵⁸ Liu, 'The Confucian as patriot and pragmatist', 33. *Kuang fang-yen kuan ch'üan-an* (Complete record of the Kuang fang-yen kuan; copy made by hand in 1949 from a block-print volume in the collection of the University of Nanking; courtesy of Prof. Knight Biggerstaff), 7-8b. See his *Earliest modern government schools*, 157.

adopted at the new Shanghai school, the Canton T'ung-wen Kuan actually operated like a Manchu banner institution.⁵⁹

From the beginning these new schools had to face the problem of incentive for their students, since the Ch'ing civil service and examination system remained unchanged. Invoking the precedent of the old Russian language school, the Tsungli Yamen obtained the throne's approval that outstanding graduates of the Peking T'ung-wen Kuan's three-year programme could be recommended for official positions of the eighth or ninth rank; one who passed further tests could even advance to the seventh rank and eventually be appointed second-class secretary (*chu-shih*) in the metropolitan bureaucracy. However, the schools at Shanghai and Canton did not have this advantage. The Shanghai T'ung-wen Kuan proposed that the best students who went through its three-year programme be awarded the *fu-sheng* status (a low-ranking *sheng-yüan* eligible to sit for the regular provincial examination).⁶⁰ The Canton T'ung-wen Kuan, following the precedent of the banner schools, promised its graduates either a translator's degree (originally signifying competence in translating between Manchu and Chinese) or the honorary status of *chien-sheng*. It will be recalled that in the spring of 1864, Li Hung-chang recommended to the Tsungli Yamen that a new category be created in the civil service examinations which would give candidates specializing in technology a chance to compete for high degrees. The proposal came to nothing, and, as it happened, the students at the Shanghai and Canton T'ung-wen Kuan were found to be practising the eight-legged essay in preparation for the regular provincial examinations, even though they had entered the schools and were paid stipends to learn English and mathematics!

A breakthrough in the institutional environment had nevertheless been attempted. This was, in retrospect, thanks largely to the establishment of the Kiangnan Arsenal and the Foochow Navy Yard in 1865–6 and to the intellectual stirrings, faint as they were, among such scholar-officials as Wen-hsiang and Tung Hsun who set the Tsungli Yamen's policies. Prince Kung himself had been impressed by the arguments presented by Li, Tso and others on the need for long-range planning regarding personnel needed for the new technology. The Yamen ministers were also stimulated by presentations made by Robert Hart and by W. A. P. Martin who translated Wheaton's *International law* into Chinese and who, while preparing a new book on natural philosophy, demonstrated the working of the telegraph transmitter at the Yamen itself.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Nancy Evans, 'The banner-school background of the Canton T'ung-wen Kuan', *Papers on China*, 22A (May 1969) 89–103.

⁶⁰ See Biggerstaff, *Earliest modern government schools*, 158 and n. 5.

⁶¹ W. A. P. Martin, *A cycle of Cathay*, 299–300.

In the winter of 1866–7, Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang made a truly bold proposal whose radical nature has generally been overlooked by historians. Earlier in 1866, when Hart went home on furlough, they had authorized him to look in Europe for instructors in sciences, to staff a department of ‘astronomy and mathematics’ to be created at the Peking T’ung-wen Kuan. (In the Ch’ing tradition, ‘astronomy and mathematics’ were recognized as having some practical value and indeed were legitimate subjects of intellectual inquiry to Confucian scholars of a certain persuasion.⁶² However, the rubric was now used by the Tsungli Yamen to cover Western sciences such as chemistry and mechanics.) Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang wished not merely to expand the T’ung-wen Kuan’s curriculum; they aimed at nothing less than recognition, by the throne and by such citadels of orthodoxy as the Hanlin Academy, of the legitimacy of Western learning itself. In its memorial of December 1866, the Tsungli Yamen proposed that scholars and officials who had the *chü-jen* degree should be encouraged to apply for admission to the new programme projected at the T’ung-wen Kuan. Then, on 28 January, Prince Kung and his colleagues further memorialized to propose that holders of the *chin-shih* degree and especially members of the Hanlin Academy – including the prestigious compilers (*pien-hsiu*) – should be encouraged to apply and upon the completion of a three-year course be given extraordinary recommendation for official advancement (*ko-wai yu-pao*).⁶³ It is perhaps not too far-fetched to suppose that, should this proposal have produced its desired effects, a major reform of the Ch’ing educational and civil service systems would have been at hand.

It was testimony to the ambiguity of Tz’u-hsi’s own cultural outlook that the December and January memorials were both approved by the throne. But, as it happened, the empress dowager was to learn, perhaps for the first time in such unmistakable fashion, that ideological conservatism could be used as a check upon Prince Kung’s political influence. The Peking bureaucracy acquiesced at first in the Tsungli Yamen’s proposals. It was only in early March that Chang Sheng-tsao, a censor, memorialized to present his view that self-strengthening depended not on guns and ships but on good and just government as well as ‘training of troops and raising of revenue’. The censor was particularly worried that the emphasis on astronomy and mathematics, which to him were mere matters of

⁶² See Wang P’ing, *Hsi-fang li-suan-hsüeh chib shu-ju* (The introduction of Western astronomical and mathematical sciences into China), 75–124.

⁶³ *IWSM-TC*, 46.47 (esp. line 3), 48b (line 5). This memorial was followed by one on 25 February recommending that Hsü Chi-yü, the ageing author of *Ying-huan chib-lüeh*, be made commissioner (*ta-sh’en*) in charge of the T’ung-wen Kuan. The recommendation was also approved.

technique (*chi-ch'iao*), would have an adverse effect on the spirit and moral principle of the literati; technical knowledge and good moral character seemed to him to be antithetical. The censor also resented the fact that generous stipends and extraordinary official promotion were held out as inducements, which again would have a degrading effect on the morale of scholars and officials. Even after this attack, however, the throne still sided with Prince Kung, stating in an edict that 'astronomy and mathematics are what Confucian scholars should know and should not be regarded as matters of technique'.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, many scholars did apply to the Tsungli Yamen to be enrolled in the T'ung-wen Kuan's new programme.

On 20 March, however, a second critical memorial reached the throne, from Grand Secretary Wo-jen (1804–71), who was not only an eminent and revered scholar but also a leader of an incipient faction at court. His Mongolian ancestry notwithstanding, Wo-jen had been widely respected as one of the two or three great transmitters of the Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism of his time. Added to his reputation for an exemplary personal life was the influence he had acquired over individuals through a series of offices he had held since the 1850s, all in an area where scholarship bordered on ideology on the one hand, and politics on the other. He had been successively president of the censorate and chancellor of the Hanlin Academy, and in 1867, besides being grand secretary, he was one of the esteemed tutors of the young emperor.⁶⁵ He declared haughtily in his memorial: 'The way to uphold the foundation of the state is to emphasize propriety and righteousness but not expedient schemes [*ch'üan-mou*]. The basic policy [of the state is to cultivate] man's mind and not techniques [*chi-i*].' Wo-jen was even more contemptuous of 'astronomy and mathematics' than censor Chang Sheng-tsao. The grand secretary identified matters of technology with the despised 'magical computations' (*shu-shu*) usually linked to impostors and to heterodoxy. But what was of even greater emotional appeal to the literati-officials was his allegation that the Tsungli Yamen wanted the Chinese 'to honour the barbarians as teachers' (*feng-i wei-shih*). The teacher's role was a particularly revered one in the Chinese tradition, and these were barbarians indeed, who had so recently invaded Peking itself and who were now spreading the abominable doctrine of Christianity.⁶⁶ Wo-jen reiterated his stand, even after Prince Kung and his colleagues, in a vigorous memorial in reply, argued that it was simply unrealistic to expect 'loyalty and faithfulness to serve

⁶⁴ *IWASM-TC*, 47.16b.

⁶⁵ See Hao Chang, 'The anti-foreignist role of Wo-jen, 1804–1871', *Papers on China*, 14 (1960) 1–29.

⁶⁶ *IWASM-TC*, 47.24 (esp. line 10)–25 (esp. line 1).

as armour and propriety and righteousness as a shield'. Morality was indeed the basis of the state, Prince Kung and his colleagues affirmed, but they proceeded to cite the words of loyal officials who strongly advocated the introduction of Western technology, such men as Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, Tso Tsung-t'ang and Shen Pao-chen – men presumably no less Confucian than Wo-jen!

Although no other official had meanwhile memorialized in support of Wo-jen, the latter's two memorials, made public by the throne, so stirred up the literati-officials in Peking that invidious rumours of the Tsungli Yamen's treasonous intent began to circulate. Those scholars who had applied for admission to the T'ung-wen Kuan's new programme were sneered at by 'fellow provincials and colleagues'. An informal group was formed among literati-officials pledging not to be tempted by the new opportunity offered by the Tsungli Yamen. In late April, Prince Kung and his colleagues reported to the throne that since Wo-jen's memorials became known, 'no one had come to this yamen to apply for the entrance examination [to the new programme]'. The Yamen was forced to abandon its former plan of influencing the scholar-official elite towards the study of technology; it now merely requested the throne's approval that the entrance examination for the new programme be held as planned, to accommodate 'those who at present have applied'.⁶⁷

The outcome was plainly a triumph for Wo-jen, who represented a major cultural strand as well as the self-righteousness and political interest of certain metropolitan officials. But it must be observed that he owed this triumph partly to Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi's failing to give Prince Kung a full measure of support. Wo-jen was embarrassed by being asked to found a school of mathematics with only Chinese instructors (whom he had casually stated to be easily available in his first memorial), and he had to ask for sick leave in order to get out of an appointment to the Tsungli Yamen. Wo-jen was also criticized in one of the edicts as 'pedantic and inflexible', but Tz'u-hsi nevertheless refrained from reiterating the call for high degree-holders to enroll in the T'ung-wen Kuan's new programme; the edict of 23 April merely stated that 'those who at present have applied for entrance are to be given careful examination and admitted to the T'ung-wen Kuan'.⁶⁸ One can imagine that Tz'u-hsi was reluctant to go against the grain of Wo-jen's interpretation of Confucian culture, since her own position as regent and indeed the Manchu rule itself had been dependent on Confucian morality and culture. Tz'u-hsi could, of

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 48.14 (esp. lines 2–4 and 7–8). See also Weng T'ung-ho, *Weng Wen-kung kung jib-chi* (Weng T'ung-ho's diaries), Ting-mao (1867), 12–13, 15b, 23–4, 26, 28, 36.

⁶⁸ *IJSM-TC*, 48.15b (line 5); 49.24b (line 6).

course, have chosen to adhere to a more flexible but still correct view of Confucian culture as exemplified in the memorials of Prince Kung or Tseng Kuo-fan. But then, she saw no harm at all in Prince Kung being outweighed by an eminent official who had a large following in the metropolitan bureaucracy. In 1868, we find an edict pointedly singling out Wo-jen and Prince Kung, mentioned in that order, as the two officials with the heaviest responsibilities – one as the moral guide to the throne and the other as the senior member of the Grand Council.⁶⁹

With the throne thus failing to insist on prestigious scholars taking up Western learning, the T'ung-wen Kuan's new departure could have only a limited significance. Seventy-two applicants, including both Han Chinese and Manchus, did appear to take the entrance examination, but they were found to be mostly unemployed middle-aged men, 'broken-down hacks to whom the stipend offered by the yamen proved dearer than their reputation'.⁷⁰ Thirty were admitted, but only five eventually graduated. In order to get students of higher quality, the Shanghai and Canton T'ung-wen Kuan were asked, with the throne's approval, to send their best graduates to the new programme at Peking. Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang did not shun the odium of honouring the barbarians as teachers. Two of the several European professors engaged by Hart arrived in 1868. Li Shan-lan, the gifted scholar with knowledge of both Chinese and Western mathematics, was appointed professor in that field. But English was taught by M. J. O'Brien, a non-missionary teacher fresh from the British Isles; chemistry by a Frenchman, Anatole Billequin, and physics by W. A. P. Martin (who had been teaching English at the Tung-wen Kuan since 1864).

In 1869, on Hart's recommendation, Martin was appointed the chief instructor (*tsung chiao-hsi*, a title which Martin himself translated as president), working together with Chinese or Manchu proctors (*t'i-tiao*), who had charge of Chinese studies as well as the students' living arrangements and discipline.⁷¹ Martin proceeded to organize the T'ung-wen Kuan into a 'college', with an eight-year programme that included a European language, mathematics, physics and chemistry, geography, international law and political economy. Later, in January 1872, J. Dudgeon, an English

⁶⁹ *Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu* (Veritable records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty, T'ung-chih, 238.17 (lines 7–9). For further discussion of the role played by Tz'u-hsi and by Wo-jen's partisans in the polemics over the T'ung-wen Kuan, see Kwang-Ching Liu, 'Politics, intellectual outlook, and reform: the T'ung-wen kuan controversy of 1867', in Paul A. Cohen and John C. Schrecker, eds. *Reform in nineteenth century China*, 85–100.

⁷⁰ Cited in Biggerstaff, *Earliest modern government schools*, 119, n. 47.

⁷¹ See the revised internal regulations of the Peking T'ung-wen Kuan, as well as 'the Tsungli Yamen ministers' instructions' in Chung-kuo k'o-hsüeh yüan *et al.* comps. *Yang-wu yüan-tung* (The Western affairs movement), 2.73–81.

medical missionary, introduced courses in anatomy and physiology. Of the one hundred or so students around this date, the majority were still from banner families, but the best were believed to be the Han Chinese youths who had had previous schooling at the Shanghai T'ung-wen Kuan. A publication programme was initiated with Martin's own *Ko-wu ju-men* (Introduction to science) and Billequin's *Hua-hsüeh chih-nan* (Guide to chemistry).⁷² The dominant purpose of the school continued, however, to be training personnel for diplomatic work; the books produced at the Peking T'ung-wen Kuan with the assistance of advanced students eventually included works on international law, political economy and the history of European states, including Russia. The best among the students were appointed translators at the Tsungli Yamen even before graduation, although many students deemed it wise and were even encouraged to devote a considerable part of their time to preparation for the regular civil-service examination.

The arsenal and shipyard schools

Meanwhile, more specialized programmes in science and technology were provided at the Foochow Navy Yard and the Kiangnan Arsenal. The Foochow school was established in 1867 (even before the foundations for the shipyard were laid) with more than a hundred pupils under the age of fourteen *sui* recruited mostly from impoverished local gentry families. The students were promised future service either in the Green Standard waterforce or civil posts to be recommended (*pao-chü*) on the basis of military merit,⁷³ a well-known ladder of success during the Taiping war. Tso Tsung-t'ang and Shen Pao-chen initially had the extravagant hope that the students could learn how to design and direct the construction of steamships after intensive training of five to seven years; youths who aspired to become captains or mates of the steamships were expected to acquire the requisite navigation skills in the same number of years. The students were required to go through a Chinese curriculum to ensure ideological correctness, but Shen Pao-chen was sensible enough to demand that they study only simple works such as *The classic of filial piety* and the *Sacred edict* of K'ang-hsi, as well as practise plain expository composition.⁷⁴ The 'French division' of the school, taught by Frenchmen, concentrated on naval construction and design. In addition to French, a good dose of mathematics including analytical geometry and calculus

⁷² For a list of early T'ung-wen Kuan publications, see *ibid.* 87–8. W. A. P. Martin's *Ko-wu ju-men*, 7 *ts'e*, had been published in 1868 and was to go through many editions.

⁷³ *IWSM-TC*, 46.24. Biggerstaff, *Earliest modern government schools*, 206.

⁷⁴ *IWSM-TC*, 50.22b (line 7).

was required, and the scientific curriculum included physics and mechanics. The students were occasionally used to help assemble machinery parts, but it was not until the fifth or sixth year of the programme that they took up more substantial work at the various shops of the shipyard. Cadets in the 'English division' of the school went through three years of theoretical navigation (taking courses in English, geography, plane and spherical trigonometry and nautical astronomy), before they were put on board a training ship under a former captain of the Royal Navy. (An engine room department, which recruited young men who had already worked in foundries and machine shops in Hong Kong or Shanghai, merely taught English, simple mathematics and the principles of the steam engine.) The teaching at the various branches of the school was apparently so efficient – and there were so many talents among the youths – that after a bare seven years tangible results seem to have been achieved. In mid-1874, Giquel reported seven graduates of the French division were already 'capable of directing the work of [assembling] engines at the Arsenal', and that twenty-one more were expected to attain this capacity in another year and a half. Eight students showed promise of eventually qualifying to be 'heads of offices of design', and nine graduates had proven their capacity 'to make an estimate for a wooden ship, . . . to make the plan of its hull and its sails, to sketch it out in the moulding hall, and superintend its execution'. Fourteen cadets of the 'English division' were pronounced to have 'the theoretical and practical instruction requisite in order to command a ship of war during a lengthy voyage'.⁷⁵

Even the brightest young engineers and designers could not be expected to take major responsibilities immediately, however. Owing to financial difficulties, the building programme at the Foochow Yard was greatly curtailed after 1874. Between 1875 and 1877, only four ships were launched, although one of them, *Wei Yuan*, was a composite ship (iron frame and wooden outside) with an English-model horizontal compound engine built at the yard itself – technically a considerable advance. While some of the Foochow school's graduates participated in the work, the chief engineer was L. Dunoyer de Segonzac, who had been Giquel's chief technical man and who had remained even after most of the other Frenchmen had withdrawn, following expiration of the contract.⁷⁶ By the mid-1870s, four of the Foochow graduates were given the captaincy of steamships after a trial period, while most of the ships built by the yard were commanded by Chinese of treaty-port background who, although lacking

⁷⁵ Prosper Giquel, *The Foochow arsenal and its results* (H. Lang, tr, reprinted from the *Shanghai Evening Courier*), 33–4.

⁷⁶ *Cb'uan-sheng tsou-i hui-pien* (Compendium of memorials regarding the Foochow Navy Yard), 13.9b; 14.12. Rawlinson, *China's struggle*, 97.

formal training, had learned how to navigate the small steamers that the Kiangsu and Chekiang governments had bought or chartered since the 1850s to fight coastal piracy. (Yen Fu, 21-year-old graduate of the Foochow school and the future renowned translator of Huxley and Mill into Chinese, was, in 1874, acting captain of *Hai-tung-yün*, a small steamer owned by the Fukien–Chekiang administration but not built by the Foochow yard itself.)⁷⁷ For the over-all command of the squadron, Shen had selected Ts'ai Kuo-hsiang, a commander of the Hunan Army waterforce once chosen by Tseng Kuo-fan as head of the Lay-Osborn Flotilla. These arrangements did not mean that Shen or Ting Jih-ch'ang (who succeeded him as head of the Foochow Navy Yard in 1875, and was replaced in 1876 by Wu Tsan-ch'eng, formerly of the Tientsin Arsenal) had slighted the Foochow school's own graduates.

For by 1870, Shen himself, impressed by the 'marvellous complexity' of the shipbuilding machinery, had become completely convinced that profound learning, particularly in mathematics, lay behind Western technology. In the memorial he submitted in 1870 jointly with the governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang, Ying-kuei, he stated: 'The quality of steamships and guns is founded in mathematics. The ships and guns of the West are making such extraordinary improvement that they almost defy imagination; this is the result of a capacity for computation that reaches smaller and smaller decimals; if the calculation is finer by the slightest degree, the performance of the machinery will be ten times more adroit.' Realizing that by 1874, the Foochow graduates would have had at most seven years of schooling, Shen recommended to the throne in 1873 that the best of the graduates should be sent to France and England for further studies – so that they could 'improve in proper progression and peep into the subtle secrets [of Western learning]'.⁷⁸

The Foochow graduates were not to go to Europe until 1875–7; meanwhile, after the French contract expired in mid-1874, Shen and his successors insisted that the school should continue as before. At least two French professors were retained, and James Carroll, who taught theoretical navigation, was reappointed in 1876. At Ting Jih-ch'ang's initiative, forty boys who had had some background in English and mathematics in British schools in Hong Kong were recruited for the Foochow school (as arranged by Tong King-sing, the head of the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, himself once a resident of Hong Kong).⁷⁹ Both

⁷⁷ Pong, 'Modernization and politics', 277–81. Pong's table shows that only two of the eighteen ships which composed the Foochow Squadron in 1875 were captained by officers of the old Ch'ing waterforce.

⁷⁸ Shen K'o, *Hsien Wen-su kung*, memorial dated 1870. Shen Pao-chen, *Shen Wen-su kung*, 4.64b–65.

⁷⁹ *Ch'uan-cheng tsou-i bui-pien*, 13.19b, 30; 14.5–6.

divisions of the Foochow school were maintained at a respectable level, but the training of navigation personnel was given particular emphasis.

While the Foochow school served as a crash course for China's first generation of modern naval architects, marine engineers and ship captains, the Kiangnan Arsenal, owing to its peculiar circumstances, made a more varied contribution. Li Hung-chang had intended, from the beginning, that literate youths should learn Western mathematics and sciences at the same time that they observed the workings of the machinery at the arsenal.⁸⁰ But the latter's educational facilities had to be postponed until the works itself was moved away from the foreign settlement; the Hongkew area, with its foreign sailors and their amusement quarters, was considered inappropriate for a school. However, several Chinese mathematician-engineers who had worked for Tseng Kuo-fan in Anking, including Hua Heng-fang, Hsü Shou and Hsü Chien-yin, were given employment at the Kiangnan Arsenal in 1867 and, at their recommendation, a translation department (including a school for translators) was established to produce books in Chinese on Western science and technology. In the spring of 1868, John Fryer, an English missionary teacher, was appointed to the department, followed later in the year by three other missionaries, all of them knowing Chinese well enough to dictate translations of technical works to Chinese amanuenses. Despite Wo-jen's diatribes of the preceding year, Tseng Kuo-fan told the throne in a memorial of late 1868 that he hoped to select intelligent scions of the gentry to study with these foreigners, so as to enable the youths to 'think through the principles' behind Western technology. (Two or three years before, Tseng Chi-tse, the governor-general's gifted eldest son, had begun to learn English and Western mathematics, presumably with his father's encouragement.)⁸¹ In late 1869, when the school building at the arsenal's new site was completed, the Shanghai T'ung-wen Kuan, which still had less than fifty students, was moved there, to be put under the arsenal's auspices and renamed Kuang fang-yen kuan (lit. 'school of numerous languages'). The arsenal itself planned at the same time a programme of on-the-job training for its workers and a night school for apprentices, where mathematics and simple sciences would be taught.

The several parts of this educational programme were not well coordinated, however. Hsü Shou and the other Chinese mathematician-scientists were without responsibility for the arsenal's production plans. They

⁸⁰ Liu, 'The Confucian as patriot and pragmatist', 38, n. 103.

⁸¹ Tseng Kuo-fan, *Tseng Wen-cheng kung ch'üan-chi* (Complete collection of Tseng Kuo-fan's papers; unamplified version used in the Harvard-Yenching Library; hereafter, *TWCK*), *Tsou-kao* (Memorials), 33.7b. Li En-han, *Tseng Chi-tse ti wai-chiao* (The diplomacy of Tseng Chi-tse), 20-1.

followed their academic interests and expanded the translation efforts. By the mid-1870s a dozen Chinese were collaborating with five missionary scholars (Fryer, Alexander Wylie, John MacGowan, Carl Kreyer and Young J. Allen) to render into precise Chinese many of the books ordered from London; as many as fifty-four works of translation or adaptation had been published by the end of 1877.⁸² Many of these were manuals on such subjects as the steam engine, moulding and foundry techniques, or Gatling and Krupp guns. Others were more provocative works like Viktor E. K. R. Von Scheliha's *A treatise on coast defense* (1868 edn); its Chinese version, appearing in 1874, was promptly perused by Li Hung-chang. Still other works were textbooks on mathematics and sciences, such as William Burchett's *Practical geometry* (1855 edn), John E. Bowman's *An introduction to practical chemistry, including analysis* (1866 edn), or John Tyndall's *Sound* (1869 edn). The books were distributed through Chinese booksellers: a handbook on Krupp guns published in 1872 sold 904 copies in eight years and a treatise on algebra, appearing in 1873, sold 781 copies in seven years, to give just two examples. But as John Fryer, who was responsible for the largest number of the Kiangnan Arsenal's translations, complained, these books were used only seldom by the various departments of the arsenal itself, including its school and training classes.⁸³

The development of the Kiangnan Arsenal's school suffered from the fact that it was supposed to train translators as well as engineers and that an ageing neo-Confucian scholar-official, T'u Tsung-ying (1811?–1894), during his brief tenure as the Shanghai taotai (1870–1), had allowed the director of education of the Shanghai hsien to guide the school's Chinese curriculum. Mathematics was given the proper emphasis in the Kuang fang-yen kuan's three-to-five-year programme (the period of study depending on each student's ability and desire for specialization). But while algebra, geometry and trigonometry were taught, the pupils were also required to go through the Chinese *Suan-ching* (Classic of mathematics), resulting in some confusion of concepts. Particularly during the first year, the students were put through a heavy programme of Chinese studies. Historical works to be read from week to week included the *Tso commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals*, and Ssu-ma Kuang's *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*. But a straight dose of orthodox doctrine was also dealt out: among the required readings were Chu Hsi's complete works and an

⁸² This figure for the period up to 1877 is derived from Adrian A. Bennett, *John Fryer: the introduction of Western science and technology into nineteenth-century China*, Appendices II and III. For the official policy regarding selection of works to be translated, see Kuang fang-yen kuan *ch'üan-an*, 32–3.

⁸³ Bennett, *John Fryer*, 40–2.

eighteenth-century Ch'ing anthology on Sung learning.⁸⁴ Moreover, the student had to spend one day a week preparing a composition, sometimes of the eight-legged style. If he still had energy left, he could spend it on English, taught by Young J. Allen, or French, taught by John Fryer. The Chinese curriculum continued into the second year, but the students could then choose to specialize in 'foreign language, customs and institutions', in preparation for diplomatic work, or alternatively take up a technical field, such as mineralogy and metallurgy, or the design or operation of machinery. It was only for students who had no ambition to take the regular civil service examinations that a separate technical programme was also provided, where the Chinese curriculum was reduced to the minimum: the *Four books* and the *Five classics*. By the mid-1870s, this separate programme, which also had an enrolment of some forty students, seems to have been divided into three groups: naval architecture, marine engineering and military science. The courses offered included English, mathematics, drafting and gunnery. Foreigners were among the instructors, presumably those connected with the arsenal's shipbuilding and ordnance programmes.⁸⁵

The educational and training programmes at the Kiangnan Arsenal were unfortunate in that in late 1870, just when they were getting started, Governor Ting Jih-ch'ang, who had inspired the arsenal's plans from the beginning, had to relinquish his post temporarily to mourn his mother's death. Although very much absorbed in problems of fiscal and judicial administration, Ting remained convinced of China's need to pursue Western sciences. In a memorandum dated 1867, he had argued that only by devotion to what seemed to be abstract pursuits could Western technology be appropriated. 'The Westerners . . . have been expending their intelligence, energy and wealth on things that were completely vague and intangible for hundreds of years; the effects are now suddenly apparent'.⁸⁶ Before Ting departed for his mourning, he helped China to go one step further in appropriating Western science, for his efforts were crucial in bringing about the famous educational mission to the United States in the 1870s.

Training abroad

As early as 1864, ministers of the Tsungli Yamen, inspired partly by a petition it received from an obscure literato-official, warning that Japan was sending men to Europe to learn how to make guns and build ships,

⁸⁴ *Kuang fang-yen kuan ch'üan-an*, 20–3. Biggerstaff, *Earliest modern government schools*, 170–1. On T'u Tsung-ying, see Ch'ing-shih pien-tsuai wei-yüan-hui, comp. *Cb'ing-shih*, 6.4963.

⁸⁵ *Kuang fang-yen kuan ch'üan-an*, 52b. Biggerstaff, 177.

⁸⁶ *IW'SM-TC*, 55.22.

consulted Li Hung-chang about the advisability of sending apprentices to arsenals abroad. Li replied that this was a measure that eventually had to be taken, but it could wait until arsenals were founded in China first.⁸⁷ In early 1868, soon after Ting Jih-ch'ang became governor, Yung Wing, the Yale-educated Chinese who took pride in his own 'liberal education', presented to Ting a plan for Chinese youths to enter preparatory schools and colleges in the United States before undergoing on-the-job training. Ting was so taken by the idea that he personally wrote to Wen-hsiang about it; eventually, Ting was able to enlist Tseng Kuo-fan in the cause. In October 1870, while Ting was in north China helping Tseng deal with the crisis created by the Tientsin massacre, he persuaded the elder statesman to propose to the throne that young students should be sent abroad to study in regular colleges as well as military and marine academies. Tseng explained in his memorial: 'The [Western] system was to establish a large number of colleges [*shu-yüan*], where studies were conducted in separate departments. Among the people, there is none who does not participate in the institutions of learning and these are taught by specialists of renown.'⁸⁸ The Burlingame Treaty of 1868 had permitted the Chinese to study in American schools and Ting Jih-ch'ang was confident that Yung Wing, having been educated in the United States himself, would be a good man to manage Chinese students going to that country, if indeed he could be accompanied by a man of orthodox background to make the scheme acceptable to Peking. It happened that in Tseng's *mu-fu* there was a Hanlin academician frustrated in his career and determined on official advancement by almost any means. This was Ch'en Lan-pin, a *chin-shih* of 1853 who, although appointed a junior secretary of the Board of Punishment, had returned to Kwangtung to engage in some local defence work; he had once been in the entourage of the Hunan Army commander Liu Ch'ang-yu but now came to work for Tseng. Ch'en has been described as 'timid in appearance, but daring in words; irresponsible in public affairs, but aggressive in seeking personal advantage'.⁸⁹ But he was a prestigious Hanlin scholar willing to go to the United States!

Tseng's proposal lay dormant in Peking for two months, but in December 1870, Li Hung-chang, now governor-general of Chihli, urged him to prepare a detailed plan and memorialize again. 'It can never be expected', Li told Tseng, 'that the matter will be initiated from within the court'.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ *IWSM-TC*, 15.32-3. *HFT*, *Chi-ch'i chü* (Arsenals), 13, 17-19.

⁸⁸ Tseng Kuo-fan, *Tseng Wen-cheng kung* (Kuo-fan) *ch'üan-chi* (amplified version), 30.8-9; Lü, *Ting Jih-ch'ang*, 210-13.

⁸⁹ William Hung, 'Huang Tsun-hsien's poem "The closure of the educational mission in America" translated and annotated', *HJAS*, 18 (1955) 60, citing the description of Ch'en found in Li Tz'u-ming's diaries.

⁹⁰ *LWCK*, *P'eng-liao han-kao*, 10.28, 32.

Yung Wing had suggested that one hundred and twenty youths between the ages of twelve and twenty *sui* should each spend fifteen years in the United States. Li felt that fifteen years was indeed necessary for 'education in depth' (*shen-tsao*), and he suggested that the proposed total expenditure of 1.2 million taels for a twenty-year period was not excessive and could come from the '60 per cent account' of the Shanghai customs revenue. Li added that 'in the future, should the studies produce results and funds could be saved for the purpose, further expansion of the scheme would be in order'. Li hoped, at first, that the pupils could be awarded the *chien-sheng* degree before they went abroad, but was satisfied when the youths were promised official rank upon the completion of their study. In June 1871 Li presented these ideas in a letter to the Tsungli Yamen co-signed by Tseng, and three months later, he and Tseng jointly memorialized on the matter. Asked by the throne to comment, the Tsungli Yamen suggested that the proposed age of the student candidates should be twelve–sixteen *sui*, instead of twelve–twenty *sui*, since this would reduce the chance of the students having to be abroad when their parents were old and likely to die! The Yamen also recommended that a shrine of Confucius be established at the education mission in the United States. On the basis of these memorials, the historic measure was approved.⁹¹

Meanwhile, Tseng had authorized the creation of a bureau in Shanghai to recruit students. Hsü Jun, a comprador-merchant in Shanghai whose native place was Hsiang-shan, Kwangtung, was responsible for persuading many Cantonese families to let their sons be recruited. Of the first group of thirty youths that responded to the opportunity in 1872, twenty-four were Cantonese (thirteen from Hsiang-shan alone), only three from Kiangsu, and one each from Anhwei, Shantung and Fukien.⁹² Yung Wing preceded the group by a month and, with the cooperation of the Board of Education of Connecticut, the headquarters of the Ch'ing education mission was set up at Hartford. It was decided that the boys would be farmed out (at a remuneration) to the families in a dozen towns of the Connecticut Valley, where they would attend school. Ch'en Lan-pin soon arrived with thirty boys and two Chinese teachers who were to give Chinese lessons periodically and on holidays at the Hartford headquarters. In the next three years, three more groups each of thirty youths arrived, making a total of one hundred and twenty by 1875.

⁹¹ LWCCK, *I-shu ban-keao*, 1.19b–22. IWSM-TC, 86.13–14.

⁹² Hsü Jun, *Hsü Yü-chai tzu-brü nien-p'u* (Hsü Jun's chronological autobiography), 17, 19b–21, 23. Of the second group of thirty boys (who went to the United States in 1873), again twenty-four were from Kwangtung. In the third group (1874), Cantonese constituted seventeen of the thirty, and in the fourth group (1875), nineteen of the thirty. Hsü's Jun's list shows that the fathers of a large number of the boys were employed by the arsenals and shipyards in Foochow, Shanghai or Tientsin. Cf. the list in Thomas E. LaFargue, *China's first hundred*.

The regulations had provided for a minimum curriculum of Chinese studies: the *Classic of filial piety*, the *Ta-hsüeh*, the *Five classics*, and the *Ch'ing code*; the youths were also required to attend lectures on the Sacred Edicts of the Manchu emperors and to perform periodic obeisance supposedly in the direction of Peking. The Chinese traveller, Li Kuei, who visited Hartford in September 1876, reported that one hundred and thirteen boys (seven were deceased, sick or had withdrawn), in groups of twelve, spent a fortnight every three months at Hartford under the Chinese teachers, engaging in reading, recitation, calligraphy and composition.⁹³ Otherwise, they were becoming Americanized, enjoying baseball with their queues tucked under large caps. They even went to church, in the company of protective lady teachers (one of whom Yung Wing married in 1875).

Ch'en Lan-pin, to all appearances a self-seeking opportunist, cooperated well with Yung Wing at this stage. Ch'en went to Cuba in late 1873 to investigate the coolie trade and then returned to Peking to get an advancement in rank; he again came to America in 1876, as minister to the United States, Spain and Peru, with Yung as vice-minister. At Ch'en's recommendation, Ou O-liang, another Hanlin academician, was appointed director of the bureau at Hartford. (Ou seems also to have been a frustrated Hanlin scholar, for he was merely a 'candidate' to be a junior secretary of the Board of Works; the post in the United States promised more rapid advancement.)⁹⁴ Ou brought along a new teacher and, fresh from Peking where the anti-foreign party was on the rise, he soon voiced criticism of Yung Wing for allowing the students to be Westernized. Yet as of 1877 his strictures were still not severe; he was more interested in an increase in the mission's annual appropriation, for which he made a joint appeal with Yung to Li Hung-chang. Li, for his part, wrote the two directors to encourage the students to take up particularly mining and metallurgy, which he considered to be in special need in China. In late 1877, Li reported to the court that several of the youths would be ready for college in one or two years and at Li's recommendation, the throne approved a total supplementary allocation of 289,800 taels for the next nine years.⁹⁵

The abandonment of the education mission to the United States in 1881 was due to an unfortunate conjunction of circumstances in Sino-American relations (see volume 11).

⁹³ For the Chinese curriculum as originally planned, see the regulations attached to a joint memorial of Tseng and Li, approved on 1 March 1872, *IWASM-TC*, 85.15b. Li Kuei's account is summarized in Hung, 'Huang Tsun-hsien's poem', 62.

⁹⁴ On Ou O-liang's background, see *ibid.* 61.

⁹⁵ *LWCK*, *P'eng-liao han-kao*, 17.1b-2; *Tsou-kao*, 30.4-5.

Meanwhile, Shen Pao-chen's plan to send graduates of the Foochow school to Europe had also materialized. Ting Jih-ch'ang, who had ended his mourning and was, in 1875, director-general of the Foochow Navy Yard, arranged for five of its best graduates (as it happened, including two cadets who were later captains of Li Hung-chang's battleships) to go with Giquel when the latter returned to Europe.⁹⁶ In January 1877, Li Hung-chang and Shen Pao-chen – the northern and the southern commissioners – jointly memorialized that thirty promising graduates of the Foochow school should be sent to Europe for at least three years of advanced study, to be financed by 200,000 taels appropriated from the likin of Fukien province as well as customs funds. The plan was approved, and a group of more than thirty departed within two months, to be supervised in Europe by Li Feng-pao, a 'candidate for taotai' trained at the Kiangnan Arsenal, as well as by Giquel.⁹⁷

As compared with the educational mission to the United States, this European project was more practical in nature; one of Li's chief aims at this time was to have Chinese captains who could operate modern warships being ordered in Europe. Nevertheless, Li and Shen also told the throne that they would encourage some students to take up such subjects as chemistry and mining.⁹⁸ Six of the Foochow cadets, including Yen Fu, entered the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. Four would-be naval architects studied at the École de Construction Navale in Cherbourg and five at the Toulon Navy Yard. But five of the Foochow students also ended up in the École Nationale Supérieure des Mines in Paris – branching out, at least, from merely naval concerns to more basic matters. Lo Feng-lu, who, like Yen Fu, was a brilliant early product of the Foochow school's 'English division', abandoned navigation to read chemistry as well as politics (*cheng-chih*) at King's College, London. In this same period from 1877 to 1880 Li Hung-chang's protégé Ma Chien-chung (1844–1900) studied law and politics in Paris.⁹⁹

In 1882, 1886 and 1897 further groups of Foochow trainees went to Europe, for three-year or six-year terms of study. Evidently such briefer periods abroad at a more mature age were less desinicizing than the experience of the students at the educational mission in Connecticut.

⁹⁶ *Ch'uan-cheng tsou-i hui-pien*, 12.9.

⁹⁷ *LWCK*, *P'eng-liao han-kao*, 15.33b; 16.3, 35–6; *Tsou-kao*, 82.20–31. Biggerstaff, *Earliest modern government schools*, 229–30.

⁹⁸ Among the other subjects regarded as desirable for the students to take up were diplomacy and international law; *LWCK*, *Tsou-kao*, 28.21 (lines 4–5).

⁹⁹ Biggerstaff, *Earliest modern government schools*, 233–5. *Ch'uan-cheng tsou-i hui-pien*, 18.21.

All these beginnings contributed an essential ingredient of cultural borrowing – trained personnel, many of whom played historic roles in later decades. In so far as they moved China a bit closer to appropriating Western technology, they advanced the cause of self-strengthening. By the late 1870s, however, self-strengthening as a policy to meet China's foreign problem had become a good deal more diverse and complicated than it had seemed in the 1860s. The application of Western technology to transportation and industry within China had begun to shift the focus of effort from defence to industrialization. This requires a similar shift of focus on the part of the historian, for the growth of modern transport and industry within China involved a wider range of problems than the advocates of self-strengthening had originally envisioned in the 1860s. (See volume 11.)

CHAPTER 11

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AND THEIR IMPACT TO 1900

Traders came to China in the nineteenth century to extract profits. Diplomats and soldiers came to extract privileges and concessions. Alone among foreigners, Christian missionaries came not to take but to give, not to further their own interests but, at least ostensibly, to serve the interests of the Chinese. Why, then, of all those who ventured to China in the last century, was it the missionary who inspired the greatest fear and hatred?

If there is any one answer to this question, it is that the missionary was deeply – and unavoidably – committed to the proposition that the true interests of the Chinese people could be served only by means of a fundamental re-ordering of Chinese culture. Catholics and Protestants, liberals and conservatives – all shared in this commitment. Where they differed was less in ultimate goals than in the tactics to be used in pursuing these goals. China's conversion was their common object, and in the end they would be content with nothing less.

The vast majority of missionaries, Protestant and Catholic, were intolerant of Chinese culture and unwilling or unable to make meaningful adjustments to it. They devoted themselves tirelessly to religious proselytizing and tended to relegate secular change to a position of secondary importance. Although narrowly conservative in personal and religious outlook, their impact on the Chinese scene was the very opposite of conservative. For these were the missionaries whose demands on the native culture were the most unyielding – and hence, from a Chinese standpoint, the most overtly iconoclastic.

A much smaller contingent of missionaries, mostly Protestant, were tolerant and even appreciative of certain facets of Chinese culture and defined their mission more in terms of the 'fulfilment' of this culture than its destruction. Yet, oddly enough, the missionaries who went farthest in this direction were precisely those who were most insistent on the need for a comprehensive overhauling of Chinese ways.

Thus, although some missionaries concentrated on attacking the old order in China while others placed more emphasis on the erection of a new

order, all missionaries, by the very nature of their calling, posed a revolutionary challenge to the traditional culture. It is for this reason, more than any other, that so many Chinese felt so threatened.

So many – but not all. And not indefinitely. As time passed and the problem of the West's intrusion came to occupy a more central place in the minds of Chinese intellectuals, there was a growing recognition of the need for fundamental change. Commitment to the old order became more tenuous and by the 1890s, if not earlier, many were beginning to view with favour the emergence of a new China. Towards the 'evangelical missionary', still hard at work trying to save the Chinese soul, these newly reform-minded Chinese remained hostile, though not so militantly hostile as before. But towards the 'secular missionary', who for upwards of a generation had been working to save the Chinese nation, they evinced a new sense of camaraderie, even going so far as to cast themselves, for a brief but intense moment, in the role of disciples.

The impact of the missionary enterprise was thus exceedingly complex, so complex that to think of it in the singular can serve only to obscure its true nature. In point of fact, there were a number of distinct missionary impacts, each evoking a different set of Chinese responses. The balance of impacts and responses, moreover, varied from place to place and time to time, a reflection in part of changing Chinese conditions, in part of the evolving character of the missionary enterprise itself. It is to the latter that we turn first.

THE MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE

Origins and early history

The missionary enterprise in modern China was only one manifestation of an effort that was world-wide in scope. This effort was fed from a number of diverse streams – religious, cultural and national. Christianity, of course, had always been a religion with universalist pretensions and hence missionary potential. But for this potential to be realized on a significant scale, certain historical preconditions had to be met. Funds were necessary for the financing of missionary activity and organizations were needed to direct it. Technological barriers to long-distance travel had to be overcome, as did national and cultural barriers to missionary penetration. Above all, numbers of Westerners had to become sufficiently preoccupied with non-Christendom to want to take an active part in its spiritual transformation.

Roman Catholic

How these preconditions came to be satisfied is inseparable from the story of the emergence of modern European civilization, with its unprecedented technological development and economic growth, and its driving impulse to discover and refashion the world. In China, after an inconclusive earlier effort under the Mongols, Catholic missionary activity began in earnest in the 1580s, with the admission into the country of the Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci (1552–1610). Ricci and his confrères were soon joined by missionaries of other Catholic orders, and an era of vigorous work commenced. This period contrasted in several vital respects with later periods of missionary activity in China. First, although differences of nationality and approach engendered considerable discord among the missionaries, all of them were Roman Catholics, representing extensions of a single ultimate religious authority, the Pope. (A small Russian Orthodox ecclesiastical mission was established in Peking in 1727, but its members do not appear to have carried on any evangelical work among the Chinese.) Second, a substantial number of missionaries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Jesuits especially) developed an attitude of great tolerance toward Chinese civilization, some even going so far as to explore the possibilities for fruitful accommodation between Christianity and Confucianism. Third, the missionary activity of this early period was unsupported by foreign military force or international treaty and therefore depended, for its continuation, entirely on Chinese consent.

This consent had been formally decreed by the K'ang-hsi Emperor in 1692; but his successor, Yung-cheng, retracted it in 1724, in response to mounting suspicion concerning the political motives of foreign missionaries. Chinese Christians were then commanded to renounce their faith; foreign missionaries, except for those attached to the Bureau of Astronomy in Peking, were requested to leave China; Catholic properties were to be confiscated and used for secular purposes. For the next 120 years Christianity was officially designated as a heterodox cult, making it little different in Chinese eyes from the secret societies that periodically threatened dynastic stability.

The proscription of Christianity did not bring missionary activity to a grinding halt. A number of foreign clerics carried on their work in the interior and, as late as the early nineteenth century, there were still several schools for the training of native priests. Nevertheless, the outlook was anything but promising. The more the Christian community was treated like a secret society, the more it was forced to act like one. Priests in the

interior had to work in secrecy, living in remote places, travelling in disguise. There was always the threat, too, of seizure by the authorities, leading to deportation or, in less fortunate instances, incarceration and even death. General persecutions took place sporadically during the long Ch'ien-lung reign, the most serious in 1784–5.¹ In the Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang periods, persecution accelerated in tempo, as the weakening of the dynasty's authority paved the way for a sharp increase in secret society-fomented disorders.

Catholicism's position in China in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was further undermined by developments in Europe. In 1773, one of the most powerful institutional supports of Christian missions, the Society of Jesus, over 450 of whose members had laboured in China since the time of Ricci, was dissolved by papal order. Also damaging to the missionary cause was the declining vigour of two of its most energetic national promoters, Portugal and Spain. Two other factors which contributed to reduced support of missions were the anti-clericalism of the Enlightenment and the exhausting quarter-century of warfare that followed in the train of the French Revolution.

These European developments brought a decline in the Church's impact throughout the world. In China, although accurate statistics are lacking, it has been estimated that in 1705 there were at most 300,000 Catholics. A hundred years later, in 1800, the total was probably somewhere between 200,000 and 250,000 – and it remained roughly at this level until 1835 or 1840. Nor does this slight lowering of the absolute total tell the whole story. For one thing, it is generally believed that the Chinese population almost doubled during the eighteenth century. If so, this would mean a halving of the ratio of Christians to the total population by 1800 and, as the population continued to expand, a still greater percentage reduction by 1840. For another thing, in the absence of strong leadership, native or foreign, the spiritual dedication of those who were defined by the missionaries as Christians very probably deteriorated. And, finally, as missionary access to the throne and to the official and educated classes was drastically curtailed, there was a corresponding reduction in the missionary's impact on these elite strata of the population. Latourette sums up the low point to which Roman Catholicism had fallen on the eve of the Opium War: 'Had missionaries after 1835 gradually ceased coming to China instead of increasing in numbers, the Church would probably

¹ Two authoritative accounts of this persecution are Bernward H. Willeke, *Imperial government and Catholic missions in China during the years 1784–1785*, and Yazawa Toshihiko, 'Kenryū yonjūkyū gojūnen no Tenshu-kyō kin-atsu' (The suppression of Catholicism in 1784–1785), *Saitama Daigaku kiyō* (Bulletin of Saitama University), vol. 7, supplement, 47–98.

have passed out of existence within a few generations, leaving behind it no permanent mark'.²

This, of course, is not what happened. In fact, after the re-establishment of peace in Europe a spirited revival of interest in Catholic missions took place. This resurgence was marked both by resuscitation of some of the older Catholic orders and by the founding of new congregations and societies, among the most famous of which was the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, established in France in 1822 for the purpose of stimulating Catholic support for missions. The renewed interest in missions grew steadily, and by 1840 the principal obstacles to a greatly expanded Catholic effort in China no longer lay in Europe.

Protestant

The renewal of Catholic interest in missions was nothing compared with the upsurge of missionary zeal that took place in the Protestant world from the close of the eighteenth century. Prior to this, Protestant Christendom had been largely indifferent to foreign missions. But the Evangelical Revival in Great Britain and the Great Awakening in America breathed new life into all denominations of Protestantism, and countless individuals, after passing through the intense emotional crisis of conversion, were prepared to devote their lives to Christ.

The evangelical movement spawned a host of new Protestant bodies, ranging from denominations like the Methodists to such institutions as the Salvation Army, the Sunday school and eventually the YMCA and YWCA. It was also the immediate impetus to the founding of some of the most important and influential Protestant missionary societies. The English Baptists led the way in 1792, followed soon after by such organizations as the London Missionary Society (1795), the Church Missionary Society (1799), the British and Foreign Bible Society (1804) and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (1810). The fact that so much of this Protestant missionary activity came out of Britain and America was due only in part to the high concentration of Protestant Christians living in these countries. It was due, in equal measure, to the unprecedented wealth and sheer human energy generated in the English-speaking world by the Industrial Revolution.

The Protestant undertaking in China began in 1807, with the arrival of Robert Morrison (1782–1834) of the London Missionary Society (LMS). (I am discounting the abortive effort of Dutch Protestant missions on Taiwan in the mid-seventeenth century.) Restricted geographically to

² Kenneth Scott Latourette, *A history of Christian missions in China*, 196. For the statistical estimates cited, see *ibid.* 129, 182–3.

Canton and to Portuguese Macao, and with no previous Chinese experience to build on, evangelical operations were severely circumscribed for the next few decades. By 1840, the body of missionaries had grown to more than twenty, representing half a dozen different societies. But fewer than one hundred Chinese had been baptized – Morrison did not baptize his first until 1814 – and most of these were either students in Christian schools or missionary employees.

The true measure of Protestant accomplishment in this early period is not to be sought in the harvest of souls but in the foundations laid for future work. One of the most important of these foundations was the preparation in Chinese of a sizeable, if rudimentary, corpus of Christian literature. Morrison, with the help of William Milne, completed a translation of the Old and New Testaments in 1819 and later compiled the first Chinese–English dictionary. The printing presses of the missionaries also put out a steady flow of religious tracts and pamphlets, the most famous of which, Milne's *Chang Yüan liang-yü hsiang-lun* (Dialogues between two friends, Chang and Yüan; 1819), was still considered useful in the early twentieth century. Indicative of the high premium that was placed on literary work by the home societies is the fact that several of the earliest missionaries (among them Walter Henry Medhurst of the LMS and Samuel Wells Williams of the American Board) were professionally trained printers.

Another form of literary work, equally necessary in the long run, was the compilation for foreign consumption of information on life and conditions in China and on the progress of missions there. The leading publication of this kind was *The Chinese Repository*, a monthly magazine begun in Canton in 1832 by one of the first American missionaries to arrive in China, Elijah C. Bridgman (1801–61). Bridgman was joined in 1833 by Samuel Wells Williams (1812–84), and under their combined editorship the periodical became, until its end in 1851, the main outlet for serious Western scholarship on China.

Medicine and education were two other important fields of Protestant activity during this early period. Dr Peter Parker (1804–88), the first medical missionary to be sent to China, opened a hospital at Canton in 1835 and, in the twenty years that he directed it, treated over fifty thousand patients (the most distinguished being Lin Tse-hsü who in 1839 was fitted for a truss). Parker was also one of the organizers of the Medical Missionary Society in China, founded at Canton in 1838 for the ‘alleviation of human suffering, and the extension of Christianity’.³

³ D. MacGillivray, ed. *A century of Protestant missions in China (1807–1907), being the Centenary Conference historical volume*, 653.

The best-known educational endeavour of the pre-Opium War years was the Anglo-Chinese College, founded by Morrison in 1818. The school was for many years located in Malacca, which had a large Chinese community and where conditions were more secure than at either Canton or Macao. Christian instruction was part of the daily curriculum. But the College's broader object (which it had only middling success in achieving) was the dual one of introducing Western culture to Chinese and Chinese culture to Western (mostly British) students. Morrison's hopes were given posthumous embodiment in the Morrison Education Society, which was established in his honour by foreign residents of China for the purpose of promoting the teaching of the English language and thereby bringing within the reach of Chinese 'all the varied learning of the Western world'.⁴

In many respects, the pattern of early Protestant activity in China was a preview, in microcosm, of what was to come. But in one respect it was not. This was, after all, the frontier phase of Western contact and the earliest missionaries were pioneers. As in most frontier-type situations, there was an acute shortage of human and other resources, and people were called upon to play a greater assortment of roles than would be the case in a more highly developed context. This circumstance, together with the continuing obstacles to the performance of the missionary's primary role of proselytizing, led a disproportionately large number of early missionaries to assume secular responsibilities, which in turn resulted in a blurring, if not complete eclipsing, of their identities as missionaries.

Thus, we find Robert Morrison serving as a translator for the British East India Company from 1809 to 1815, and in 1816 accompanying the Lord Amherst embassy to Peking as interpreter. George Tradescant Lay came to China in the 1820s as a naturalist, returned in the 1830s as an agent of the British and Foreign Bible Society, and in 1842 was appointed the first British consul at Canton. The Prussian missionary, Karl Gützlaff (1803–51), acted during the Opium War first as a British interpreter and then as 'magistrate' of Chusan; he subsequently succeeded Morrison's son as Chinese secretary to the British authorities at Hong Kong. Bridgman and Parker were secretaries to the American negotiating mission for a time in 1844, Parker later giving up his missionary status altogether to become US *chargé d'affaires*. Williams, too, eventually severed his connection with the American Board in order to join the diplomatic service. Author of an encyclopaedic survey of China entitled *The Middle Kingdom*, he finished his career at Yale University as occupant of the first American chair in Chinese language and literature.

This fluid situation did not last. As long as China remained effectively

⁴ *Ibid.* 646.

closed to Western penetration, the paramount aim of all foreigners was the same. But once the country was 'opened' and Sino-Western intercourse was structured within a treaty framework, the divergent interests of missionaries, traders and diplomats came to the fore. The frontier phase was over. Missionaries henceforth would be missionaries.

The treaties and Christian missions

The effects of the first treaty settlement

The treaties negotiated between China and the Western powers after the Opium War contained no provisions specifically relating to Christian missions. Insofar as missionaries were foreigners, however, they naturally benefited from certain of the treaty clauses. The British acquisition of Hong Kong and the opening to foreign residence of the five port cities (Canton, Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy and Ningpo) provided additional points of access to the empire. Permission was expressly given for foreigners to erect churches within the open ports. Extraterritoriality made missionaries immune to Chinese laws, and work in the interior, while still illegal, was rendered less dangerous by the stipulation that, if foreigners were found away from the treaty ports, they were simply to be conducted to the nearest consul. Although these new privileges were not all expressly included in each treaty, the most-favoured-nation clauses made any privilege granted to one power automatically applicable to the rest.

France, mindful of the precarious position of Catholic missionaries and converts, sought to have a toleration provision incorporated in its treaty. In this it was frustrated. But the French negotiator was able to wring from the Chinese government two edicts which somewhat liberalized the existing bans. The first, issued in December 1844, exempted from punishment Chinese whose adherence to Christianity was deemed sincere. The second, dated February 1846, explained the new toleration policy to the provincial authorities and granted the additional concession that old church buildings, dating from the time of the K'ang-hsi Emperor, if still standing and not otherwise in use, should be restored to Christian ownership.

The new treaties and edicts facilitated a considerable extension of Catholic and Protestant missionary operations during the remainder of the 1840s and the 1850s. The flow of Catholic priests to China was measurably increased, the Jesuits alone sending fifty-eight new missionaries into the field between 1843 and 1857. Other orders also experienced rejuvenation. Although priority was given to rebuilding Catholic communities that had been previously established and allowed to deteriorate,

new territories were opened and precedents set (notable being the arrival in the 1840s of a pioneer contingent of Catholic sisters). Persecutions continued to hamper Catholic work and, especially after the accession of the xenophobic Hsien-feng Emperor (1850), there was plenty of official harassment. But despite a still weak legal position, the Church, by the end of the 1850s, had more than succeeded in reversing its earlier downhill course and Catholic missionaries in the interior enjoyed much greater freedom of action than in the pretreaty days.

In contrast with the Catholics, Protestants in the intertreaty period preferred the safety and relative comfort of the open ports. The reasons for this were several. There were as yet no Protestant communities and facilities in the interior requiring attention. Protestant missionaries were still few in number – a reported eighty-one in 1858 – and the preparatory work that remained could be more effectively tackled in the treaty ports. Finally, unlike their Catholic brethren, Protestants more often than not were encumbered by families, which at this early date posed an insuperable barrier to residence away from the port cities.

Individual Protestant missionaries took occasional excursions into the hinterland for reconnaissance purposes, sometimes distributing Bibles and tracts and even preaching to sizeable crowds. One exceptionally gullible missionary, Gützlaff, devised an ambitious scheme for bringing Christianity to the attention of the entire empire through the agency of a small battalion of native evangelists operating out of Hong Kong. Many of Gützlaff's 'evangelists', however, turned out to be unscrupulous characters who, only pretending to leave the Hong Kong area, spent their expense money on opium and sold the literature Gützlaff gave them to the printer who promptly resold it to Gützlaff.

Incalculably more important in making Chinese in the interior aware of the existence of an alternative form of Christianity was the Taiping Rebellion, which rocked and ravaged the lower Yangtze region in the 1850s and early 1860s. The bizarre Taiping ideology was strongly influenced by Protestant writings, and two of the rebellion's top leaders, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and Hung Jen-kan, received personal instruction from Protestant missionaries in the Canton area. Nevertheless, although the Taipings initially stirred up considerable excitement within Protestant circles, their departures from a generally accepted minimal core of essential Protestantism soon brought widespread disillusionment.⁵ And whatever may have been the long-term social, economic and political effects of the

⁵ Such, in any case, is the view still generally current. A recent revisionist study argues that the Taiping religion 'reproduced with remarkable fidelity' the Protestant fundamentalism of the 1840s and 1850s. See Donald W. Treadgold, *The West in Russia and China: religious and secular thought in modern times*, 2.50 et passim.

movement, its religious impact seems to have died with it in the mid-1860s.

The more lasting, if less dramatic, testimonials of Protestant missionary activity in the 1840s and 1850s were in the literary domain. In 1850 work was completed on the so-called 'Delegates' Version' of the New Testament, representing a partially successful effort on the part of the Protestant missionary body as a whole to arrive at a common Chinese translation of the Scriptures. Although the Delegates' Version was regarded by some as being insufficiently literal, its erudition and polish were unquestioned. Adopted by the British and Foreign Bible Society, it went through eleven printings by 1859 and was still in use as late as the 1920s.

The other major literary event of this period in Protestant circles was James Legge's decision to embark on an English translation of the entire Confucian canon, 'in order that the rest of the world should really know this great Empire and also that especially our missionary labours among the people should be conducted with sufficient intelligence and so as to secure permanent results'.⁶ Legge (1815–97) began his work in the 1840s soon after arriving in Hong Kong (1843) under the auspices of the LMS. Although over a hundred years have passed since the publication of the first volume of *The Chinese classics*, it is still considered standard by sinologists everywhere. What has been forgotten is that it was principally to enhance the effectiveness of Christian missionary work that Legge took on the challenge in the first place.

The French protectorate and the second treaty settlement

The position of all Christian missions in China was revolutionized by the Sino-French agreements of 1858 and 1860. Lacking substantial real interests in the Chinese empire, France felt compelled to create unreal ones in order to offset the prestige and influence of her British rival. It was thus for predominantly political reasons that, starting in the 1840s, she assumed the role (once held in China by Portugal) of champion and protector of Roman Catholic missions.

The only question was how vigorously France would pursue this role. For a time, in the late 1840s, she vacillated. But in the early 1850s growing imperialist sentiment at home dovetailed with Catholic missionary pressure in China to give a more activist direction to French policy. The judicial execution of a French missionary, Auguste Chapdelaine, in Kwangsi province on 29 February 1856, being a clear violation of the treaties, furnished France with the necessary legal pretext for participation in the

⁶ Quoted in Lindsay Ride's 'Biographical Note', introducing the 1960 Hong Kong edition of James Legge tr, *The Chinese classics*, vol. 1.

military expeditions of 1857–60. When the war ended and the spoils of victory were distributed, the most conspicuous material beneficiary, on the French side, was the Catholic missionary interest.

The benefits were substantial. Article 13 of the Sino-French Treaty of Tientsin (negotiated in 1858 and ratified in 1860) guaranteed to Catholic priests the freedom to preach and practise their religion anywhere in the empire and to Chinese subjects the right to practise Christianity without being liable to punishment. Also, it formally rescinded all previous official documents directed against the foreign religion.

Article 6 of the French text of the Sino-French Convention of 1860 reiterated the earlier Chinese promise to restore to the Catholic Church all confiscated religious and benevolent facilities. The Chinese text went much further, apparently due to duplicity on the part of one of the French interpreters.⁷ It promised that Catholicism would be tolerated throughout China; that those who arrested Christians illegally would be punished; that the titles to churches, schools, cemeteries, lands and buildings which had been previously seized from Catholics would be turned over to the French representative at Peking for transmission to the proper parties; and, most important, that Catholic missionaries would be permitted to rent and purchase land in all the provinces and to erect buildings thereon at will.

The Sino-French treaties established, in broad outline, the legal framework within which Catholic missions would operate for the remainder of the century. As a result of the most-favoured-nation clauses, Protestant missionaries also benefited from the new order. The missionaries of both faiths guarded their treaty privileges as treasured possessions and often applied pressure on their governments to enforce them. None, at the time, seemed concerned over the manner in which these privileges had been won.

The organization, scale and financing of Christian missions, 1860–1900

The new treaties provided the legal preconditions for the unprecedented growth experienced by the missionary movement after 1860. The term ‘movement’, to the extent that it implies common direction and a single organization, is ill-chosen. Catholic and Protestant missionaries, for cultural and linguistic as much as for religious reasons, operated in largely separate worlds and often were barely on speaking terms. Even within the two missionary bodies, moreover, there were widely varying degrees of organizational unity and coordination.

The Catholics, of course, presented a far more unified picture than the

⁷ Most authors (including Catholic) believe it to have been the missionary, Louis Delamarre. Despite their doubts as to the validity of the Chinese text, Chinese officials tried at least half-heartedly to put it into force. The friction arising out of the discrepancies between the two texts was removed only partially by the Berthemy Convention of 1865.

Protestants. A special Vatican agency, the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (usually shortened as the Propaganda) had been set up in the seventeenth century to oversee and coordinate the world-wide activities of the various orders and societies. In China, the Propaganda operated through administrative divisions known as vicariates apostolic, each of which was headed by a vicar apostolic, who ranked as a bishop in the Church hierarchy. In general, the vicariates apostolic were based on provincial boundaries and each vicariate apostolic was entrusted to a single order. Shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century, the map of the Chinese empire was broadly divided among five major orders as follows: Spanish Dominicans (Fukien), Jesuits (Kiangsu, Anhwei, south-eastern Chihli), Lazarists (the larger part of Chihli, Mongolia, Kiangsi, Honan, Chekiang), Franciscans (Shantung, Hunan, Hupei, Shansi, Shensi), Société des Missions-Étrangères de Paris (Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Manchuria, Tibet). As other societies entered the field, existing vicariates apostolic were subdivided and new ones formed.

The Catholic missionary body expanded rapidly in the last four decades of the nineteenth century. By 1870 there were roughly 250 European priests. Fifteen years later this figure had jumped to 488 (including 35 bishops), and by 1900 it stood at 886.

An enterprise of this magnitude – physically expressed in the thousands of churches, schools and philanthropic installations that by 1900 dotted the Chinese landscape – required large-scale financial support. At the start of the new era most of this support came from the Propaganda and other European sources. But between 1860 and 1900 the Church in China – some orders more than others – became increasingly less reliant on European subsidization. The new treaties permitted the Church to own land and by the end of the century its holdings in certain parts of the empire – most especially the province of Szechwan and the treaty ports of Tientsin, Shanghai and Nanking – had become extensive. Just how extensive, and what kind of landlord the Church turned out to be, are subjects that have yet to be seriously studied.

Although separately financed and occasionally stressing different aspects of the missionary's calling, the various Catholic orders believed and taught the same doctrines, received and administered the same sacraments, kept the same laws, and rendered submission to the same authority. Even if there was little field cooperation among the orders, therefore, the Catholic effort as a whole had a certain underlying integrity.

The same could not be said of the Protestant undertaking in China. It may be going too far to speak, as one Catholic scholar has, of 'different

Protestant sects fighting each other and always at variance . . .⁸ But it remains generally true that the Protestant missionary body was a 'body' in name alone. Completely decentralized, it consisted by 1905 of sixty-three separate societies, each with its own organization, its own sources of support, and its own conception of Christian truth.

The denominational societies (Baptists, Wesleyan Methodists, Presbyterians and the like) were financed by contributions from their respective Church memberships back home. Contributions were also the main basis of support for the non-denominational bodies. Most of the societies were directed by home committees which, aside from setting policies, were in charge of raising money, recruiting and examining new candidates, and so forth. The most important exception to this general pattern was the non-denominational China Inland Mission (CIM), the Home Department of which was completely subservient to the dictates of the CIM's founder and leader in China, J. Hudson Taylor.

Unlike the Catholics, the Protestants after 1860 had to start from scratch in their penetration of the Chinese interior. At first the going was slow. But, with Taylor's organization taking the lead, Protestants were able to establish themselves in three inland provinces by 1877, and by 1890 they were residing in all the provinces of China with the possible exception of Hunan. Ten years later the number of Protestant mission stations (under the direct care of a foreign missionary) approached five hundred, while the total of substations (in the care of Chinese) ran to several thousand.

The growth of the Protestant missionary community was equally dramatic. Four years after the opening of the interior, there were 189 missionaries in the country. A decade later, in 1874, there were 436 missionaries. This total, in turn, trebled by 1889 and by 1905 it had climbed to 3,445. Over 90 per cent of all Protestants were British or American. The former generally were of middle-class origin, few with university training. The latter, by and large, were from small town and rural backgrounds and, in the case of the men, usually were graduates of denominational colleges. By the turn of the century well over half of the Protestant missionary body was composed of women.

Missionary approaches and results, 1860–1900

Although it has been observed frequently that, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Protestant missionaries were much more concerned than Catholics with the broader issues of cultural and institutional change,

⁸ Paschal M. D'Elia, *The Catholic missions in China: a short sketch of the history of the Catholic Church in China from the earliest records to our own days*, 58.

it is well to remember that this was true only of a tiny fraction of the Protestant missionary community. The overwhelming majority of missionaries, Protestant as well as Catholic, took as their consuming object and main day-to-day challenge the making of converts.

Catholic

The task of winning souls was approached by Catholics in many ways. Some Jesuit missionaries, emulating their distinguished forebears, sought to break down Chinese resistance by means of scholarly and scientific activity. But their greatest achievements – the dictionaries and translations of Seraphin Cuvreur and the scholarly monographs on China produced at Zikawei under the series title *Variétés Sinologiques* – were better suited to furthering European understanding of China than to building up Chinese receptivity to Christianity. Much more effective, as a means of accomplishing the latter purpose, were direct preaching by Chinese catechists, refuges for the curing of opium addicts, famine relief, the Catholic schooling sometimes made available to children of non-Christians, and the numerous orphanages established by Catholic missionaries after 1860.

The orphanages were generally administered by sisters and were located at various places in the hinterland as well as in the treaty ports. The religious basis for this most important of Catholic philanthropies was the belief that if infants died soon after baptism, they were assured of salvation. If an orphan did not die, of course, he would be brought up in a Christian environment under the sisters' care. Orphanages were sometimes known to accept infants from poor parents in exchange for small sums of money. Although, in the unsettled conditions prevailing in many parts of China in the late nineteenth century, these institutions filled a clear need, they were widely misunderstood by the Chinese and provided a major focal point of popular anti-foreign feeling.

Another approach pursued by Catholic missionaries after 1860 was probably even more counterproductive. This was the widespread practice of interfering in local political and judicial affairs in order to win over potential converts. The Chinese brought into the Church via this means were often from among the least law-abiding elements of the population, and the missionaries, in relying on the French protectorate to defend the interests of these elements, excited the deepest animosity of both the authorities and the non-Christian populace in general.

Adult Chinese, after signalling an interest in Catholicism, were put through an extended course of instruction in the essentials of the faith; it was sometimes several years before they were finally baptized. For the

children of Catholic parents, the missionaries established a far-flung network of schools. In the Jesuit-administered vicariate apostolic of Kiangnan (Kiangsu and Anhwei), to cite a leading example, there were in 1878–9 a reported 345 boys' schools with 6,222 pupils and 213 girls' schools with 2,791 pupils; by the last years of the century the total of Catholic pupils in Kiangnan had risen to over 16,000. Although there existed seminaries for the training of native priests, and schools for Chinese catechists and religious women pledged to the Church, the great majority of Catholic schools were elementary-level. The instruction was in Chinese and the curricula and texts were designed almost exclusively to reinforce the Christian commitment of the pupils. Little or no effort was made to introduce Western secular learning.

By 1900 there were over 700,000 Catholics in China, including some 450 to 500 native priests. On entering the Church, these individuals were asked to renounce many features of Chinese life: the gamut of 'pagan' religious beliefs and practices, the sale and consumption of opium, folk festivals (including theatrical performances), Sunday work, concubinage and above all ancestor worship. Catholics thus became, to a great extent, a community apart, isolated and often estranged from their fellow Chinese. It can be no cause of surprise to learn that this community was drawn almost entirely from the most disadvantaged classes – poor peasants, shopkeepers, merchants, vagabonds – the very people whose stake in the existing Chinese order was most tenuous.

Protestant

Protestant missionaries, in their efforts to convey the Christian message, did much more direct preaching and made much more extensive use of the written word than their Catholic counterparts. The early missionaries of both faiths seem to have been in motion a good part of the time. But for different purposes. It would be some years before Protestants formed numerous congregations requiring the care and supervision of peripatetic foreign missionaries. In the meantime, the purposes of Protestant itineration were generally twofold: to disseminate the Gospel over a widespread area (both by preaching and by colportage) and to gather information on where more settled work might later be commenced.

Although some missions, such as the CIM and the Bible societies, continued to emphasize itinerant work, Protestant operations overall gradually acquired a more settled character. The mission stations that were founded, generally in cities, consisted, in the typical instance, of a preaching hall or street chapel, a church building, one or more schools, residences for the missionaries and their Chinese helpers, a dispensary and sometimes

a small hospital. The station formed the urban nuclear core surrounding which there emerged in time a configuration of smaller rural congregations, each with its own chapel and a Chinese pastor who was closely supervised by the foreign missionary.

As implied in the physical make-up of the typical mission station, Protestant missionaries in the post-1860 period continued to involve themselves in such non-evangelical pursuits as education and medical work. They also became increasingly active in a wide range of philanthropic ventures: famine relief, rehabilitation of opium addicts, education of the deaf and the blind, and so on. Protestant participation in activities of this sort sometimes had the stated aim and often the unintended effect of paving the way for far-reaching changes in Chinese life. Nevertheless, most missionaries who became so involved acted on the assumption that they were helping to prepare Chinese for acceptance of Christianity.

By 1900, although the Protestant missionary body was far larger than the Catholic, the community of baptized Chinese Protestants numbered only about one hundred thousand, served by a scant three hundred or so ordained native ministers. In comparing these figures with those for the Catholics, it is essential to bear in mind that there were sizeable differences in the two religions' conceptions of what constituted a Christian, infant baptism, for example, being very important to the Catholics but unacceptable to most Protestants. Some have suggested, also, that Protestant missionaries tended to be more rigorous in their demands on prospective communicants, and that in consequence of this the percentage of 'good Christians' was higher among Protestants than among Catholics. This may or may not be so. In any case the fact remains that, whatever the quality of their Christianity, the social standing and influence of Chinese Protestants, as of their Catholic countrymen, was almost invariably low. In telling contrast with Meiji Japan, where 30 per cent of all converts to Protestantism were of samurai background and Christians played a leading part in the intellectual life of the nation, the number of educated persons in China who embraced the faith was negligible. And religious leaders of the stature of the Japanese Christian educator, Niishima Jō (1843–90), or the creator of the 'No Church' (Mukyōkai) movement, Uchimura Kanzō (1861–1930), were nowhere to be found.⁹

Certainly it was not for lack of concern on the part of Protestant missionaries that the situation was thus. Several missionaries, such as Timothy Richard (1845–1919), W. A. P. Martin (1827–1916) and the founder of the

⁹ On Protestantism in Meiji Japan, see Winburn T. Thomas, *Protestant beginnings in Japan: the first three decades, 1859–1889*; Irwin Scheiner, *Christian converts and social protest in Meiji Japan*. According to Latourette, 'by 1897 the Chinese Protestant Christian communities had given birth to no important literature', *History of Christian missions*, 434.

'Mission among the Higher Classes of China', Gilbert Reid (1857–1927),¹⁰ made it a special point to try to reach the educated elites, and many Protestants took advantage of the periodic convening of candidates for the state examinations to distribute Christian religious literature. In the latter instance, however, the missionary could count himself lucky if he came away physically unharmed, while, in the former, the message he finally succeeded in conveying to Chinese of prominence turned out to be secular rather than religious in content. Martin's *religious* message was far more influential in Japan than in China.¹¹ The reasons for this massive unresponsiveness of educated Chinese to Christianity were complex. They had to do, above all, with the nature of the old order and the special manner in which the missionary interacted with it.

THE MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE AND THE OLD ORDER

For a foreign religion to make headway in any society, it has to become relevant to the needs of that society's membership. How it becomes relevant (if at all), and for whom, are extraordinarily difficult questions, the answers to which depend on such factors as the relative strangeness of the new religion's doctrines and usages, the historical circumstances attending its presentation, the manner in which it is propagated, the presence or absence of other new 'religions' which can compete with it, and the degree of prevalence of alienated elements for whom a new religion provides either relief from distress or the intellectual-psychological leverage to rebel.

In China, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the one factor that might have contributed to widespread acceptance of some form of Christianity was the Taiping Rebellion. But the Taipings failed, and the orthodox fervour that was aroused in the process of suppressing them made it all the more difficult subsequently for the Westerners' religion to sink roots. Followers of Christianity there were. But these were never

¹⁰ On Richard's strategy, see Paul A. Cohen, 'Missionary approaches: Hudson Taylor and Timothy Richard', *Papers on China* 11 (1957) 43–52; on Martin, see Peter Duus, 'Science and salvation in China: the life and work of W. A. P. Martin, 1827–1916', *ibid.* 10 (1956) 97–127 (reprinted in Kwang-Ching Liu, ed. *American missionaries in China: papers from Harvard seminars*, 11–41); Reid spelled out his approach in 'Duty of Christian missionaries to the upper classes of China', *The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal*, 19 (1888) 358–64, 397–402, 465–72.

¹¹ W. A. P. Martin's *T'ien-tao su-yüan* (Evidences of Christianity), 3 *chüan*, was translated by Nakamura Masanao as *Tendō sōgen*. The translation went through numerous Japanese editions. In the book Martin portrayed Confucianism as a forerunner of Christianity and used Confucian terminology to introduce the Western religion. Many Japanese Confucians were first inspired to accept Christianity by their reading of it. See Thomas, *Protestant beginnings in Japan*, 194; Scheiner, *Christian converts and social protest in Meiji Japan*, 62; and Arimichi Ebisawa, comp. *Christianity in Japan: a bibliography of Japanese and Chinese sources*, pt 1 (1543–1858), 114–15.

very numerous, as we have seen, and they were confined almost entirely to poor peasants and townspeople, criminal elements and other unsavoury types, and deracinated individuals in the treaty ports. For the vast majority of Chinese who remained closely identified with the status quo, Christianity not only lacked appeal, it appeared as a definite menace. And among all social classes, resistance – both passive and active – was rampant.

The legacy from the past: Christianity as heterodoxy

The sources of this resistance were numerous. Chinese scholars, emotionally caught up in their own modern history, have shown an understandable tendency to assign responsibility not to doctrinal differences between Christianity and Confucianism or to the legacy of pre-Opium War native attitudes, but to the abrasive character of what one writer has called the 'Treaty-Missionary'.¹² Ugly xenophobia, which always existed, is an embarrassment to these scholars. But with patriotic indignation, a product of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they can easily identify. Thus, the long-standing tradition of Chinese hostility to Christianity tends to be either overlooked, denied or reduced to relative inconsequence.¹³

This is unfortunate. For even if it is true, as I am certain it is, that missionaries in the late Ch'ing were a major irritant, the fact that they encountered a population many of whose members were *predisposed* to be irritated cannot be so lightly dismissed. The tradition of anti-Christian thought went back at least to the late Ming. Its literature was extensive. And it constituted an important part of the 'ideological' climate for China's reception of Christianity in the second half of the nineteenth century.¹⁴

Long before the entrance of Christianity, a set vocabulary had evolved in China for the identification of teachings and practices which posed a

¹² T'ang Leang-li, *China in revolt: how a civilization became a nation*, 57–78.

¹³ It is overlooked in Chinese Communist writings, an example of which is Li Shih-yüeh, 'Chia-wu chan-cheng ch'ien san-shih-nien chien fan yang-chiao yün-tung' (The movement against the Western religion during the thirty years prior to the war of 1894), *Li-shih yen-chiu* (Historical Research), no. 6 (1958) 1–15. It is expressly denied in a review article by Wang Erh-min in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 28.1 (1965) 184–5. It is soft-pedalled in Lü Shih-ch'iang, *Chung-kuo kuan-shen fan-chiao ti yüan-yin (1860–1874)* (The causes of opposition to Christianity among China's officials and gentry, 1860–74). Many non-Communist Chinese writers would agree with the Communist historian Hu Sheng that the Chinese people 'had no anti-foreign prejudices' and that if they 'showed themselves "anti-foreign" in their attitudes and actions, this was the result of aggressive wars and economic plunder carried out in China by capitalist aggressors'. *Imperialism and Chinese politics*, 10.

¹⁴ Portions of the ensuing account are freely drawn from my article, 'The anti-Christian tradition in China', *JAS*, 20.2 (Feb. 1961) 169–75. This article is reprinted in Jessie G. Lutz, ed. *Christian missions in China: evangelists of what?*. For a more detailed review of the Chinese anti-Christian tradition, see Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity: the missionary movement and the growth of Chinese antisforeignism, 1860–1870*, ch. 1.

threat to ideological unity, moral purity and/or political stability. This vocabulary – *i-tuan*, *hsieh* and *tso-tao* were its most common designations – was understood as being in direct opposition to the concept *cheng* (right, straight), creating an antithesis quite similar to that between ‘heterodoxy’ and ‘orthodoxy’ in the Western tradition. Heterodoxy in China, despite an inherent potential for rebelliousness, was apt to be tolerated as long as it remained impotent. But the moment it became linked with suspicious activity of any sort or showed signs of acquiring independent power, it was stamped out ruthlessly by the state.

From the Sung period on, as state power in China became increasingly inseparable from Neo-Confucian ideology, the beliefs and practices that were defined as heterodox tended more and more to be those which presented the greatest threat – social, political and cultural – to a Confucian-based orthodoxy. On the resumption of Western missionary efforts in the late sixteenth century, Christianity, with its foreign origin, its fundamental non-adherence to Confucianism (particularly in its Sung and post-Sung guise), the miraculous content of some of its doctrines, and its suspected motives of political subversion, became a natural candidate for the heterodox label.

The earliest writing of importance to be directed against Christianity and other aspects of Western civilization appears to have been the *P'o-hsieh chi* (An anthology of writings exposing heterodoxy). This work, compiled by a Chekiang literatus and with a preface dated 1640, contains almost sixty essays, memorials and other short pieces written by some forty Buddhist and Confucian scholars of the late Ming.

The arguments in the book are quite varied. One writer, for example, basing himself on reason and common sense, asks: If God is really as good and as powerful as the Catholics claim, how could He permit Adam and Eve to commit a sin so contaminating that it was transmitted to all subsequent generations? If even man, in his weakness and impotence, can to some extent guard against evil, should not an all-powerful God have been capable of rooting out this evil altogether?

Another refutation of Christianity in the *P'o-hsieh chi* is grounded more in scepticism than in reason *per se*: ‘[The Catholics] chide the Buddhists and Taoists on the ground that . . . their doctrines of cause and effect and transmigration are vague and unsusceptible of proof. Is [the Catholic doctrine] that those who worship God are assured of going to heaven . . . while those who reject God are certain to enter hell . . . alone capable of being examined into and proven?’¹⁵

The phenomenon of comparing Catholicism unfavourably with Bud-

¹⁵ Quoted in Cohen, *China and Christianity*, 22.

dhism and Taoism is one that is seen again and again in the *P'o-hsieh chi* and other anti-Christian works of the Ming and Ch'ing. On doctrinal grounds alone, the orthodox intellectual of these periods frequently tended to reject Buddhism and Taoism as heterodox or, at least, to place them in a lower position *vis-à-vis* Confucianism. But when it came to defending Chinese culture as a whole, the two traditional teachings were, more often than not, drawn protectively to the bosom of orthodoxy in an attempt to marshal all available forces against the new foreign invader.

One other form of polemic found in the *P'o-hsieh chi* deserves mention. This was the legalistic argument, which pitted the provisions of the Ming code, proscribing such acts as the assembling of crowds at night, against certain suspicious practices of the Catholics, demonstrating that the foreign religion could be viewed as heterodox for political as well as doctrinal reasons.

The next great literary outburst against Christianity came from the writing brush of the early Ch'ing official, Yang Kuang-hsien (1597–1669). Yang's reputed violence of temper, his ardent xenophobia, and his jealousy of the power held in Peking by the prominent Jesuit astronomer, Adam Schall (1591–1666), joined to make him a self-appointed antagonist of the Western religion. His attacks on Christianity and on the calendar devised by Schall were published in 1665 under the title *Pu-te-i* (I could not do otherwise). The arguments voiced in this work are the product of an acute, if not overly dispassionate, mind and indicate that Yang took the trouble to familiarize himself with at least the basic elements of early Christian history and doctrine. But the chief reason for Yang's later appeal – he became the hero of nineteenth-century opponents of Christianity and was frequently reprinted – is the sense of urgency which he imparted to the question of the Western missionary's intrusion. In his own day, such anxiety was out of keeping with the level of the threat. But transposed to the latter half of the nineteenth century, it seemed to many Chinese to be perfectly appropriate.

For almost two centuries following Yang Kuang-hsien's death, the comprehensiveness and emotional intensity of his *Pu-te-i* remained unrivalled. Throughout this period, Chinese writers nevertheless continued to take an extremely dim view of Christianity, and in the aftermath of the Opium War, a number of prominent scholar-officials – among them Wei Yüan (1794–1856), Hsia Hsieh (1799–1875), Hsü Chi-yü (1795–1873), and Liang T'ing-nan (1796–1861) – included critical accounts of the foreign religion in their works on the West.

In establishing the heterodox credentials of Christianity, no private writing, however widely circulated, could possibly match in influence a

number of public events that took place in the pre-1860 era. The Yung-cheng Emperor's prohibition of the religion in 1724 caused it to be listed in the Ch'ing code as a forbidden sect, and as a result of the emperor's extensive comments on the *Sacred edict*, issued in the same year, it became linked in many minds with one of the most dreaded of secret societies, the White Lotus. The dangerous character of the religion seemed to be finally and decisively confirmed when, over a hundred years after the Yung-cheng reign, certain Christian doctrines exerted a profound impact on the ideology of the Taiping movement.¹⁶

Although the articles proscribing Christianity were expunged from the 1870 edition of the Ch'ing code and the great majority of missionaries did all they could to dissociate themselves from the Taipings, it was impossible to root out overnight the psychological associations that had been built up over a period of many decades. Even after its legalization, therefore, Christianity continued to be viewed by many Chinese as heterodox, with all the connotations of political and social subversiveness implied in that classification. In one respect, indeed, the religion of the Westerner became even less tolerable after 1860 than before. For, as we have seen, it was the combination of heterodoxy and power that Chinese dreaded most, and in the post-1860 era the social and political power of Christianity in China grew to unprecedented proportions.

The missionary's threat to the traditional social order

On a nation-wide basis, the ratio of foreign missionaries to the total Chinese population, as late as 1900, was probably still below 1:100,000. Even allowing for a much steeper ratio in certain urban centres, where there were also high concentrations of native Christians, it seems clear that the threatening character of the Christian enterprise after 1860 cannot be understood principally in terms of numbers. Qualitative factors, such as high visibility and external political support, were vastly more important. Like an organism's reaction to the intrusion of a foreign body, even of microscopic dimensions, the fragile balance of social, political and cosmic forces in a Chinese community could easily be upset by the presence of a mere handful of missionaries and converts.

¹⁶ New evidence of the widespread identification of Christianity with anti-dynastic secret societies (as well as with the Taipings) is presented in Li En-han, 'Hsien-feng nien-chien fan Chi-tu-chiao ti yen-lun' (Anti-Christian opinion expressed during the Hsien-feng period), *Ch'ing-hua hsieh-pao* (Tsing Hua journal of Chinese studies), NS, 6.1-2 (Dec. 1967) 55-60.

The missionary and the gentry

At least until the end of the nineteenth century, and in many instances well beyond, the elite social group in most Chinese communities was the *shen-shih* or gentry.¹⁷ More than any other class of Chinese, the gentry were deeply wedded both to Chinese civilization and, more generally, to the proposition that China was the seat of all civilization. They were schooled from early childhood in the traditions and values of Confucianism, and their social position and prestige rested, to a very considerable extent, on active identification with these traditions and values. Consequently, when Confucian civilization came under attack, it was the gentry class that stood to lose the most.

This attack was spearheaded, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, by the missionary. Perhaps Sir Frederick Bruce went too far in remarking that missionaries 'systematically falsify the moral condition of China'.¹⁸ But systematic or not, their assault on the state of Chinese morals – above all, what one missionary called the 'incubus of Confucianism' – was relentless and uncompromising.

It was also aggressively direct. Although no one has yet done a comprehensive content analysis of the Chinese-language religious writings of missionaries, the examples (particularly of Protestant tracts) that have so far come to light betray a singular lack of accommodation to Chinese sensibilities. (Typical was a pamphlet assailing ancestor worship which was distributed by American missionaries in the 1870s. Its title was *Pien hsiao lun* [On filial piety].) A comparable brusqueness seems to have characterized the public preaching of Protestant missionaries. Joseph Edkins (LMS; 1823–1905) describes for us a tour he took in the spring of 1851:

I went with a Missionary brother to Lung-Hwa. Large crowds of people were assembled on occasion of the annual spring festival. We tried to make our address as plain as possible against idolatrous practices; the priests were irritated more than commonly. . . .

Went to Keang-Wan, to another large festival. The noise . . . rendered preaching almost impossible. We retreated, therefore, to an old temple in the environs of the town. . . . Here a large audience soon gathered, among them some play-actors; they listened for nearly an hour, scarcely any leaving their places, while we told them that their superstition was wrong, and their Confucianism enor-

¹⁷ The following account of the missionary threat to the gentry's social and cultural position is based, except where otherwise noted, on Cohen, *China and Christianity*, 77–86, and Cohen, 'Some sources of antimissionary sentiment during the late Ch'ing', *Journal of the China Society*, 2 (1962) 4–9.

¹⁸ Letter of 12 Jan. 1864, reproduced in *Ch'ing-shih wen-i'i* (Problems in Ch'ing history), 1.5 (Apr. 1967) 14, from the Elgin/Bruce Archive at Broomhall, Scotland.

mously deficient, and then unveiled to them some of the grandeur of Christianity.¹⁹

Since Confucius was regarded as the supreme enemy of China's conversion, it was natural for missionaries to vent their frustrations, disappointments and anger on the most immediate embodiment of Confucius' influence, the gentry-scholar class. 'Under the outward show of politeness and refinement imparted to the educated Chinese chiefly by Confucianism', one missionary wrote, 'there is almost nothing but cunning, ignorance, rudeness, vulgarity, arrogant assumption and inveterate hatred of everything foreign.'²⁰ Few missionaries in nineteenth-century China would have found this characterization excessive.

When missionary hostility towards the gentry is juxtaposed with the latter's bitter resentment against the former, one gets some sense of the depth and intensity of the cultural conflict that emerged in China after the mid-nineteenth century. Where the Chinese viewed the missionary, particularly the Catholic, as motivated by material interests, the missionary responded by viewing the Chinese as hopelessly ensnared in the things of this world. Where the missionary regarded the Chinese as superstitious, the Chinese replied with profound scepticism towards the most cherished beliefs of the missionary. Each viewed the other as unfathomable. Each felt that the other belonged to a lower order of civilization. It would be difficult, indeed, to imagine a more violent non-meeting of minds.

In addition to challenging their fitness for cultural and moral hegemony, the post-1860 missionary posed a direct threat to the gentry's traditional monopoly of social leadership. This was done in countless ways, only a few of which can be noted here. Missionaries, especially Catholic, frequently assumed the garb of the Confucian literati. They were the only persons at the local level, aside from the gentry, who were permitted (by treaty) to communicate with the authorities as social equals. Missionaries operated orphanages and engaged in famine relief – social obligations customarily shouldered (if at all) by the gentry. And they enjoyed an extraterritorial status in the interior which gave them greater immunity from Chinese laws than had ever been possessed by the gentry class.

More important, perhaps, than any of these concrete invasions of the gentry's traditional prerogatives was the simple fact that the missionary was a teacher. He was educated, at least to the extent that he could read and write – skills which, if not the exclusive possession of the gentry, were certainly among the most characteristic attributes of gentry status.

¹⁹ Letter of 2 May 1851, in *The Missionary Magazine and Chronicle*, 15.205–6.

²⁰ John Chalmers, as quoted in Cohen, *China and Christianity*, 80.

He established schools for the inculcation of a rival set of truths. He preached these truths in public places. And, especially in the Protestant case, he wrote and distributed a prodigious amount of literature. The effect of this on educated Chinese was aptly summarized by a leading Protestant missionary:

It is impossible not to displease them. To preach is to insult them, for in the very act you assume the position of a teacher. To publish a book on religion or science is to insult them, for in doing that you take for granted that China is not the depository of all truth and knowledge . . . To propound progress is to insult them, for therein you intimate that China has not reached the very acme of civilisation, and that you stand on a higher platform than they.²¹

The missionary and the common people

Although the animosity of China's educated classes was generally taken for granted – even if its causes were but dimly understood – a surprising number of missionaries viewed the illiterate masses as a kind of *tabula rasa*: inert, impressionable, convertible. Griffith John spoke for many when he wrote of the common people: 'These are, on the whole, quiet, industrious, and harmless. With respect to foreigners, the people seem to me to be passive, except when roused to antagonism and hatred by their superiors. It would be too much to say that they like us or desire intercourse with us; but it would be equally wide of the mark to say that they are ill-disposed towards us.'²²

This optimistic picture of the Chinese masses was doubtless psychologically necessary: missionaries could never accept the proposition that 'the people' might actively dislike them. But it hardly squared with the facts. While it is true that most converts came from the ranks of the common people, it is also true that an overwhelming preponderance of commoners refused to have anything to do with the foreign religion. Overt popular hostility to missionaries and converts, moreover, was much in evidence throughout China in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, and this hostility was far from being the product solely of incitement by 'superiors'.

The grounds for popular fear and hatred of the foreigner were manifold. Sometimes they were of a local and ephemeral nature. For example, in the early 1860s, many people in the Hunan-Kiangsi region identified Catholicism with Taiping Christianity and believed that Catholic missionaries were secretly in league with the rebels. But, while fears of this kind were easily generated in areas such as Hunan and Kiangsi which had experienced long and bitter fighting against the rebels, they were much less apparent in other parts of the empire.

²¹ Griffith John, as quoted in Cohen, *China and Christianity*, 85.

²² Quoted in Wardlaw R. Thompson, *Griffith John: the story of fifty years in China*, 256.

Other causes of popular antipathy to missionary and convert were more widely prevalent. For the most part, these can be broken down into two categories: socio-economic grievances and the complex of cultural, racial and superstitious fears loosely subsumed under the heading of xenophobia. The former set of causes resulted directly or indirectly from the new legal arrangements embodied in the Tientsin and Peking treaties. The latter set, although greatly aggravated after 1860, were principally nourished by non-political factors and had been in operation for many decades prior to the new treaty era.²³

One common source of popular grievance was the arrogant, sometimes even unscrupulous, behaviour exhibited by many Chinese converts after 1860. Cases were reported of converts being carried ostentatiously in sedan chairs, wearing foreign garb, pushing into official yamens on Church business, and taking advantage of their foreign connections to engage in extortionate practices and to resist payment of taxes. Particularly outrageous was the widespread tendency of converts involved in lawsuits with non-Christian adversaries to rely on missionary support and protection. Some missionaries (mostly Catholic) condoned, and even encouraged, this practice. And since they were able to exercise considerable influence in the yamens, a kind of reverse discrimination, favouring Christians over non-Christians, sometimes came into being. To the extent that this was so, the seedier elements of the population were naturally attracted to the Church, further exacerbating friction between converts and ordinary Chinese.

Effective missionary interference in convert lawsuits, in addition to fostering social disharmony, was a direct cause of economic hardship for the losing party. Other economic grievances were more evenly distributed among the population. Non-Christian commoners often had to foot the bill for the indemnities missionaries exacted following anti-Christian riots.²⁴ They also had to pay a higher share of the costs for 'idolatrous' festivities and ceremonies, once Christian subjects were freed, on religious grounds, from having to contribute. Irritations of this sort were common, and for poor people living on the margin of subsistence the sums involved could constitute an onerous burden.

A potentially more explosive economic grievance was unveiled from

²³ The fullest account of these sources of popular hostility, focusing on the period from 1860 to 1874, is in Lü, *Chung-kuo kuan-shen fan-chiao ti yüan-yin*, 130–94.

²⁴ The French representative in China in the late 1860s thought the 'principal reason' for the antagonism harboured by the population of Szechwan against Christianity to be 'the enormous sums paid to Mgr. Desflèches by the district of Yuyang . . . sums levied on the people and distributed by the Bishop to his Christians'. Cohen, *China and Christianity*, 315, n. 3. Other examples of this in the 1860s are discussed in *ibid.* 217–21.

time to time in places where native Catholic merchants had an important grip on the local economy. When such areas were hit by economic crisis – as happened in Chungking in the summer of 1886 – it was almost inevitable that the local inhabitants would direct the sharp edge of their bitterness against the Catholic community.

The social and economic roots of popular anti-Christian feeling were often energized by forces of a darker, more irrational character. One such force was what the missionaries of the time called ‘superstition’. Ordinary Chinese believed, for example, that in order to ensure or restore the well-being of the community, the ‘gods’ had to be propitiated. Therefore, when missionaries erected new buildings which, in height or location or orientation, defiantly disregarded native geomantic notions (*feng-shui*), or when Chinese converts, in time of drought, refused to participate in ceremonies designed to bring rain, the non-Christian population became deeply disturbed.

The strange customs and usages of the Christian community constituted another important source of popular fear and suspicion. Modern medicine, as practised by Protestant (and to a lesser extent Catholic) missionaries, and certain Catholic institutions, such as the confessional, the sacrament of extreme unction, and the baptism of dying infants, had no exact counterparts in Chinese culture, while Christian rejection of ancestor worship directly challenged values which lay at this culture’s core. In such circumstances, it was inevitable that Christianity would be misunderstood and that the most diabolical motives would be attributed to its propagation.

Finally, among the more irrational sources of popular hostility, there was the dark and explosive force of racial prejudice. A careful study would, I think, show that such prejudice was rife on both sides. (When a Canadian missionary in Taiwan took the unusual step of marrying a Chinese lady in his congregation, it drew a sharply critical response from other missionaries.) But it was particularly virulent among the Chinese. For, at the same time that the odd behaviour and physical appearance of Westerners made them stand out in a Chinese setting, the vast majority of Chinese had little or no personal intercourse with Westerners. They saw them in the aggregate, but did not know them as individuals. Therefore it was possible to believe anything of them, and the suspect behaviour observed in some was easily generalized to embrace all. As long as Westerners were conceived merely as barbarians, uncivilized but civilizable, they could be pitied and helped. But once they came to be viewed as beasts and devils – less than or worse than human – they were beyond redemption. At this point, the only cure was to drive them out.

The response of the old order: anti-Christian violence

As a result of the fears and passions aroused by the missionary and his following, anti-Christian conflict was extremely widespread in the late Ch'ing period. During the four decades from 1860 to 1900, there were several hundred incidents or disturbances important enough to need top-level diplomatic handling, while the number of cases that were settled locally easily ran into the thousands. (A Catholic missionary in eastern Chihli reported in the 1860s that in a single year his work was hampered by over two hundred minor cases of 'persecution'.) Furthermore, aside from incidents as such, there were times when major sections of the empire were inundated with inflammatory anti-Christian pamphlets, posters²⁵ and handbills – in some instances, it appears, a response in kind to the literary warfare waged by Christian missionaries.

The anti-Christian literature of the late Ch'ing may be roughly divided into two types. The first, general in nature and found typically in the form of manifestos (*hsi-wen*), posters and pamphlets, aimed at generating an atmosphere of intense hatred and revulsion. Presumably the handiwork of members of the scholar class, it capitalized on charges of the most salacious and dehumanizing sort: priests mutilated pregnant women and gouged out the eyeballs of dying converts for weird alchemical purposes; the privacy of the confessional was exploited for the ravishing of Chinese ladies; foreigners – and by extension Chinese converts, who were deemed to be possessed – were cuckolded by their wives, committed sodomy with their fathers and brothers, and enjoyed incestuous relations with their mothers and sisters. The incredible, through skilful presentation and endless repetition, was rendered believable, and a potent anti-Christian folklore grew up.

One pamphlet in this category which enjoyed especially wide circulation from the early 1860s on was *Pi-hsieh chi-shih* (A record of facts to ward off heterodoxy). Banned by Chinese officials in at least three provinces, its incendiary quality is graphically suggested in the following excerpt:

During the first three months of life the anuses of all [Christian] infants – male and female – are plugged up with a small hollow tube, which is taken out at night. They call this 'retention of the vital essence'. It causes the anus to dilate so that upon growing up sodomy will be facilitated. At the junction of each spring and summer boys procure the menstrual discharge of women and, smearing it on their faces, go into Christian churches to worship. They call

²⁵ Some of these are reproduced in Cohen, *China and Christianity*. For a Russian study, see I. P. Garanin, 'Kitaiski antikhristsianski lubok XIX v.' (Chinese anti-Christian folk pictures of the 19th century), *Ezhegodnik Muzeia Istorii Religii i Ateizma* (Annual of the Museum of the History of Religion and of Atheism), 4 (1960) 403–26.

this 'cleansing one's face before paying one's respects to the holy one', and regard it as one of the most venerative rituals by which the Lord can be worshipped. Fathers and sons, elder and younger brothers, behave licentiously with one another, calling it 'the joining of the vital forces'. They say, moreover, that if such things are not done, fathers and sons, as well as brothers, will become mutually estranged. There are all sorts of things of this nature which cannot be fully related. Hard as it may be to believe, some of our Chinese people also follow their religion. Are they not really worse than beasts?²⁶

A second type of anti-Christian literature, very brief and usually appearing in the form of anonymous placards, handbills and notices (*ni-ming chieh-t'ieh*) adapted the contents of the first type to concrete situations and did so in such a way as to be highly effective in inciting mass action. Some pieces of this kind mentioned specific missionaries by name; others referred to specific places. Many of them gave directions for carrying out some act of destruction. Moreover, in a number of instances, the issuance of such writings was timed to take advantage of specific occasions, one of the commonest being the assembling of the literati for the examinations.

This anti-Christian literature was either posted in prominent places or reproduced in quantity and distributed. (Eight hundred thousand copies are said to have been made of one edition of *Kuei-chiao kai-ssu* [Death to the devils' religion], the most notorious anti-Christian pamphlet of the early 1890s. The pamphlet was distributed free of charge.) The manner in which it exerted its effect on the masses was dual in nature. On the one hand, by plumbing the depths of sexual fantasy and racial fear, it cast an explosive cloud of suspicion over the activities of the foreigner. On the other, it activated suspicions, fears and resentments which the non-Christian populace had accumulated on its own through direct, personal experience with the missionary and convert. An interplay of forces was thus set up which could, given the necessary spark, lead to violence.

Violence cannot be quantified. Nor is overt rioting necessarily its most significant expression. It is well to remember this when approaching the anti-Christian disturbances of the last decades of the nineteenth century. These disturbances were often planned and instigated, directly or indirectly, by members of the gentry class. But there is little evidence to support the recurrent foreign claim that they were part of a well-organized regional or national 'plot' to rid China of Christianity. The disturbances ranged in seriousness from such everyday occurrences as the stoning of a Christian family's home or the molesting of a party of travelling missionaries, to the destruction of valuable property and the injuring or killing of human beings. With the exception of such catastrophes as the Tientsin Massacre (1870) and the Boxer Uprising (1899–1900), it is probably fair to say that

²⁶ Quoted in Cohen, *China and Christianity*, 51.

rioting *per se* was less important in the late Ch'ing than the insuperable political problems it generated.

The missionary and the undermining of Chinese political authority

Although it was the avowed policy of the Chinese government after 1860 that the new treaties were to be strictly adhered to, this policy could be carried out in practice only with the whole-hearted cooperation of the provincial and local authorities.²⁷ Unfortunately, there is abundant evidence that, in relation to missionary activity, such cooperation was often a good deal less than whole-hearted. Why did so many Chinese officials, especially lower-ranking ones, oppose the foreign missionary? The simplest and most direct answer is that all officials were, in the broadest sense, members of the gentry class. To the extent that they shared the cultural and intellectual commitments of this class, it was thus natural that they would be vigorously opposed to the spread of Christianity. But to the extent that officials took their responsibilities to the throne seriously, one might expect that they would do their best to overcome feelings of personal antipathy and make an earnest effort to implement the treaties.

Such was the situation *in vacuo*. In actual practice, there were many factors that tended to encourage the natural opposition of the official to Christianity and to discourage him from genuinely fulfilling his imperial obligations. The most important of these, perhaps, was gentry opposition to the missionary enterprise. In a severely understaffed bureaucracy, which ruled as much by persuasion as by force, the official, almost always a stranger in the locality in which he served, was highly dependent upon the active cooperation of the local gentry class. If he energetically attempted to execute the treaty provisions concerning missionary activities, in direct defiance of gentry sentiment, he ran the risk of alienating this class and destroying his future effectiveness as an official.

Another factor was the missionary's exploitation of his privileged legal status and the resulting challenge to the prestige and authority of the official. Sometimes this challenge was a direct consequence of the missionary's treaty rights, as when missionaries, after suffering injury or property damage, obtained satisfaction from the Chinese government. In other cases, missionaries made their power felt on the local scene by abusing their treaty rights or by using them with a minimum of discretion. Both Catholics and Protestants regularly accepted the application of force on their behalf to obtain redress. Catholic missionaries often demanded excessively large indemnities for injuries sustained. (In the single province of Szechwan, between 1863 and 1869, they collected 260,000

²⁷ In the ensuing section, I have drawn freely on *ibid.* ch. 4.

taels.) During the early 1860s, Catholics took full advantage of the treaty clauses providing for the return of previously confiscated church properties, the Franciscan fathers even going so far as to request additional reimbursement for house and land rents collected over the preceding hundred-year period. Also, in this connection, Catholic missionaries routinely demanded, as restitution for injuries suffered in anti-missionary riots, buildings (such as literati halls and temples) which had been erected with public funds and were of symbolic importance to the Chinese.

Sometimes missionaries encroached on official authority even more directly. Frequently they pressed their legations to obtain the transfer of hostile provincial officials. Catholics occasionally aroused the ire of the Chinese government by employing improper forms of correspondence. Finally – and this was, in the view of Chinese officials, by far the most intolerable of all missionary abuses – there was the predilection, already noted, for interference in local official affairs, either on behalf of converts or in order to win converts.

Official hostility to the missionary enterprise was sometimes translated into open opposition, a prime example being afforded by the repeated harassment of the Christian community of Kweichow by T'ien Hsing-shu and other high officials in Kweichow in the early 1860s. More often, however, the part played by the official was of an indirect and passive nature. By giving the gentry almost complete liberty to carry on their propagandistic and organizational activities and shielding them from reprisals when anti-missionary incidents occurred, the officials provided an operating framework for anti-Christian action that was relatively free of obstacles or risks.

Wherever the sympathies of officials may have lain, it remains a fact that after 1860 anti-missionary activity was a source of acute embarrassment for the Chinese government at all levels. At the local and provincial levels, if such activity was sufficiently serious, officials could be demoted or otherwise punished. At the level of the central government, there was always the possibility that foreign force would be applied, resulting in humiliation and loss of prestige for an already tottering dynasty. Thus, the effort to implement the new treaty provisions was an inherently self-defeating one, corroding the authority of the local official if successful and undermining the position of the central government if unsuccessful.

Authentic anti-foreignism and political anti-foreignism

This raises some interesting questions: If anti-missionary activity posed such grave problems for the Chinese authorities, how sure can we be that, in the period from 1860 to 1900, the primary motive for active opposition

to the missionary was invariably anti-missionary feeling, and never anti-official or anti-dynastic feeling? Was anti-foreignism, to put it somewhat differently, always 'authentic'? Or was it sometimes politically inspired? Certainly, there were more than enough grounds for the kindling of genuine anti-foreign sentiment in nineteenth-century China. But this does not mean that, given the proper context, anti-foreignism could not be manipulated for political purposes.

To illustrate, there is evidence that the Yangtze Valley riots of 1891 were fomented in part by disgruntled secret society members whose aim was not to do injury to Christians, but to bring down the dynasty by forcing it into conflict with the Western powers. The initial phase of the Boxer movement, in which secret society involvement was of paramount importance, may have been guided by a similar impulse: early in 1899, it will be recalled, the Boxers made much of the slogan, 'Overthrow the Ch'ing, destroy the foreigner'.

Conversely, the authorities themselves, in some instances, intentionally associated themselves with extreme anti-foreign stands, not so much because they were extremely anti-foreign, but because this was the only way to prevent popular anti-foreign feeling from being turned against them. This happened in Canton in the 1840s. It may also have been a factor in the official and dynastic responses to the Boxers. Clearly, the whole subject of politically motivated anti-foreignism in the latter half of the nineteenth century deserves a great deal more attention than it has so far received. One important by-product of such a venture is sure to be a more sophisticated understanding of the complex anatomy of Chinese opposition to Christianity.²⁸

THE MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE AND THE NEW ORDER

By any ordinary standard of accounting, the religion of the West failed, in the late Ch'ing, to relate itself effectively to Chinese needs. Western secular knowledge and practice, the transmission of which, up to the turn of the century, was largely in the hands of Protestant missionaries, found a much warmer reception. Missionary rationalizations for involvement in secular activity were numerous. Some viewed it as a kind of wedge, a sweetener, by which resistance to Christianity might be lowered. Others, more philosophically inclined, assumed that Christianity was immanent in all of Western culture and that, therefore, the acceptance of any part of this culture was a move in the proper direction. The trouble with all such

²⁸ This discussion is based on Paul A. Cohen, 'Ch'ing China: confrontation with the West, 1850-1900', in James Crowley, ed. *Modern east Asia: essays in interpretation*, 55-7.

rationalizations was that they were not binding on the recipient.²⁹ Not only did it prove possible to accept Western knowledge and reject Western religion; the former, as it turned out, could even be used as a weapon against the latter.

The professionalization of missionary work

The tremendous physical expansion of the Protestant missionary enterprise in the last decades of the Ch'ing dynasty was accompanied by a significant shift towards professionalization in certain fields of missionary endeavour, notably medicine and education. These fields had long been adjuncts of evangelism. As they became increasingly divorced from evangelical aims, acquiring quasi-independent existences, professional standards rose and higher levels of specialization set in, both in respect to subject matter and to the missionaries themselves. The missionary enterprise, in preparation for the part it was to play in China's modernization, was itself undergoing a similar process.³⁰

Medicine

Although it had been necessary at one point to justify the very existence of medical missions, at the centennial conference of Protestant missions, held in Shanghai in 1907, it was announced that medical work formed 'part of the work of almost every missionary society throughout the world'.³¹ The growth of such work in China over the preceding three decades had been staggering. The number of fully qualified medical missionaries had soared from 10 in 1874 to an estimated 300 in 1905. In 1876, 41,281 patients were treated in some 40 hospitals and dispensaries; thirty years later it was reported that at least 2,000,000 patients were being treated annually in 250 mission hospitals and dispensaries.³²

Many of these hospitals – and all of the dispensaries – were small-scale operations and it is probably safe to say that only in the occasional instance was the most up-to-date medical service and care made available

²⁹ The more clearheaded of the missionaries were plainly aware of this. Joseph Edkins, for example, wrote that Li Hung-chang is able 'to imitate foreign benevolence in establishing hospitals and opium refuges, and to accept foreign science . . . while . . . he refuses his assent to all the claims of the Christian religion'. 'Current Chinese literature: how far is it antagonistic to Christianity?', in *Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China held at Shanghai, May 7–20, 1890*, 572–3.

³⁰ In this section I have leaned heavily on Irwin T. Hyatt, Jr, 'Protestant missions in China (1877–1890): the institutionalization of good works', *Papers on China*, 17 (1963) 67–100 (reprinted in Liu, *American missionaries in China*, 93–126).

³¹ *China Centenary Missionary Conference*, 247.

³² *Ibid.* 267; compare with the statistical chart in MacGillivray, *A century of Protestant missions in China*, facing p. 670, where, for the year 1905, the total number of hospitals (166) and dispensaries (241) is higher, and the number of patients lower (under 1,100,000).

and the best equipment used. The treatment offered, nevertheless, was different from anything the Chinese were accustomed to, and the total of annual patients suggests not only a relatively high level of success, but that sizeable numbers of Chinese were being exposed to situations which might prompt them to take a more positive attitude towards practical Western scientific knowledge and technique.

Some of the more outstanding achievements warrant special mention. Dr J. G. Kerr of the American Presbyterian Mission (North), who took over the hospital founded by Peter Parker in Canton, supervised the treatment of over a million patients in his almost fifty years of service, and towards the end of the century established what may have been China's first institution for the mentally ill. The efforts of Dr Duncan Main (Church of England) in Hangchow produced by 1890 a hundred-bed hospital, a children's home and refuges for lepers and opium addicts. In 1880 Dr John Kenneth Mackenzie of the LMS erected a large hospital in Tientsin; the hospital was endowed by Li Hung-chang's wife, whose life Mackenzie and a co-worker had saved.

Missionaries were also involved in the training of China's first modern physicians. A few individuals, such as Wong Fun and Ho Kai, after being educated as youths in mission schools, went to the West for their medical training. But by the last decades of the nineteenth century a far greater number (including the future revolutionary Sun Yat-sen) were being trained in medical schools attached to missionary hospitals in China or Hong Kong. As of 1897, some 300 Chinese physicians had graduated from such institutions and there were another 250–300 in training. Many of these native doctors, after completion of their studies, were drafted into government service; a few established lucrative practices in the port cities. As a group, they probably did not have as much contact with their countrymen as the less fully trained 'native assistants' who formed the staffs of most hospitals and dispensaries.

Another vehicle for transmitting Western medical knowledge to the Chinese was the written word. The best known of the early authors was Dr Benjamin Hobson (1816–73), whose compilations remained standard for many years and whose book on anatomy, *Ch'üan-t'i hsün lun* (Canton, 1851; 99 leaves), gained the rare distinction of being incorporated into a leading Chinese encyclopaedic collection. Later, Dr J. G. Kerr, Dr John Dudgeon, John Fryer and others translated books on a profusion of medical subjects, including diagnosis, bandaging, skin diseases, syphilis, eye diseases, inflammatory diseases, the principles and practice of medicine, *materia medica*, fevers, hygiene, surgery, anatomy and physiology. Reaching an audience which often could not be reached by the mis-

sionary directly, writings of this kind helped to prepare growing numbers of educated Chinese for an acceptance of Western scientific knowledge.

The vast majority of mission hospitals and dispensaries continued to provide their patients with instruction in Christianity. But such instruction was removed, more and more, from the hands of the overtaxed medical missionary. As the latter became a full-time doctor, his professional identity sharpened. The Medical Missionary Association of China, formed in 1886, published its own medical journal. And with increasing frequency, Chinese officials sought out medical missionaries for advice on matters relating to public health, sanitation, housing, water supply, government hospitals and medical education. Medical missionaries were beginning 'to plan for the health of the entire Empire',³³ and for many the creation of a healthy China was starting to assume as much importance as the creation of a Christian China.

Education

Missionary involvement in secular education had less basis in scripture than missionary involvement in healing the sick. It was harder, therefore, to win the missionary body's acceptance and approval of this line of work. By the dawn of the twentieth century, nevertheless, the major battles had been fought and won – at least on the Protestant side. Catholic missionaries, as we have seen, operated numerous schools. But, with few exceptions (mainly Jesuit institutions), these were elementary level and devoted entirely to instruction in religion and in the Chinese classics.

During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, Protestants generally took a negative stand with regard to secular education. But beginning around the time of the first general conference of Protestant missionaries in China (1877), the situation changed quite markedly. At this conference the American Presbyterian, Calvin Mateer, implored his fellow missionaries to assume greater responsibility in the educational sphere. Although Mateer was bitterly criticized at the time, the ice had been broken and more and more missionaries were converted to his position in the ensuing decade.

Another important consequence of the 1877 conference, largely inspired by Mateer's address, was the establishment of a 'School and Text-book Series Committee' under the general editorship of John Fryer. Committed to the proposition, as expressed by Mateer, that 'the success of mission schools depended in no small measure on having good and suitable textbooks',³⁴ the members of the Committee supervised the prepara-

³³ Latourette, *History of Christian missions*, 460.

³⁴ Quoted in Hyatt, 'Protestant missions in China', 75.

tion and publication by 1890 of eighty-four books and forty maps and charts, mostly of secular content. Over thirty thousand volumes were sold during this period and the Committee's work was soon placed on a self-supporting basis.

Another approach to the teaching of Western subjects was to provide instruction in English, thereby avoiding the necessity of relying on translated texts which, all too often, bordered on being unintelligible. Initially, many missionaries opposed this, reasoning that since a knowledge of English was economically useful, many Chinese would enrol in mission schools for materialistic purposes. The advantages of teaching English, however, more than outweighed the disadvantages, and during the 1880s, English instruction won growing support.

The broadening of missionary attitudes was matched by a dramatic expansion in Protestant educational facilities. Enrolment in mission schools stood at 6,000 in 1877. By 1890 it had risen to 16,836, and by 1906 to 57,683. In addition to over two thousand primary schools, there were by 1906 close to four hundred higher-level institutions, including a number of colleges. In contrast with Catholic practice, a great majority of Protestant schools of all levels included Western subjects in their curricula.

Another important change, paralleling what had taken place in the medical field, was the emergence of the professional missionary educator. Irwin Hyatt notes that the missionaries who had spoken on education at the 1877 conference – men like Mateer – ‘had come to China as evangelists and became teachers somewhat by accident. In contrast, a number of those who made comments in 1890 . . . seem with their advanced degrees and more specialized interests to have been more professional educators than ministers. These men, all heavily committed to educational or literary work, were relative newcomers and represented a new generation and a new type of missionary educator.’³⁵ This trend became even more pronounced after 1900.

A further indication of growing professionalization was the formation in 1890 of the Educational Association of China (EAC). As successor to the School and Textbook Series Committee, the EAC was much concerned with improving the textbook situation in mission schools. But all matters pertaining to education in China came within its purview. By the time of the third general conference of Protestant missionaries (1907), the EAC had a membership of four hundred. Aside from publishing books, it had established a fourteen-year general syllabus and was ‘the recognized guardian of educational standards for the entire Protestant community’.³⁶

³⁵ *Ibid.* 73–4.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 77.

Missionary promotion of Western learning

Schools, by their very nature, were able to reach only the young. To transmit Western learning to the educated adult population of China, missionaries resorted to publication of books and magazines in Chinese. Protestant involvement in secular publishing went back to the pre-Opium War days. A notable early example, *Tung-hsi-yang k'ao mei-yüeh t'ung-chi chuan* (Chinese monthly magazine; Canton, 1833 *et seq.*), was edited by Elijah Bridgman and others, and contained articles on the steam engine, world geography, the British and American systems of government, and the life of George Washington. In the period 1810–67, according to one estimate, Protestant writings on secular subjects totalled 108 and constituted some 14 per cent of their overall output. By the end of the nineteenth century, there were over a dozen active mission presses, and Protestant scholars, in addition to editing several periodicals of note, had written or translated hundreds of books on a wide range of non-religious subjects.

Science and mathematics

In the twentieth century, one of the main Chinese arguments against Christianity has been that its claims are inconsistent with the results of modern science. In the nineteenth century, ironically, a leading part in the introduction of Western science into China was taken by Protestant missionaries. Indeed, despite the special problems involved in the creation of a new Chinese scientific vocabulary, Protestants produced more books on science and mathematics than on all other non-religious subjects combined.

One of the most successful translating teams in the scientific field consisted of Alexander Wylie (1815–87), a British missionary of considerable sinological attainments, and the brilliant Chinese mathematician, Li Shanlan (1810–82). Working together in Shanghai in the 1850s, these two men translated Books 7–15 of Euclid's *Elements* (*Hsü chi-ho yüan-pen*, 9 *chüan*), Sir John F. Herschel's *Outlines of astronomy* (*T'an-t'ien*, 18 + 1 *chüan*), Augustus de Morgan's *Elements of algebra* (*Tai-shu hsüeh*, 13 *chüan*), and *Elements of analytical geometry and of differential and integral calculus* by Elias Loomis (*Tai wei chi shih-chi*, 18 *chüan*). The prolific Li also collaborated in the translation of works by William Whewell (with Joseph Edkins) and John Lindley (with Edkins and Alexander Williamson).

Since translations of Western books, if they were to have any chance of being read, had to be executed in acceptable literary Chinese, and since even the most accomplished of missionary scholars (like Wylie) were in-

capable of writing the literary language with any degree of grace, a special method of composition had to be followed. Essentially, it was the same procedure that had been worked out two-and-a-half centuries earlier by the Jesuits. First, the foreign missionary would provide his native assistant with an oral translation of the original text. Then, the assistant would convert the colloquial version into literary Chinese. Finally, if the missionary were sufficiently skilled, he would read over the literary version for accuracy and clarity of expression.

The man who exploited this method to the fullest extent in the last century was John Fryer (1839–1928). An Englishman who came to China initially as a teacher in a missionary school, Fryer was the archetype of what may be called the ‘secular missionary’. Although he cooperated with missionaries in various educational undertakings, he was not connected with any missionary society and seems to have attached more importance to the strengthening of the Chinese nation than to the conversion of the Chinese people. Fryer’s mission was to bring Western learning – especially science – to China.

For twenty-eight years (1868–96) Fryer worked as a translator at the Kiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai. Of the 129 translations which constituted his lifetime’s output – he continued to do translation work after leaving China to take the Louis Agassiz Professorship of Oriental Languages and Literature at the University of California, Berkeley – 57 were in the natural sciences, 48 in applied sciences, 14 in military and naval science, and 10 in history and the social sciences. The Arsenal published 77 of Fryer’s translations.

Aside from his work for the Chinese government, Fryer was active in a number of private ventures connected with the promotion of Western science. He was secretary and co-founder of the Shanghai Polytechnic Institution and Reading Room (Ko-chih shu-yüan), which was established in the mid-1870s by a group of Chinese and foreigners interested in advancing China’s knowledge of the West. Fryer gave magic lantern lectures every Saturday night at the Institution and was an enthusiastic supporter of its prize essay contests, inaugurated in 1886 to ‘induce the Chinese literati to investigate the various departments of Western knowledge with the view to their application in the Middle Kingdom’.³⁷ Between 1876 and 1892 Fryer also served as editor of the influential illustrated magazine, *Ko-chih hui-pien* (The Chinese scientific magazine; subsequent English title: The Chinese scientific and industrial magazine).

³⁷ Quoted from one of Fryer’s reports, in Knight Biggerstaff, ‘Shanghai Polytechnic Institution and Reading Room: an attempt to introduce Western science and technology to the Chinese’, *Pacific Historical Review*, 25.2 (May 1956) 141.

The articles in *Ko-chih hui-pien*, popular in format and written in many instances by Protestant missionaries, covered a vast array of scientific and related topics.

One other of Fryer's projects must be noted, although its purpose was broader than the diffusion of scientific knowledge alone. This was the Chinese Scientific Book Depot, a non-profit bookstore established by Fryer in 1885 in Shanghai. By 1888 the Depot had in stock some 650 titles on Western subjects, and branches had been established in Tientsin, Hangchow, Swatow, Peking, Foochow and Hong Kong.

History and international law

Authentic children of the modern scientific and industrial revolutions, missionaries who ventured into literary work generally tended to channel their energies into natural and applied science (including military science). There were, nevertheless, a number of influential missionary publications in other fields, particularly history and international law. One of the earliest was Elijah Bridgman's *Mei-li-ko ho-sheng-kuo chih-lüeh* (A brief account of the United States of America). First published in 1838, Bridgman's book went through a number of revisions, the last of which appeared in 1862 under the title, *Lien-pang chih-lüeh*. It appears to have been the principal source of information on the United States for two seminal Chinese accounts of world history and geography: Wei Yüan's *Hai-kuo t'u-chih* (Illustrated gazetteer of the countries overseas; 1844) and Hsü Chi-yü's *Ying-huan chih lüeh* (Brief survey of the maritime circuit; 1850).

Another widely read history was William Muirhead's (1822–1900) *Ta-Ying-kuo chih* (An account of Great Britain; 1856). The praise which Muirhead's translation received from Chinese scholars was due, in no small part, to the skill of his collaborator, Chiang Tun-fu (1808–67), a leading literary light in the Shanghai of the 1850s.

Other historical compilations by missionaries included D. Z. Sheffield's *Wan-kuo t'ung-chien* (Outline history of the world; Shanghai, 1882), which, according to Arthur Smith, 'gave a whole generation of Chinese their first ideas of the great mysterious outer world',³⁸ and Timothy Richard's popular translation (to be discussed presently) of Robert Mackenzie's *The nineteenth century: a history* (1880), published in 1894 under the title *T'ai-hsi hsin-shih lan-yao*.

One other area in which missionary translations made a significant impact was that of international law. This was largely due to the efforts of

³⁸ Quoted in Roberto M. Paterno, 'Devello Z. Sheffield and the founding of the North China College', *Papers on China*, 14 (1960) 121 (reprinted in Liu, *American missionaries in China*, 53).

one man, the American missionary-educator, W. A. P. Martin. Of Martin's several translations in this field, the most important was *Wan-kuo kung-fa* (Peking, 1864), which placed at the disposal of the Chinese government Henry Wheaton's standard work, *Elements of international law*.

Smith's assessment of Sheffield's work, if one discounts its condescending tone, could well be applied to the whole corpus of missionary-produced secular literature. This literature made available to educated Chinese a vast fund of previously inaccessible information on Western learning and on the Western world in general. Moreover, until the last years of the nineteenth century, it constituted the principal source of such information. This, however, gives us little more than the chapter headings of a very complex story, the text of which remains unwritten.

Some of the lines of inquiry future scholars will want to pursue, in filling out the text, may be briefly noted. First – a problem for the student of communication – how clear was the missionary's message? How intelligible were missionary compilations and to what extent did they say what their compilers intended them to say? Second – a problem for intellectual historians – what was the message? Missionary translators posed as transmitters of the best that Western civilization had to offer. Yet it was left for people like Yen Fu (1853–1921) to translate Spencer, J. S. Mill and Montesquieu, while the most widely circulated of all missionary translations of secular works, Mackenzie, was a vulgar hymn to the conquests of science and the dogma of progress, described by R. G. Collingwood as being 'among the most unsavoury relics of third-rate historical work'.³⁹ (Inevitably one is reminded of the sensation caused in Meiji Japan by another third-rate work, Samuel Smiles' *Self-help*.) A third and final question: who got the message? How wide a readership, both social and geographic, did missionary writings have, and in what ways did patterns of readership change over the years? Only when the answers to questions like these are in, will we be in a position to measure with greater precision the extent and quality of the impact made by the secular writings of missionaries.

Chinese reform thought and activity: the missionary impact

'Reform', according to the dictionary, means to 'change into a new and improved form or condition'.⁴⁰ If we give a loose reading to this definition, all missionary endeavour could, from the missionaries' own point of view, be regarded as reform-directed. A more sensible reading would

³⁹ R. G. Collingwood, *The idea of history*, 145.

⁴⁰ *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, 711.

limit 'reform' to improvements advocated or effected in the political, economic, educational and social realms. Missionary influence on Chinese reform thought and activity, even in this narrower sense, was a multilevel phenomenon. The instruction in secular subjects afforded in Protestant schools and the knowledge of the West and of Western culture communicated in Protestant publications nourished an atmosphere conducive to reform. Missionaries, in their policies, methods and social attitudes, furnished live, on-the-spot models for Chinese reformers to emulate. Finally, a few missionaries, the most prominent being Timothy Richard, Young J. Allen and Gilbert Reid, became enthusiastic propagandists for a reformed China and established close relations with leading Chinese reformers, both within and without officialdom.

The emancipation of women

A hallmark of modernization in general and of Chinese modernization in particular has been the upgrading of the status of women. Traditionally, Chinese women were expected to show total submissiveness before parents and husband within the family, while their opportunities for self-expression and social involvement outside the family were minimal. Formal education for females was non-existent. Women were forbidden to compete in the civil service examinations or to serve in any official capacity. The prevalence of concubinage, female infanticide and above all of the custom of footbinding stood as both symbol and consequence of the inferior social position occupied by the Chinese female.

The missionary enterprise was ideally suited to stimulate change in this area. By the turn of the century, the majority of Protestant, and a fair number of Catholic, missionaries were themselves women. And although few of these could be counted as highly educated, all were literate, many served as teachers in missionary schools, and several were trained physicians. There was, moreover, a high incidence of explicit commitment among Protestants to the tenets of feminism, and a determination to crusade for the 'equal rights' of Chinese women.

This crusade took many forms. Missionaries were, of course, outspoken in their condemnation of concubinage and infanticide. They also frowned on arranged marriages for Church members. Their greatest impact, however, was on the anti-footbinding movement of the late Ch'ing. The first missionary society for the suppression of footbinding is said to have been founded in Amoy in 1874. In time, it became customary for women, on joining the Church, to unbind their feet, and in many schools, girls with bound feet were refused admission. The most important foreign organization devoted to the abolition of footbinding was the T'ien-tsu hui or

Natural Foot Society, founded in Shanghai in 1895, with Mrs Archibald Little (a non-missionary) as president. The Society engaged in extensive pamphleteering, and efforts were made by Mrs Little to influence Chinese in high places. The reformers of the 1890s, acutely sensitive to foreign charges of Chinese barbarism, took up the crusade against footbinding with zeal. Responding to growing pressure, the empress dowager in 1902 issued an edict officially abolishing the practice. And, as the twentieth century wore on, the binding of women's feet went increasingly out of style.⁴¹

Less dramatic, but ultimately much more important in elevating the status of Chinese women, were missionary efforts in the educational sphere. The first missionary school for girls (Miss Aldersey's) was founded in Ningpo in 1844 under the supervision of the Society for Promoting Female Education in the East (formed in London in 1834). By 1905 Protestant missionaries counted 7,168 girls in their primary schools and 2,761 female students in higher-level institutions. Several women doctors were trained under missionary auspices. Efforts were also made to spread literacy among adult women – frequently through the medium of romanized Chinese – and to furnish elementary instruction in home economics. Although there were unquestionably great variations in the quality of the female education thus provided, it has been claimed that, as late as the eve of the 1911 revolution, Protestant institutions were still the only ones in China at which the educational opportunities for women were roughly comparable to those available to Chinese men.

The 'Christian' reformers of the coastal periphery

Since Christianity was presented in nineteenth-century China in an anti-Confucian guise, it was likely to be most acceptable to those Chinese for whom, whatever their innermost convictions, continued attachment to the outward trappings of Confucian culture was least compelling. In the case of the educated, the greatest concentration of such persons prior to the 1890s was in the treaty ports and Hong Kong. It was from the coastal periphery, too, that many of the earliest Chinese modernizers emerged. And, although it has been generally overlooked, a sizeable number of these pioneers were either Christian or deeply indebted to Christian missionaries for their ideas and views.

Among the top leaders of the Taiping movement, the most articulate spokesman for Western-style reform, Hung Jen-kan (1822–64), had been trained as a Protestant evangelist in Hong Kong in the 1850s. Tong King-sing (T'ang T'ing-shu, 1832–92), a major figure in several early

⁴¹ Howard S. Levy feels that missionaries 'exerted a strong influence' on the abolition of foot-binding. See *Chinese footbinding: the history of a curious erotic custom*, 78.

industrial enterprises, and Yung Wing (Jung Hung, 1828–1912), who promoted the first educational mission to the United States (1872–81), had both been educated as boys in missionary schools, Yung going on to become the first Chinese graduate of an American university (Yale, 1854). Ho Kai (Ho Ch'i, 1859–1914), the son of a businessman who had formerly been a preacher associated with the Hong Kong branch of the LMS, took advanced degrees in both law and medicine in Great Britain, before returning to become one of Hong Kong's most distinguished Chinese residents. Ho was active in a variety of philanthropic ventures (including the founding of the College of Medicine for Chinese in Hong Kong, at which Sun Yat-sen completed his medical training) and, in the late 1880s, pioneered in advocating the introduction of parliamentary government. A brother-in-law of Ho, Wu T'ing-fang (1842–1922), after secondary education in a church-run school in Hong Kong and legal training in Great Britain, served for fourteen years on the staff of Li Hung-chang and later became a well-known diplomat and advocate of legal reform. Another early reformer, Cheng Kuan-ying (1842–1923), studied English for a time with John Fryer and was an enthusiastic reader of missionary literature. Although there is no evidence that Cheng, a successful comprador with wide foreign connections, ever converted to Christianity,⁴² the humanitarian sentiments permeating his influential reform tract, *Sheng-shih wei-yen* (Warnings to a prosperous age), were clearly of Christian provenance.

Some Christian reformers, among them Ts'ai Erh-k'ang, the Chinese collaborator of Timothy Richard and Young J. Allen, and Ma Liang (Ma Hsiang-po, 1840–1939), one of the rare instances of a reformer of Catholic family background – for a time in the 1870s he was actually a Jesuit priest – have been largely ignored by scholars. Others, such as Wang T'ao (1828–97) and Ma Liang's younger brother, Ma Chien-chung (1844–1900), have been given their due as reformers, but not as Christians. Educated as a youth in Catholic schools, Ma Chien-chung later studied in France. On returning to China in the late 1870s, he joined Li Hung-chang's secretarial staff and, with his unique knowledge of the West, quickly became one of Li's most valuable advisers on foreign matters. Wang T'ao's career was even more unconventional. After assisting W. H. Medhurst in the preparation of the Delegates' Version of the New Testament, he was baptized in 1854 in Shanghai. In Hong Kong in the 1860s, he worked closely with James Legge on the translation of the Chinese classics. After spending two years with Legge in Scotland in the late 1860s, he

⁴² In the cases of Tong King-sing and Wu T'ing-fang, on the other hand, the presumption of baptism is strong even though proof is still lacking. Wu was described as 'a baptized Christian with two concubines' in Cyril Pearl, *Morrison of Peking*, 234.

returned to Hong Kong and in 1874 founded his own newspaper. Wang T'ao's books and his daily editorials on current affairs and reform brought him fame as an expert on the West. Moving back to Shanghai in 1884, he became associated with John Fryer's Polytechnic Institution and in the early 1890s contributed regularly to the reform-oriented missionary periodical, *Wan-kuo kung-pao* (Review of the times).

What does it mean to refer to people like these as 'Christian' reformers? It does not mean, certainly, that their reform ideas were grounded in specifically Christian precepts or that reform was seen by them (as it was by some missionaries) as a bridge to a future Christianized China. (Actually, it is hard to know, in most cases, how deep or lasting their Christian affiliations were. The opprobrium attached to Church membership in the nineteenth century was so great that educated converts did their best to conceal their Christianity. In the voluminous corpus of Wang T'ao's printed writings, there is not a single word indicating that he was a Christian, though he admits it quite freely in an unpublished diary of the 1850s). What it means, more than anything else, is that these men were early escapees from a closed Confucian world. Christianity, for most of them, does not appear to have served (as it did for many Meiji Protestants) as a substitute world view – a replacement for Confucianism. Rather, it served to dramatize the fact that other world views – legitimate and respectable – were *possible*. Once this became plain, Confucian society, for the first time, was placed on the defensive. And so we find that, even when Christian (or Christian-influenced) reformers retained a commitment to Confucianism, as was often the case, the nature of this commitment was changed. If Confucianism was to continue to reign supreme in China, they seem to have reasoned, it would have to be a very different Confucianism from that of yore. Hence, the need for reform.

The new reformers of the 1890s

Although individual 'Christian' reformers remained active even past the turn of the century, as a group they yielded the stage to a younger generation of reformers – and revolutionaries – in the 1890s. Since the revolutionary movement is a phenomenon belonging more to the twentieth than to the nineteenth century, I shall only touch on it in this chapter in order to note the very prominent role that Christians played in the pre-1905 phase of the movement's history (at least that strand of the movement that was led by Sun Yat-sen). Most of the leaders of the Hong Kong branch of the Hsing-Chung hui, including of course Sun himself, were Christians. The leadership of the Canton plot of 1895 was predominantly Protestant, and Christians, according to one Chinese estimate, accounted for 30 per

cent of the original participants in the Waichow uprising of 1900 (including its Canton component). While this subject awaits study, I am inclined to accept Harold Schiffrin's contention that the revolutionists' Christianity (unlike that of the earlier Taipings) was of little importance as a motivating force and constituted 'merely the religious aspect of their generally Western orientation'.⁴³

Contrary to what one might expect, the new reformers who came to the fore in the 1890s, while often more radical than the old, were generally better schooled in the learning of the past. In fact, some of the best-known among them found in the Modern Text tradition of Confucianism the main sanction for their reform thought. In contrast with the older reformers, who for the most part came to their reformism after years of direct exposure to treaty port life, the new reformers tended to become committed to reform first (sometimes, to be sure, after brief visits to the treaty ports) but actually settled in the treaty ports only later – and, then, usually for reasons of convenience or political security. A final contrast, again of a paradoxical quality: although none of the more important reformers of the 1890s were Christians, some of them were at least as deeply influenced by Christianity and Christian missionary methods as their nominally Christian predecessors.

Led by K'ang Yu-wei (1858–1927), the new reformers first achieved national prominence in 1895, in the wake of China's defeat at the hands of Japan. During the next few years the reformist tide swelled. Then, after a peak in the summer of 1898, it was suddenly cut short, as the empress dowager's *coup d'état* restored to power forces hostile to radical change.

It was during the period from 1895 to 1898 that the missionary impact on Chinese reform efforts reached its height. In part, this impact was achieved through personal contacts. Gilbert Reid, whose Mission among the Higher Classes of China (founded in 1894) had as a principal goal the stimulation of interest in reform among officials in Peking, claimed in 1896 to be personally acquainted with over 250 officials and in communication with another 200.⁴⁴ The Welsh missionary, Timothy Richard, was another who worked at cultivating personal relations with highly placed Chinese, as an effective means of encouraging reform. Richard had interviews with such leading dignitaries as Li Hung-chang and Chang Chih-tung. (With characteristic audacity, he attempted in 1894 to persuade Chang to sponsor the proposal that, for a prescribed period of years, China be converted into what would amount to a foreign protectorate. Chang's response was decidedly unenthusiastic.) In the winter of 1895–6,

⁴³ Harold Z. Schiffrin, *Sun Yat-sen and the origins of the Chinese Revolution*, 89–90, 228–9.

⁴⁴ *Norib-China Herald*, 6 Nov. 1896, 784–5.

while on a visit to Peking, Richard became friendly with K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (who served briefly as his secretary), and other members of the short-lived Ch'iang-hsüeh hui (Self-strengthening Society) and was a frequent speaker at the Society's meetings.

Much more influential than personal contacts were the reformist writings of Protestant missionaries, circulation of which grew rapidly from the late 1880s. Richard, in 1891, became secretary of the leading sponsor of such publications, the SDK (Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese; Kuang-hsüeh hui in Chinese). The SDK published his translation of Mackenzie (1894) and Young J. Allen's compilation on the Sino-Japanese War (*Chung-Tung chan-chi pen-mo*; 1896). Beginning in 1889, it also put out the influential monthly, *Wan-kuo kung-pao*, under the general editorship of Allen and Ts'ai Erh-k'ang.

As propagandists for reform, the missionaries succeeded, in these years, beyond their wildest dreams. The yearly income from SDK sales soared from \$800 in 1893 to over \$18,000 in 1898. And John Fryer in 1896 was able to report exultantly: 'The book business is advancing with rapid strides all over China, and the printers here cannot keep pace with it. *China is awakening at last.*'⁴⁵ Allen's book on the Sino-Japanese War (which contained a section spelling out the author's reform views) and Richard's translation of Mackenzie – both popular enough to be pirated repeatedly by Chinese booksellers⁴⁶ – were required reading for Changsha examination candidates in 1896. The first periodical publication of the Ch'iang-hsüeh hui (in 1895) not only drew much of its material from the *Wan-kuo kung-pao*, but for a time even used the same title. The Chinese names of men like Timothy Richard and Young Allen were on people's lips throughout the country. And had the *coup d'état* of September 1898 not taken place, it is very likely that Richard would have been invited (on K'ang Yu-wei's recommendation) to join the inner circle of imperial advisers. The Kuang-hsü Emperor (whose introduction to Western learning, under the indirect supervision of W. A. P. Martin, had been going on for some years) had already studied the Mackenzie translation and was enormously impressed.

Christian missionaries, in addition to playing an important part in initially awakening Chinese to the need for reform – K'ang Yu-wei is said to have told a reporter in 1898 that he owed his conversion to reform

⁴⁵ Letter of 1 Apr. 1896 (emphasis in original), Fryer Papers, University of California Library (Berkeley). In a letter of 1 July 1898, Fryer wrote that 'every book of any value is now pirated'.

⁴⁶ Richard's translation is said to have been pirated nineteen times in Szechwan alone in 1898. Wang Shu-huai, *Wai-jen yü wu-hsü pien-fa* (Foreigners and the 1898 reform), 40–2.

chiefly to the writings of Richard and Allen – also helped to shape the specific techniques, ideas and even world views of the reformers. The establishment of reform societies and the use of the periodical press to arouse interest in and support of reform were, if not directly inspired by missionary models, at least strongly influenced by them. So too, obviously, was K'ang Yu-wei's scheme for making Confucianism into a national religion, with its own holidays, empire-wide network of churches, and missionaries. (Reference should also be made here to the prominent Buddhist reformer, Yang Wen-hui, who was impressed by the picture of Christian missionaries, learned in their scriptures, going out into the interior to preach their doctrines to laymen.)

Comparison of the writings of missionaries and reformers suggests a very considerable missionary influence in the realms of educational and economic policy and on a variety of social questions. Missionary preferences in foreign affairs also seem to be reflected in the writings of many reformers, a case in point being the anti-Russianism of the predominantly Anglo-American Protestant missionary community. It was the evolving Chinese conception of the world and of mankind, however, that missionary writers probably affected most profoundly. T'an Ssu-t'ung's *Jen-hsüeh* (The study of humanity; 1898), one of the boldest philosophical statements of the late Ch'ing, gave equal weight to Christian and Confucian ethics – something unheard-of at the time. And the utopian dream, shared by K'ang, T'an and the early Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, of a future world order in which the barriers separating nations would be struck down and men would live together in harmony and peace, although not without roots in Chinese tradition, found strong reinforcement in the writings of Richard and other missionaries. To be sure, not all Chinese reformers were prepared to accept such a rose-coloured vision of the future, some (like Yen Fu) inclining much more to a view of the world in which struggle and conflict occupied the central place. Most reformers, however, were ready by 1900 to incorporate into their new world view the dogma of progress and an uncritical faith in the benefits to mankind of scientific advance, two notions that were propounded with wearisome repetition in the missionary literature of the day.

Where the missionaries of the late nineteenth century were least successful was in selling to the Chinese the proposition that Western learning and institutions, and the wealth and power that accompanied them, were somehow rooted in Christianity.⁴⁷ Some, like K'ang Yu-wei, granted that

⁴⁷ For a Chinese articulation of this failure, see the essay 'Lun Hsi-cheng Hsi-hsüeh chih-luan hsing-shuai chü yü Hsi-chiao wu-she' (The condition of Western government and the state of Western learning have nothing to do with Western religion), which appeared in 1898 in a

religion might save China, and even the world. But when it came to choosing his religion, K'ang's biggest concession to his missionary mentors was a Christianized Confucianism – a sizeable concession, perhaps, from the Chinese point of view, but not from the missionaries'. Timothy Richard's contention that progress was the universal ruling of God, with its implication that acceptance of the first would automatically lead to acceptance of the second, underwent a similar fate, the Chinese quickly discovering that they could reject God and still have progress. Chinese reformers, in short, were willing enough in these years to buy what the missionaries had to sell. But they were not willing to accept the conditions which the missionaries thought were implicit in the transaction.

When the suppression of the Boxer Uprising set the stage for a renewal of reform activity in the first decade of the twentieth century, missionary involvement and influence were sharply curtailed. One reason for this sudden shift may have been the increased importance of political issues – the struggle, for example, between the reformers and the revolutionaries – public discussion of which missionaries tended to avoid.⁴⁸ A second, and certainly more crucial, reason was the opening up of alternative (and for most Chinese more acceptable) channels of information concerning the non-Chinese world. China's own periodical press grew by leaps and bounds after the Sino-Japanese conflict, making readers less dependent on foreign-run Chinese-language magazines and papers, and from 1900 a steadily increasing flow of Chinese went abroad (particularly to Japan) to study.

No longer needed as apostles of reform and superseded as instruments for the transmission of secular Western culture, missionaries like Richard and Allen found themselves progressively less able, after 1900, to affect the Chinese scene. Reform-minded missionaries, vitally concerned with the welfare of the Chinese people and with China's fate as a nation, continued to play an active part in the twentieth century, notably in such areas as public health, education and rural reconstruction. But, important as their contribution was, it tended to be diffuse in content and local in range. China's problems were too massive, her political conditions too

Hunan reform journal edited by T'an Ssu-t'ung *et al.*, *Hsiang-hsüeh hsün-pao* (The new journal of Hunan), 4 vols., 1.441–77.

⁴⁸ There were, of course, exceptions. Alexander Williamson, in the early 1870s, published an article recommending gradual establishment of parliamentary government. See Kwang-Ching Liu, 'Nineteenth-century China: the disintegration of the old order and the impact of the West', P. T. Ho and Tang Tsou, eds. *China in crisis*, 2 vols., 1.140 n. Also, by the turn of the century, some missionaries had declared their sympathy for the young revolutionary cause. As a rule, however, missionaries appear to have feared the official backlash that might result from Christian identification, real or suspected, with the revolutionists. See Schiffrin, *Sun Yat-sen and the origins of the Chinese Revolution*, 90.

chaotic, and the secular agents of reform (both native and foreign) too numerous and diverse for missionaries ever again to have the kind of nation-wide impact that had been possible, for a flickering moment, in the waning years of the nineteenth century.

The turn of the century was a true turning point for Christian missions in another sense as well. The Boxer holocaust, which brought violent death to almost two hundred foreign missionaries (not counting the children of Protestants) and over thirty thousand Chinese Christians (mostly Catholic), climaxed years of mounting strain between the Chinese and foreign communities and represented a high-water mark in xenophobia-powered opposition to Christian missions. Anti-Christian feeling did not subside in the twentieth century. It lasted through the years of Kuomintang ascendancy and became effectively institutionalized under the Chinese People's Republic. But there was one outstanding difference. Where earlier opposition to Christianity symbolized the determination of an ancient civilization to resist the foreign forces threatening it with destruction, opposition in the twentieth century has been the expression of a young country restlessly in search of new grounds for self-respect. The anti-foreignism has survived, but within a new environment shaped more by anger than fear, more by modern nationalism than by old-style xenophobia.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS

I. INTRODUCTION: THE OLD ORDER

In the course of 2,000 years the Chinese historical record accumulated so voluminously that bibliography early became a specialty. Historians of China, both Chinese and foreign, have constantly produced bibliographies in the effort to avoid drowning in the flood of historical literature. For the English-reading public the quickest starting point is in the bibliographies attached to survey texts written for the obviously intelligent but unfortunately ignorant beginner. Most recently available are the reading lists in Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *The rise of modern China*, and Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, *The Far East, a history of Western impacts and Eastern responses, 1830–1973*. In one survey there is even a fifty-page essay on 650 books on China, mainly modern; see John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China*. For the present introductory chapter, the most recent background study, with selected bibliography, is Charles O. Hucker, *China's imperial past: an introduction to Chinese history and culture*.

What is the Chinese historical record from which all such Western works derive? The English-reading public interested in Chinese history will not be practically concerned (until more of its members read Chinese and Japanese) with the large apparatus of printed source materials, bibliographies, reference works and research aids available in sinological libraries, the mass and variety of which are the visible proof that sinology exists and prospers. But non-sinologists may indeed be interested and edified by reading sinological aids like Endymion Wilkinson, *The history of imperial China: a research guide*, which lays out in clear detail the main categories of source materials and of scholarly work on China to 1911 published in China, Japan and the West. This broad approach is continued in Andrew J. Nathan, *Modern China, 1840–1972: an introduction to sources and research aids*, which notes libraries, archives and a wealth of essential information about useful publications down to the 1970s. These recent guides refer to earlier ones to which they are affiliated.

This introductory chapter inevitably reflects the author's own survey (John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia, tradition and transformation*), but it is also indebted, like all surveys, to a great many other writers, some of whom are cited in the footnotes.

2 AND 8. CH'ING INNER ASIA

The history of Ch'ing Inner Asia between 1800 and 1862 has been a neglected topic. Enough primary material exists to permit detailed study, but few historians have attempted the task.

The best book is Morris Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia from 1368 to the present day*. O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: the 'great game'*, provides a good treatment of much of Ch'ing Inner Asia in its dimension of Sino-Russian relations. A Han Chinese perspective, placing Inner Asia in the context of general Ch'ing history, is to be found in Hsiao I-shan, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih* (A general history of the Ch'ing period), pt 2, revised edn (1962). Valuable background coverage is given in the *Iwanami-kōza Sekai rekishi* (Iwanami-kōza World History), vol. 13, by Hagiwara Jumpei, Saguchi Tōru (who covers the nineteenth century), Satō Hisashi and Wakamatsu Hiroshi. The framework of Inner Asian international politics may be seen in Ram Rahul, *Politics of central Asia*. Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian frontiers of China*, remains a basic study for all students of Inner Asian history. The most accessible general bibliography of works in European languages is Denis Sinor, comp. *Introduction à l'étude de l'Eurasie centrale*, but Ch'ing Inner Asia 1800–62 is very lightly represented. A bibliography of Chinese works is Teng Yen-lin, comp. *Chung-kuo pien-chiang t'u-chi lu* (Bibliography of works on the Chinese frontiers).

Basic works from the Ch'ing period are: the trilingual *Ch'in-ting wai-fan Meng-ku Hui-pu wang kung piao chuan* (Imperially commissioned genealogical tables and biographies of the princes and dukes of the Mongols and Muslim tribesmen of the outer entourage; 1795) – in Manchu, *Hesei toktobuha tuleri Monggo Hoise aiman-i wang gung-sai iletun ulabun*, and in Mongolian, *Jarligh-iyar toghtaghaghsan ghadaghadu Mongghol Khotong ayimagh-un wang güng-üd-ün iledkel shastir* – and its continuations for the Chia-ch'ing, Tao-kuang, Hsien-feng and T'ung-chih periods; Ch'i Yün-shih, comp. *Huang-ch'ao fan-pu yao-lieh* (Summary of essential data on the Inner Asian tribes [subordinate to] the imperial dynasty), which draws on the same material as the foregoing; and the trilingual *Ch'in-ting Li-fan Yüan tse-li* (Imperially commissioned [compilation of] precedents for the Li-fan Yüan; particularly the 1827 edn, revised and reprinted, 1843) – in Manchu, *Hesei toktobuha Tuleri golo-be dasara jurgan-i kooli bacin-i bithe*, and in Mongolian, *Jarligh-iyar toghtaghaghsan Ghadaghadu Mongghol-un törö-yi jasakhu yabudal-un yamun-u khaulii jüil-ün bichig*. The Ch'ing institutional framework is outlined in the *Hui-tien* (Collected statutes) and the *Shih-li* (precedents), in particular the 1818 and 1899 edns.

Good separate studies of Manchurian, Mongolian, East Turkestani and Tibetan history are available for general readers of English, and there are also important histories in other languages. For Manchuria, the only synthetic treatment is Robert H. G. Lee, *The Manchurian frontier in Ch'ing history*.

For Mongolia the historical literature is richer, but it emphasizes Outer Mongolia, leaving the Inner Mongols and Oirats relatively unstudied. In

English, the main contributions are Charles R. Bawden, *The modern history of Mongolia* and Robert James Miller, *Monasteries and culture change in Inner Mongolia*. But the fullest treatments are those of the Mongols themselves – *Bügd Naïramdax Mongol Ard Ulsyn tüüx, Ded bot'* [2]: 1604–1917 (History of the Mongolian People's Republic, Pt 2 [1604–1917]); Š. Nacagdorž, *Manžijn erxkeeld baïsan üyeiin Xalxyn xuraanguï tüüx (1691–1911)* (Short history of Khalkha in the period of Manchu dominion, 1691–1911); and some documentary collections and monographs on more restricted topics, notably Š. Nacagdorž and C. Nasanbalžir, eds. *Dörvön aimgiin alba tegjitgesen dans* (Tax regulation registers for the four aimaks; C. Nasanbalžir, *Manž Čin ulsad Ar mongoloos niilүүлž baïsan alba (1691–1911)* (Obligations to the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty fulfilled by Outer Mongolia, 1691–1911); and C. Nasanbalžir and Š. Nacagdorž, comps. *Ardyn žargyn bičig (XVIII–XX žuuny exen)*, which has been translated by Š. Rasidondug in collaboration with Veronika Veit as *Petitions of grievances submitted by the people (18th–beginning of 20th century)*.

The main Chinese work is Chang Mu, *Meng-ku yu-mu chi* (On the nomads of Mongolia), translated into Russian by P. S. Popov as *Men-gu-iu-mu-tsz'i: Zapiski o mongol'skikh kočev'iakh* and into Japanese by Susa Kakitsu as *Kaikō Mōko yūboku ki*. A bibliography of Chinese scholarship is Chang Hsing-t'ang, comp. *Meng-ku ts'an-k'ao shu-mu* (Bibliography of research on the Mongols).

Much of the most important historical work on the nineteenth-century Mongols has come from Japanese and Russian historians. Two well known older works, Yano Jin'ichi, *Kindai Mōkoshi kenkyū* (Study of modern Mongolian history) and Hashimoto Kōhō, *Mōko no ramakyō* (Mongolia's lamaist religion) have been followed and largely supplanted by Tayama Shigeru, *Shin jidai ni okeru Mōko no shakai seido* (The Mongolian social system in the Ch'ing period), which is essential reading for all students of Ch'ing-dynasty Mongolian history. A bibliography of Japanese Mongolian studies is Iwamura Shinobu and Fujieda Akira, comps. *Mongoru kenkyū bunken mokuroku (1900–1972): Bibliography of Mongolia for 1900–1972*. The principal Russian works are G. E. Grumm-Grzhimailo, *Zapadnaia Mongolii i Uriankhaiskii kraï: Western Mongolia and the Uriankhai country*, vol. 2: *Istoricheskie očerki eticheskoi stran v sviazi s istoriei Srednei Azii: An historical sketch of these countries in connection with the history of central Asia*, and the joint Soviet–Mongolian collaborative effort, *Istoriia Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki* (History of the Mongolian People's Republic), revised and expanded edn, 1967. A Chinese translation of the first edition (1954) is entitled *Meng-ku Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo t'ung-shih*. A bibliography of works mainly in Russian but also in other European languages is V. V. Khurlat, comp. *Bibliografiia rabot po Mongolii* (Bibliography of works on Mongolia), I–III. For literature, G. I. Mikhailov, *Literaturnoe nasledstvo mongolov* (The Mongols' literary legacy), is a succinct treatment. The most important study of Mongolian literary history for the nineteenth century is Walther Heissig's masterful *Geschichte der mongolischen Literatur*, vol. 1.

For Sinkiang in the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, the leading

authority is Saguchi Tōru, whose *Jūhachi-jūkyūseiki Higashi Torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū* (Study of the social history of Eastern Turkestan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) and numerous articles dominate the field. Two parts of his *Jūhachi* have been translated into English: 'The Eastern trade of the Khoqand khanate' (chapter 6), *Memoirs of the research department of the Toyo Bunko*, 24 (1965) 47–114; and 'The revival of the White Mountain Khwājas, 1760–1820 (from Sarimsāq to Jihāngīr)' (partial translation of chapters 2 and 7), *Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture*, 14 (1968) 7–20. His *Roshia to Ajia sōgen* (Russia and the Asian steppe) is a pleasant introduction to the history of middle Asia from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth. An essential bibliography of Japanese studies is Yüan T'ung-li and Watanabe Hiroshi, comps. *Shinkyō kenkyū bunken mokuroku 1886–1962: Nichibun hon: Classified bibliography of Japanese books and articles concerning Sinkiang 1886–1962*.

The most influential accounts of any of the Altishahr rebellions are those of Wei Yüan in *Sheng-wu chi* (Chronicle of imperial military campaigns), translated into Japanese under the auspices of the Kōa In Seimu Bu (Political Affairs Section of the Asia Development Board), with the title *Seibu ki* (1943). The section on Jahāngīr has been translated into French by Camille Imbault-Huart in his *Recueil de documents sur l'Asie centrale*. The main Han Chinese contribution to the study of Sinkiang's history is Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih* (History of China's management of the western regions). A native treatment, written from a separatist point of view, is Muḥammad Amīn Beg Boghra, *Sharqī Türkistān tārīkhī* (History of Eastern Turkestan). Jahāngīr's jihad is covered by Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Hui-chiang chiao-ch'in ni-i fang-lüeh (An imperially commissioned military history of the pacification of the Muslim frontier and the apprehension of the rebels' posterity) comp. by Ts'ao Chen-yung *et al.*

A gifted Soviet historian, V. S. Kuznetsov, has substantially advanced the field with his *Ekonomicheskaja politika Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane v pervoi polovine XIX veka* (Economic policy of the Ch'ing government in Sinkiang in the first half of the nineteenth century) and several important articles: 'O reaktsionnoi sushchnosti dvizheniia Dzhangira' (On the reactionary nature of Jahāngīr's movement), *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, Seriia istorii, arkheologii i etnografii*, no. 1 (15) (1961) 70–91; 'K voprosu o politike Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Vostochnom Turkestane vo vtoroi chetverti XIX v.' (On the question of the Ch'ing government's policy in Eastern Turkestan in the second quarter of the nineteenth century), *Izvestiia AN KazSSR, Ser. ist. arkh. etn.*, no. 2 (16) (1961) 54–64; 'Ekonomicheskaja politika Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane v pervoi polovine XIX veka' (same title as his book), *Izvestiia AN KazSSR, Ser. ist. arkh. etn.*, no. 3 (17) (1961) 78–89; 'Kazakhskokitaiskie torgovyie otnosheniia v kontse XVIII veka (po kitaiskim istochnikam)' (Kazakh–Chinese trade relations at the end of the eighteenth century [according to Chinese sources]), *Trudy Instituta Istorii, Arkheologii i Etnografii im. Ch. Ch. Valikhanova Akademii Nauk Kazakhskoi SSR*, 15 (1962) 138–45; and 'K voprosu o torgovle Anglii i Rossii s Sin'tszianom v pervoi polovine XIX veka' (On the

question of the trade of England and Russia with Sinkiang in the first half of the nineteenth century), *Izvestiia AN KazSSR, Seriiia obshchestvennykh nauk*, no. 6 (1963) 20–30. An English summary of the first three articles is 'Tsin administration in Sinkiang in the first half of the nineteenth century', *Central Asian Review*, 10.3 (1962) 271–84.

L. I. Duman, *Agrarnaia politika Tsinskogo (manchzhurskogo) pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziiane v kontse XVIII veka* (Agrarian policy of the Ch'ing [Manchu] government in Sinkiang at the end of the eighteenth century) gives much that is relevant for the nineteenth century, as does Duman's condensed treatment, 'Zavoevanie Tsinskoi imperiei Dzhungarii i Vostochnogo Turkestana' (Conquest of Zungharia and Eastern Turkestan by the Ch'ing empire), in S. L. Tikhvinskii, ed. *Man'chzhurskoe vladychestvo v Kitae* (Manchu dominion in China), 264–88.

As Anglo-Russian rivalry increased in the nineteenth century, both sides intensified their gathering of information in Sinkiang, which culminated in two virtually paired reports. The Russian one is Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, 'O sostoiianii Altyskhara ili shesti vostochnykh gorodov kitaiskoi provintsii Nan-lu (Maloi Bukharii) v 1858–1859 godakh' (On conditions in Altishahr or the six eastern cities of the Chinese province of Nan-lu [Little Bukharia] in 1858–9), amplified by a number of other pieces on Zungharia and Altishahr that have been published in Valikhanov's *Sobranie sochinenii* (Collected works), vol. 2. The corresponding British report is R. H. Davies, comp. *Report on the trade and resources of the countries on the north-western boundary of British India*. Davies' report, although of enormous value to the historian, seems to have been largely forgotten, whereas Valikhanov's account has left its imprint on virtually all subsequent scholarship. An English translation is to be found in John and Robert Michell, trs, *The Russians in central Asia*.

Henry Walter Bellew, drawing heavily on Valikhanov, wrote a 'History of Káshghar', which was included in T. D. Forsyth, *Report of a mission to Yarkund in 1873*. Forsyth's Russian contemporary, A. N. Kuropatkin, wrote a corresponding report entitled *Kashgariia: istoriko-geograficheskii ocherk strany, ee voennye sily, promyshlennost' i torgovlia*, translated into English by Walter E. Gowan as *Kashgaria: Eastern or Chinese Turkistan: historical and geographical sketch of the country, its military strength, industries, and trade*. This too owes much to Valikhanov as does the best of all the comprehensive histories of Eastern Turkestan, V. V. Grigor'ev, 'Vostochnyi ili Kitaiskii Turkestan' (Eastern or Chinese Turkestan), published in Grigor'ev's *Zemlevedenie K. Rittera* (K. Ritter's *Erdkunde*), pt 2, where material from Davies' *Report* is also included. Other Russian works of interest may be found in the bibliography of Kuznetsov's *Ekonomicheskaiia*.

The history of Tibet is comparatively well covered, but the period 1800–62 has not yet received the attention that it deserves, and the literature stresses Tibet proper. Particularly neglected by modern historians are Tsinghai and Kham. The principal treatments in English are Pedro Carrasco, *Land and*

polity in Tibet; Alastair Lamb, *Britain and Chinese central Asia: the road to Lhasa 1767 to 1905*; H. E. Richardson, *A short history of Tibet*; Giuseppe Tucci, *Tibet land of snows*; W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: a political history*; David Snellgrove and H. Richardson, *A cultural history of Tibet*; and R. A. Stein, *Tibetan civilization* cited above in chapter 2, n. 2, and also L. Petech, *Aristocracy and government in Tibet 1728–1959*. W. W. Rockhill, 'The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and their relations with the Manchu emperors of China, 1644–1908', *T'oung pao*, 11 (1910) 1–104, remains useful. A list of Tibetan primary sources is given in Shakabpa, *Tibet*, 335–9. The basic Japanese study is Suzuki Chūsei, *Chibetto o meguru Chū-In kankei shi: Jūhachiseiki nakagoro kara jūkyūseiki nakagoro made* (History of Sino-Indian relations concerning Tibet: mid-eighteenth century to mid-nineteenth century). Günther Schulemann, *Geschichte der Dalai-Lamas* is also of value.

The Huang-chung region of Tsinghai is covered in Louis M. J. Schram, 'The Monguors of the Kansu-Tibetan frontier', pt I: *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, NS, vol. 44 (1954) pt 1, pp. 1–138; pt II: *Transactions*, NS, vol. 47 (1957) pt 1, pp. 1–164; pt III: *Transactions*, NS, vol. 51 (1961) pt 3, pp. 1–117. For the history of Ladakh, the main book is A. H. Francke, *A history of western Tibet*, and for the years between 1800 and 1862, Alexander Cunningham, *Laddak physical, statistical, and historical, with notices of the surrounding countries* is indispensable. For Bhutan, Ram Rahul, *Modern Bhutan* is useful. For Nepal, the excellent study by Leo E. Rose, *Nepal: strategy for survival* makes entertaining and informative reading.

3. DYNASTIC DECLINE AND THE ROOTS OF REBELLION

No satisfactory work covering the internal history of the Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang reigns (1796–1850) exists in any language. This is not because sources are lacking, but rather because our conception of modern history has developed in ways that have tended to promote research either on the formative period of basic Ch'ing institutions, or on the ways in which those institutions responded to the Western challenge. Therefore this important period, in which the distinctive problems of late imperial society were making themselves felt in political and intellectual life, has remained under-researched. Opportunities for significant historical work are therefore unusually rich.

The approach to the period must begin with its place in the larger span of Ch'ing history. Ping-ti Ho has written two excellent general essays that present over-views of the mid-Ch'ing period: 'The significance of the Ch'ing period in Chinese history', *JAS*, 26.2 (Feb. 1967) 189–95; and also chapter 9 in his *Studies on the population of China, 1368–1953*. Another general essay on the first half of the Ch'ing period is Frederic Wakeman, Jr, 'High Ch'ing: 1683–1839', in James B. Crowley, ed. *Modern East Asia: essays in interpretation*. Of the two standard Chinese histories of the Ch'ing, Meng Sen's *Ch'ing-tai shih* (A history of the Ch'ing dynasty) is the most useful for general institutional analysis; while Hsiao I-shan, *Ch'ing-tai i'ung-shih* (A general history of the Ch'ing period),

includes a plethora of frequently undocumented detail and excerpts from private and official writings, with many anecdotes from *wai-shih* ('unofficial' histories) (see below). On the White Lotus Rebellion, the leading works are by Suzuki Chūsei, as cited in the notes to this chapter. For more specific topical guidance to secondary works in all languages, consult G. W. Skinner's *Modern Chinese society: an analytic bibliography*.

Pending the publication of the immense palace and Grand Council archives collection in China (a project already begun on Taiwan for the late nineteenth century), the basic sources for early nineteenth-century history remain the *Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu* (Veritable records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty) and other standard documentary collections. The nature of these sources is discussed in Endymion Wilkinson, *The history of imperial China: a research guide*. As a particularly useful (and under-used) general introduction to the primary sources, special mention should be made of the governmental encyclopaedia *Huang-ch'ao cheng-tien lei-tsu'an* (Classified compendium on the governmental statutes of the Ch'ing dynasty), compiled by Hsi Yü-fu, which draws from a wide range of official and unofficial writings and always cites its sources.

While the development of official policy may be followed through the official documentary collections and encyclopaedias, conditions in local society remain a more difficult research problem. Besides the thousands of local gazetteers (*ti-fang chih*) which exist from county (hsien) level upwards, valuable information can be found in two collections of memorials derived from palace archives: Lo Chen-yü, comp. *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i* (Memorials of the great Ch'ing), which covers the period to 1820; and a continuation, compiled by Wang Yün-wu, *Tao-Hsien-T'ung-Kuang ssu-ch'ao tsou-i* (Memorials from the Tao-kuang, Hsien-feng, T'ung-chih and Kuang-hsu reigns). Though these memorials were apparently copied out in the palace during Ch'ing times for exemplary (ideological or literary) purposes, rather than for their importance in policy-formation, they are of considerable value for their detailed picture of local conditions.

Our understanding of this period will remain two-dimensional unless we can reveal the web of informal relationships behind the official documentary record. One of the best ways to do so is through biography. Arthur W. Hummel, ed. *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, 1644–1912*, is the standard reference work in English and includes bibliographic references. However Hummel's work is limited to leading officials and some influential or highly regarded members of the scholar-gentry. Indices to Ch'ing biographies in Chinese are listed by Wilkinson, *History of imperial China*, 104. Of the biographical collections, the most useful are: *Pei-chuan chi* (Collected memorial inscriptions), compiled by Ch'ien I-chi; and *Kuo-ch'ao ch'i-hsien lei-cheng* (Classified biographical records of venerable persons of the reigning dynasty), compiled by Li Huan. The latter usually includes an official biography compiled by the State History Office (Kuo-shih kuan) as well as one or more biographies from other sources. The former consists solely of privately-written commemorative essays as well as a

few entries from local gazetteers, all with attributions. *Pei-chuan chi* frequently includes more entries for each individual than *Kuo-ch'ao ch'i-hsien lei-cheng*. Although much of the material overlaps, these collections are best used together. The *Pei-chuan chi*, which was completed by 1826, is supplemented by the *Hsü* (continued) *Pei-chuan chi* and the *Pei-chuan chi pu* (supplement), the former compiled by Miao Ch'üan-sun, the latter by Min Erh-ch'ang. Biographies of individuals not included in these major collections can often be found in *Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan* (Collected biographies of the Ch'ing period), compiled by the Ch'ing History Office (Ch'ing-shih kuan). This collection contains only one official biography for each individual. In addition to supplying a cross-check on other sources, authorship of privately written biographies is a useful preliminary guide to informal networks of friendship and political alliance.

A largely untapped resource for the study of Ch'ing history and politics is the wealth of information contained in the so-called unofficial histories (*yeh-shih* or *wai-shih*). The seven listed here are a sample of the best of these. *Ch'ing-ch'ao yeh-shih ta-kuan* (An over-view of unofficial history from the Ch'ing dynasty), compiled by Hsiao-heng-hsiang-shih chu-jen, 12 vols., includes anecdotes drawn from over 110 sources (some of which are listed by the compiler in his preface) as well as personal recollections of the compiler, all without attribution. The well known voluminous *Ch'ing pai lei-ch'ao* (Unofficial sources on the Ch'ing arranged by categories; 12 vols.), compiled by Hsü K'o, is arranged in 92 categories and chronologically ordered within each category. The contents are indexed in Saeki Tomi, *Chūgoku zuihitsu zatchō sakuin* (An index to the notebooks of various writers). *Ch'ing-tai i-wen* (Anecdotes about the Ch'ing dynasty), compiled by Ch'iu K'uang-lu (Ch'iu Yü-lin), is arranged in seven categories including famous people, palace gossip, foreign relations and the Taiping Rebellion, all entries without attribution. The compiler gives a partial listing of the 'hundreds' of works consulted. *Ch'ing-t'an* (Pure discourse), compiled by Ou-yang Shao-hsi, is divided into palace affairs, military problems, foreign relations, natural disasters and 'the rich and powerful' (*ch'üan-kuei*). In some cases the compiler cites sources for individual entries. *Chiu-wensui-pi* (Random notes on old tales), compiled by Yao Yung-p'u, includes annotations which give first names (*ming*) for individuals referred to only by surname or by literary name. *Ch'un-ping-shih yeh-ch'eng* (Unofficial record from the Spring Ice Studio), compiled by Li Yueh-jui (Li Meng-fu) is not arranged in categories. It does include many well known anecdotes which appear in other sources, including *Ch'ing-t'an* (above).

A final source in this group which has received more attention and has been accorded more respect is the Manchu prince Chao-lien's *Hsiao-t'ing tsa-lu* (Miscellaneous notes from the Hsiao pavilion, and *Hsiao-t'ing hsiu-lu* (Notes from the Hsiao pavilion, continued). The latter was completed by 1826 and is thus confined largely to observations on the Chia-ch'ing reign. Chao-lien's observations are a valuable source of information on the Ho-shen years and the early Chia-ch'ing reign. The contents of both works are indexed in *Chūgoku zuihitsu sakuin* (Index to Chinese random notes), compiled by Tōyōshi Kenkyūkai, 1954.

4. THE CANTON TRADE AND THE OPIUM WAR

There are rich documentary sources for the history of the Canton trade and of the Opium War. In addition to the primary sources mentioned in the bibliographical note to chapter 5, there are several annotated collections of diplomatic documents: Chiang T'ing-fu (T. F. Tsiang), *Chin-tai Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih-liao chi-yao* (A source book of important documents in modern Chinese diplomatic history), 2 vols.; Lo-shu Fu, *A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations (1644-1820)*; and Pin-chia Kuo, *A critical study of the first Anglo-Chinese war*. The four volumes of T'ao Hsi-sheng's *Lieh-ch'iang ch'in-lieh* (The aggression of the great powers), published by the Kuomintang Commission to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the 1911 revolution, also contain essays and memoirs not included in the Peking collection of materials on the Opium War (Ch'i Ssu-ho, *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng*; see note to chapter 5).

Earlier diplomatic relations between China and the West are partly detailed in E. H. Pritchard's 1936 study, *The crucial years of Anglo-Chinese relations, 1750-1800*, which illuminates European views. The many excellent essays in *The Chinese world order*, edited by John K. Fairbank, provide more recent evaluations of Chinese conceptions of foreign affairs; and the introductory chapters of Fairbank's own classic study, *Trade and diplomacy on the China coast*, contain some of the best comments ever written about the Chinese management of diplomatic relations.

The background to nineteenth-century trade is given in almost documentary detail by H. B. Morse in *The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, 1635-1834*, 5 vols. The private 'Country trade' is well analysed by Michael Greenberg in *British trade and the opening of China, 1800-1842*, which is based upon research in the Jardine papers at the University of Cambridge. By far the best and most synoptic study of Sino-foreign trade before the Opium War is Louis Dermigny's magisterial *La Chine et l'occident: le commerce à Canton au XVIII^e siècle, 1719-1833*, 3 vols. and folio.

There are many valuable studies of the hong merchants of Canton. One of the earliest was written by the French sinologist, Henri Cordier: 'Les marchands hanistes de Canton', in *T'oung Pao*. The most extensive study based upon Chinese sources was written by Liang Chia-pin in 1937, *Kuang-tung shih-san hang k'ao* (Study of the thirteen hongts of Kwangtung). More recently, Dilip Basu has completed a dissertation entitled 'Asian merchants and Western trade: a comparative study of Calcutta and Canton, 1800-1840', which details the relations between the hongists and other commercial groups like the Banians of India and the private houses of Boston and Salem. The importance of these relations, and of private bills of exchange in the Canton trade, is also emphasized by W. E. Cheong in an important article, 'Trade and finance in China: 1784-1834, a reappraisal', which was published in *Business History*, 8.41 (Jan. 1965) 34-56.

Many of the studies mentioned above stress the importance of opium to the

private and Company trade with China. Official English policy towards the opium trade was carefully studied in 1934 by David Edward Owen in *British opium policy in India and China*. Three years later W. C. Costin published his study of *Great Britain and China, 1833-1860* which dealt rather more gingerly with the opium question. Sir Charles Webster's *The foreign policy of Palmerston 1830-1841*, 2 vols., later examined the China question from the point of view of the liberal movement in England, thereby emphasizing domestic political issues rather than the opium trade's economic importance to the British government. However, the work by Michael Greenberg mentioned above redresses this balance. The most recent and authoritative study of the opium question is by Jonathan Spence 'Opium smoking in Ch'ing China', in Frederic Wakeman, Jr and Carolyn Grant, eds. *Conflict and control in late imperial China*. Chinese reactions to the opium trade are carefully examined in Hsin-pao Chang's important work, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*. There is also an excellent biography of Commissioner Lin Tse-hsü in Chinese, *Lin Tse-hsü chuan* by Lin Ch'ung-yung, who discusses the opium suppression measures in considerable detail.

The Opium War itself provoked a spate of memoirs by contemporary observers and participants. On the Western side, studies like John Ouchterlony's *The Chinese War* and W. D. Bernard's *Narrative of the voyages and services of the 'Nemesis' from 1840 to 1843* – both published in 1844 – provided vivid accounts of the conflict. These were in turn to inspire a succession of lively military histories of the Opium War, beginning with Maurice Collis' *Foreign mud* in 1946, continuing with Edgar Holt's *The Opium Wars in China* in 1964, and culminating in Jack Beeching's *The Chinese Opium Wars*. The best of any such work written in English and one which combines military history with excellent social and political analysis, is Peter Ward Fay's *The Opium War 1840-1842*.

There were also contemporary Chinese memoirs by wartime participants. Lin Tse-hsü's own collected works, *Lin Wen-chung kung ch'üan-chi*, 2 vols., include journals from that period, as well as letters to friends and memorials to the emperor. Lin's advisers also wrote histories of the war – Liang T'ing-nan's *I-fen chi-wen* (An account of the barbarian invasion) and a portion of Wei Yüan's *Sheng-wu chi* (Chronicle of imperial military campaigns; translated in part by E. H. Parker in 1888 under the title, *Chinese account of the Opium War*). A more general history of Sino-Western contact during that entire period, including much first-hand material, was published in 1851 by Hsia Hsieh as *Chung-hsi chi-shih* (Records of Sino-Western relations). There are also other contemporary accounts contained in the documentary collections mentioned earlier and in A-ying's *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng wen-hsüeh chi* (Collected literary materials on the Opium War), 2 vols. Some of these, including Lin Tse-hsü's diary, are translated in Arthur Waley's sympathetic and entertaining study, *The Opium War through Chinese eyes*.

The negotiations which culminated in the Treaty of Nanking are examined in several of Chiang T'ing-fu's works, including his English-language article on the extension of equal commercial privileges to Western nations (*Chinese Social and*

Political Science Review, October 1931). These negotiations are also the subject of Ssu-yü Teng's study, *Chang Hsi and the Treaty of Nanking, 1842*, as well as of Fairbank's work on trade and diplomacy mentioned above. Finally, some of the social and economic effects of the war are discussed in several important essays by the Taiping historian, Hsieh Hsing-yao. These essays are collected in his *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-shih lun-ts'ung* (Essays on the history of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom). The connection between the Opium War and the origin of the Taiping Rebellion is also emphasized by Hatano Yoshihiro in his work on the Taipings in *Rekishi-gaku kenkyū* (Historical research) (March 1951), and by Frederic Wakeman, Jr, in *Strangers at the gate: social disorder in south China, 1839-1861*.

5. THE CREATION OF THE TREATY SYSTEM

The sources on the 'opening' or invasion of China in the late 1840s and 1850s have a very marked genealogy. They began with the publication of the British side of the story in parliamentary papers or bluebooks shortly after the events occurred – such as the big bluebook of 1840 and the 488-page bluebook of 1859, which in each case provided the documentation to show how British policy had had to develop as it did. To understand is to forgive, and the world has comprehended the British actions ever since. Only recently have studies appeared re-evaluating the evidence to suggest, for example, that Consul Harry Parkes at Canton in fomenting the second war in 1856 lied about the *Lorch Arrow* flying the British flag (see note 42, page 247).

The Chinese side of the story began to become available only in 1930 with the publication by the Palace Museum in Peking of the special compilations on 'the management of barbarian affairs' in the Tao-kuang reign from 1836, as well as in the Hsien-feng and T'ung-chih reigns down to 1874 (see in bibliography below *IWSM*, *Ch'ing-tai ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo* and the account in Earl Swisher, *China's management of the American barbarians*). The 1930s down to 1937 saw a flood of documentary publications on China's foreign relations from the Department of Historical Records (Wen-hsien kuan) of the Palace Museum (see list in John K. Fairbank, *Ch'ing documents: an introductory syllabus*). In 1936 there was also published in Tokyo, the 4,485 chapters (*ch'uan*) of the *Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu* (Veritable Records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty), so that quite suddenly historians could read the principal memorials from officials and edicts from the emperor, hitherto largely secret, that had embodied the major deliberations of the Ch'ing government. To be sure, selections of court records like the *Tung-hua lu* (THL) as well as the collected memorials of some leading officials had been available before the 1930s, but not in sufficient mass to inspire a field of research; nor by then had many researchers gone behind the copious contents of the bluebooks to ransack the holdings of the Public Record Office (PRO) in London.

In the forty years since the 1930s further documentation has been made available on both sides – at the PRO in the form of the legation and consular

archives brought back from China, the confidential prints (see Lo Hui-min) and most recently the Chinese files from the British embassy in Peking (see David Pong, *A critical guide to the Kwangtung provincial archives deposited at the Public Record Office of London*). A Japanese contribution has been made by Sasaki Masaya, who has published a series of volumes of materials in Chinese found in the PRO (see Noriko Kamachi, John K. Fairbank and Chüzō Ichiko, *Japanese studies of modern China since 1953*, items 2.2.3, 2.3.21–2).

On the Chinese side extensive documentary collections have emerged since 1950 from both Taipei and Peking; see especially the six-volume publication of 1954, Ch'i Ssu-ho, *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng* (The Opium War), which seeks to document popular feelings and movements in addition to the official record. Particularly noteworthy are the materials from popular sources compiled by A-ying (pen-name of Ch'ien Hsing-ts'un; see bibliography).

The treaty ports began quite early to produce a body of literature on contemporary China in a tradition that still continues unabated. The first sino-logical pundit, who had been an East India Company official and became British envoy and governor of Hong Kong, was Sir John Francis Davis, whose two volumes of 1836, *The Chinese: a general description of the empire of China and its inhabitants*, were followed by a revised and enlarged two volumes of 908 pages in 1857. By that time it was outclassed by the most influential of modern compendious accounts, S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom: a survey of the geography, government, literature, social life, arts, and history of the Chinese empire* (2 vols., 1848, 1,204 pages; rev. edn 1883, 1,611 pages). Williams' work directly reflected the foreign experience, and especially the early missionary approach, in Canton from 1833. It also drew upon the monthly *Chinese Repository* edited by E. C. Bridgman and Williams at Macao and Canton, from 1832 to 1851. The *China Mail* began publication at Hong Kong in 1845 and the *North-China Herald* at Shanghai in 1850. All these periodicals recorded events and also served to express and perpetuate foreign views of things Chinese.

As the record thus became available, a major historian emerged in the person of a retired commissioner of Chinese maritime customs, Hosea Ballou Morse (Harvard BA 1874, LID 1924), whose first volume of *The international relations of the Chinese empire*, published in 1910, became the chief classic of 'bluebook history'. Dr Morse's thirty-years' experience as a late Ch'ing official gave his treatment of the 1834–60 record a degree of realism and (for his day) impartiality seldom matched. In Japan major work on this period has been published by Prof. Masataka Banno of the University of Tokyo (see the 20-odd items in Kamachi, Fairbank and Ichiko, *Japanese studies*). His principal work in English is *China and the West 1858–1861: the origins of the Tsungli Yamen*. Other works of value are of course cited in the footnotes to chapter 5.

Treaty-port biographies include an enthusiastic two-volume *The life of Sir Harry Parkes* by Stanley Lane-Poole and F. V. Dickens, and a two-volume life of Sir R. Alcock, *The Englishman in China during the Victorian era* by Alexander Michie. Both these men deserve modern reappraisal. Travel accounts include

fascinating observations by a French priest, Evariste Huc, *A journey through the Chinese empire*, 2 vols., and by an English botanist, Robert Fortune, who got tea plants for India on three journeys through interior provinces in the 1840s and 1850s. Both the first and the second wars produced many memoirs by foreign participants.

Contemporary writings of Chinese observers were also numerous. Best known are Wei Yüan's *Hai-kuo t'u-chih* (Illustrated treatise on the maritime kingdoms) and Hsü Chi-yü's *Ying-huan chih-lüeh* (A brief survey of the maritime circuit), both produced as world geographies in the 1840s and recently studied by Jane Kate Leonard, Peter M. Mitchell and Fred W. Drake among others. The late Hsin-pao Chang's study of Commissioner Lin Tse-hsü has been noted in the preceding section. A study of Commissioner Yeh Ming-ch'en has been made by J. Y. Wong from the Kwangtung provincial archives at the PRO mentioned above. The forty-odd monographs produced from the Tsungli Yamen archives at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, are concerned mainly with the period after 1860, but works by Lü Shih-ch'iang, Wang Erh-min *et al.* go further back.

On the French part in the second war see John F. Cady, *The roots of French imperialism in eastern Asia*. On the domestic history of Hong Kong, G. B. Endacott, *Government and people in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: a constitutional history*. The early history of Shanghai awaits treatment.

Yet on balance, when all this historical work on the first close contact between China and the West is weighed against the issues involved – economic, cultural and social as well as political – historians seem still only at the beginning of encompassing the subject. Partly this is because attention has been drawn to the larger scene post-1860, partly it is due to the underdevelopment of Chinese history generally for the first half of the nineteenth century. Major work on the Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang eras (1796-1850) is still hard to find in any language. Articles in *Li-shih yen-chiu* (Historical research) have raised questions and asserted new views; work from substantial Chinese historians is to be expected.

6. THE TAIPING REBELLION

Hampered by the scarcity and world-wide dispersal of basic documents, professional historiography of the Taiping Rebellion did not begin in China until the 1930s. Led by Lo Erh-kang, whose *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-kang* (An outline history of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom) is still the best short survey of the movement, the new generation of critical historians began to open up the field, based on many newly discovered Chinese documents in foreign museums and libraries. In the West, the treaty-port perspective on the rebellion was abruptly transcended in 1927 by William J. Hail, whose *Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion* put the Ever Victorious Army firmly in its Chinese context through the use of Tseng Kuo-fan's collected works. Since then a huge body of sources

and studies has emerged, the shape and extent of which are best appreciated by consulting the excellent critical bibliography by Ssu-yü Teng, *Historiography of the Taiping Rebellion*, which treats sources and monographs in east Asian and Western languages.

Researchers will also want to consult Chang Hsiu-min *et al.* *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo tzu-liao mu-lu* (Bibliography of sources on the Taiping Rebellion), which is strong on local sources arranged by province. For the important information in local gazetteers, often the only indication of the effects of the rebellion on local society, consult the bibliography of 374 titles appended to Kuo T'ing-i, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih* (A historical chronology of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom).

Since Ssu-yü Teng's bibliography was published, a number of important works have appeared. Among them is the best history of the movement in English, by Franz Michael in collaboration with Chang Chung-li: *The Taiping Rebellion: history and documents*. The first volume is a well-researched narrative history. The second and third are a massive compilation of newly-translated Taiping documents, ranging from major constitutional and canonical works to fragmentary ephemera. The critical apparatus in these volumes, in addition to an extensive bibliography in east Asian and Western languages, makes the work essential for serious research in Taiping studies.

Another publication since Teng's bibliography is a massive collection of sources assembled by the Taiping Historical Museum at Nanking, on the basis of an exhaustive multi-province search through local libraries, evidently supervised by Lo Erh-kang. Many rare or unpublished items were found; since the total gleanings were too immense to publish, a selection was issued in six volumes as *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi* (Shortened collection from the collected historical materials on the Taiping Kingdom). Also published is a facsimile of the doctrinal spark of the Taiping conflagration, Liang A-fa's *Ch'üan-shih liang-yen* (Good words to admonish the age), a rare document often discussed but seldom read.

Among other recent works are Wang Erh-min's study of Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army, *Huai-chün chih* (Treatise on the Anhwei Army); Ssu-yü Teng's *The Taiping Rebellion and the Western powers*, which goes well beyond its title to discuss many miscellaneous side-currents of the movement, including other rebellions; and the English abridgment of Jen (Chien) Yu-wen's monumental study of the rebellion, issued as *The Taiping revolutionary movement*. Other useful sources have been cited in the footnotes to chapter 6.

7. SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1800-62

The published literature on nineteenth-century Sino-Russian relations stresses the negotiations for the Aigun, Tientsin and Peking treaties. Less studied are Sino-Russian trade, especially in Sinkiang, and the background to the Treaty of Kulja. Soviet writing tries mainly to exculpate Russia from her seizures of

Ch'ing territory. Chinese writing is mainly accusatory in the same vein. Even on this topic, no deep analysis has yet been published from either point of view. We still wait to learn the full dimensions of the Amur issue within the Russian government and the degree to which Muraviev's acts coincided with official directives. We also wait to learn how it happened that Peking allowed the situation to reach the point of Russian annexation, how much the Ch'ing government knew or cared about north-eastern Manchuria, and what repercussions this loss of territory had in China. (How did the government explain it? Who cared?)

For English readers, O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: the 'great game'*, is the best study of Sino-Russian relations as a whole. For the 1858–60 negotiations, the fullest treatment is R. K. I. Quested, *The expansion of Russia in east Asia 1857–1860*. Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *China's entrance into the family of nations: the diplomatic phase 1858–1880*, is also valuable. An older, standard work on Russia's incorporation of the Amur is Ernst G. Ravenstein, *The Russians on the Amur*. The eighteenth-century background to Sino-Russian relations in the 1800s is Clifford M. Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin: Russia's trade with China and its setting, 1727–1805*.

The principal Soviet studies are M. I. Sladkovskii, *Istoriia torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii narodov Rossii s Kitaem (do 1917 g.)* (History of commercial-economic relations of the peoples of Russia with China, to 1917), and A. L. Narochnitskii, *Kolonial'naia politika kapitalisticheskikh derzhav na Dal'nem Vostoke 1860–1895* (Colonial policy of the capitalist powers in the Far East 1860–1895). Ivan Barsukov, *Graf Nikolai Nikolaevich Murav'ev-Amurskii* (Count N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii), remains an indispensable source for Russian actions on the Amur. For Russian foreign policy in general, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka* (Russia's foreign policy of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century) is a major contribution. The series *Ocherki po istorii russkogo vostokovedeniia* (Sketches on the history of Russian oriental studies) provides insightful information on the growth of Russian sinology, Mongolian studies and related fields.

Chinese scholarship on Sino-Russian relations in the 1800–62 period is considerable but, for the most part, has emphasized territorial losses and has taken a rather simplistic view of Russian expansion. Most accounts of Russian actions reflect little more than a knowledge of Russia's need for an ice-free seaport and her frustrations in the Near and Middle East – as, for example, in Ch'en Teng-yüan, *Chung-O kuan-hsi shu-lieh* (Account of Sino-Russian relations), and Tseng Chih-ling, *Chung-tung-lu chiao-she shih* (History of negotiations over the Chinese Eastern Railway). A deeper understanding is to be found in Ch'en Fu-kuang, *Yu Ch'ing i-tai chih Chung-O kuan-hsi* (Sino-Russian relations in the Ch'ing period), which uses Russian material.

By far the best book is Chao Chung-fu's excellent study, *Ch'ing-chi Chung-O tung-san-sheng chieh-wu chiao-she: Sino-Russian negotiations over the Manchurian border issue 1858–1911*.

For Sino-Russian territorial questions as a whole, including the Mongolian and Sinkiang frontiers, the most comprehensive study is Ch'eng Fa-jen, *Chung-O kuo-chieh t'u-k'ao* (Illustrated study of the Sino-Russian borders; enlarged edition, 1970). The book undermines its own argument by making extravagant claims on the Ch'ing empire's behalf, betraying a misunderstanding of what it meant to be a Ch'ing tributary. Ch'eng's arresting map, facing his p. 20, includes Kokand, Bukhara, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Burma as Ch'ing territory. The book is nevertheless replete with information and, if used carefully, can be helpful. Excellent but less detailed maps are to be found in the *Chung-O chiao-chieh hsiang-t'u* (Detailed maps of the Sino-Russian boundaries).

Additional titles in various languages, including some Japanese works, are listed in the bibliographies of Chao, *Ch'ing-chi*; Clubb, *China and Russia*; Qusted, *Expansion*; Sladkovskii, *Istoriia*, and Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *The Ili crisis: a study of Sino-Russian diplomacy 1871-1881*. The main collections of relevant original documents are the *Ch'ing-tai ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo* (A complete account of the management of barbarian affairs), the *Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo pu-i* (Supplement to the preceding), and the *Ssu-kuo hsin-tang* (New files on the four powers), vol. 3.

8. CH'ING INNER ASIA (SEE P. 592)

9. THE CH'ING RESTORATION

The bibliographical as well as the conceptual starting point for the study of the Ch'ing restoration remains Mary C. Wright's *The last stand of Chinese conservatism: the T'ung-chih restoration, 1862-1874*. At least for the T'ung-chih reign (1862-74), Wright ploughed through not only the *Veritable records* (CSL) but many collections of memorials submitted to the throne, to say nothing of hundreds of items of Chinese secondary works. Ch'ing documents are, however, so varied in nature and so enormous in quantity that a comprehensive work portraying an entire era inevitably leaves out some types of sources. Amongst the more important omissions of *The last stand* is the confidential correspondence between such officials as Tseng Kuo-fan and Hu Lin-i now available in published form; another is the *p'i-tu* sections of the published papers of gubernatorial officials, containing 'comments and communications' from such men as Hu and Tseng to local officials (prefects, magistrates, military commanders) in reply to the latter's petitions. Based on extensive 'comments and communications' in the extant papers of the governor of Kiangsu, 1868-70, Jonathan K. Ocko's 'Ting Jih-ch'ang in restoration Kiangsu, 1864-1870', a magnificent PhD dissertation produced at Yale in late 1975, pursues one of Mrs Wright's themes - the unchanged behaviour patterns of the local yamen underlings who continued to enjoy a crucial role in collecting taxes and handling lawsuits.

Since the publication of *The last stand*, Peking historians have published in their documentary collections some of the papers from the palace and Grand Council

archives that were not moved to Taipei. (Although the larger part of these invaluable archives for most of the Ch'ing reigns is now in Taipei, the great bulk of such papers *for the T'ung-chih period* remains in Peking.) The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, has been publishing systematically from the Tsungli Yamen archives in its custody. The collected works of many officials and scholars are now available in Taiwan reprints, as are many local gazetteers, hitherto not easily accessible. While only a fraction of the materials not used by Mrs Wright has been studied, enough new research has been done to produce controversies or to present new viewpoints regarding this period.

Franz Michael, in his introduction to Stanley Spector's *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army*, argues that 'There was no real T'ung-chih Restoration, since the regional power, once established, carried on.' Yet, as Mary Wright's review of Spector's book (*JAS*, Feb. 1966) points out, Mr Spector himself seems to have changed his perspective halfway through his book and states on p. 171 that the conflict between regional and imperial interests 'is perhaps partly obscured in the case of Li Hung-chang (and even more in the case of Tseng Kuo-fan) because no clear line could be drawn between his central and regional functions'. More recent studies, including articles by Li Kuo-ch'i (on Liu K'un-i in Kiangsi, 1865-74), S. A. M. Adshead (on the governors-general of Szechwan after 1875), and Daniel H. Bays (on Chang Chih-tung in Kwangtung, 1884-9), have borne out the Wright thesis on the continued weight of central authority. The behaviour of late Ch'ing gubernatorial officials was a far cry from the Three Feudatories of the early Ch'ing. The throne's power of appointment and dismissal was in fact as sacrosanct in the late nineteenth century as in the ante-bellum years. Wei Hsiu-mei's statistical analysis (*CYCT*, 1973) shows that during the entire Kuang-hsü period (1875-1908), 98.6 per cent of the governors and 82.4 per cent of the governors-general served less than six years in one province.

On personnel policy below the gubernatorial level, two monographs have emphasized the importance of the increasing use of *mu-yu* (personal advisers) by the T'ung-chih officials - Kenneth E. Folsom's *Friends, guests, and colleagues: the 'Mu-fu' system in the late Ch'ing period* and Jonathan Porter's *Tseng Kuo-fan's private bureaucracy*. Folsom uses the term *mu-fu* to cover all imperially authorized and semi-regular agencies (such as likin bureaux and arsenals, even the *yung-ying* armies), thus transforming the specific term *mu-fu* into a metaphor. But Folsom, like Spector, has brought out the importance of personal rapport between high officials such as Tseng and the men they introduced into the new semi-regular government agencies. Porter's work argues, however, that this 'Confucian' pattern notwithstanding, the Hunan Army and its many adjuncts already went a considerable way in the 'specialization of functions' by putting a premium on expertise. Under Tseng as the imperially-ordained commander, the exigencies of the civil war had compelled some degree of administrative rationalization, enough to sustain the beginnings of the 'self-strengthening' efforts initiated in the 1860s. The two books have added considerably to current knowledge on Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, although the careers of such

figures as Tseng, Hu, Li and Tso remain to be fully assessed. (Scholars interested in the study of Tseng Kuo-fan should note that there are several different editions of his so-called *ch'üan-chi* or 'complete collected writings'. Research for chapters 9 and 10 of this volume has been based on the 1876 edition at the Harvard-Yenching Library. An amplified version, with many parts in completely new block print prepared in 1877 but *still bearing the date 1876 on the reverse title page*, has been reprinted by the Wen-hai publishers, Taipei, 1974.)

The Wright thesis on the Ch'ing restoration meets its most profound challenges in Philip A. Kuhn's *Rebellion and its enemies in late imperial China* and in James Polachek's article, 'Gentry hegemony: Soochow in the T'ung-chih restoration'. Kuhn's remarkable research not only brings to light the role of the small local defence forces in the Taiping war, but has also pointed to the likelihood of enhanced power of the local notables, after 1864, in sub-county policing functions and fiscal administration. This important hypothesis is bound to stimulate research among the extensive sources of the Kuang-hsü period on the deployment of new types of imperial forces in provinces facing unrest and on the experiences of officials trying to revive the *t'uan-lien* forces, for example during the widespread anti-Christian disturbances in the Yangtze valley in 1891.

Polachek believes even more strongly that Ch'ing victories in the 1860s merely resulted in the gentry's ascendancy over the bureaucracy, including the sub-bureaucracy. He is sceptical, moreover, of the benignness of Confucian statecraft even during the post-bellum phase of rehabilitation. He derives principal support from a remarkable treatise on the plight of rural tenants, entitled *Tsu ho* (Inquiry into rents), written between 1876 and 1884 by T'ao Hsü, a Kiangsu literatus who criticized Feng Kuei-fen for only half-heartedly championing the reduction of agrarian rents, even while he worked so hard in 1863 for the land-tax reduction in eastern Kiangsu. (First published in 1895 and reprinted by T'ao's son in 1927, *Tsu ho* is available in facsimile reproduction as appendix to an article by Suzuki Tomoo dated 1967.) This valuable source, together with Muramatsu Yüji's collection of articles on the landlord bursaries in Kiangnan (1970), now demands the attention of students of the T'ung-chih period, indeed all students of the Confucian statecraft. For one must either accept or qualify in some fashion Polachek's contention that from the standpoint of tenants, who were in many parts of China more numerous than the small, barely self-supporting rural landowners, even the most reform-minded among the gentry and officials were in fact hypocritically greedy and indifferent to the sufferings of the multitude.

10. SELF-STRENGTHENING: THE PURSUIT OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY

For the study of policies and projects identified with the phrase 'self-strengthening' (or alternatively 'Western affairs'), memorials and edicts remain the basic source. But as is evident in the eight-volume documentary collection, *Yang-wu*

yün-tung (Chung-kuo k'o-hsüeh yüan *et al.* ed.), the semi-private letters included in the posthumously published collected papers of the officials tell more of the inside story. Four other categories of documents are sampled in the eight-volume collection: (1) miscellaneous writings (*tsa-wen*), e.g., chapters from the reform treatises by Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng or Cheng Kuan-ying; (2) miscellaneous notes (*tsa-chi*), e.g., a brief account of the Kiangnan Arsenal among Wang T'ao's random notes on Shanghai; (3) biographies, such as the comprador-official Hsü Jun's autobiography; and (4) diaries, such as the extremely valuable journal of Weng T'ung-ho, imperial tutor and long a power in the metropolitan administration, indispensable to any understanding of the politics at Peking through mid-1898.

Policy-making at the Tsungli Yamen, as reflected particularly in the correspondence between the two commissioners of trade and other gubernatorial officials on the one hand, and the Yamen on the other (with attached documents from subordinate officials), can now be studied in *Hai-fang tang* (Archives on maritime defence) in nine hardbound or seventeen paperbound volumes published by the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei. This source, which sometimes includes candid semi-personal letters from the Yamen ministers, can be compared with the private letters of gubernatorial officials (for example, from Li Hung-chang to Ting Jih-ch'ang) to gauge the motivation of the recommendations brought before the throne. The materials in *Hai-fang tang* concerning the operation of various innovative projects can be read together with personal or journalistic accounts, both Chinese and Western – e.g., H. Macartney's letters preserved in his biography by Demetrius C. Boulger, or reports on arsenals and schools in the *North-China Herald* or the *Shen pao* (Shanghai news).

For Western journalistic sources, see Frank H. H. King and Prescott Clarke, *A research guide to China coast newspapers, 1822–1911*. On the role of Hart and his customs commissioners, see the text as well as the bibliographical information in John K. Fairbank *et al.* ed., *The IG in Peking*. Portions of the maritime customs archives concerning China's diplomatic relations have been translated into Chinese and published in mainland China, under the title *Ti-kuo chu-i yü Chung-kuo hai-kuan* (Imperialism and the Chinese customs). A few Peking historians (e.g. Shao Hsün-cheng) have used bits of material from these archives for their study of self-strengthening undertakings. Except for its infrequent use of archival sources as well as the correspondence of Ch'ing officials, Sun Yü-t'ang, ed. *Chung-kuo chin-tai kung-yeh shih tzu-liao* (Materials for the history of modern Chinese industry), series 1, 1840–95, is remarkably comprehensive in putting together relevant pieces of material (including Western accounts translated for the compendium).

Since chapter 10 of this volume treats only one aspect of the 'self-strengthening movement', namely, the pursuit of Western technology primarily for *military* purposes, only important works on this narrowed-down subject are noted below.

The patriotism of the advocates of self-strengthening has been assumed by pioneering historians of modern China; see, e.g., T. F. Tsiang (Chiang T'ing-fu), 'China and European expansion'. Yet even Dr Tsiang and like-minded scholars did not forgive Li Hung-chang for his alleged venality and especially for his part in losing the Sino-Japanese War. Mou An-shih's comprehensive study, *Yang-wu yüen-tung*, puts the 'Western affairs movement' in the Maoist historical framework of a 'feudal bureaucracy' capitulating to Western imperialism. The arsenals and shipyards established in the 1860s are regarded as having been designed for suppressing internal uprisings and as a means for pilfering state revenues. Moreover, in allowing Hart to interfere in China's affairs and in encouraging economic imperialism (especially the manipulations of Western armament merchants) and cultural imperialism (including missionary publications on Western scientific and technical knowledge), such men as Li Hung-chang are viewed as treasonous. (For a list of thirty-three articles and ten books by Peking historians touching on the 'Western affairs movement', see Hayashi Yōzō's historiographical article of 1966). K. H. Kim's *Japanese perspectives on China's early modernization* shows that many Japanese scholars of Chinese history have, since the mid-1950s, written on this movement in the Marxist-Maoist vein.

Among the non-Marxist Japanese historians, Ichiko Chūzō, in an important article published in 1960, sees Li Hung-chang, Tso Tsung-t'ang and others as being engaged in a conservative effort to protect 'the gentry's local interests' in a period of dynastic decline. Nonetheless, Ichiko believes that Li, Tso and others did have a concern for public duty, although the larger political entity in their minds was still the celestial empire, not the nation-state. Hatano Yoshihiro, in his article on Li (1961), similarly believes that this statesman's continued efforts at *military* innovation were chiefly directed against Japanese aggression towards Korea, a Ch'ing tributary. Among American historians, Li's motivation is also a subject of controversy. Stanley Spector, in *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army*, states that 'When Li Hung-chang spoke of self-strengthening, he discussed generalities; when he engaged in self-strengthening, he was strengthening himself' (p. 153). Kenneth E. Folsom believes, however, that while Li jealously guarded his personal power, he must at the same time be regarded as a patriot. Even Li's personal wealth, Folsom believes, was used to buy support in Peking and to reward his numerous subordinates outside of the regular civil service or the Green Standard military system. (This hypothesis now gains support from evidence in Li's confidential letters to P'an Ting-hsin, discovered in Shanghai and published in 1960.) Mr Folsom concludes that 'Where Tseng [Kuo-fan] drew back from power, Li reached out for it; where Tseng sought to preserve Confucian culture, Li sought to preserve China' (*Friends, guests, and colleagues: The 'mu-fu' system in the late Ch'ing period*, p. 190).

More recent studies on the few officials who shared Li's outlook suggest that 'Confucian patriotism' was more than a paradox. Lü Shih-ch'iang's 1972 monograph on the Kiangsu governor, Ting Jih-ch'ang, shows that ever since he

became acting Shanghai taotai in 1864, Ting had devoted himself to a broad concept of self-strengthening that even included domestic administrative reform. Wang Chia-chien's 1973 article on Wen-hsiang similarly documents the Manchu statesman's conviction, formed by 1864–6, that learning to construct steamships and even railways was necessary to China's survival. The concept of 'Confucian patriotism' is elaborated by David Pong's 1973 article on Shen Pao-chen's tearing down the Woosung Railway, initially built by foreign merchants in violation of treaty provisions.

Why were the self-strengthening undertakings so few and in many cases so tardily approved? Why did not the established ones fare better? This 'what went wrong?' approach to China's early modernization has been re-examined by Thomas L. Kennedy's historiographical article 'Self-strengthening: an analysis based on some recent writings', *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i*, 3.1 (Nov. 1974) 3–35, which refers especially to books by Li Kuo-ch'i, Lü Shih-ch'iang and Wang Erh-min. Kennedy points, moreover, to a new tendency among scholars to go beyond the question of success or failure and instead study the 'evolutionary and developmental trends during the self-strengthening era in an effort to relate them to subsequent developments in the twentieth century'.

The inefficiency and small number of self-strengthening undertakings remain, nevertheless, historical facts, and because of humiliating defeat in foreign wars, these facts were prominent in the background of reform and revolution. For further analysis of China's initial ill-success in appropriating the secrets of Western power, the following published works provide excellent beginnings: (1) on factional politics at the Tz'u-hsi court, Wu Hsiang-hsiang's book (1961), Lloyd E. Eastman's article (1965), and Li Tsung-t'ung and Liu Feng-han's biography of Li Hung-tso (1969); (2) on shipyards and arsenals, Chang Yü-fa's article (1971) and Thomas L. Kennedy's articles (1971 and 1974); (3) on the ineffectiveness of naval and military training programmes, John L. Rawlinson's book (1967), relevant chapters in Wang Erh-min's *Huai-chün chih* (1967), and Richard J. Smith's article in *MAS* (1976); (4) on the attitude of provincial officials who were charged with coastal defence and yet were indifferent to Western innovations, see Li Kuo-ch'i's second article on Liu K'un-i (1975); (5) on the training schools for the introduction of science and technology, see K. Biggerstaff's authoritative monograph (1961) and A. A. Bennett's bio-bibliographical study of John Fryer (1967). (On the economic aspects of the 'self-strengthening movement', see bibliographical essays in vol. 11.)

11. CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AND THEIR IMPACT TO 1900

The literature on Christian missions in nineteenth-century China is enormous. The vast bulk of it, however, was produced by the missionaries themselves and its overall point of view, understandably, is a missionary one. Only in the last few decades have scholars begun to use Chinese-language materials and to look at Christian missions seriously from the perspective of Chinese history. The

main purpose of this bibliographical note is to review the work that has been done in this new field of investigation.

For major bibliographies and research guides in English, French and German, a convenient place to start is the annotated 'Suggestions for additional reading' in Jessie G. Lutz, ed. *Christian missions in China: evangelists of what?* Two valuable titles not found in Lutz are Leslie R. Marchant, *A guide to the archives and records of Protestant Christian missions from the British Isles to China, 1796-1914*, and Alexander Wylie, *Memorials of Protestant missionaries to the Chinese: giving a list of their publications, and obituary notices of the deceased*. Wylie's work lists and summarizes Chinese- and Western-language publications of missionaries during the first sixty years of Protestant activity in the empire. Chinese documentary materials on over three hundred cases of conflict between Christians and non-Christians (*chiao-an*) are brought together in Wu Sheng-te and Ch'en Tseng-hui, comps. *Chiao-an shih-liao pien-mu* (A bibliography of Chinese source materials dealing with local or international cases involving Christian missions).

Although it is almost half a century since it was published, the best general Western-language survey of the missionary enterprise is still Kenneth Scott Latourette's *A history of Christian missions in China*. Latourette approaches his subject from the vantage point of mission history and makes no use of Chinese sources. His Protestant bias, moreover, shows in places. Nevertheless, his account is profusely documented and, on the whole, remarkably objective. A Japanese work of comparable scope (though limited to the Ch'ing) is Saeki Yoshirō, *Shinchō Kirisuto-kyō no kenkyū* (A study of Christianity under the Ch'ing dynasty). A comprehensive survey of Christian missions from the Chinese side has long been needed.

Serious study of the Catholic and Protestant missionary movements in nineteenth-century China by non-participants is only beginning. Louis Tsing-sing Wei, *La politique missionnaire de la France en Chine, 1842-1856: L'ouverture des cinq ports chinois au commerce étranger et la liberté religieuse*, covers the intertreaty period and is based on extensive use of Chinese official documentation and French government and Catholic missionary archives. Two shorter studies which explore different aspects of Protestant missionary opinion are: Stuart Creighton Miller, 'Ends and means: missionary justifications of force in nineteenth-century China', in John K. Fairbank, ed. *The missionary enterprise in China and America*, 249-82, 411-15, and Sidney A. Forsythe, *An American missionary community in China, 1895-1905*. A leading approach in recent years to study of the Protestant enterprise has been through the lives and careers of outstanding missionaries. There are several examples of this approach in *Papers on China*. Book-length studies include Edward V. Gulick, *Peter Parker and the opening of China*, and Irwin T. Hyatt, Jr, *Our ordered lives confess: three nineteenth-century missionaries in east Shantung*.

The influence of Protestant Christianity and missionaries on the Taiping Rebellion has occasioned much interest, especially among Western historians. The pioneer monograph on the subject is Eugene Boardman, *Christian influence upon*

the ideology of the Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864. One of the few works by Chinese scholars to emphasize the Christian role is Yu-wen Jen's magisterial *The Taiping revolutionary movement*. Translations of Taiping Christian sources are provided in vols. II–III of Franz Michael and Chung-li Chang, eds., *The Taiping Rebellion: history and documents*.

The disruptive effects of the missionary movement on Chinese society have been widely studied in recent years. A pioneer survey of major *chiao-an* in the latter half of the nineteenth century is Wang Wen-chieh, *Chung-kuo chin-shih shih shang ti chiao-an* (A study of missionary cases in modern Chinese history). Anti-Christian thought is explored in Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity: the missionary movement and the growth of Chinese antiforeignism, 1860–1870*, and Li En-han, 'Hsien-feng nien-chien fan Chi-tu-chiao ti yen-lun' (Anti-Christian opinion expressed during the Hsien-feng period), *Ch'ing-hua hsüeh-pao* (Tsing Hua journal of Chinese studies), NS, 6.1–2 (Dec. 1967) 44–71.

The Tsungli Yamen archives for the *chiao-an* of the 1860–71 period have been published by the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, in two series, each comprising three thick volumes. A total of 3,209 documents is included, arranged by province. See Chang Kuei-yung *et al.* comps. *Chiao-wu chiao-an tang* (Archives on church affairs and disputes involving missionaries and converts). The *chiao-an* of the T'ung-chih period, including the Tientsin Massacre (1870), are dealt with in Cohen, *China and Christianity*; Lü Shih-ch'iang, *Chung-kuo kuan-shen fan-chiao ti yüan-yin (1860–1874)* (The causes of opposition to Christianity among China's officials and gentry 1860–74); and John K. Fairbank, 'Patterns behind the Tientsin Massacre', *HJAS*, 20 (1957) 480–511. Ellsworth Carlson explores the friction between Chinese and missionaries in the Foochow region in *The Foochow missionaries, 1847–1880*. A number of excellent studies of individual incidents have appeared in *Papers on China*. The Yangtze valley riots of 1891 are investigated in Edmund S. Wehrle, *Britain, China, and the antimissionary riots, 1891–1900*; Yazawa Toshihiko, 'Chōkō ryūiki kyōan no ichi kōsatsu' (The attitude of Chinese officials towards the anti-foreign riots in 1891), *Kindai Chūgoku kenkyū* (Studies on modern China), 1 (1958) 107–36; Yazawa Toshihiko, 'Chōkō ryūiki kyōan no kenkyū' (The anti-foreign riots of 1891), *Kindai Chūgoku kenkyū*, 4 (1960) 109–58. For a Communist interpretation of anti-Christian activity in the last third of the nineteenth century, see Li Shih-yüeh, 'Chia-wu chan-cheng ch'ien san-shih-nien chien fan yang-chiao yün-tung' (The movement against the Western religion during the thirty years prior to the war of 1894), *Li-shih yen-chiu* (Historical Research), 6 (1958) 1–15.

An interesting view of Christianity, from the perspective of Chinese converts in the mid-nineteenth century, is provided in Adrian A. Bennett and Kwang-Ching Liu, 'Christianity in the Chinese idiom: Young J. Allen and the early *Chiao-hui hsin-pao*, 1868–1870', in Fairbank, *The missionary enterprise in China and America*, 159–96, 396–401.

The influence of the Protestant missionary movement on the early phases of

Chinese modernization has been much noted but little studied. For a brief introduction and analysis, focusing on medicine, education and famine relief, see Irwin T. Hyatt, Jr, 'Protestant missions in China (1877-1890): the institutionalization of good works', *Papers on China*, 17 (1963) 67-100 (reprinted in Kwang-Ching Liu, ed. *American missionaries in China*, 93-126). Timothy Richard's famine relief and prevention activities are studied in Paul Richard Bohr, *Famine in China and the missionary: Timothy Richard as relief administrator and advocate of national reform, 1876-1884*.

Protestant activities in the educational sphere are surveyed in Alice H. Gregg, *China and educational autonomy: the changing role of the Protestant educational missionary in China, 1807-1937*. An over-view of the Protestant colleges of the late Ch'ing is supplied in Jessie G. Lutz, *China and the Christian colleges, 1850-1950*.

The contribution of missionaries to the development of modern Chinese medicine is dealt with in a number of works, the most useful still being K. Chimin Wong and Lien-teh Wu, *A history of Chinese medicine* (2nd edn). The anti-opium crusading of Protestant missionaries, often carried on in association with mission hospitals, is explored in Hilary J. Beattie, 'Protestant missions and opium in China, 1858-1895', *Papers on China*, 22A (1969) 104-33. Jonathan Spence suggests ways in which the study of medical missions may deepen awareness of the internal dynamics of late Ch'ing society in 'The American missionary endeavor, 1830-1910', in John Z. Bowers and Elizabeth F. Purcell, eds. *Medicine and society in China*, 40-54.

Protestant involvement in secular publishing and its influence are studied in two articles by Suzanne Wilson Barnett: 'Silent evangelism: Presbyterians and the mission press in China, 1807-1860', *Journal of Presbyterian History*, 49.4 (Winter 1971) 287-302, and 'Protestant expansion and Chinese views of the West', *MAS*, 6.2 (April 1972) 129-49. Adrian A. Bennett examines John Fryer's promotion of modern science and technology in *John Fryer: the introduction of Western science and technology into nineteenth-century China*.

Pre-1890 Chinese reformers with Christian affiliations are studied in Paul A. Cohen, 'Littoral and hinterland in nineteenth-century China: the "Christian" reformers', in Fairbank, *The missionary enterprise in China and America*, 197-225, 401-8. A pioneering study of the influence exerted by Protestant missionary writings (above all, *Wan-kuo kung-pao*) on the reform movement of the 1890s is Wang Shu-huai, *Wai-jen yü wu-hsü pien-fa* (Foreigners and the 1898 reform). The missionary impact on a leading reformer is analysed in Chi-yun Chen, 'Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's "Missionary education": a case study of missionary influence on the reformers', *Papers on China*, 16 (1962) 66-125.

Communist appraisals of the missionary impact on late Ch'ing reform emphasize the theme of cultural imperialism. An example is Ting Tse-liang, *Li-t'í-mo-t'ai: i-ko tien-hsing ti wei ti-kuo-chu-i fu-wu ti ch'uan-chiao-shih* (Timothy Richard: a typical missionary in the service of imperialism).

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This list consists of all items cited in article footnotes and Bibliographical essays. For convenience it is divided into two sections, one for Western sources (including certain sources in Asian languages), the other for Chinese and Japanese materials.

Bibliographic uniformity and simplicity are necessary ideals but in this volume we have allowed a certain degree of variety. Thus the *Veritable records* (*shih-lu*), a massive compilation of basic imperial documents, is cited sometimes by the emperor's dynastic title or temple name (*miao-hao*), as in the form *Jen-tsung shih-lu* (for 1796–1820) or *Hsüan-tsung shih-lu* (for 1821–50), and sometimes by the better-known reign title (*nien-hao*) as in *CSL-Kuang-hsü* (*Ch'ing shih-lu* for the Kuang-hsü reign, 1875–1908).

Old-style Chinese books often have no stated place of publication and are dated by the dates of prefaces. We have tried to indicate such dates of origin. Modern reprints made in Taipei and other places are usually photographic facsimiles of the original editions.

Abbreviations of titles for journals or frequently cited works are listed below.

BSOAS	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i>
CPNF	I-hsin <i>et al.</i> , <i>Chiao-p'ing Nien-fei fang-lieh</i>
CSL	<i>Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu</i>
CYCT	<i>Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan chin-tai-shih yen-chiu-so chi-k'an</i>
FEQ	<i>Far Eastern Quarterly</i> and <i>JAS</i>
HCTC	Feng Kuei-fen, <i>Hsien-chih t'ang chi</i>
HFT	<i>Hai-fang tang</i>
HJAS	<i>Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies</i>
HWCK	Hu Lin-i, <i>Hu Wen-chung kung i-chi</i>
HWHTK	Liu Chin-tsao, <i>Ch'ing-ch'ao hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao</i>
IMH	Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica
IWSM	<i>Ch'ing-tai ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo</i>
JAH	<i>Journal of Asian History</i>
JAS	<i>Journal of Asian Studies</i>
LHCC	Li Hung-chang, <i>Li Hung-chang shih P'an Ting-hsin shu-cha</i>
LWCK	Li Hung-chang, <i>Li Wen-chung kung ch'üan-chi</i>
MAS	<i>Modern Asian Studies</i>
SFLS	<i>Kuo-li T'ai-wan shih-fan ta-hsüeh li-shih hsüeh-pao</i>

- STCH *Shan-tung chün-hsing chi-lüeh*
 STCT Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh hui Chi-nan fen-hui, *Shan-tung chin-tai-shih tzu-liao*
 THL *Tung-hua lu*
 TPTK Hsiang Ta *et al.* ed., *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo*
 TWCK Tseng Kuo-fan, *Tseng Wen-cheng kung ch'üan-chi*
 TWCKIC Ting Pao-chen, *Ting Wen-ch'eng kung i-chi*
 TWHK Tso Tsung-t'ang, *Tso Wen-hsiang kung ch'üan-chi*
 YCCL Yin Keng-yün, *Yü-chün chi-lüeh*

ROMANIZED LANGUAGES

- 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī. *Histoire de l'Asie Centrale (Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand) depuis les dernières années du règne de Nadir Châh (1153), jusqu'en 1233 de l'Hégire (1740-1818)*, tr Charles Schefer. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1876
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
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 Shang-tsa 上雜出版社 (Shanghai)
 Shao-yeh shan-fang 掃葉山房 (Shanghai)
 Shen-chou kuo-kuang she 神州國光社 (Peking, Shanghai)
 Shih-chieh 世界 (Shanghai, Taipei)
 Ta-t'ung 大通 (Taipei)
 T'ai-lien kuo-feng 台聯國風出版社 (Taipei)
 Te-chih 德志出版社 (Taipei)
 Tsui-liu-t'ang 醉六堂 (Shanghai)
 Tu-men 都門 (Peking)
 T'u-shu chi-ch'eng 圖書集成 (Shanghai)
 Wen-hai 文海 (Taipei)
 Wen-pao 文寶 (Shanghai)
 Ya-tung 亞東 (Hong Kong)

Late Ch'ing rulers and princes
(from Ch'ien-lung times; highly selective)

Late Ch'ing rulers and princes
(from Ch'ien-lung times; highly selective)



* Together with Yung-lin and another brother, Yung-hsuan, Yung-hsing shared in spoils of Ho-shen's estate.

** I-tsung's other sons, Tsai-lien and Tsai-lan ('Duke Lan'), were prominent in the Boxer movement.

*** I-hsin's eldest son, Tsai-ch'eng (1858-85) died without heirs.

GLOSSARY

This is a list of the Chinese names, terms, titles and phrases appearing in the text, arranged in alphabetical order with Chinese characters added. Some exotic terms, such as *amban* from Manchu or *compradore* from Portuguese, will be omitted because they are not derived from Chinese. Place names, especially if well known, are sometimes in the Chinese Post Office romanization.

A-pu-tu-k'ai-li-mu 阿布都凱里木

Aigun 璦琿

Altai 阿爾泰

Amoy (Hsia-men) 廈門

An Lu-shan 安祿山

an-min 安民

An Te-hai 安得海

Anhwei (An-hui) 安徽

Anking 安慶

Annam (An-nan) 安南

Apak (Pu Hsing-yu) 布與有

Buyantai (Pu-yen-t'ai) 布彥泰)

Canton (Kuang-chou) 廣州

cha-wei 札委

chai 寨

ch'ai-wei 差委

Chang Chia-hsiang 張嘉祥

Chang Chih-tung 張之洞

Chang Ching-ch'ü 張景渠

Chang-ch'iu 章邱

Chang-chou 漳州

chang chü 章句

Chang Hsi 張喜

Chang Huan-lun 張煥綸

Chang Huan-yüan 張煥元

Chang Kuo-liang 張國樑

Chang Lo-hsing 張樂行 (張樂刑)

Chang Mu 張穆

Chang San 張珊

Chang Shan-chi 張善繼

Chang Sheng-tsao 張盛藻

Chang Shu-sheng 張樹聲

Chang Tsung-yü 張宗禹 (張祖愚)

Chang Yüan liang-yu hsiang-lun 張遠兩友
相論

Ch'ang-an chün 長安軍

ch'ang-ch'iang 長牆

Ch'ang-ch'iang hui 長槍會

Ch'ang-chieh chün 常捷軍

Ch'ang-chou 常州

Ch'ang-ch'un 長春

Ch'ang-ling 長齡

Ch'ang-sheng chün 常勝軍

Ch'ang-shu 常熟

ch'ang-wei 長圍

Changsha (Ch'ang-sha) 長沙

Chao Lieh-wen 趙烈文

Chao Shu-chi 趙樹吉

Chapu 乍浦

Chefoo (Yen-t'ai) 芝罘 (烟台)

Chekiang 浙江

Chen-chiang (Chinkiang) 鎮江

Chen-hai (Chinhai) 鎮海

Chen-hsi 鎮西

- Ch'en Chieh-p'ing 陳階平
 Ch'en Lan-pin 陳蘭彬
 Ch'en Li 陳遼
 Ch'en Lun-chiung 陳倫炯
 Ch'en Ta-hsi 陳大喜
 Ch'en Yü-ch'eng 陳玉成
 cheng 正
 cheng-chih 政治
 Cheng Fu-kuang 鄭復光
 Cheng Hsüan 鄭玄
 Cheng-i shu-yüan 正誼書院
 cheng-jen 正人
 Cheng Kuan-ying 鄭觀應
 Cheng-peí chu-chiang 征北主將
 cheng-t'u 正途
 Cheng-yang-kuan 正陽關
 Ch'eng-Chu 程朱
 Ch'eng En-tse 程恩澤
 ch'eng-fa 成法
 Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i 程學啓
 Ch'eng-nan shu-yüan 城南書院
 ch'eng-t'uan 城團
 Ch'eng Wu-ku 程五姑
 Chi-an 吉安
 chi-ch'iao 技巧
 chi fu-tzu yü ts'ui-k'o 寄撫字於催科
 chi-i 技藝
 chi-mi 羅縻
 chi-mi pu-chüeh 羅縻不絕
 Chi-nan (Tsinan) 濟南
 Chi-ning (Tsining) 濟寧
 Chi-yang 濟陽
 Ch'i Chi-kuang 戚繼光
 ch'i-chu 族主
 Ch'i Chün-tsao 祁喬藻
 Ch'i-ho 齊河
 ch'i-jen 族人
 ch'i-lao 耆老
 Ch'i-shan (Kishen) 耆善
 ch'i-shan 琦善
 ch'i-shu 氣數
 ch'i-t'ien 旗田
 ch'i-ting 旗丁
 ch'i-t'un 旗屯
 Ch'i-ying (Kiyang) 耆英
 Ch'i Yüan-fu 祁元輔
 Chia Chen 賈楨
 Chia-ch'ing 嘉慶
 Chia-hsing (Kashing) 嘉興
 Chia-lu ho 賈魯河
 Chia-ting 嘉定
 Chia-ying 嘉應
 Chia-yü-kuan 嘉峪關
 Chiang-chün 將軍
 Chiang Chung-yüan 江忠源
 Chiang-mu 匠目
 Chiang-nan chi-ch'i chih-tsao chü 江南機器製造局
 Chiang-nan chi-ch'i chih-tsao tsung-chü 江南機器製造總局
 Chiang-nan lun-ch'uan ts'ao-lien chü 江南輪船操練局
 Chiang-p'u 江浦
 Chiang Ti 江地
 Chiang Tun-fu 蔣敦復
 Chiang-yin (Kiangyin) 江陰
 Chiang Yu-hsien 蔣攸銑
 ch'iang 強
 Ch'iang-hsüeh hui 強學會
 ch'iang-p'ao ying 槍礮營
 chiao-an 教案
 Chiao-lai ho (Canal) 膠萊河
 Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i 校邠廬抗戰
 chieh-Huang chi-yün 借黃漢運
 chieh-ping chu-chiao 借兵助剿
 chieh-shou 節壽
 chien-hao 僭號
 chien-kung 監工
 chien-pi ch'ing-yeh 堅壁清野
 Chien-sha-tsui 尖沙嘴
 chien sheng 監生
 chien-tu 監督
 ch'ien 乾
 ch'ien 錢
 ch'ien-chuang 錢莊
 Ch'ien-lung 乾隆
 Ch'ien Ting-ming 錢鼎銘
 ch'ien-t'un 遣屯

- chih 知
 chih 制
 chih chi, chih pi, pai chan, pai sheng
 知己知彼，百戰百勝
 chih-ch'i 製器
 Chih-chiang 枝江
 chih-ch'ien 制錢
 Chih-ho 雒河
 Chih-ho-chi 雒河集
 chih-yung 致用
 Chihli 直隸
 chin 斤
 Chin-ch'uan 金川
 chin-kun 衿棍
 Chin-ling chih-tsao chü 金陵製造局
 Chin-lou-chai 金樓寨
Chin P'ing Mei 金瓶梅
 chin-shih 進士
 Chin-t'ien 金田
 chin-wen 今文
 Chin Ying-lin 金應麟
 ch'in 親
 Ch'in 秦
 ch'in-ch'ai ta-ch'en 欽差大臣
 Ch'in Hui-t'ien 秦蕙田
 Ch'in Jih-kang 秦日綱
 ch'in-min 親民
 ch'in-ming 欽命
 Ching-an 景安
 ching-chi 經濟
 Ching-fu shu-yüan 敬敷書院
 Ching-ho 精河
 Ching hsiang 京饟
 ching-shih 經世
 Ching-shou 景壽
 Ching Tao-ch'ien 荆道乾
 Ching-te-chen 景德鎮
 Ch'ing 清
 Ch'ing-ch'eng 青城
 Ch'ing-hai 青海
 Ch'ing-hsiang 慶祥
 Ch'ing-liu p'ai 清流派
 Ch'ing-shih kuan 清史館
 Ch'ing-ying 慶英
 Chinkiang (Chen-chiang) 鎮江
 Chiu-chiao 舊教
 Chiu-fu-chou 九浚洲
 Chou 周
 chou 州
 Chou 鄒
 Chou-chia-k'ou 周家口
 Chou Hsing-yü 周星譽
 Chou K'ai-hsi 周開錫
 Chou T'ien-chüeh 周天爵
 Chou Tsu-p'ei 周祖培
 chu 主
 Chu-ch'eng 諸城
 Chu Feng-ko 朱鳳閣
 Chu Hsi 朱熹
 chu-huang 注荒
 Chu Hung-chang 朱洪章
 Chu Kuei 朱珪
 Chu P'in-lung 朱品隆
 chu-shih 主事
 chu-shu 注疏
 Chu Wei-pi 朱爲弼
ch'u-fen tse-li 處分則例
 chü 局
 chü ching 居敬
 chü-jen 舉人
 Chü-jung (Kou-jung) 句容
 Chü-p'o ching-she 菊坡精舍
 chü-shen 互紳
 chü-shih t'u-hao 互室土豪
 Ch'ü-chou 衢州
 Ch'ü-fu 曲阜
 ch'uan-chien p'ao-li 船堅礮利
 Ch'uan-pi (Chuenpi) 穿鼻
 chüan 捐
 Ch'üan-chou 泉州
 ch'üan-kuei 權貴
 ch'üan-mou 權謀
Ch'üan-shih liang-yen 勸世良言
Ch'üan-t'i hsin lun 全體新論
 ch'üan-yang chih hsing 犬羊之性
 chuang-ch'i 裝旗
 Chuang Ts'un-yü 莊存與
 Chüeh-tzu (-shan) 角子(山)

ch'ui-lien t'ing-cheng 垂簾聽政
Ch'un Ch'in-wang (Prince) 醇親王

Ch'un-ch'iu 春秋

ch'un-ch'iu po 春秋撥

Chün-chi ta-ch'en 軍機大臣

chün-shih 均勢

chün-tzu 君子

chung 忠

Chung-chou 中州

chung-hsin 忠信

chung-hsing 中興

chung-i chih ch'i 忠義之氣

Chung-i chü 忠義局

chung-ku 中古

Chung-kuo 中國

chung-pao 中飽

chung-ts'ai 中才

Chung-t'u 中土

Chung-Tungchan-chi pen-mo 中東戰紀本末

Chung-wai hui-fang chü 中外會防局

Chung wang 忠王

Ch'ung-hou 崇厚

Chungking 重慶

Chusan (Chou-shan) 舟山

Cohong (Kung-hang) 公行

Consoo (Kung-so) 公所

Dorgon 多爾袞

E-le-teng-pao 額勒登保

en 恩

Ennin 圓仁

fa 法

fa-chia 法家

fan 藩

fan hsün 犯順

fan-t'un 犯屯

Fang Ch'uan-shu 方傳書

fang-ho 防河

Fatshan (Fo-shan) 佛山

fen 分

Fen 汾

fen ch'i pan 分其半

fen-t'ung 分統

feng 封

Feng Chün-kuang 馮峻光

feng-i wei-shih 奉夷爲師

Feng Kuei-fen 馮桂芬

feng-shui 風水

feng-su 風俗

Feng-t'ai 鳳臺

Feng-t'ien (Fengtien) 奉天

Feng Yün-shan 馮雲山

Foochow (Fu-chow) 福州

fou-fu 浮賦

fou-i 浮議

fou-shou 浮收

fu 府

fu 富

fu-cheng 輔政

Fu-chi 福濟

fu-ch'iang 富強

fu-fei 幅隄

Fu-k'ang-an 福康安

fu-min 富民

Fu Nai 傅鼎

fu-pi 輔弼

fu-piao 撫標

fu-p'ien 附片

fu-sheng 附生

Fu-yang 阜陽

Fukien 福建

Fulhungge (Fu-le-hung-o) 富勒洪阿

Fusengge (Fu-seng-o) 富僧阿

ginseng 人參

Gobi 戈壁

Hagiwara Jumpei 萩原淳平

Hai-an 海安

hai-fang 海防

Hai-kuo t'u-chih 海國圖志

Hai-kuo wen-chien lu 海國聞見錄

Hai lu 海錄

Hai-tao i-chih 海島逸志

Hai-tung-yün 海東韻

Hakka 客家

- Han 漢
Han-ju t'ung-i 漢儒通義
 Han Chao-ch'ing 韓肇慶
 Hang-Chia-Hu 杭嘉湖
 Hangchow (Hang-chou) 杭州
 Hankow (Han-k'ou) 漢口
 Hanlin 翰林
 hao-mi 耗米
 Hart, Robert 赫德
 Heilungkiang 黑龍江
 Heng-ch'i 恆戰
 Ho Ch'ang-ling 賀長齡
 ho-ch'in 和親
 Ho-ch'un 和春
 Ho-fei 合肥
 Ho Kai (Ho Ch'i) 何啓
 Ho Kuei-ch'ing 何桂清
 Ho-lin 和琳
 Honan 河南
 Hopei 河北
 Ho-shen 和紳
 ho-shih 和時
 Ho-shuo meng-chu 河朔盟主
 hong (hang) 行
 Hong Kong 香港
 Hongkew 虹口
 Howqua (Wu Ch'ung-yüeh) 浩官
 Hsi-ch'uan 浙川
 Hsi-fan 西蕃
 Hsi-hsiang 西鄉
 Hsi-hsüeh 西學
 Hsi-la-pen 西拉本
 hsi-pu 西部
 hsi-wen 檄文
Hsi-yu-chi 西遊記
 Hsia-chin 夏津
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 Hsiang-hsiang 湘鄉
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 Hsiang-shan (Huengshan) 香山
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 hsiang-yüeh 鄉約
 hsiang-yung 鄉勇
 hsiao 小
 Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei 蕭朝貴
 Hsiao Fu-ssu 蕭孚泗
 hsiao-hu 小戶
 hsiao-jen 小人
 Hsiao Ling-yü 蕭令裕
 Hsiao-tao hui 小刀會
 hsieh 邪
 Hsieh Ch'ing-kao 謝清高
 hsieh-hsiang 協餉
 hsieh-min 協民
 hsieh-tou 械鬥
 hsien 縣
 hsien ch'i so chi 先其所急
 hsien ch'ieh chih che 賢且智者
 Hsien-feng 咸豐
 hsien-wang 先王
 hsien-yüan 賢員
 Hsin 莘
Hsin-chiang chib-lüeh 新疆志略
 Hsin-chiao 新教
 hsin-hsüeh 新學
 Hsin-ning 新寧
 Hsing-Chung hui 興中會
 hsing li 性理
 hsiu cheng-shih 修政事
 hsiu-ts'ai 秀才
 Hsiung Ching-hsing 熊景星
 Hsiung-nu 匈奴
Hsü chi-bo yüan-pen 續幾何原本
 Hsü Chi-yü 徐繼畲
 Hsü Chien-yin 徐建寅
 Hsü-chou 徐州
 Hsü Jun 徐潤
 Hsü Jung 徐榮
 Hsü Kuang-chin 徐廣綬
 Hsü Nai-chi 許乃濟
 Hsü-p'u 激浦
 Hsü Shou 徐壽
 Hsü Sung 徐松
 Hsü T'ung 徐桐
 Hsüan-nan 宜南
 Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng 薛福成
 Hsüeh-hai T'ang 學海堂

- hsüeh-hsing 血性
 Hsüeh Huan 薛煥
 Hu-chou 湖州
 Hu-kuang 湖廣
 Hu Kuang-yung 胡光墉
 Hu Lin-i 胡林翼
 Hu-men-chai 虎門寨
 Hu Pu 戶部
 hu-t'un 戶屯
 Hu-wei pien 虎尾鞭
 Hua Heng-fang 華蘅芳
 hua-ho ch'üan-ti 畫河圖地
 Hua-hsien 花縣
 Hua-hsien 滑縣
Hua-hsüeh chih-nan 化學指南
 Hua-t'ou yung 花頭勇
 Huai 淮
 Huai-an 淮安
 Huai-chün 淮軍
 Huai-pei 淮北
 Huai-yang 淮陽
 Huai-yüan 懷遠
Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien 皇朝經世文編
 Huang Chüeh-tzu 黃爵滋
 Huang-chung 溫中
 Huang En-t'ung 黃恩彤
 Huang Mien 黃冕
 Huang Tsung-han 黃宗漢
 Hui-min 惠民
 hui-pan 會辦
 Hui-tien 會典
 Hui-t'un 回屯
 Hui Tung 惠棟
 Hui-yüan 惠遠
 Hukwang (Hu-kuang) 湖廣
 Hunan 湖南
 Hung-ch'iao 虹橋
 hung-ch'ien 紅錢
 Hung-chin 紅巾
 Hung Hsiu-ch'uan 洪秀全
 Hung Jen-kan 洪仁玕
 Hung Liang-chi 洪亮吉
Hung-lou meng 紅樓夢
 Hung men 洪門
 Hung Taiji (Huang T'ai-chi) 皇太極
 Hung-tse Lake 洪澤湖
 Hung-wu 洪武
 huo-hao 火耗
Huo-lun-ch'uan t'u-shuo 火輪船圖說
 Hupei 湖北
 i 義
 I (Prince of) 怡
 i-cheng wang 讞政王
I-ching 易經
 I-ching 奕經
 I-ch'uan 宜川
 i-chün 義軍
 i-fa 義法
 I-ho ch'üan 義和拳
 I-hsin (Prince Kung) 奕訢
 i-i chih-i 以夷制夷
 i-i wei-shih 以夷爲師
 i-jen 夷人
 i-li 義理
 I-li-pu 伊里布
 I-liang 怡良
 I-shan 奕山
 i-shih t'ung-jen 一視同仁
 I-tu 宜都
 i-tuan 異端
 i-wu 夷務
 i-yung 夷勇
 Ili 伊犁
 Jalafuntai (Cha-la-fen-t'ai) 札拉芬泰
 Jalungga (Cha-lung-a) 札薩阿
 Jehol 熱河
 Jen Chu 任柱
Jen-hsüeh 仁學
 Ju-yang 汝陽
 Juan Yüan 阮元
 jung-fei 冗費
 Jung Hung, *see* Yung Wing
 kai-hu ch'i-chung i 孩乎其中矣
 kai-t'u kuei liu 改土歸流

Kaifeng (K'ai-feng) 開封
 K'ai-p'ing (Kaiping) 開平
 kan-ch'ing 感情
 Kan Wang 干王
 K'ang-hsi 康熙
 k'ang-kuan sha-ch'ai 抗官殺差
 K'ang yu chi hsing 康輜紀行
 K'ang Yu-wei 康有爲
 Kansu 甘肅
 Kao-ch'iao 高橋
 Kao-mi 高密
 kaoliang (kao-liang) 高粱
 Kao Pang-che 高邦哲
 Kao Shu-lin 高書麟
 Kao-yu 高郵
 k'ao-cheng 考證
 Keang-Wan (Kiangwan) 江灣
 keng-chan 耕戰
 Keying (Ch'i-ying, Kiyang) 耆英
 Kiakhta 恰克圖
 Kiangnan 江南
 Kiangsi (Chiang-hsi) 江西
 Kiangsu 江蘇
 Kiaochow (Chiao-chow) 膠州
 Kirin 吉林
 Kiukiang (Chiu-chiang) 九江
 ko-chih 格致
 Ko-chih hui-pien 格致彙編
 Ko-chih shu-yüan 格致書院
 ko-wai yu-pao 格外優保
 Ko-wu ju-men 格物入門
 k'o 科
 k'o-chi i li-hsing 克己以力行
 k'o-min 客民
 k'o-shang 客商
 kotow (k'o-t'ou, kowtow) 叩頭
 Kowloon 九龍
 ku 股
 Ku-ch'eng 古城
 Ku-ching ching-she 詰經精舍
 ku-ming chih ch'en 顧命之臣
 Ku-pen Ching-hsiang 固本京餉
 Ku Tsu-yü 顧祖禹
 ku-wei 古微

ku-wen 古文
 Ku Yen-wu 顧炎武
 Ku Yung-ch'ing 邵永清
 Kuai (River) 滄 (河)
 k'uai-hsieh 快蟹
 kuan-pi min-fan 官逼民反
 kuan-sheng 官生
 kuan-ti 官地
 Kuan-ti 關帝
 kuan-tien min-ch'ien 官墊民欠
 kuan-t'ien 官田
 Kuan T'ien-p'ei 關天培
 kuan wei ching-li 官爲經理
 Kuang fang-yen kuan 廣方言館
 Kuang-hsin 廣信
 Kuang-hsü 光緒
 Kuang-hsüeh hui 廣學會
 Kuang yung 廣勇
 Kwangsi (Kuang-hsi) 廣西
 Kuei-chiao kai-ssu 鬼教該死
 kuei-fei 規費
 Kuei-hsien 貴縣
 Kuei-hua-ch'eng 歸化城
 Kuei-liang 桂良
 Kuei-p'ing 桂平
 Kuei-te 歸德
 k'uei-ch'ien 虧欠
 k'uei-k'ung 虧空
 k'uei-sung 饋 (饋) 送
 Kulangsu 鼓浪嶼
 K'un-shan 崑山
 kung 公
 Kung (Ch'in-wang, Prince) 恭親王
 Kung (Prince), see I-hsin
 kung 貢
 Kung Chen-lin 龔振麟
 Kung Ching-han 龔景瀚
 kung-chü 公舉
 kung-sheng 貢生
 kung-shih 貢士
 kung shun 恭順
 kung-so 公所
 Kung Te 龔得
 Kung Tzu-chen 龔自珍

- Kung-yang 公羊
 Kunlun 崑崙
 kuo-chi 國計
 kuo-lu 囉囉
 Kuo Ping-chün 郭秉鈞
 Kuo-shih kuan 國史館
 Kuo Sung-lin 郭松林
 Kuo Sung-tao 郭嵩燾
 kuo-t'i 國體
 Kuomintang 國民黨
 Kwangsi 廣西
 Kwangtung 廣東
 Kweichow 貴州
 Kweilin 桂林

 Lai-chou 萊州
 Lai Wen-kuang 賴文光
 Lan Cheng-tsun 藍正燾
 Lanchow 蘭州
 Lao-chiao 老教
 Lao Ch'ung-kuang 勞崇光
 lao-shih 老師
 Le-pao 勒保
 Lei I-hsien 雷以誠
 Lei Tsai-hao 雷再浩
 Lhasa 拉薩
 li 里
 li 理
 li 利
 li 例
 li 禮
 Li Chao-shou 李昭壽 (李兆受)
 li-chia 里甲
 li-chiao 禮教
 li chih 立志
 Li Fan 李璠
 Li-fan Yüan 理藩院
 Li Feng-pao 李鳳苞
 Li Han-chang 李瀚章
 Li Heng-sung 李恆嵩
 Li Ho-nien 李鶴年
 Li Hsiu-ch'eng 李秀成
 Li Hsü-i 李續宜
 Li Hsü-pin 李續賓

 li-hsüeh 理學
 Li Huan 李桓
 Li Hung-chang 李鴻章
 Li Hung-tsao 李鴻藻
 Li Kuei 李圭
 Li Meng-ch'ün 李孟群
 Li Shan-lan 李善蘭
 Li Shih-hsien 李世賢
 Li T'ang-chieh 李棠階
 Li Tsung-hsi 李宗羲
 Li Tz'u-ming 李慈銘
 Li Wen-ch'eng 李文成
 Li Yüan-fa 李沅發
 Li Yüan-tu 李元度
 liang 兩
 Liang 梁
 Liang A-fa 梁阿發
 liang-ch'ai 糧塋
 Liang Chang-chü 梁章鉅
 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁啓超
 Liang-huai 兩淮
 Liangkiang (Liang-chiang) 兩江
 Liang-Kuang 兩廣
 liang-min ts'e 良民冊
 Liang-shan 梁山
 liang ssu-ma 兩司馬
 liang-t'ai 糧臺
 Liang T'ing-nan 梁廷枬
 Liang-wang 梁王
 Liao-chai chih-i 聊齋志異
 Liao-tung 遼東
 lien-chiang 練將
 lien-chuang hui 聯庄會
 lien-chün 練軍
 lien-chung 練衆
 lien-huan ch'iang-p'ao 連環槍礮
 lien-ming 廉明
 Lien-pang chih-lüeh 聯邦志略
 lien-tsung 練總
 lien-yung 練勇
 likin 釐金
 Lin Ch'ing 林清
 Lin ch'ing 臨清
 Lin-huai 臨淮

Lin Po-t'ung 林伯桐
 lin-sheng 廩生
 Lin Shuang-wen 林爽文
 Lin Tse-hsü 林則徐
 Lin Wei-hsi 林維喜
 Lintin (Ling-ting) 零丁
 Liu-an 六安
 Liu Chan-k'ao 劉占考
 Liu Ch'ang-yu 劉長佑
 Liu Chih-hsieh 劉之協
 Liu-ch'iu (Ryūkyū) 琉球
 Liu Feng-lu 劉逢祿
 Liu Hsün-kao 劉郵膏
 Liu Jung 劉蓉
 Liu K'un-i 劉坤一
 Liu Ming-ch'uan 劉銘傳
 Liu Ping-chang 劉秉璋
 Liu-pu 六部
 Liu Sung 劉松
 Liu Te-p'ei 劉德培
 Liu Yen 劉晏
 Liu Yü-yüan 劉玉淵
 Liu Yung 劉燾
 Lo Erh-kang 羅爾綱
 Lo Feng-lu 羅豐祿
 Lo-ling 樂陵
 Lo Ping-chang 駱秉章
 Lo Ta-kang 羅大綱
 Lo Tien 羅典
 Lo Tse-nan 羅澤南
 lou kuei 陋規
 Loyang 洛陽
 Lu K'un 盧坤
 Lu-wang 魯王
 lü 律
 Lü-t'ou yung 綠頭勇
 lü-ying 綠營
 lun-chi 倫紀
 lun-li 倫理
 Lung-hwa 龍華
 Lung-wen 蔭文

Ma Chien-chung 馬建忠
 Ma Hsin-i 馬新貽

Ma Lai-ch'ih 馬來遜
 Ma Liang (Ma Hsiang-po) 馬良 (馬相伯)
 Ma Ming-hsin 馬明心
 Ma Tuan-lin 馬端臨
 Macao (Ao-men) 澳門
 Mai-mai ch'eng 買賣城
 Mamiya Rinzō 間宮林藏
 man-kan 籲預
 Manchu 滿洲
 Mao Ch'ang-hsi 毛昶熙
 Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東
 Mei-li-ko bo-sheng-kuo chib-lüeh 美理哥合省國志略
 Mei-ling 梅嶺
 men-sheng 門生
 Meng-ch'eng 蒙城
 meng-chu 盟主
 Meng Te-en 蒙得恩
 Mi (River) 彌河
 mi-fan-chu 米飯主
 Mi-le-fo 彌勒佛
 mi-ti tou-wei 覓地兜圍
 Miao 苗
 Miao P'ei-lin 苗沛霖
 mien-ssu p'ai-p'iao 免死牌票
 Min (River) 閩
 min-chüan min-pan 民捐民辦
 min-li 民力
 min-sheng 民生
 Ming 明
 ming 命
 Ming-liang 明亮
 ming-wang 明王
 mo-shih 末世
 mou 畝
 mou-kung 謀攻
 Mu-chang-a 穆彰阿
 mu-chih 幕職
 mu-fu 幕府
 mu-yu 幕友
 Mukden (Shen-yang) 瀋陽

Nagasaki 長崎

- Nan-yang t'ung-shang ta-ch'en 南洋
 通商大臣
 Nan-lu 南路
 Nanking 南京
 Nanyang 南洋
 Nayanceng (Na-yen-ch'eng) 那彥成
 nei-fan 內藩
 Nei-ko 內閣
 nei-luan 內亂
 Nei-wu Fu 內務府
 nei-ying 內應
 Nerchinsk (Nertchinsk) 尼布楚
 Newchwang 牛莊
 Nguyen 阮
 ni-ming chieh-t'ieh 匿名揭帖
 nien 捻
 Nien 捻
 nien-tzu 捻子
 Ning-yang 寧陽
 Ning-yüan 寧遠
 Ningpo 寧波
 Ninguta 寧古塔
 Niu Chien 牛鎗
 Niu-huru 鈕古祿
 nu 奴
 Nurhachi 努爾哈赤

 o-jen 惡人
 O-lo-ssu wen kuan 俄羅斯文館
 O-shan 鄂山
 Ou O-liang 區諤良
 Ou-yang Hou-chün 歐陽厚均
 Ouan-Nien-Tsing (Wan-nien Ch'ing)
 萬年清

 Pa-kua chiao 八卦教
 pa-kung-sheng 拔貢生
 p'a-lung 扒龍
 pai-i 白役
 Pai-lien chiao 白蓮教
 Pai-lien ch'ih 白蓮池
 Pai-lien she 白蓮社
 Pai Shang-ti hui 拜上帝會
 Pamirs 帕米爾

 Pan-p'o 半坡
 P'an Shih-ch'eng 潘仕成
 P'an Shih-en 潘世恩
 P'an Ting-hsin 潘鼎新
 P'an Tseng-wei 潘曾瑋
 P'an Tsu-yin 潘祖蔭
 pang-t'ung tsung-t'ung
 Pao Ch'ao 鮑超
 pao-cheng 包攬
 pao-chia 保甲
 pao-chü 保舉
 Pao-hsing 寶興
 pao-hu 包戶
 pao-lan 包攬
 Pao Shih-ch'en 包世臣
 pao-sung 保送
 pao-yüeh 保約
 Pao-yün 寶鑑
 Paoting 保定
 Pei-t'ang 北塘
 Pei-yang t'ung-shang ta-ch'en 北洋通
 商大臣
 Peiho 北河
 Peking 北京
 P'eng Yü-lin 彭玉麟
 Pi-ch'ang 璧昌
 Pi Chin-k'o 畢金科
 Pi-hsieh chi-shih 辟邪紀實
 p'i-tu 批牘
 p'iao-hao 票號
 pien-fa 變法
 Pien hsiao lun 辨孝論
 pien-hsiu 編修
 Pin-ching 斌靜
 Pin-ch'un 斌椿
 ping-ch'üan li-ch'üan 兵權利權
 ping-t'un 兵屯
 p'ing yüan 平原
 Po-chou 亳州
 Po-kuei 柏貴
 Po-p'ing 博平
 P'o-hsieh chi 破邪集
 p'o-ke 破格
 Poyang 鄱陽

- pu-chan, pu-ho, pu-shou; pu-ssu, pu-hsiang, pu-tsou 不戰, 不和, 不守, 不死, 不降, 不走
 Pu Hsing-yu (Apak) 布興有
Pu-te-i 不得已
 P'u-k'ou 浦口
 P'u Sung-ling 蒲松齡
 Puankhequa 潘啓官
 Punti (pen-ti) 本地

 Sai-shang-a 賽尙阿
 Saicungga (Sai-ch'ung-a) 賽沖阿
 Samqua (Wu Shuang kuan) 吳爽官
 San-ho-chen 三河鎮
 San-ho-chien 三河尖
 San-ho hui 三合會
 San-hsing 三姓
 san-kang 三綱
San-kuo-chih yen-i 三國志演義
 san-shih 三世
 San-tien hui 三點會
 San-yüan-li 三元里
 Satō Hisashi 佐藤長
 Senggerinchin (Seng-ko-lin-ch'in) 僧
 格林沁
 Sha (River) 沙
 sha-ch'uan 沙船
 shan-chang 山長
 Shan-hai-kuan 山海關
 Shang 商
 shang 上
 shang-chan 商戰
Shang shu 尙書
 Shang-ti 上帝
 Shang Yang 商鞅
 Shanghai 上海
 Shansi 山西
 Shantung 山東
 shao-chang 哨長
 Shao-hsing 紹興
 Shao-kuan 韶關
 she-cheng 攝政
 She-hsien 歙縣
 Shen Chao-lin 沈兆霖

 Shen-chi ying 神機營
 shen-ch'i 紳耆
 Shen Kuei-fen 沈桂芬
 Shen Pao-chen 沈葆楨
 Shen Pao-ching 沈葆楨
 shen-shih 紳士
 shen-tsao 深造
 Shen-yang (Mukden) 瀋陽
 Sheng-pao 勝保
 Sheng-p'ing she-hsüeh 昇平社學
Sheng-shih wei-yen 盛世危言
Sheng-wu chi 聖武記
 sheng-yüan 生員
 Shensi 陝西
 shih 事
 shih 勢
 shih-chang 什長
 Shih Chih-o 史致驄
Shih-ching 詩經
 Shih-hsüeh 實學
Shih ku-wei 詩古微
 shih-li 事例
 Shih Liu-teng 石柳鄧
 Shih San-pao 石三保
 Shih Ta-k'ai 石達開
 Shou-chou 壽州
 shu 殊
Shu-ching 書經
Shu ku-wei 書古微
 shu-shu 術數
 shu-wu 東伍
 shu-yüan 書院
 Shuai-i-tu 蓑衣渡
Shui-hu chuan 水滸傳
 shui-shou 水手
 Shun 舜
 Shun-chih 順治
 shuo-t'ieh 說帖
 Sian 西安
 Sining (Hsi-ning) 西寧
 Sinkiang 新疆
 so 所
 Soochow 蘇州
 ssu 私

- ssu-ch'eng yang-shui 四成洋稅
 Ssu-k'u 四庫
Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu 四庫全書
 Ssu-ma Kuang 司馬光
 Su-chou 宿州
 Su-chou 肅州
 Su-shun 肅順
 Su-Sung-T'ai 蘇松太
 Su T'ing-k'uei 蘇廷魁
 Su-tsung 肅宗
Suan-ching 算經
 sui 歲
 Sui 隋
 sui-ch'üeh ti 隨缺地
 Sui-fen (River) 綏芬
 Sun Hsing-yen 孫星衍
Sun-tzu 孫子
 Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙
 Sung 宋
 Sung Chi-p'eng 朱繼朋
 Sung-chiang (Sungkiang) 松江
 Sung Ching-shih 宋景詩
 sung-kun 訟棍
 sung-shih 訟師
 Sung-yün 松筠
 Swatow 汕頭
 Szechwan 四川

 ta 大
 ta Chiang-chün 大將軍
 ta-chieh 大劫
 Ta-chien-lu 打箭爐
Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien 大清會典
 Ta-Han ming-ming wang 大漢明命王
 Ta Han te-chu 大漢德主
Ta-hsüeh 大學
 ta-hu 大戶
 ta-i 大義
 ta-t'ung 大同
Ta-Ying kuo-shih 大英國志
 T'a-ch'i-pu 塔齊布
 Tai Chen 戴震
 Tai Lake (T'ai-hu) 太湖
tai-shu hsüeh 代數學

tai wei-chi shih-chi 代微積拾級
 T'ai-hang 太行
 T'ai-ho 太和
T'ai-hsi hsin-shih lan-yao 泰西新史攬要
 t'ai-ku 太古
 T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo 大平天國
 T'ai-ts'ang 太倉
 taipan (ta-pan) 大班
 Taiping 太平
 Taiwan 臺灣
 Taiyuan 太原
 Taku 大沽
 Tan-yang 丹陽
 t'an-chüan 攤捐
 t'an p'ai 攤派
 T'an Ssu-t'ung 譚嗣同
T'an-t'ien 談天
 tang-shih 當十
 Tang, Wing-hong (Teng Yung-k'ang)
 鄧永康
 T'ang 唐
 t'ang 堂
 T'ang Chien 唐僖
 t'ang-chu 堂主
 t'ang-fei 堂匪
 T'ang Hsün-fang 唐訓方
 T'ang-i 堂邑
 T'ang I-hsün 唐義訓
 T'ang Su-tsung 唐肅宗
 T'ang T'ing-shu 唐廷樞
 tanka 蛋家
 tao 道
 Tao Chih 盜跖
 Tao-kuang 道光
 T'ao Chu 陶澍
 taotai 道臺
 te 德
 Te-chou 德州
 Te-leng-o 德楞額
 Te-leng-t'ai 德楞泰
 Teng Sui-fan 鄧隨帆
 Teng T'ing-chen 鄧廷植
 ti-fang 地方
 ti-fang chih 地方志

- ti-pao 地保
 t'i 體
 t'i-chih 體制
 t'i-tiao 提調
 t'i-tu 提督
 tiao-shen lieh-chien 刁紳劣監
 t'ieh pan 鐵板
 T'ien-ch'ao t'ien-mou chih-tu 天朝田畝制度
 T'ien-chi 恬吉
 T'ien-chia-chen 田家鎮
 t'ien-hsia 天下
 T'ien Hsing-shu 田興恕
 t'ien-kuo 天國
 T'ien-li chiao 天理教
 T'ien Shan 天山
 T'ien Shan Nan-lu 天山南路
 T'ien Shan Pei-lu 天山北路
 t'ien shu 天數
 T'ien-ti hui 天地會
 T'ien-tsu hui 天足會
 T'ien-tsung 天縱
 t'ien-tzu shou tsai ssu-i 天子守在四夷
 t'ien-wang 天王
 Tientsin 天津
 Tihwa (Urumchi) 迪化
 Ting-hai 定海
 Ting Jih-ch'ang 丁日昌
 Ting Kung-ch'en 丁拱辰
 Ting Pao-chen 丁寶楨
 Ting Shou-ch'ang 丁壽昌
 Ting Shou-ts'un 丁守存
 Ting-yüan 定遠
 t'ing-fei 艇匪
 t'o-ku kai-chih 託古改制
 Tong King-sing (T'ang Ching-hsing)
 唐景星
 Tonking 東京 (Bac-ky t 計
 tsa-chi 雜記
 tsa-wen 雜文
 Tsai-ch'un 載淳
 Tsai-t'ien 載恬
 Tsai-yüan 載垣
 Ts'ai Erh-k'ang 蔡爾康
 Ts'ai Kuo-hsiang 蔡國祥
 ts'ai-mai 採買
 tsan-hsiang 贊襄
 Ts'ang-chou 滄州
 Ts'ao Chen-yung 曹振鏞
 ts'ao-hsiang 漕項
 Ts'ao-hsien 曹縣
 ts'ao-kuei 漕規
 ts'ao-kung 漕貢
 ts'ao-wei 漕委
 ts'ao-yün tsung-tu 漕運總督
 tse-li 則例
 Tseng Chao 曾釗
 Tseng Chi-tse 曾紀澤
 Tseng Kuo-ch'üan 曾國荃
 Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩
 Tsinan (Chi-nan) 濟南
 Tsinghai (Ch'ing-hai) 青海
 Tsingpu 青浦
 Tsitsihar 齊齊哈爾
 tso-pu 左部
 tso-tao 左道
 Tso Tsung-t'ang 左宗棠
 Tsou-hsien 鄒縣
 Tsou wang 奏王
 tsu-chan 租棧
 Tsun-ching shu-yüan 尊經書院
 tsun-shang 尊上
 Tsun-wang 遵王
 tsung chiao-hsi 總教習
 tsung chien-kung 總監工
 tsung hai-fang ssu 總海防司
 tsung-ho ming-shih 綜核名實
 tsung-kuan 總管
 tsung-pan 總辦
 Tsungli Yamen 總理衙門
 Tu Ch'iao 杜鰲
 tu-ching 篤敬
 Tu Shou-t'ien 杜受田
 t'u-hao lieh-shen 土豪劣紳
 T'u-hai (T'u-hsieh) River 徒駭河
 t'u-ssu 土司
 T'u Tsung-ying 涂宗瀛
 Tuan-hua 端華
 t'uan 團

- t'uan-chang 團長
 t'uan-lien 團練
 t'uan-lien ta-ch'ên 團練大臣
 t'uan-tsung 團總
 t'uan-ying 團營
 T'ui-i-po-t'e 推依博特
 t'un-t'ien 屯田
 tung 聳
 Tung-cheng chü 東征局
 Tung Chung-shu 聳仲舒
 Tung-hsi-yang k'ao mei-yüeh t'ung-chichuan
 東西洋考每月統計傳
 Tung Hsün 聳恂
 Tung Huai 聳槐
 Tung Kao 聳謫
 T'ung-ch'eng 桐城
 T'ung-chih 同治
 T'ung-chou 通州
 t'ung-hsiang hui 同鄉會
 t'ung-kuei yü chih 同歸於治
 t'ung-ling 統領
 t'ung-shang ta-ch'ên 通商大臣
 t'ung-sheng 童生
 T'ung-wen Kuan 同文館
 Tungting 洞庭湖
 Turfan 吐魯番
 Tzu-cheng hsin-p'ien 資政新篇
 tzu-ch'iang 自強
 Tzu-chih t'ung-chien 資治通鑑
 Tzu-ching shan 紫荊山
 Tzu-ch'uan 徂川
 tzu-hsin 自新
 tzu wo ch'uang-chih 自我創之
 Tz'u-an 慈安
 Tz'u-hsi 慈禧
 Ulungge (Wu-lung-o) 武隆阿
 wai-fan 外藩
 wai-huan 外患
 wai-shih 外史
 Waichow (Hui-chou) 惠州
 Wakamatsu Hiroshi 若松寬
 Wan-fei 皖匪
 Wan-kuo kung-fa 萬國公法
 Wan-kuo kung-pao 萬國公報
 Wan-kuo t'ung-chien 萬國通鑑
 wang 王
 Wang An-shih 王安石
 Wang Ch'ang 王昶
 Wang Chen 王鑫 (王珍)
 Wang Ch'ing-lien 王青蓮
 Wang Chung-yang 汪仲洋
 Wang Fu-chih 王夫之
 Wang Hai-yang 汪海洋
 Wang K'ai-yün 王闡運
 Wang Ping-t'ao 王秉滔
 Wang Ta-hai 王大海
 Wang T'ao 王韜
 Wang Ting 王鼎
 Wang T'ing-chen 王庭楨
 wei 衛
 Wei 涓
 Wei Ch'ang-hui 韋昌輝
 Wei Mu-t'ing 魏陸庭
 Wei Yüan 魏源
 Wei Yüan 威遠
 wei-yüan 委員
 wen 文
 Wen-ch'ing 文慶
 Wen-hsiang 文祥
 Wen-hsien chiao 文賢教
 Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao 文獻通考
 Wen-shang 汶上
 wen-t'ung 文童
 Weng Hsin-ts'un 翁心存
 Weng T'ung-ho 翁同龢
 Weng T'ung-shu 翁同龢
 Whampoa (Huang-p'u) 黃埔
 Whangpu (Huang-p'u) 黃浦
 Wo-ho 渦河
 Wo-jen 倭仁
 Wo-yang 渦陽
 Wong Fun (Huang K'uan) 黃寬
 Woosung (Wu-sung) 吳淞
 Wu-ch'i 五旗
 Wu Chia-shan 吳嘉善
 Wu-chiang 吳江

Wu Chien-chang 吳健彰
 Wu Ch'ung-yüeh 伍崇曜
 Wu Hsiung-kuang 吳熊光
 Wu Hsü 吳煦
 Wu-kang 武岡
 Wu Lan-hsiu 吳蘭修
Wu-li t'ung-k'ao 五禮通考
 Wu Pang-ch'ing 吳邦慶
 wu-shu 武術
 Wu Shuang-kuan 吳爽官
 Wu-su 烏蘇
 Wu-t'ai shan 五臺山
 Wu T'ang 吳棠
 Wu T'ing-fang 伍廷芳
 Wu Tsan-ch'eng 吳贊誠
 Wu wang (Wo wang) 沃王
 Wu Wen-jung 吳文鎔
 Wu Yün 吳璥
 Wuchang (Wu-ch'ang) 武昌
 Wusung 吳淞

Yalu 鴨綠
 yamen 衙門
 yang 陽
 yang-ch'iang tui 洋槍隊
 Yang-chou 揚州
 Yang Fang 楊芳
Yang-fang chi-yao 洋防輯要
 Yang Hsiu-ch'ing 楊秀清
 Yang Kuang-hsien 楊光先
 yang-lien 養廉
 Yang Wen-hui 楊文會
 yang-wu 洋務
 yang-wu yün-tung 洋務運動
 Yang Yüeh-pin 楊岳斌
 Yangchow 揚州
 Yangtze 揚子
 Yao 搖
 Yao 姚
 Yao 堯
 yao-k'ou 窑口
 Yao Nai 姚鼐
 Yao Ying 姚瑩
 Yeh Ming-ch'en 葉名琛

Yeh Shih 葉適
 yeh-shih 野史
 Yeh Shih-huai 葉世槐
 Yeh Wen-lan 葉文瀾
 Yehonala 葉赫那拉
 Yen Ching-ming 閻敬銘
 Yen-chou 嚴州
 Yen Fu 嚴復
 Yen Jo-chü 嚴若燧
 Yen Ju-i 嚴如煜
 yen-lu 言路
 Yen Po-shou 顏伯壽
 Yen-t'ai (Chefoo) 烟台
 Yenan 延安
 yin 陰
 Yin Chao-yung 殷兆鏞
 yin-sheng 蔭生
 yin-su li-chih 因俗立制
 Yin-ti 音底
 yin-t'i-mi-t'e 因地密特
 Yin Yao-tsung 尹耀宗
 ying-ch'ien lei-pai 盈千累百
 Ying-chou 穎州
 Ying-ho 穎河
 Ying-ho 英和
 ying-hsin (ying hsün) 營汛
Ying-huan chih lüeh 瀛環志略
 ying-kuan 營官
 Ying-kuei 英桂
 Ying-ni 英逆
 Ying Pao-shih 應寶時
 Ying wang 英王
 ying-wu ch'u 營務處
 yu-kung-sheng 優貢生
 yu-min ts'e 勞民冊
 Yu Po-ch'uan 游百川
 yu-pu 右部
 yü 圩
 Yü Ch'ang-hui 俞昌會
 yü-chiang 馭將
 Yü-ch'ien 裕謙
 yü-chu 圩主
 Yü-chün 豫軍
 Yü-jui 裕瑞

Yü-san Huo-cho I-shan 王散霍卓依善

Yü-yüan 歐遠

Yüan-ming Yüan 圓明園

Yüan Ming-yüeh 袁名曜

yüan 元

Yüan Chia-san 袁甲三

Yüan-pao 元寶

Yüan Pao-heng 袁保恒

Yüan Yü-lin 袁玉麟

Yüeh-hua 越華

Yüeh-lu shu-yüan 嶽麓書院

Yün-ch'eng 鄆城

yün-fei 運費

yün-hui 運會

yung 勇

yung 用

Yung-an 永安

Yung-cheng 雍正

Yung Hung, *see* Yung Wing

Yung-lo 永樂

Yung-lung ho 永隆河

yung-min chih-i 用民制夷

yung-shang chih-i 用商制夷

Yung Wing (Jung Hung, Yung Hung
容閔)

yung-ying 勇營

Yunnan 雲南

Zikawei (Hsü-chia-hui) 徐家匯